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
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Political Processes and Individual Political Behavior



Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory

Kenneth Janda

This essay reviews the state of research on comparative political parties, which I define as the analysis of parties across nations. If your field is comparative politics, my focus should suit you. If you are primarily interested in American party politics, please continue reading. I intend to demonstrate that even students of American parties can benefit from a comparative perspective on their research.

This essay covers only publications since 1980 that take an explicitly comparative approach to the analysis of political parties. Although it refers to earlier writings and to some single-country studies, it does so only to make certain points. This essay does not pretend to cover all important articles before 1980 nor all examples of outstanding research on parties in individual countries. With two exceptions, every citation is in English, which distinctly limits the scope of this review. It does not consider the rich literature on comparative political parties that exists in other languages – especially in the works of French, German, and Italian scholars. Fortunately, some important works in other languages have been translated into English, and – even more fortunately for us mono-lingual Americans – many foreign parties scholars (thankfully most of the Scandinavians) write and publish in English. In fact, more than half the citations herein were written by European scholars and about half were originally published outside the United States.

Because of scholarly ethnocentricity, much of the comparative parties literature escapes the attention of American academics. Consider the findings of Giles, Mizell, and Patterson (1989), who surveyed faculty in departments with graduate programs about professional journals. About half of American political scientists were familiar with *Comparative Politics* (55%) and *Comparative Political Studies* (46%), the leading U.S. journals in the comparative field.¹ Less than 7%, however, were familiar with the *European Journal of Political Research* – a major source of articles on comparative political parties – or even with *The British Journal of Political Science* – another important source. Presumably, even fewer knew about the *International*

Political Science Review, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, and *West European Politics* – all foreign publications and all frequently cited herein. LaPonce (1980) conducted an "import-export" analysis of citations in the *American Political Science Review* [APSR] compared with the official journals of the other four oldest political science associations (Canadian, Indian, French, and British). He found that all national journals are ethnocentric, but the APSR was particularly so. This supports McKay's statement, "Rarely do American scholars read, and therefore rarely do they cite, European journals" (1988, 1052).²

With some notable exceptions to be discussed below, the parties literature in the U.S. is not strong on comparative analysis. In contrast, the European parties literature reflects the great strength of European political science in structural comparative politics, which McKay defines as "the systematic study of political institutions and processes across several and sometimes many countries" (1988, 1054). The American literature deals mainly with home-grown political parties and makes relatively few comparisons with parties in other countries. Of course, the United States is a large country, arguably the world's oldest democracy, and a true superpower – all of which support the case for studying American parties per se. I argue, however, that limiting focus to American parties limits understanding as well. It is the familiar problem of missing the forest for the trees. The best way to understand the peculiar nature of American parties (and they are peculiar) is to study them in a comparative framework – which means reading more works of foreign scholars who do such analyses.

This essay on the field adjusts for this imbalance in scholarship in the United States by reviewing recent writings on the comparative analysis of political parties, emphasizing the conceptual bases of the research and theory. Readers are directed to two excellent reviews of writings on American parties – one by Leon Epstein in 1983 and the other by William Crotty in 1991 – for coverage of the American literature.

American Parties in Comparative Perspective

What can we learn from looking at American parties in comparative perspective? Viewed by scholars from abroad, American political parties have always been puzzling phenomena. Analyzing politics in the U.S. Congress around the turn of the century, Bryce "kept to the last the feature of the House which Europeans find the strangest. It has parties, but they are headless. There is neither Government nor Opposition. There can hardly be said to be leaders..." (1912, V.I, 151). Writing just after World War II, Maurice Duverger, the most influential European writer on political parties in this half of the century, remarked that "American parties have a very archaic structure" (1963, 22; originally published in 1951). Nearly twenty years later, he still described American parties as "traditional" and largely excluded them from his analysis of modern mass (European) parties (1972, 8-9).

U.S. scholars have also noted the peculiar character of the Democratic and Republican parties compared with parties in other countries. In his comprehensive U.S. parties textbook, Eldersveld (1982) devoted a chapter to "The Special Nature of American Party Organizations." He described their structure as a "stratarchy" -- a nonhierarchical system of layers of control with diffused power and limited lines of accountability (pp. 97-99). Leon Epstein, who had compared parties in Western democracies (1980) in a major work two decades earlier, titled his own text on U.S. parties, *Political Parties in the American Mold* (1986), implying that the "mold" was unique:

The distinctiveness of American parties is old and well established. It is not mainly the product of the last few decades of widely perceived decline. As governing agencies, American parties have nearly always been less cohesive in national policy making than parties in parliamentary regimes. And as extragovernmental agencies, their strength, where it existed, was traditionally state and local rather than national. Moreover, American parties have ordinarily been without the dues-paying mass memberships characteristic of European parties (p. 4).

Similarly, Keefe (1991), in the sixth edition of his popular textbook, characterized American parties as being dispersed in power, consisting of coalitions of groups, displaying ideological heterogeneity, emphasizing inclusivity, and lacking a clear notion of membership.

In describing American parties, all these authors made explicit or implicit references to parties in other

countries. They engaged in comparative analysis to explain the nature of the Democrats and Republicans. If such comparisons help us understand parties in the United States, we can understand even them better by expanding our comparative knowledge of political parties. One needs to know how scholars have defined and measured generalized concepts of party structure, cohesion, factionalism, ideology, strategy, and so on in order to make intelligent comparisons across parties and party systems. One also needs to know the results of comparative research on what causes these party properties, how they interrelate, and what effects they have on politics and government. On entering this literature on comparative political parties, one soon learns that it has a rich theoretical tradition and has maintained that tradition in developing party theory.

Party Theory and Party Definitions

In his sweeping review of the American parties literature, Crotty also indicted writings on comparative parties for lacking "any one approach or model to supply an adequate perspective for relevant analysis" (1991, 182). But in an earlier essay (1969), Crotty recounted the history of theoretical integration in European scholarship, notably in the work of Ostrogorski, Michels, and Duverger. Ostrogorski (1964, originally 1902) attributed the rise of parties to the industrial revolution and the extension of the franchise. Michels's famous Iron Law of Oligarchy (1962, originally 1911) accounted for the tendency of leaders to maintain power at the expense of their members' interests. Duverger's rich contribution (1963) linked party ideology to party structure and explained the nature of a nation's party system by the nature of its electoral system.

Contemporary European scholarship has maintained its leadership in the development of party theory. Of course, some important party theorists have been American, but most of the stimulating theorists have a European appointment or origin (e.g., Budge, Charlot, Duverger, Laver, Mair, Panebianco, Rokkan, Sartori, Schofield, and Strom). There are reasons for this European influence in party theory. Some might cite the juxtaposition of party systems in nearby countries. To interpret politics across common borders (the argument goes), scholars are encouraged to conceptualize more broadly about party politics, which spurs the development of party theory.

Unfortunately, an explanation of common boundaries does not travel well to the United States. Only a few party scholars -- e.g., Epstein (1964) and Schwartz (1991a and 1991b) -- have compared American with Canadian parties, much less with Mexican parties.

A more plausible explanation lies in the greater number and variety of parties within European countries compared with the United States. Because the Democrats and Republicans have duopolized U.S. politics for more than a century, American scholars have focused on the powerful, studying the only two parties with major impact on national politics. When third parties cast darker shadows on the two-party landscape, scholars have been encouraged to think more generally about parties and have devised typologies to accommodate the interlopers (Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984). Otherwise, relatively few U.S. political scientists have been challenged by our party system to build party theory. Crotty's 50-page review of the American literature devoted only four pages to "The Search for Theory" and mostly dealt with the single book by Downs (1957) and various publications by Schlesinger -- which have been recently collected in a single volume (1991).

The very nature of the two major U.S. parties has also constrained the development of party theory due to the problem of defining the boundaries of a party to serve as a unit of analysis. In Europe, there is a better-developed sense of formal party membership, sometimes reflected in membership fees, that helps define who belongs to a party. Although most states record party registration for purposes of conducting primary elections, the concept of party members clearly has no national applicability, and the term, "dues-paying member," sounds foreign to our ears. American scholars have attempted to deal with this boundary problem by distinguishing among the "party in the organization" and "party in the government" as opposed to "party in the electorate." But this piecemeal attempt to resolve the problem has not proven to be theoretically fruitful (Schlesinger 1991, 3).

As Pomper noted, "American parties are a jumble of these three conventional forms, which cannot readily be separated" (1992, 146). Pomper's solution was to conceptualize parties in terms of their *goals* (collective or coalitional), *mode of operation* (instrumental or expressive), and *breadth of focus* (elite or mass). These three dimensions produced an eight-fold classification of party concepts. Accordingly, the U.S. Democrats and Republicans are predominantly coalitional and instrumental, with a mass focus -- which means they fit Pomper's concept of party as an "office-seeking rational team." Although his conceptualization produced seven other types of parties, the range of concepts is still not broad enough to encompass some parties in cross-national analysis. The issue hinges on choosing a narrow or a broad definition of a political party.

A Narrow Definition of "Party"

Schlesinger noted that some scholars "want to define party to include all the numerous political organizations that call themselves by the name" (1991, 6). He continued, "However useful a theory of party based on such a broad definition would be, the theory I propose to elaborate is less ambitious" and applies only to "parties that contest in free elections, and primarily those parties that are able to win elections over time" (p. 6). Accordingly, Schlesinger adopted the well-known definition by Downs: a party is "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (1957, 25). Many scholars employ a comparably narrow definition, perhaps excluding entities that they would commonly regard as a party in other countries.

This contradiction was apparent in Neumann's *Modern Political Parties* (1956), one of the first collections of studies in comparative politics. In his concluding essay, Neumann wrote, "Only the coexistence of at least one other competitive group makes a political party real," and said, "A one-party system is a contradiction in terms" (p. 395).³ Nevertheless, Neumann's reader included an article on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite the way he defined a party, even Neumann found it awkward not to regard communist parties as political parties (see also Epstein 1975, 233). To do otherwise would exclude a huge body of literature important to comparative politics (Fischer-Galati 1979; Szajkowski 1986; Timmerman 1987; Gilberg 1989; Narkiewicz 1990). Moreover, Randall (1984, 4) contended that this "Eurocentric" definition would exclude non-communist one-party systems in Third World countries, and, as Pempel pointed out in his book on one-party dominant regimes, "The vast majority of the nation-states in the world could be characterized as one-party states" (1990, 1).

Focusing on parties' functions in contesting elections tends to exclude the class of "anti-system" parties, which Sartori defined as parties that undermine the legitimacy of the regime (1976, 132-133). For example, communist parties in multiparty systems often participated only tactically in elections (Gilberg 1989; Narkiewicz 1990). A definition based in electoral competition would also exclude militant religious, ethnic, and regional parties that operate on the fringes of the political system. For instance, McDonald and Ruhl noted that only "a few" of the more than 125 active parties in Latin America play the roles "attributed to them in the general theoretical literature -- literature that is based on Western European and Anglo-American systems in which military obedience and legislative power are taken for granted" (1989, 3).

A Broad Definition

A truly general theory of political parties cannot be built on a narrow definition of party that precludes applications to one-party systems and anti-system parties. Duverger's classic *Political Parties* fruitfully discussed single party systems as well as multiparty systems, and it compared paramilitary parties with competitive parties. His scope of application was so general that he did not base his study on a definition of party. In a later book, Duverger defined parties as (1) having "their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise," and (2) drawing "their support from a broad base" in contrast to pressure groups, which "represent a limited number with a particular or private interest" (1972, 1-2). The first part of his definition implied that parties can exist without contesting elections. The second part attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to distinguish parties from pressure groups -- which is the critical issue in constructing a broad definition of a political party.

Sartori analyzed at length the conceptual issues in defining a party (1976, 60-64). He aimed for a "minimal definition" that treated as variables all properties that were not *required* of a party. Sartori defined a party as "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office" (p. 63). By indicating that elections need not be free, Sartori broadened the definition to include parties in party-state systems ruled by a single party. However, Sartori's definition did not admit for study those organizations that sought or obtained power outside the electoral process.

Still more broadly, a party can be defined as an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions (Janda 1980b, 5). All organizations have multiple goals. To qualify as a party, an organization must have as *one* of its goals that of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. ("Government" here means in the U.S. sense of public office, not the British sense of the cabinet.)⁴ Moreover, these individuals must be *avowed* representatives of the party, which means in practical terms that they must be openly identified with the party name or label. If an interest groups openly runs its own candidates, it becomes a party. In Epstein's words, "The recognizable label (which may or may not be on the ballot) is the crucial defining element" (1966, 104). Finally, the term "placing" should be interpreted broadly to mean through the electoral process (when a party competes with one or more others in pursuing its goal) or by a direct administrative action (when a ruling party permits no electoral competition) or by forceful imposition (when a party seeks to subvert the system and

thereby capture the government). Thus, parties can pursue, respectively, *competitive*, *restrictive*, or *subversive* strategies to achieve their goal.

As opposed to Sartori's definition, this broader one accommodates the Bolshevik seizure of power in the 1917 revolution (Barghoorn 1956), the Cuban Popular Socialist Party's capitalization on Castro's rise to power (Griffiths 1988), the Iraqi Ba'ath Party's takeover following the 1968 coup (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1988), and the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party's practices in restricting electoral competition (Philip 1988). Obviously, these subversive and restrictive parties are different from competitive parties and require some different theory (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, 29-33). Nevertheless, Duverger (1963) already demonstrated that revolutionary and authoritarian parties could be analyzed productively along with competitive parties, and other research productively compared parties in all regions of the world (Janda and Gillies 1983). It remains to be seen how much overlap there is in propositions covering different types of parties.

For comparative political parties, the basic issue in defining a party is whether parties are narrowly or broadly defined. The definition determines whether general theory is limited to explaining only the behavior of purely competitive parties in democratic systems or whether it aims at a broader universe, including parties in single-party systems and anti-system or subversive parties. Many American party scholars would, like Schlesinger, be satisfied with a narrow definition of party that supported a "general" theory that only applied to competitive parties. Even many European scholars would accept a definition that restricted study to party systems in Western democracies (von Beyme 1983, 2), but those studying the Third World would need a broader definition that supported theory about parties operating in their political systems. Even Epstein, who restricts his own study to competitive parties in western democracies admits that "there is no harm in maintaining the breadth of definition" (1975, 233).⁵

Concepts for Analyzing Political Parties

This review of literature on comparative political parties employs a broad definition of party. To skirt the vast comparative politics literature that is more interested in the nation as a unit of analysis, it slights writings on party *systems* in preference for those on individual parties. To structure my discussion, I rely on a conceptual framework employed in my cross-national survey of political parties (Janda 1980b). I contend that most of the important aspects of political parties, as opposed to party systems, can be embraced by ten broad

concepts: institutionalization, issue orientation, social support, organizational complexity, centralization of power, autonomy, coherence, involvement, strategy and tactics, and governmental status. The literature on comparative political parties can be usefully reviewed under each of these conceptual headings.

Institutionalization

Institutionalization is the process by which parties become established and acquire value and stability (Huntington 1965, 394). As Welfling (1973, 13) pointed out, institutionalization is not only a process but a property or state. As a property, party institutionalization can be defined as the extent to which a party is reified in the public mind so that it exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders while regularly engaging in valued patterns of behavior (Janda 1980b, 19). In the United States, the two major parties are virtually identical in their state of institutionalization, but across the world, party institutionalization is highly variable. For example, Scott (writing in the mid-1960s) noted that in Latin America "little real political party machinery exists at the local level, and what does exist is seldom related directly to a national party. Instead, a few local notables build on their own personalistic organizations for each election, allying themselves with national leaders of so-called national parties for reasons of power or material advantage" (1966, 337). Pye saw parties in Southeast Asia in much the same light (1966), but Welfling's careful analysis found that even African parties varied in institutionalization (1973). Dix's recent research on Latin American parties also found that parties and party systems "were somewhat more institutionalized as the 1990s began than they were during Latin America's previous democratic heyday around 1960" (1992, 505).

Party institutionalization has been measured in various ways. Sometimes party age or counts of splits and mergers are used as indicators (Lane and Ersson 1991, 113; Dix 1992). It has also been measured on a scale built from measures of age, electoral stability, legislative stability, and leadership change.⁶ More often, the concept has been tapped with simpler measures of minimum election strength and minimum durability. Rose and Mackie, for example, said, "a party is judged to have become institutionalized if it fights more than three national elections. A group that fails to do this is not an established political party, but an ephemeral party" (1988, 536). Applying their criterion to 19 democratic countries from electoral origins through 1983, they uncovered 369 parties that contested at least one national election and won at least 1% of the vote, but barely more than half of these became institutionalized.

Clearly, the numerous new parties in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union face a challenge of institutionalization. In the 1989 Polish elections, Solidarity swept nearly all the offices it contested, but Jasiewicz (1992) attributed its success to anti-government voting rather than to pro-Solidarity sentiment -- a view supported by the regression analysis of election results by Heyns and Bialecki (1991). After the October 1991 elections to the Polish parliament, Jasiewicz reported that some 30 parties or groups were elected to the 460-seat chamber and the strongest party had only 62 seats. Speaking of Poland's new political situation, he said, "With the exception of the renamed communists and a few veteran opposition groups..., the parties are brand new. They have no tradition, no apparatus, no organizational history, no established rules of conduct" (1992, 66).

The situation was comparable in the former Soviet Union, which, according to Kelley (1992), demonstrated "behavioral" pluralism in 1991 with more than 60,000 political organizations. However, Kelely said it lacked "institutionalized" pluralism and certainly was not a multiparty system,

at least inasmuch as that description commonly implies that the party structures channel political conflict, accurately reflect the views of and speak for particular constituencies, and take part in the functioning of government or opposition. In many ways, the evolution of the party and group structures has not reached that level of maturity" (1992, 31).

McFaul held that party development in Russia was hampered by citizens' obvious reasons to distrust and disdain political parties and by the new parties' reluctance in discarding old attitudes about the purposes and functions of political organizations. "Finally," McFaul said, "there are simply too many parties; democracy has been hindered by too much democracy" (1992, 32).⁷

Treating institutionalization as a dependent variable, Rose and Mackie identified four factors that increased the chances of a nascent party becoming institutionalized: (1) its origin at the founding of competitive elections, (2) a proportional representation system of elections, (3) being based on an organized social group, and (4) its initial success in winning votes. Three of these factors pertain to a party's "conditions of origin," which Duverger (1963) identified as a major predictor of party properties. Other scholars have owed party institutionalization to party origin. Panebianco (1988, 50-52) identified three important factors: (1) whether the party was organized by a "center" that "penetrated" the country or arose from local

organizations that congealed into a national organization (i.e., territorial *penetration* or *diffusion*);⁸ (2) whether the party was sponsored by an existing institution or arose on its own (i.e., *externally* or *internally* legitimated); (3) whether or not its founder stamped the organization with his *charisma*. Panebianco theorized that territorial penetration, internal legitimation, and the absence of charisma all predict to strong party institutionalization.

Institutionalization has a more interesting role in party theory as an independent variable. This is its prime function for Panebianco, who contended that "parties can be distinguished primarily according to the *degree of institutionalization* they attain" (1988, 55). For Panebianco, institutionalization not only predicts organization of internal groups, but it also is a major inhibitor of party transformation or change (p. 265). That is, highly institutionalized parties are more resistant to change. Moving from individual parties to the party system, Welfling theorized that the overall level of party institutionalization inhibited social conflict and promoted stability (1973, 54-58), and Dix (1992) viewed party system institutionalization as contributing to democracy in Latin America.

Issue Orientation

Comparative research on political parties pays great attention to parties' positions on issues with cross-national significance. Many such issues have been subsumed under the concept of ideology, but concern has also been given to issues that do not fit common ideological concepts. As Duverger demonstrated forty years ago, ideology has a central role in party theory, primarily as an *independent* variable that affects other party characteristics. He spoke primarily about ideological types -- communist, socialist, center, conservative, and fascist -- but implicitly viewed them as positions along a left-right scale.

The Left-Right Dimension

The theoretical centrality of ideology in party theory is demonstrated by the outpouring of empirical research on comparative party ideologies -- most of which has been done by European scholars (Mavrogordatos 1987, 335). Since Duverger, scholars have advanced beyond the simple typologies of parties as communist, socialist, and so on, while accepting the principle of a single left-right dimension. Laver and Schofield (1990, 51-52) identified several methods used to order parties along a left-right continuum, including old-fashioned reading of primary and secondary sources (Taylor and Laver 1973; de Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976), systematic surveys of experts (Castles and Mair 1984),

content analysis of party platforms (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987), and dimensional analysis of mass survey data (Huber 1989).⁹ Laver and Schofield conveniently summarize much of this research for 18 countries in an appendix (pp. 245-266).

The survey by Castles and Mair (1984) deserves discussion. They asked over 100 western political scientists to classify parties in 17 countries on an 11-point scale, ranging from Ultra-Left (0) to Ultra-Right (10). A total of 119 parties were rated, each by at least three country experts. Then Castles and Mair averaged their ratings to assign a left-right scale position to every party. They noted that "such a procedure necessarily does some damage to a multifaceted reality in which two or more political dimensions coexist and cross-cut each other" (p. 75). Nevertheless, they concluded that the parties' ideologies were judged by "general standards rather than purely national considerations" (p. 83), supporting the parties' placements on a single continuum.

Other cross-national research on party ideologies has uncovered at least two dimensions underlying parties' issue positions. One study used library research to code 150 parties in 53 countries on 13 different issues commonly identified with the left-right continuum, and then analyzed their intercorrelations to disclose the latent factors. Eleven of the issues came out on two distinct factors (Janda 1980b, 147-149). Seven mostly economic variables correlated with what was called a "Marxist" scale, and four "civil rights and liberties" variables correlated with a "liberalism" scale.

A "two-factor" interpretation of parties' issue positions was also supported in the most ambitious effort at analyzing party ideology. Budge, Robertson, and Hearl (1987) reported the results of a project sponsored by the European Consortium for Political Research to perform a content analysis of the election manifestos of all significant parties in 19 countries from 1945 to 1983. Rather than judging the political substance of the parties' statements, the group of country experts engaged in the more objective but controversial procedure of counting the number of sentences in the platform according to 54 categories in seven broad policy domains. "For this implies that the most important aspect of the documents is the degree of emphasis placed on certain broad policy areas, rather than each party's support for, or opposition to, a specific policy within these areas" (p. 24). Using factor analysis, this method of content analysis produced two major factors: "a central and clearly Left-Right cleavage in most of the countries under consideration -- 15 out of 20" (p. 392) and a second dimension that "often seems to reflect Left-Right contrasts in a modified form" (p. 395). So despite the possibility of great complexity in parties' issue positions across nations, existing research suggests that the variation can be accounted for with only

two factors, both of which have some "left-right" elements. (See Silverman (1985) for a probing conceptual analysis of two dimensions in the left-right typology.)

In principle, parties can change their ideology, and Downs (1957) theorized that they do change in order to win votes. However, research on the spatial distribution of voters in European party systems disclosed that parties avoid the center of the left-right dimension, even though that area is dense with voters (Listhaug, Macdonald, and Rabinowitz 1990).¹⁰ Despite instances of abrupt changes in party ideology for electoral gains -- the German SPD's transformation in 1959 is the stellar example (see Panebianco 1988, 253-257) -- the more common argument has been that parties change issue positions incrementally over time, becoming less ideological and more "catch-all" in nature (Kirchheimer 1966). Thomas' longitudinal study of 54 parties in 12 Western nations over nearly a century showed "a dramatic narrowing in the scope of domestic political conflict" over issue positions (1975, 46; Thomas 1980). Thomas also uncovered subtle variations of the "end of ideology" and the "convergence" hypotheses, some of which were not supported.

Most recently, scholars have focused on whether the conflict between "materialist" and "post-materialist" values has absorbed the classic left-right conflict in party cleavages, as Inglehart claimed (1977, 242; 1990, 296-298). Knutsen (1988; 1989) tested this "new politics" viewpoint with data on party preferences in ten countries and found that both cleavages existed, with neither dominating. In a related vein, Kitschelt (1990) explored the "new structural differentiation and polarity" introduced in Europe by Left-libertarian parties (p. 201).

Issue-Based Parties

While most major parties can be placed along a single left-right continuum, and still more can be comfortably accommodated with the introduction of a second dimension, some parties resist classification because of their commitment to a single issue or type of issue. Lane and Ersson (1991, 273) distinguish between *nonstructural* issues, which are based on notions of national policies, and *structural* issues, which are based in social groups and give rise to ethnic, religious, regional, and certain class-based parties (pp. 103-111). (Parties based on structural issues are treated below under social support.)

Considerable research has been done recently to identify parties that promote nonstructural issues, especially "new" issues promoted by new parties when existing parties fail to take up the issue (Lawson and Merkl 1988; Dalton and Kuechler 1990). The prime example is protection of the environment advocated by

European "Green" parties (Müller-Rommel 1985; Schoonmaker 1988). In their study of 233 new parties formed in western countries from 1960 to 1980, Harmel and Robertson (1985) found that only 10% qualified as "new issue" parties "(i.e., those characterized as ecology parties, anti-nuclear or peace parties, anti-EEC parties, anti-NATO parties, or feminist parties)" -- despite the attention academics paid to them (p. 508). Nearly half of the new parties offered alternatives to "old" issues on the left-right dimension. They included "tax protest" parties and other parties on the new right (Lane and Ersson (1991, 108-111). Whether the purer "new politics" parties fit on the Left-Right dimension has been a subject of study (Müller-Rommel 1990). Kitschelt and Hellemans (1990) set forth the issues, and in a limited study of Belgian parties, concluded that economic leftism exists in contemporary politics but it does not exactly match the traditional left-right dimension.

Most research on issue orientation is concerned with measurement. When ideology and issues are involved in theoretical studies, they are mainly treated as independent variables. Scholars are less concerned with the causes of issue orientation than with its consequences for government process (coalition formation) and policy outcomes (e.g., economic and social programs). We review this literature later, for it involves other concepts that we need to discuss first.

Social Support

Parties are formed not only to promote policy issues in a Burkean fashion but also to secure social interests (Charlot 1989).¹¹ Lipset and Rokkan (1967) produced the most powerful comparative statement of parties as political expressions of social cleavages. They isolated four major cleavages -- center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and owner-worker -- that gave rise to European parties with different social bases, e.g., regional, religious, occupational, and so on. Dalton (1988, 128-149) provided a concise and updated explanation of these cleavages. Although Dix (1989) argued that the Lipset-Rokkan historical cleavages did not apply to Latin American parties, there is evidence that the Lipset-Rokkan social bases do apply across cultures. More specifically, the six social dimensions -- economic status, religion, ethnicity (including language and race), region, urbanization, and education -- were used productively to analyze party support across a broad range of nations (Janda 1980b, 41).

The operating assumption of an early collection of voting studies was that "social differences structure party loyalties" (Rose 1974, 16). Smith (1989) described the difficulty in keeping straight the distinction between parties and party systems when discussing the subject of

social cleavages, which "relates to the social make-up of support for individual parties -- not to the 'system,' not that is if we follow a definition based on interaction" (p. 351). For now, we restrict attention to parties, not to parties as they interact within a political system (Laver 1989). The major dimensions of party systems are discussed later.

Considerable research involving parties' social support was stimulated by the seminal study of Rose and Urwin (1975). They assessed the "social cohesion" of 76 parties in 17 Western nations by the degree to which their supporters come from a given region, religion, ethnic group, urban-rural area, or social class. Rose and Urwin found that parties were most cohesive on religion and class, in that order. Analyzing votes cast within regions for 93 parties in 16 Western nations over three elections, Ersson, Janda, and Lane (1985) found that region alone explained most of the variance in party support but also found strong influence of religion and class within regions.¹²

Parties that have broad social bases are assumed to aggregate diverse interests rather articulate specific ones. Presumably, parties differ from interest groups by aggregating rather than articulating interests (Almond and Powell 1966), but this distinction is not ironclad. Jankowski (1988) argued that broad interest groups do better at aggregation than political parties, and some parties rival interest groups in articulation. The narrower the social basis of a party's support, the more likely they are to articulate interests. Most studies of the social bases of party support have simply assumed that structural parties (those with strong bases) articulate structural issues Mair (1989a, 170-171). Some research has confirmed this assumption. The greater the concentration of party supporters from a single region, the stronger the party's opposition to national integration; and the greater the concentration of supporters from a given religion, the stronger the party's position on secularization of society -- depending on the religion (Janda 1989).

In their 1967 book, Lipset and Rokkan had also contended that the origins of cleavage resulted in a "freezing" of the European party system such that parties' support in the 1960s reflected their support 40 years earlier. In finding that European parties' electoral strength changed little from 1945 to 1969, Rose and Urwin (1970) supported the Lipset-Rokkan thesis of a frozen party system. For a time, this interpretation of stability in European party politics was accepted, but no longer. Mair (1983) recounted the many studies that demonstrated electoral volatility that occurred since 1970 (see also Maguire 1983; Pedersen 1983). In some countries, electoral volatility resulted in the systematic loss of support for certain parties, particularly for communist parties (Waller and Fennema 1988) and

socialist parties (Piven 1992). Challenging Lipset and Rokkan, Shamir's time series analysis (1984) showed that the party systems were never really frozen in the first place, and Lybeck (1985) contended that the Lipset-Rokkan hypothesis was inherently untestable anyway. However, Mair (1989b) contended that when Lipset and Rokkan discussed cleavages, they were not necessarily referring to specific political parties but to political opponents (e.g., left and right) more generally, which could save their hypothesis. This argument was developed in Bartolini and Mair (1990, 63-65), who analyzed electoral volatility in 303 elections in 13 Western European countries from 1885 to 1985 and found a "fundamental bias toward stability" that "became more pronounced over time" (pp. 287-288).

Scholars still use the Lipset-Rokkan framework for studying the declining importance of structural cleavages for party support, which some view as party dealignment (Knutson 1988 and 1989). In their edited collection of studies, Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) reported the "common theme" of "shifts in the long-term bases of partisan support -- party identification and social cleavages" (p. 451). In *When Parties Fail*, Lawson and Merkl (1988) viewed these shifts as evidence of major party decline: "All over the world, single-issue movements are forming, special interest groups are assuming party-like status, and minor parties are winning startling overnight victories as hitherto dominant parties lose the confidence of their electorates" (p. 3). Reiter (1989) reviewed the literature that explained "party decline" according to various independent variables: "affluence, the growth of the state, the catch-all party, neo-corporatism, the mass media, new political issues and cleavages, problems with state performance, or post-industrialism" (p. 329). But neither Reiter nor Selle and Svåsand (1991) found systematic evidence of party decline in cross-national, longitudinal data on party support. Wolinetz (1988) said that evidence of party change was more likely to be found in organizational change as parties adapted to a changing environment.

Organizational Complexity and Power

There is very little contact between the vast organizational theory literature and the literature on political parties (Janda 1983).¹³ For example, a computer search of the *Sociological Abstracts* file available in the DIALOG[™] online information services found 905 abstracts that mentioned "political party" or "parties" in articles and conference papers from 1980 to 1991, but only three also mentioned "organizational theory" or some variant. Moreover, only two (Deschouwer 1986; Jankowski 1988) pertained specifically to political parties. Because few comparative party scholars draw on the

well-developed organizational theory literature, the conceptualization of party structure has an ad hoc quality, with little attention paid to creating reliable measures of party organization (Janda 1983). In this case, the American literature on party organization has an earlier history (see Crotty 1968) and is better developed.¹⁴ Creative measurement of party organization is evidenced in the collaborative work by Gibson et al. (1983) and Cotter et al. (1984) on comparative analyses of state and county party organizations, and in later work by Gibson et al. (1989). This research found a surprising amount of organizational strength among state and local parties in 1980 and, if anything, increased levels of strength when the parties were studied again in 1984. Unfortunately, these studies were rooted in the American context and do not help much in comparative cross-national analyses.

Wellhofer (1979) is one of the few scholars who devised measures of a broad organizational concept for application to parties across nations. Wellhofer proposed the concept of "organizational encapsulation," defined as "the elaboration of party sub-units to envelop as many of the day-to-day life activities of the membership as possible" (p. 206).¹⁵ Encapsulation was measured with three objective indicators of party membership and local organizations for socialist labor parties in Argentina, Britain, Norway, and Sweden. He used time series analysis in a longitudinal study to demonstrate how these organizational inputs were linked to vote outputs (see also Wellhofer 1981). Unfortunately, Wellhofer dealt primarily with that one organizational concept. On the other hand, Panebianco (1988), conceptualized party organization more richly -- discussing its dominant coalition, institutionalization, and organizational complexity -- but was less clear on how to measure these concepts objectively.

Most of the empirical comparative research on party organization again draws inspiration from Duverger. He advanced propositions using such concepts as direct/indirect structure, basic elements, organizational articulation, and centralization of power. Lane and Ersson thoughtfully modified and applied these concepts in their study of European parties (1991, 123-128). Janda (1980b) interpreted Duverger through the organizational theory literature to differentiate two major dimensions of organizational structure: degree of organization and centralization of power. Degree of organization, which is similar to Duverger's articulation, referred to the complexity of structural differentiation. Centralization of power, following Duverger, referred to the location and distribution of authority. When measured by two highly reliable scales over more than 100 parties, these two dimensions were empirically unrelated.¹⁶ Despite these findings, the distinction between organizational complexity and centralization of

power have not been widely recognized, which is why they are treated together in this section.

With few exceptions, the comparative parties literature has paid relatively little attention to conceptualizing party organization and even less to measurement issues. This is particularly true for the concepts of complexity and power. For example, Sartori (1976) simply talked of an undifferentiated "organization" dimension on which parties could be classified as "organized," "organizationless," or "half and half" (pp. 76 and 81). Lawson (1976) created a set of six types of organization based on the locus of power and involvement of active members (p. 78). Indeed, von Beyme despaired over the complicated network of organizational influences in European parties and said, "A typology of similar cases is the utmost that seems possible" (1983, 367).

Concepts of organizational structure are also not prominent in empirical party theory, with Duverger again an exception. He used organizational variables as both independent and dependent variables. For Duverger, centralization of power was a cause of party cohesion (discussed below) and was caused by leftist ideology. He also explained party organization by the conditions of origin (e.g., whether it began inside or outside the parliament; early or late in the nation's political development). Several scholars (Hodgkin 1961; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966) have used conditions of origin to explain party structure in the Third World and European parties, while Koelble (1989) cited both ideology and conditions of origin in explaining the West German Green Party's decentralized structure. Few scholars have used centralization as an independent variable in comparative research. An exception is Dalton (1985), who combined a European voter survey with a simple measure of party centralization to show that the more centralized the party, the more accurately voters perceived its cues.

Complexity of party organization and centralization of power are also caused by environmental factors. In their study of 95 parties in 28 democratic and quasi-democratic nations, Harmel and Janda (1982) found that parties in the same country tended to be similarly organized. For complexity of organization, 44% of the variance was explained with six environmental variables (modernity, population size, electoral system, restrictions on suffrage, recency of democratic experience, and lack of party competition). For centralization of power, 35% of the variance was explained with six variables (country size, federalism, and aspects of legislative-executive structure).

As noted earlier, Eldersveld, Epstein, Keefe, and others have characterized both major U.S. parties as extremely decentralized. A quantitative cross-national analysis of more than 100 parties documented their claim:

American parties are clearly less centralized than the European norm, and they are certainly among the most decentralized parties in the world. None of the Western European parties in the sample had a lower score on the centralization of power than did U.S. parties. Moreover, when the entire sample of the world's parties is considered, the American parties outrank only the Blancos and Colorados of Uruguay — which some scholars would contend are not parties but coalitions, or groupings of parties — and the Social Action Party of Chad, which terminated in 1962 . . . (Janda 1980a, 355).

However, the same study also showed that American parties did not lack in complexity of organization: "In point of fact, American political parties do tend to have as much if not more in the way of formal structure than most other parties in the world . . ." (p. 355). Since that cross-national comparison was made, most observers would contend that American national party organizations have become more professional and organizationally active, and somewhat more centralized (Herrnson 1990), but the Democrats and Republicans are still highly decentralized by world standards.

In analyzing the nature of American parties, Keefe held that "parties are less what they make of themselves than what their environment makes of them" (1991, 1). Clearly, the U.S. constitutional framework (especially the presidential system and federalism) has contributed to the decentralized nature of its parties compared with parties elsewhere (Janda 1992). But both the Democrats and Republicans have changed over time, as they adapted to a changing environment. Future scholars will be aided in studying organizational change with the publication of a major data handbook on indicators of party change from 1960 to 1990, edited by Katz and Mair (1992). The result of a coordinated cross-national research project involving scholars in 12 Western countries, this handbook provides time-series data on party membership, finance, staff size, and so on, and detailed information on party rules changes and on the relationship of political parties to other social organizations over time.

Autonomy

Autonomy can be defined as a party's structural independence from other institutions and organizations, whether in or out of the country (Janda 1980b, 91).¹⁷ This concept figures prominently in writings of Sartori (1976, 45-46) and Panebianco (1988, 55-58), who said a party is autonomous to the extent that it is not dependent on resources controlled by other organizations, and it fits with Lagroye's comment (1989, 364-365) that parties are

embedded in a "system of organizations," all of which are subject to changes affecting their parts of the system. Parties can sacrifice autonomy to other sectors of society by relying on them for funds, members, or leaders. Structural infringement on party autonomy can also come from relations with domestic parties or foreign organizations. Some research showed that all five sources of infringement are essentially unrelated (Janda 1980b, 152). Apparently autonomy, like virtue, can be compromised in a variety of ways.

Source of Funds

In an early article, Heidenheimer (1963) described the difficulty in obtaining data for comparative research on party finance. In his study of parties in eight countries, only the German SPD covered its normal expenses from party dues (p. 792-793). This fits with other findings that only about 25% of the world's parties in the 1950s and 1960s relied on their own sources (mainly party dues) for most funding (Janda 1980b, 92). Since Heidenheimer, there has been relatively little cross-national research on party finance published in journals, especially in English.¹⁸ However, some valuable studies have appeared in edited volumes on elections and campaign funding (particularly Alexander 1989a; Levush 1991). This research has focused on the trend toward public financing in western nations (Paltiel 1980 and 1981). Alexander reported that 18 of 21 nations introduced public funding after 1960 (1989b, 14), resulting in a decline in the importance of party dues. The effects of public funding on parties are complex. Strom (1990, 579-581) theorized that public finance increased the autonomy of party leaders vis-a-vis party activists, and Schlesinger (1991, 25) thought that public finance made parties more bureaucratic. Nassmacher's study (1989) of public subsidies to parties in Austria, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany tended to support both contentions, and Mendilow's research on party politics in Israel and elsewhere concluded that public funding "is capable of generating fundamental changes such as may lead to the restructuring of the entire party system" (1992, 113). One major result was an increased centralization of power "by the subordination of branches to the central headquarters and top leadership" (p. 112). Public funding was also addictive, and — at least in Israel — tended to increase the ideological stance of new parties.

Source of Members

Duverger distinguished between "direct" and "indirect" membership, depending on whether membership is a voluntary act of affiliation or a consequence of membership in another social organization, like a labor union (1963, 6). This is a

meaningful distinction, for parties (like British Labour) with indirect membership are less autonomous than those with only individual members. Nevertheless, fewer than 10% of the world's parties in 1960 had any indirect members, while about 20% had no formal membership requirements (Janda 1980b, 93). Because party membership data are unreliable and often not applicable, Lawson advised paying more attention to the number of votes actually received by a party than the number of members it claimed (1976, 93). Alternatively, one can study party identification or "attachment" as a form of party affiliation (Richardson 1991). In the case of Europe, this research is facilitated by two decades of Eurobarometer surveys, which permit longitudinal, comparative research, albeit with some problems (Katz 1985). In several countries from 1974 to 1988, Schmitt (1989) found a decline in people who felt "close to" a party, but the pattern tended to be mixed elsewhere, and Germany even showed a slight increase of attachment. Formal party membership is discussed below under the concept of involvement.

Source of Leaders

Panbianco uses the term, "dominant coalition," for the group of leaders who control the principal power resources of a party organization (1988, 38). In slightly more than 25% of the parties in 1960, most leaders came from one sector of society, indicating a lack of autonomy (Janda 1980b, 94). Lawson (1976) analyzed diversity in party leadership in three countries, but this topic has not been studied heavily through comparative research. Everyone seems to agree on the importance of leadership, particularly in party change (Wilson 1980, 542-544), but it is notoriously difficult to study rigorously.

Relations with Domestic Parties

Duverger identified three types of cooperative interparty "alliances": electoral, parliamentary, and governmental (1963, 330-351). Electoral alliances infringe the least on autonomy, and governmental alliances the most. "Satellite" parties of ruling parties in Eastern Europe demonstrated the most severe loss of autonomy (Fischer-Galati 1979), but this subject drew little attention from party scholars.¹⁹ Although there are other dimensions to research on party alliances (Gilberg 1989; Kolinsky 1987), the emphasis has been on governing coalitions in parliamentary democracies (Pridham 1986; Laver and Schofield 1990). The coalition literature, which relies heavily on rational choice theory, is reviewed below under party strategy. The concern here is whether coalition possibilities limited party autonomy, a concern that surfaced in the concept of

a "relevant" party. Sartori said that a party is relevant if it "affects the tactics of party competition" by having "coalition potential" or having "blackmail potential" -- possessed by an antisystem party or one that can veto political arrangements (1976, 123; see also Herzog 1987). Budge and Keman theorized about the effects of antisystem parties on party behavior (1990, 44), while Hofferbert and Klingemann (1990) contended that the FDP in Germany acts as a swing party due to its blackmail potential.

Relations with Foreign Organizations

Parties can have relationships (mostly but not exclusively) with international party organizations or foreign governments that can impinge on their autonomy. This was clear in the case of communist parties but it also applied to Socialists (Pelinka 1983, 108-124), Christian Democrats (Irving 1979), and Liberals (Hrbek 1988) -- all of whom maintained international organizations and demonstrated varying degrees of solidarity in international bodies (Pridham and Pridham 1981). Goldman (1983) has been the foremost scholar of such "transnational" parties, and the topic is certain to grow in importance with the growth of the European community. For example, Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991) analyzed the competition for votes among parties competing in direct elections to the European parliament in 1989.

Coherence

The concept of coherence was introduced into comparative politics by Huntington (1965, 403-405) and developed by Anderson (1968, 396-397) for the study of state and local parties. In comparative analysis, coherence has been defined as "the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party members" (Janda 1980b, 118). "Behavior" is emphasized because few cross-national studies have surveyed the attitudes of party activists or members -- as opposed to voters. One exception was the European Political Parties Middle-Level Elites Project, which collected questionnaires from activists attending more than 65 national party conferences in nearly all the European community countries (Niedermayer 1986). Most research from this project was published in German, with a typical study focusing on the representation of social groups within the party elites (Niedermayer and Schmitt 1983). This mammoth survey of middle-level party elites was criticized by Pierre (1986) for being done in isolation from other aspects of party organization.²⁰ In any event, there are few such studies (but see Dalton 1985) because massive research is required to compare attitudinal

congruence among party members or activists. It is much easier to study coherence in party behavior, which is more open to inspection.

Cohesion

Party cohesion, defined as the extent to which parties vote together in legislative bodies, is readily amenable to study, and legislative voting has generated a huge literature in the United States. Despite the publication of such voting data in foreign countries, research on party cohesion is less common in cross-national analysis, although there are many studies in individual countries (Collie 1985). There has also been surprisingly little research on the effect of organizational attributes on party cohesion -- despite Duverger's early hypotheses. He said that "domination over the parliamentary representatives by the party" was due to the "general structure of the party and its general orientation" (1963, 202). His argument can be reformulated into three hypotheses: the more centralized the party, the higher the cohesion; the greater the leftism, the higher the cohesion; and the more ideologically extreme, the higher the cohesion.

Ozbudun (1970) conducted the most concerted effort at the comparative study of party cohesion. He and other scholars (Turner and Schneier 1970; Loewenberg and Patterson 1979) concentrated on six environmental factors in explaining party cohesion: presidential government, federalism, multiple parties, ideological polarization, single-member districts, and legislative effectiveness. Harmel and Janda (1982) found that 32% of the variance in legislative cohesion could be explained with only two variables (legislative-executive structure and legislative effectiveness). Their analysis supported Epstein's contention that separation of powers was the key variable in explaining the low cohesion of American parties compared with those elsewhere (1980, 315-350).

Factionalism

There is another aspect to coherence in party behavior, factionalism. In a pioneering article, Zariski (1960) defined a faction as "any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of the common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively -- as a distinct bloc within the party -- to achieve their goals" (p. 33).²¹ Sartori (1976, 76-79) proposed a typology of factions based on their interest (power or spoils) and their principles (ideologies or ideas). Another approach distinguished between factionalism based on ideology, issues, leadership, and strategy (Janda 1980b). Over 100 parties were scored on

each type of factionalism on a seven-point scale. The ideological basis was somewhat more common than the others, but all types of factionalism tended to be interrelated; e.g., if a party had ideological factions, it also tended to have leadership factions.

Most research on factionalism has regarded it as a dependent variable in party theory. Belloni and Beller (1978) edited a collection of studies that sought to describe and explain factionalism. It included an article by Zariski (1978), who listed a "dozen most tenable and agreed-upon generalizations on factionalism" (p. 32). Most of his propositions linked factionalism to environmental factors, such as the nature of the electoral system. Nevertheless, Belloni and Beller concluded that factionalism was also due to the "sociological complexity of the party; ideological looseness of the party; the origin of the party in a merger of predecessor parties [i.e., its conditions of origin]; [and] the party's internal looseness or decentralized structure" (p. 435).

The Belloni and Beller book largely avoided regarding factions as independent variables. However, party factionalism is an important cause of low voting cohesion and needs to be included in any theory of party government. Factionalism's effect on party cohesion is apparent in American politics. Southern and Northern Democrats often opposed each other in Congressional voting until an ideological realignment began to occur in the South around 1970. Since then, party cohesion (as measured by *Congressional Quarterly* party unity scores), has almost steadily increased. Sinclair attributes this rise in voting cohesion to decreased ideological heterogeneity of the Democrats (1990, 241-242). Finally, factionalism and cohesion together (the general concept of coherence) are critically important in coalition theory, which -- with few exceptions (Luebbert 1986; Laver and Shepsle 1990) -- assumes that parties act as units (Laver and Schofield 1990, 17-22). Brady and Bullock (1985) provided a general review of literature on parties and factions in legislatures from the standpoint of legislative behavior. They saw "much to be done" in linking the legislative party to external components and in investigating the relationship "between the degree of fractionalization and/or factionalization of legislative parties and the way in which parties distribute task and power" (pp. 175-176).

Involvement

In a major section of his book, Duverger (1963) discussed at length the concepts of party membership, degree of participation, and nature of participation. Individually, these topics have drawn a great deal of attention in the parties literature, but there has been only mixed success in integrating the discussion. I prefer to subsume these topics under the concept of involvement,

defined as the intensity of psychological identification with the party *and* as the commitment to furthering its objectives by participating in party activities (Janda 1980b). The italicized "and" distinguishes party involvement from mere party identification by requiring some degree of party activism (voting alone does not qualify). In comparative research, this concept has been measured with several types of variables: severity of membership requirements, membership participation, material incentives, and purposive incentives. Research has shown that these variables tend to intercorrelate and can be combined into a scale of involvement (Janda 1980b).²²

Membership

The concept of formal membership in a political party has little meaning in the United States (Schlesinger 1991, 152), but it is important in comparative analysis. As Duverger noted, signing one's name to a membership form both signifies and produces commitment to the party (1963, 71). For Duverger, the notion of a "card-carrying" party member reflected his conception of a modern mass (usually leftist) party. He created the "membership ratio" — the number of members to the number of electors — and speculated about its meaning but did not really formulate much theory (p. 94). Merkl (1980) compared party members, voters and leaders, and Bartolini (1983) analyzed membership data and membership ratios over time. Bartolini formulated several hypotheses (e.g., party membership is more stable than the party electorate), tested them with data on socialist parties in about a dozen European countries, and found most of them worked better for the pre-war than the post-war period. He concluded that Duverger was reacting to the past and overestimated the role and future of mass parties (pp. 119, 213).

In contrast to Bartolini's pessimism about the future of political parties in contemporary society, Selle and Svåsand (1991) writing a decade later and analyzing a longer time series found that "aggregate membership figures for Western European parties do not show a general decline in party membership" (p. 460). Calculating party membership as a ratio to electors, however, Katz computed downward trends for 20 of 29 parties from 1945 to 1984 (1990, 149). Because party members can constrain leaders, Katz concluded that both leaders and members are finding formal membership less attractive, which raises questions about the linkage function of parties (pp. 158-159). Lawson's volume on party linkage also drew negative conclusions for the "policy-responsive" linkage function of parties (1980, 21-22). However, Dalton's study (1985) of 742 party candidates in nine countries for election to the European

parliament in 1979 compared the candidates' attitudes toward policies with attitudes of party voters interviewed the same year, and contradicted Katz. Overall, Dalton found "substantial agreement between policy views of the Western European public and party elites," and he attributed a large portion of this agreement "to the interactive linkage between voters and parties" (1985, 293).

Incentives

Parties scholars have devoted considerable attention to incentives for party activists (Duverger's "nature" of participation) regardless of formal membership. A starting point for such analysis is Clark and Wilson (1961), who distinguished between "material" (economic benefits), "purposive" (party policies), and "solidary" (social) incentives as motivational factors in all organizations. In parties, these incentives translate into gaining personal benefits, implementing the party's program, or making friends and having fun. Early empirical studies, particularly in the U.S., sought to determine which motivation was dominant. Wilson (1962) said that "professional" party organizations (i.e., city machines) were primarily composed of activists motivated by material incentives, whereas "amateur" organizations had more activists motivated by purposive incentives. In a study of Republican and Democratic county leaders active in their candidate's 1988 presidential campaigns, Bruce, Clark, and Kessel (1991) determined that the purposive or "true believer" orientation predominated within both presidential party groups.

In an influential essay, Wright (1971) elaborated Wilson's distinction into the Rational-Efficient and the Party-Democracy models of political parties (pp. 6-7). American parties tend to be Rational-Efficient: concerned with performing their electoral function and winning elections. In contrast, traditional European socialist parties are "more policy-oriented, ideological, and concerned with defining policy" (p. 7). Wright believed that specific parties could possess some mix of these models, and he argued that "the development of theory and research on political parties has been hindered by adherence to one or the other" as either-or models (p. 7).

In recent years, the discussion of incentives has revived the distinction between party leaders and their rank-and-file that formed the basis of Michels's "iron law of oligarchy." In simple form, Michels's theory explained how leaders perpetuate themselves in power at the expense of their followers' interests (1962).²³ This distinction has surfaced in rational choice theory in the assumption that leaders seek "office" — which can *only* come from winning elections — while activists seek

"benefits" — which may or may not come from winning (Schlesinger 1991, 138). For Schlesinger, who views party leaders as pure office seekers, Wright has it all wrong: there are not "different kinds of parties but the same kinds of parties subject internally to the tensions provoked by the conflicting goals of office and benefits" differentially shared by leaders and activists (p. 145). May (1973) applied the term "curvilinear disparity" to the condition arising when top party leaders and party voters were congruent in their goal orientations while middle-level leaders differed. Kitschelt's analysis (1989) of "the curvilinear disparity of political incentives between voters, party activists and party leaders" (p. 401) contended that evidence of such disparity comes mainly from two-party systems and that "curvilinearity is a much less plausible trait of the micropolitics of party organization" in continental Europe (p. 421).

Nevertheless, Schlesinger uncovered a confusing question in the discussion of incentives: are incentives properties of individuals or of groups? He regretted that Downs, who defined a party as "a team" seeking office through election, assigned ambition to the party collectively rather than to party activists individually. To Schlesinger, Downs's approach led away from understanding party organization (Schlesinger 1991, 36). By shifting discussion from the motivational bases of party activists (incentives) to the nature of party goals, Wright shifted to the concept of party strategy.

Strategy and Tactics

Earlier, I favored defining "party" broadly to include restrictive and subversive parties as well as competitive parties. Instead of categorizing parties into different strategies, one can regard a party's strategy for obtaining its goal as a variable. For example, the French Communist Party, which competed in elections and won about a quarter of the vote during the 1950s, also operated as an anti-system party, using strikes and demonstrations to destabilize the government. Thus the PCF could be scored as following a mixed strategy: mostly competitive but somewhat subversive. The dominant Mexican PRI, on the other hand, followed a mostly competitive but somewhat restrictive strategy, hampering and even controlling its opposition. One study of a representative sample of 150 parties across the world in 1960 found that only about 50% followed a pure competitive strategy, 11% were pure restrictive, 3% were pure subversive, and the other third employed some mix of strategies (Janda 1980b, 78-90). Mixed strategies are consistent with Wright's view (1971) of competitive parties as combining elements of the Rational-Efficient and the Party Democracy models. As we will see, the concept of party strategy as a variable opens new avenues

in rational choice analyses of the behavior of competitive parties. Not only is the theory of party strategies best developed for competitive parties, but most of the world's parties (68% in 1960) have been purely or mostly competitive. So further discussion will deal only with competitive party strategies.

Competitive Strategies

Downs's seminal book (1957) is often viewed as belonging to the spatial theory of voting, but it is equally pertinent to the theory of parties. Downs assumed not only that parties seek to win office but that they seek to maximize votes (1957, 11,31). Arguing that parties formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies, he theorized that parties in a two-party system with a unimodal distribution of voter preferences would locate their policies vaguely at the middle of the distribution. In so doing, Downs neatly accounted for the centrist two-party system in the United States. Downs's model of the vote-maximizing party has been especially influential for American party theorists, such as Schlesinger (1991, 143). In comparative research, however, Downs's work has been less important than that of Riker (1962). Riker also assumed that parties seek to win office, but they do not maximize their votes (see also Wellhofer 1990). Instead, they seek to win by the smallest possible margin, called the "minimum winning coalition" (1962, 32-33).²⁴

Riker's work was important to comparative parties theory because it applied to the creation of parliamentary coalitions to form a government. Coalition theory assumed an "office-seeking" rather than "vote-seeking" strategy.²⁵ Early tests of coalition theory by De Swaan (1973) and Dodd (1976), and articles in Browne and Dreijmanis (1982) typically found minimum winning coalitions (measured by size of the legislative majority or by number of parties) forming less than half the time. Dodd also showed that minimum winning coalitions lasted longer than non-minimum winning coalitions, but his finding was challenged by Grofman (1989), who explained it by features of the party system. Laver and Schofield (1990) provided the most thorough nonmathematical discussion of coalition theory, comparing minimal winning coalitions (using various criteria) with minimal winning coalitions that are also ideologically "connected," with other versions that incorporate policy considerations, and with the game-theoretic concept of the "core point" in parties' preferred policy positions. They noted that while the best "policy blind" theory "is more often wrong than right about which coalition will form (making correct predictions in about 40% of all situations in which no party has a legislative majority), it does very much better than we

would do by picking coalitions out of a hat" (Laver and Schofield 1990, 96).

Like Laver and Schofield, Budge and Keman (1990) reviewed the empirical research sparked by the pure office-seeking theory and concluded that the theory fit the data better when it permitted only coalitions that were ideologically "connected," which fits with findings by Franklin and Mackie (1984) about the importance of ideology in predicting coalition formation. However, that restriction modified the office-seeking assumption by introducing a policy-seeking strategy (pp. 17-19). Budge and Keman also reviewed results from pure policy-based theory (core theory) that predicted coalitions whose policies would be closest to those of its component parties but found no improvement in results (Laver and Schofield 1990, 19-26). In formulating their own theory of party government, Budge and Keman rely on a mixed strategy: parties seek office as a means of advancing policy (1990, 31).

In an important article, Strom (1990) outlined and critiqued three pure party strategies: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking. He then proposed seven hypotheses stating the effects of institutional features on competitive party behavior, for example:

1. The greater the degree of electoral competitiveness (the uncertainty of electoral contests), the more parties will pursue votes.

7. The greater the office benefit differential between government and opposition relative to the policy influence differential, the greater the propensity of political parties toward office-seeking behavior" (pp. 588-589)

Strom incorporated his propositions concerning parties' internal organization into two causal models to explain the mix of strategies pursued by competitive political parties.

In the poetically titled, *Paper Stones*,²⁶ Przeworski and Sprague explored the strategic decision confronting democratic socialist parties that arises from this dilemma: "Socialism cannot be achieved without participation in democratic institutions, but participation erodes the will for socialism" (1986, 2). Przeworski and Sprague reported, moreover, that the proportion of the population employed as wage earners in industrial activities never surpassed 50% in any country. Because socialist parties regularly peaked at less than 50% of the vote, they needed to broaden their appeal beyond the proletariat. However, "By broadening their appeal, socialist parties dilute the general ideological salience of class and, consequently, weaken the motivational force of

class among workers" (p. 45). Przeworski and Sprague conducted a rigorous quantitative analysis of the consequences for socialist parties in opting for "pure supraclass and pure class-only strategies" in seven countries, saying "The difference between the shares resulting from pursuing pure strategies is the range of choice that a party faces when it decides which course of action to adopt" (p. 106). In most cases, they concluded that a pure supraclass strategy from the beginning would have been preferable, particularly in Denmark and Norway. Although such a strategy would have cost socialist parties some working-class votes, their net increment in voting support would have been positive.

Competitive Tactics

In military terminology, strategy refers to a plan for pursuing a goal while tactics refers to actions taken to implement the strategy. Similarly, party tactics refer to what parties actually do to carry out their strategy. The cross-national literature on party tactics that fulfill a competitive strategy is relatively small. Penniman (1981) studied campaign styles. Farrell and Wortmann (1987) analyzed parties in three countries for "political marketing" — use of candidate packaging and communications media. Bowler (1990) examined the effects on voters of party movement on issues. Sainsbury (1990) edited a symposium on strategies and party-voter linkages in several countries, and noted that parties confronted a dilemma, in that "dwindling membership increased the difficulties of parties to mobilize and structure the vote, while less direct citizen involvement in parties made congruity between mass opinion and public decisions more difficult to achieve (p. 6)."

Governmental Status

The term "governmental status" refers to the nature and extent of a party's participation in national politics. This concept subsumes research on parties' electoral strength and political importance.²⁷ In keeping with a vote-seeking model of the party and our form of government, American scholars are apt to measure party dominance by percentage of votes won in elections and control of the executive. In keeping with an office-seeking model and a parliamentary form of government, European scholars look at percentages of seats won in parliament and participation in government — i.e., the distribution of cabinet ministries. As Budge and Keman said, "Evaluations of office-seeking theory have concentrated on the emergence of government coalitions because it is here that the theory is most explicit and widely applied" (1990, 15). More definitively, Strom

said that the "strategic interaction" among parties, so essential to coalition theory, simply "collapses" in two-party systems (1990, 586).

Electoral Strength

In party theory, measures of electoral performance occasionally serve as dependent variables in studies assessing the "effectiveness" of party organizations. Despite the popular academic opinion that party organization counts for little in turning out votes, practical politicians think otherwise. The expansion and strengthening of the Republican Party's national organization, particularly in the area of campaign finance, was done "to win elections and to maximize the number of elective offices won" (Sorauf and Wilson 1990, 199). Similarly, the strengthening of American state and local parties, observed by Gibson et al. (1989) and mentioned earlier, was aimed at being more effective, not less. As Huckfeldt and Sprague said, "If party activity is so ineffective, why do parties and candidates continue to invest their resources in the activity?" (1992, 84). Their detailed study of party mobilization in one U.S. community stressed the "catalytic function of party activity" in the neighborhood, not just its direct effects on individual voters. "Party organizations mobilize the faithful, and the activity of the faithful sends a message to the rest of the public (p. 84)."

As already noted, one study (Dalton 1985) found that centralized parties were more able to communicate their message to voters. Others have noted a tendency toward increased organization and centralization of power in certain conservative European parties as they employed the new campaign techniques of mass media and polling to combat the mass organization of leftist parties, which, in turn, responded in kind -- producing a "contagion from the right" (Epstein 1980, 257). Deschouwer (1986) sought to determine what type of party organization was most effective for parties across countries. He distinguished between "electoral" effectiveness, measured in votes won and "political" effectiveness, measured by both cabinet participation and governmental leadership. Relating these measures to various measures of party organization and the environment, Deschouwer found results consistent with the contingency model of organizations. It holds that there is no "best way" to organize for effectiveness, which is contingent on environmental factors.

Participation in Government

More commonly, however, the concept of governmental status has served as an independent variable in studies on the "impact" of political parties on governmental policies under the assumption of party

government (Wildemann 1986; Katz 1987). A spurt of such research in the late 1970s used governmental status in conjunction with party ideology. (Small parties typically were ignored in this research; see Müller-Rommel and Pridham 1991.) Studying 25 Western industrial countries, Hewitt (1977) found a correlation between the strength of socialist parties in the legislature and expenditures for social services. In Hibbs's study (1977) of 12 nations, the longer socialist labor parties were in the executive from 1960 to 1969, the lower the mean unemployment rate but the higher the inflation rate.²⁸ Cameron's analysis (1978) of public expenditures in 18 countries found that "the dominance in government of leftist parties was a sufficient condition for a relatively large increase in the scope of public activity" (p. 1253). In a pair of articles (1978a and 1978b), Cowart looked over time at socialist dominance in government in seven nations and concluded that leftist governments were more likely than rightist governments to respond to changing economic conditions and to employ more diverse policy instruments.

Castles (1982) edited an important collection of cross-national studies of party impacts on policies in democratic states. Using various measures of the legislative and cabinet strength of leftist and rightist parties in analyzing public expenditures in 18 nations, Castles's own study found that the "best measure of partisan control typically 'explains' between 20 and 50% of the variance in expenditure" (p. 85). The other studies in his book showed fewer party effects. Schmidt's research (1982) on macroeconomic policies (tax base, unemployment, inflation) questioned how much party control really matters and looked to "extra-parliamentary" politics for explanation. Armingeon's article (1982) on redistribution of income also downplayed the role of leftist parties alone in the absence of the commitment by union wage negotiators to party goals (p. 269), and Arnhem and Schotsman (1982) reached a similar conclusion about the role of labor unions. In short, this set of studies loosened the linkage between leftist parties' governmental status and government policy made in the earlier studies. Lehner and Schubert (1984) and Weede (1990) addressed such mixed findings.

Budge and Keman (1990) advanced the study of party influence on government policy by separating cases in which the parties governed singly from those of government by party coalition. They rigorously set out a series of four general assumptions and some auxiliary ones (p. 42), from which they drew implications for policies pursued by governments. For example:

- (iv) Each party in the government will have some of its preferred policies put into effect: for instance, governments including an Agrarian party will pursue policies more

favourable to farmers and rural interests than governments without an Agrarian party . . .

(Assumptions 2,3(c)).

(v) The direction of policy in specific areas will be influenced by party control of the competent ministries (Assumptions 1,2,3; Table 2.2 Assumption 3). (pp. 50-51)

Budge and Keman tested their theory with data on 20 Western governments and found that it fit the post-war experience. Their analysis of coalition government concluded that "parties exert a strong, and even determining, influence on government decision-making," and swung the evidence back to the "party matters" side (1990, 158).

Nevertheless, governments, not parties, remained the real units of analysis for Budge and Keman. Studying the policy impacts of individual parties requires examining their platforms or manifestos to see what particular parties propose and what they really pursue when given the opportunity. There are such studies that demonstrate party impacts in the United States (Pomper and Lederman 1980) and in Britain (Rose 1984), but there is little cross-national research on this complicated problem. However, Hofferbert was involved in similar studies of party impacts in two countries – the United States (Budge and Hofferbert 1990) and Germany (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990) – using data from the ECPR party manifesto project. Both studies demonstrated specific impacts of party programs on government policy, with party influence in the U.S. coinciding most strongly with occupancy of the presidency and party influence in Germany working mainly through possession of cabinet ministries. Hofferbert and Klingeman warned, "Comparative policy studies, with their general focus on blunt indicators of party control are clearly in need of refinement and amendment." The party patterns "are but poorly revealed by contrasting the mere incumbency of one set of collective actors (parties of the 'left' or of the 'right') against one another and then seeking policy consequences of that contrast" (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990, 300-301).

Concepts for Analyzing Party Systems

Although research on political parties is related to that on party systems, the two bodies of literature employ different concepts and theories. Duverger reflected this difference by dividing his classic *Political Parties* into "Book I: Party Structure" and "Book II: Party Systems." Sartori's *Parties and Party Systems* (1976) is similarly divided into two parts, with that on party systems more than twice as long as that on parties.

Whereas parties are studied by specialists interested in them as political institutions, party systems attract the larger group of scholars interested in politics across nations. Especially in the U.S., more articles have been published on cross-national studies of party systems than comparative analyses of parties. For the most part, the literature on party systems focuses on Western democratic nations, but there have been some efforts to build typologies of Latin American party systems (Wertz 1987; Collier and Collier 1991, 498-505).

Although the difference in the unit of analysis produces a different set of analytical concepts, party concepts and system concepts might seem to be identical in a one-party system. In a penetrating analysis, Sartori reasoned that parties make a system only when there are multiple parties (1976, 42-45). One party can relate to the state in a "party-state system," in which the party's properties figure in analysis, but there cannot properly be a one-party system. Despite the frequent usage of the terms "one-party" or "single-party" systems, Sartori's view holds in the literature, which requires at least two parties to make a party system.

In the first edition of their book, Lane and Ersson (1987b) carefully reviewed scholars' positions on definitional, conceptual, and analytical issues involved in studying party systems. All scholars agreed that a party system, like any system, consists of parts and relationships among those parts, such that the system is more than the sum of its parts. Accordingly, Lane and Ersson defined a party system as "a set of political parties operating within a nation in an organized pattern, described by a number of *party-system properties*" (1987b, 155). Scholars differ on what system properties are important concepts in theories of party systems, and their emphases are reflected in their research. Using Lijphart's set of important properties (1984), we find emphasis on (1) minimum winning coalitions (Dodd 1976; Laver and Schofield 1990), (2) government durability (Dodd 1976; Grofman 1989), (3) effective number of parties (Taagepera and Grofman 1985; Herzog 1987; Molinar 1991), (4) number of issue dimensions (Powell 1987; Lijsthaug, McDonald, and Rabinowitz 1990), and (5) electoral disproportionality (Rae 1971; Lijphart 1990). Others would add party competition (Laver 1989; Strom 1989; Ware 1989) and volatility (Pedersen 1983).

To establish the important dimensions of variations in party systems, Lane and Ersson factor analyzed a set of 14 different indicators (along the lines of those proposed by Lijphart) for 272 elections in 16 European countries from 1920 to 1984. (The factor analysis was only reported in the first edition of their book, not in the second.) They concluded that the European party systems had five major dimensions:

1. *Fractionalization*, i.e., the variation in the number and strength of the constituent parts of the party systems
2. *Functional orientation*, i.e., the variation between traditional bourgeois parties and religious and ethnic parties
3. *Polarization*, i.e., the variation in the ideological distance between the political parties along the right-left scale
4. *Radical orientation*, i.e., the variation in the strength of leftist parties
5. *Volatility*, i.e., the variation in net mobility between political parties (Lane and Ersson 1987b, 177).

Lane and Ersson also concluded that the basic problem for the study of party systems is the analysis of change on these dimensions, which they defined as both fluctuations and trends.

In recent years, measurement of party system change has been one of the most important research topics in comparative politics (Mair 1983; Flanagan and Dalton 1984; Wolinetz 1988; Laver 1989; Mair 1989b; Smith 1989; Smith and Mair 1989; Smith and Mair 1990). Fewer writings, however, have tried to *explain* system change (Silverman 1985; Mair 1989a; Alber 1989; Carmines 1991). Those that have, as Reiter said, consider rising "affluence, the growth of the state, ... neo-corporatism, the mass media, new political issues and cleavages, problems with state performance, or post-industrialism" (1989, 329). Inglehart's work on postindustrialism (1990) and a new politics stressing the environment and quality of life is heavily featured in this literature. Poguntke (1987) for example, spelled out central elements of the new politics and suggested five possible effects on party systems: formation of new social movements, take-over of small parties, splitting of larger left-wing party into a post-material left party, alienation of new politics citizens and withdrawal of political support, and foundation of a new party (pp. 78-79). Party system concepts have figured most prominently as independent variables in cross-sectional analyses of political system performance. Powell's analysis of 28 party systems in the 1965-75 period found that those high in support for extremist parties had executive instability and mass rioting (1981). In a later study, he distinguished between effects on instability and those on rioting (1986). However, Lane and Ersson (1987a) found only indirect effects of party system fractionalization and polarization on social disorder and government instability.

The most developed theory about party systems is that on electoral systems, which usually treats party systems as dependent variables. Much of this theory originated in Book II of Duverger, and the proposition that single-member districts and plurality elections produce a two-party system has become known as

"Duverger's Law" (Taagepera and Grofman 1985; Scarrow 1986). Fortunately, that vast literature has been admirably represented in some recent publications (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Lijphart 1990). Blais (1991) also produced an excellent summary of the "debate" over electoral systems, complete with explanatory models of electoral effects. Reviewing the evidence on proportional representation, Blais says, "PR is not clearly superior to the plurality rule in promoting political order in advanced democracies and seems to be a risky choice in new ones" (p. 246).

With the fall of communism and the emergence of party competition in Eastern Europe, the effects of electoral systems on party politics assumed new political importance. Lijphart soon became the most prominent advocate of PR and multiparty politics for these emergent nations, arguing that PR and parliamentary government had a better record than alternative plurality systems, "particularly with respect to representation, protection of minority interests, voter participation, and control of unemployment" (1991a, 83). In reply, Quade defended plurality systems and criticized Lijphart's argument:

Plurality voting encourages the competing parties to adopt a majority-forming attitude. The parties incline to be moderate, to seek conciliation, to round off their rough edges - - in short, to do *before* the election, in the public view, the very tasks that Lijphart applauds PR systems for doing *after* the election" (1991, 41).

Laryedret sided with Quade, saying, "Parties in plurality systems tend to be moderate because most votes are to be gained among the undecided voters of the center" (1991, 33). In his rejoinder, Lijphart (1991b) held that democracies often turned to PR to accommodate cleavages, that the superior economic record of PR systems was unquestioned, and that plurality systems produced distorted majorities that were seen as undemocratic.

In the midst of this academic debate, the new nations devised new electoral systems. Hibbing and Patterson (1992) described Hungary's complex system involving PR and plurality voting, and they favored its plurality features over straight PR. Analyzing the Polish situation, Jasiewicz (1992) found less fault with the electoral system than with its lack of established parties, although he was not convinced by Lijphart's case for PR. Later, Lijphart (1992) analyzed the choice of voting systems in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland during the collapse of communism, testing Stein Rokkan's hypothesis that old established bourgeois parties in the late 1800s (and communist parties in the late 1980s) favored PR as a way of retaining some power against

new waves of voters. He concluded that it applied at least to Poland, which did adopt an extreme form of PR.

These exchanges of views on electoral impacts occurred outside any broad theoretical structure. Katz (1980) formulated a deductive theory "to explain the issue orientation, ideological style, and structural coherence (cohesion versus disintegration versus factionalism) of legislative parties" (p. 13). The thrust of his theory was that "parliamentary party organization will appear as an extension of campaign organization, and hence will reveal the same structural characteristics as a rationally organized campaign" dictated by electoral rules (p. 32). Based on eight assumptions of voters and electoral competition (pp. 17-18), Katz proposed twelve hypotheses, for example:

5. Parties in large district PR systems will be more likely to be ideologically oriented than those competing in plurality systems.
6. Parties competing in small districts will tend to be personalistically oriented or patronage oriented, whereas parties competing in larger districts will tend to be issue oriented. (pp. 33-34).

Katz tested his hypotheses in two ways, with an extensive test involving cross-national data on parties and with an intensive test involving in-depth analysis of parties in Britain, Ireland, and Italy. Both tests supported most of his hypotheses. Other scholars had advanced similar findings, but Katz said, "There is a difference between knowing something to be so and understanding why" (p. 117). His theoretical structure helped explain why parties differed according to electoral systems.

The State of Party Theory

Our attention turns now to party theory, focusing on theories that involve individual parties as units of analysis. It is fashionable among party scholars at home and abroad to lament the lack of party theory. This complaint has a long and honorable history. Writing in French over fifty years ago, Duverger said:

We find ourselves in a vicious circle: a general theory of parties will eventually be constructed only upon the preliminary work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties (1963, xiii).

Duverger then spun out scores of bivariate generalizations, scattered widely over 200 pages. Janda and King (1985) isolated 19 major hypotheses in

Duverger's book, tested them with cross-national data on approximately 100 parties, and found statistical support for 12.²⁹ The keystone of Duverger's theorizing was the concept of party ideology. Because Duverger viewed leftist parties as the "modern" type, Janda and King used the concept of leftism in formalizing his hypotheses. Of the 12 supported hypotheses, 11 involved leftism as either a direct or indirect causal factor. The driving force of ideology in Duverger's theory is seen in Figure 1, the causal diagram that Janda and King devised for all 12 confirmed hypotheses, with specific variables identified by the major concepts in this review.

According to Figure 1, ideology (leftism) is the initial cause of virtually all organizational attributes in Duverger's bivariate propositions about party structure. In general, leftist parties tend to demonstrate more involvement by their members in party doctrine, more complexity in organizational structure, and more centralization of power. They do so because leftist parties are agents of social change (Hamilton 1989, 219), and parties need stronger organization to effect change than to defend the status quo. Even today, Duverger's theorizing dominates party research (Sartori 1976, x).³⁰

Despite Duverger's considerable success in his effort to "sketch a preliminary general theory of parties," scholars decades later still pleaded for party theory. In 1972, Mayer titled the chapter on parties in his comparative politics text, "The Search for a Theory of Parties." Acknowledging the stimulus of Duverger's book in 1976, Sartori observed that "there is still no general theory of parties" (1976, xi). Rewriting his comparative text nearly two decades later, Mayer still found that "research in any one aspect of parties tends to appear in isolation from other aspects of the topic without justification for the theoretical importance of the questions being asked" (1989, 142). In his recent review of the American parties literature, Crotty denied any "dominant perspective in the study of political parties" and saw party theory as "a goal to be sought" (1991, 148). In the English translation of his major book on political parties in Western democracies, von Beyme emphasized the importance of theory building to organize facts about parties, but sighed, "Complaints about a lack of satisfying theories are as old as party research itself and will certainly be directed against this study as well" (1985, 6).³¹

In contrast to the view that we lack party theory, Schlesinger contends, "A theory has lain embedded in most of our writing on parties. We have, however, failed to see it as a whole" (1991, 4). I agree that we have complained too long about the lack of party theory. Over the years, a substantial body of theory has been built, and it is time to recognize the accomplishments. Perhaps party scholars have been expecting too much by




Figure 1: Causal Diagram of Twelve Confirmed Hypotheses from Duverger

calling for "a general theory." What would a general theory look like? We can try to envision this mythical object by speculating on its form and scope.

The Form of a General Theory

Must a general theory of political parties meet the rigorous requirements of a hypothetico-deductive system, complete with axioms, postulates, and mathematical expression? If so, rational choice theory applied to parties (Greenberg and Shepsle 1987; Holler 1987; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Baron 1991; Coram 1991) would seem to qualify. Judging by the scholarly style of some who have called for general theory (e.g., Sartori and von Beyme), this requirement is too demanding. For many, a general theory could consist of tightly organized verbal statements of theoretical propositions that were empirically testable. If so, examples can be found in Duverger, Katz (1980), Panebianco (1988), Budge and Keman (1990), Laver and Schofield (1990), Strom (1990), and Schlesinger (1991).

In discussing what it means to build party theory, Budge and Keman (1990) advanced "a series of hypotheses or propositions each of which can be examined and compared with what the collected information on that point actually tells us. Taken together, such propositions constitute the 'theory' or 'explanation' of why and how the parties act as they do, and if upheld should also enable us to anticipate what they are going to do in government, under given circumstances" (pp. 7-8). An important way to achieve theoretical clarity "is to put all this in mathematical form," but that narrows the focus because of restrictive and simplified assumptions (p. 9). They chose to favor broad coverage and practical relevance, relying on verbal expression of tightly reasoned propositions. Their work and other examples indicate that party theory need not be mathematized to be general.

Scope of Explanation

A truly general theory should also have a broad scope of application to political parties. There are two aspects to the scope of a theory: the types of parties to which it applies and the range of party phenomena that it explains. The scope of application depends on the definition of party that underlies the theory. The issue is whether the definition is narrow and theoretically *exclusive*, or broad and theoretically *inclusive*. If based on a broad definition of party, as used in this review, party theory should be applicable in principle to political parties everywhere, within the parameters of the theoretical conditions. We are left with the range of party phenomena encompassed by the theory.

What would a truly general theory of parties explain? For example, would a general theory about parties encompass voting behavior? As Schlesinger (1991) argues, that is excluded by defining parties as organizations; voters are choosers among parties, not the parties themselves. Although it is common to speak of parties as coalitions of voters, none are coalitions in the proper sense of the word. "Noce represent conscious, explicit agreements by members of these categories to pursue joint action" (p. 8). He states that this exclusion is a critical point. "Much of the difficulty political scientists have had in developing a theory of political parties has come from not knowing what to do with the voters" (p. 8). Excluding voting behavior from a theory of parties does not mean that party theory cannot include propositions about voting behavior. It simply means that party theory has no responsibility for explaining voting behavior, for its theoretical target is party organization and behavior.

Must a general theory of parties explain everything about parties? Furthermore, must it be a single integrated theory? If so, we will lack a general theory until we have a body of interrelated propositions that -- at a minimum -- explains (1) covariation among organizational characteristics within individual parties; (2) how and when parties form, change, and disappear; and (3) the effects of political parties on political life -- on its institutional and personal aspects. If this is the goal of general theory, then it is virtually certain that there will never be a general theory of political parties. Nor will there be a general theory of voting, or of legislatures, or of any other political institution or behavior, for we demand too much.

We should not expect a single general theory to explain everything about parties. Instead, we should acknowledge the existence of coherent bodies of explanation for broad segments of party phenomena as general theory. Our task should be to discover islands rather than look for continents. An analogy with voting behavior may be helpful: There are bodies of theory that explain voting turnout and bodies that explain voting choice. Turnout and choice theories share some points of contact, but they are essentially separate bodies of propositions. In the parties field, as I hope to have demonstrated in this review, we already have some bodies of theory that address distinct but important party phenomena.

Conclusion

In his recent and comprehensive review of literature on American parties, Crotty (1991) observed, "Political parties research, then, is more a uniting of a

broad confederation of individual studies and research emphases with a tenuous relationship to one another than it is a highly focused, clearly demarcated or well-integrated subfield of the discipline" (p. 138). In a section on "The Search for Theory," he characterized the American research as "self-consciously empirical and atheoretical" (p. 145). He saw special promise in the work of Schlesinger and said, "The more theoretical applications and conceptual developments that are attempted, the more models generated and explanations advanced, the better it will be for a field that has not been known for the quality or variety of its theorizing" (p. 148).

I agree with Crotty that research on American parties can benefit greatly from closer attention to theoretical applications, and there are other American theorists besides Schlesinger and Downs. Kamens (1989), for example, has proposed a theory of party development to account for the paradox that U.S. parties have grown stronger organizationally since the 1960s while becoming less important as vehicles for mass mobilization. His explanation focuses on the nationalization of politics and shifts in culture with the rise of higher education and the mass media. Nevertheless, there are many more examples of theorizing about parties in the comparative literature than in the American literature. For instance, I have already cited theoretical efforts by Duverger, Katz, Strom, and Budge and Keman. There is also Ware's flow-chart model of party behavior (1987, 108), Panebianco's theory of party transformation (1988, 262-273), the theories of candidate selection analyzed by Gallagher and Marsh (1988), Hamilton's well-developed model of determinants of socialist party radicalism (1989, 30-31), the exposition of coalition theory in Laver and Schofield (1990), and Schlesinger's theory of the multinuclear party (1991, 151-172). Party scholars can lament the lack of party theory no longer. Our challenge now is to assimilate, develop, and extend existing theory rather than wait for a general theory to descend from on high. Even if students are primarily interested in U.S. party politics, they could sharpen their analytical skills and theoretical insights by paying more attention to comparative political parties and by reading the European literature.

Notes

1. Virtually all those surveyed reported that they were familiar with the *American Political Science Review* (99%) and the *Journal of Politics* (91%).

2. LaPonce shows that all national journals are basically ethnocentric, with the *British Journal of Political Science* least so. Nevertheless, in a comparison of British and American journals, Crewe and Norris found that "the proportion of American political scientists

reading U.K.-based journals was two and a half times the proportion of British political scientists who read U.S.-based journals" (1991, 526).

3. Neumann's formal definition of a political party was "the articulate organization of active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views" (p. 396).

4. Ware (1987, 17) failed to recognize that "government" means "public office" in the United States in the context of this definition.

5. However, Schlesinger takes the opposite position: "I would argue that the compulsion to seek an all-inclusive definition of parties blinds us to the great varieties and types of political organizations that the restricted view allows us to identify in democracies, and therefore, the crucial distinctions that should be made between them" (1991, 203).

6. Intercorrelations among indicators of age, leadership competition, legislative stability, and electoral stability produced a single factor solution for 150 political parties and a scale with a Cronbach reliability coefficient of .79 (Janda 1980b, 143-144, 155).

7. Given the proliferation of parties in the former communist countries, one needs a reference guide to party politics, and some have already been published. Szajkowski (1991) listed more than 500 parties in 12 countries in the region, and other books by Pribylovskii (1992) and Abramov and Darzhayev (1992) described hundreds of parties and proto-parties in Russia alone.

8. Panebianco credited this distinction to an analytical framework proposed by Eliassen and Svåsand (1975).

9. Laver and Schofield actually listed another technique, dimensional analysis of parliamentary roll call votes, but this method has been primarily limited to party analyses in single countries, not in cross-national analysis.

10. In contrast to the traditional "proximity" theory of voting proposed by Downs, an alternative "directional" theory is proposed by Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug (1991). This theory assumes that political issues are bipolar, and that voters decide according (1) to the direction of their preference and (2) to the strength of their preference. "Similarly, parties advocate different directions of policy and present them with different levels of intensity" (p. 149). Given a voter slightly left of center, "proximity theory predicts a preference for the party nearest the center, while directional theory predicts a preference for a party farther away" (p. 150). See also Macdonald, Listhaug, and Rabinowitz (1991).

11. Charlot (1989, 353) credits Seiler (1986) for distinguishing between two sequences of party formation. In one, the issue orientation precedes the laying claim to power and the resulting partisan alignment. In the other, the partisan alignment precedes the issue orientation and the laying claim to power. Seiler's work is in French.

12. In a later study of 108 parties in 19 elections over two widely spaced elections, Rose and Urwin (1975) found little support for regionalism as a basis of party cohesion.

13. One early, and lonely, exception is Anderson (1968), who worked to relate the organizational theory literature to the study of state and local parties.

14. Although the study of party organization is better developed in the American literature, even there it is a neglected topic. Epstein (1991) examined 238 articles and research notes published in the *American Political Science Review* from March 1986 through December 1990 and found only one item, a research note, on extra-governmental party organization.

15. This is similar to Duverger's concept of "community" (1963, 131).

16. The six-item scale for degree of organization (complexity) had a reliability of .82, as measured by Cronbach's alpha. The eight-item scale for centralization of power had an alpha of .83.

Over all the parties, the two scales were virtually uncorrelated, $r = .03$. (Janda 1980b, 156-157).

17. Huntington (1965) defines autonomy in terms of interests rather than structure. He requires autonomous organizations to "have their own interests and values indistinguishable from those of other social forces" (p. 401).

18. Out of 905 abstracts on political parties identified in a DIALOG™ search, only 25 mentioned finance or funding; only a few dealt specifically with party finance; and none that were remotely comparative were in English.

19. Not only did the former "satellite" parties of ruling Communist parties in Eastern Europe (e.g., the four minor parties in the German Democratic Republic) clearly lack autonomy, but some scholars contended that they should not be regarded as separate parties. However, their survival after the collapse of the ruling party indicated that they had distinct organizations, albeit subservient ones.

20. For a defense of the Middle-Level Elite project, see Reif, Niedermayer, and Schmitt (1986).

21. A later definition by Belloni and Beller (1978), is conceptually identical. They define faction as "any relatively organized groups that exists within the context of some other group and which (as political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part" (p. 419, emphasis in original).

22. Five indicators of involvement — severity of membership requirements, membership participation, material incentives, purposive incentives, and doctrinism — were used to produce a scale with an alpha reliability coefficient of .78 (Janda 1980b, 154-155).

23. Koehle (1989) has contended that Michels's "iron law" did not apply to the West German Green Party, when organization did not result in oligarchy.

24. See Schlesinger (1991, 135-145) for a trenchant analysis of these opposing positions.

25. Although Schlesinger used the term "office-seeking" in referring to his theory (1991, 143), it is really a "vote-seeking" theory when compared to the European usage of office-seeking. See Strom (1990).

26. Przeworski and Sprague explain their title, *Paper Stones*, with this statement: "Barricades were no longer needed when workers could cast ballots; votes were 'paper stones.'" (1986, 1).

27. Duverger's chapter on "Strength and Alliances" (1963, 281-351) dealt with indicators of governmental status.

28. But Hibbs's research drew criticism from Payne (1979) for biased selection of cases, and other methodological issues, to which Hibbs replied (1979).

29. In keeping with Duverger's own broad view of comparative party analysis, these linkages were empirically supported by data that included restrictive and subversive parties in communist and Third World countries along with the larger group of mostly competitive parties in democratic regimes (Janda 1979). The numbers of parties underlying each proposition varied from 79 to 135 (Janda and King 1985).

30. For a dissent on the value of Duverger's work, see Daalder (1983, 10-12).

31. Von Bayme was replying to an earlier review of the German edition of his book, which found "incomprehensible" his "lack of interest in general theory" (Raschke 1983, 109).

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The Not So Simple Act of Voting

Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg

In today's increasingly complex political world, what has been called "the simple act of voting" (Kelley and Mirer 1975) is no longer quite so simple. With more party options to choose from in most of the world's established democracies -- and in the United States many more voting choices to make -- voters' decision-making capabilities are being tested more than ever. Adding to the public's task is the expanding governmental agenda. In addition to their traditional responsibilities of ensuring the economic and physical well-being of their citizens, governments are now regularly being called upon to deal with numerous matters that were not on the political agenda just a generation ago. These include protecting the environment, guaranteeing the rights of consumers, arbitrating moral issues like abortion, and ensuring equality of opportunity for minorities and women.

This chapter provides a broad comparative assessment of research on voting behavior in advanced industrial democracies. This is an extremely large, and rapidly growing literature, all of which cannot fit into a single chapter.¹ Moreover, there are many aspects of electoral behavior that are specific to one nation, or at least not generalizable across most systems. Therefore, we have chosen to focus on the evolution of research on what we feel is the central question of electoral behavior: how voters in advanced industrial democracies deal with the increasingly difficult task of guiding governments via the ballot box.

On the one hand, several developments have significantly helped Western publics to meet this challenge. These societies have experienced an information explosion through the expansion of the mass media, thereby substantially decreasing the costs of obtaining political information (Graber in this volume; Ranney 1983; Semetko et al. 1991; Neuman 1986). It is easy to forget that our contemporary world of instant news and 24-hour cable news services stands in marked contrast to the information environment of even one generation ago. In addition, steady increases in the educational level of Western publics have presumably increased the political skills of contemporary electorates. With more political information available to a more

educated electorate, it might be hypothesized that today's voters no longer need shortcuts or cues to guide their decisions. More citizens now possess the level of political skills and resources necessary to become self-sufficient in politics (Inglehart 1990, chap. 10; Dalton 1984). Instead of depending solely on elites and reference groups, such voters should now be able to deal with intricate political issues and make their own decisions.

On the other hand, any increase in the public's ability to deal with complex political issues has to be balanced against the rise in the complexity of politics itself. Issues such as health care reform, nuclear power, global warming, and national industrial policies challenge the abilities of even the experts. American voters are being asked to make decisions that range from judging the needs for school construction bonds to selecting the president of the United States; Europeans are deciding on town councilors as well as the future of European integration.

The actual balance between the abilities of voters and the demands involved in their making political decisions is a central controversy in electoral research that we will review in this chapter. Still, most analysts believe that voters must rely on some cues and political shortcuts to make their decisions. As Samuel Popkin (1991, 218) writes, "the use of information shortcuts is ... an inescapable fact of life, and will occur no matter how educated we are, how much information we have, and how much thinking we do." Consequently, our review of the electoral behavior literature focuses on the cues that citizens still need to guide their choices. The kinds of cues used by voters may have changed over time, but the process of employing cognitive shortcuts remains intact.

The Nature of Belief Systems

Any discussion of voting behavior is ultimately grounded on basic assumptions about the electorate's

political abilities – the public's level of knowledge, understanding, and interest in political matters. For voters to make meaningful decisions, they must understand the options the polity faces. Citizens must have a sufficient knowledge of the workings of the political system if they intend to influence and control the actions of their representatives. Historically, many theorists maintained that democracy was workable only when the public possessed a high degree of political information and sophistication. Mill, Locke, Tocqueville, and other writers saw these public traits as essential requirements for a successful democratic system.

One of the most striking findings of the first empirical surveys of voter beliefs was the stunning contrast found between the classic image of the democratic citizen and the actual nature of the electorate. The public's political sophistication fell far short of theoretical ideal. For most citizens, political interest and involvement barely extended beyond casting an occasional vote in national or state elections. Furthermore, citizens apparently brought very little understanding to their participation in politics. It was not clear that voting decisions were based on rational evaluations of candidates, parties, and their issue positions. Rather, voting was conditioned by group loyalties and personal considerations. As one early seminal work in the area concluded:

Our data reveal that certain requirements commonly assumed for the successful operation of democracy are not met by the behavior of the 'average' citizen....Many vote without real involvement in the election....The citizen is not highly informed on the details of the campaign....In any rigorous or narrow sense the voters are not highly rational (Berelson et al. 1954, 307-10).

The landmark in early electoral research, *The American Voter*, reinforced this negative impression of the electorate (Campbell et al. 1960). Campbell and his colleagues documented a lack of ideological awareness or understanding by the American electorate. *The American Voter* concluded that the electorate "is almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government actions; knowing little of the particular policies and what has led to them, the mass electorate is not able either to appraise its goals or the appropriateness of the means chosen to secure these goals" (Campbell et al. 1960, 543). Other research soon extended this negative view of the unsophisticated citizen to other Western democracies (e.g., Converse and Dupeux 1962; Converse 1975; Butler and Stokes 1969). Perhaps the most damning judgment was *The American Voter's* conclusion that the limited

ideological sophistication of the electorate reflected inherent limits that were not likely to change (Campbell et al. 1960, 253-56).²

This image of the uninformed and unsophisticated voter began to reshape our view of the citizenry and democratic politics, but then it confronted a new wave of "revisionist" research. The highly politicized and ideological nature of American campaigns in the 1960s seemed to increase the public's "level of political conceptualization" on indicators similar to those used in *The American Voter* study (Field and Anderson 1969; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976, chap. 7). Other research found that the consistency of the public's issue preferences also had risen in the 1960s (Nie and Andersen 1974; Pierce 1975), indicating that political beliefs were becoming more ideologically structured. In general terms, it was argued that the sophistication of voters was significantly affected by the political environment. In the halcyon days of the 1950s, citizens displayed less interest or involvement in politics; in the politicized decade of the 1960s, citizens seemingly responded by becoming more interested in politics and more sophisticated in their understanding of politics.

The environmental explanation of political sophistication was further supported by cross-national studies indicating that the "level of conceptualization" of the public varies sharply across nations, with the relatively non-ideological American system yielding one of the least ideological publics (Klingemann 1979; Westholm and Niemi 1992). The available longitudinal data from other advanced industrial democracies seemed to parallel these trends: political interest was generally on the rise (van Deth 1990; Almond and Verba 1980; Dalton 1988, chap. 1), and German time series displayed an increasing number of political ideologues over the past two decades (Klingemann 1979; Dalton 1988, chap. 1). Furthermore, in many instances these trends are accelerated in other (non-U.S.) democracies because the socioeconomic transformation of these societies has been even more rapid than in the United States.

The debate moved in a new direction when methodologists began to question the validity of the empirical evidence. Analyses indicated that a major portion of the increased constraint in issue beliefs in U.S. surveys was caused by improvements in question wording and format (Sullivan et al. 1978; Bishop et al. 1978). Other methodological studies questioned the validity of the levels of conceptualization measure used in the original *The Changing American Voter* monograph (Smith 1980; Nie et al. 1979, 366). Using results from an election panel survey in the 1970s, Converse and Markus (1979) showed that the stability of political beliefs, another indicator of the existence of a sophisticated belief system, were relatively unchanged among Americans

when compared to panel results of the 1950s. The most direct assault has come from Eric R.A.N. Smith (1989). By redefining the meaning of the concept, Smith argues that the sophistication of the American electorate has remained virtually unchanged in the three decades since *The American Voter*. Whether or not one agrees with Smith's evidence and argumentation, the book itself illustrates the continuing controversy on the basic parameters of this debate.³

The "counter-revisionist" literature has itself been questioned in other studies. John Pierce and his colleagues replicated Converse's measurement of Americans' level of conceptualization; they find that the proportion of ideologues among the U.S. electorate remained at higher levels after the turbulent 1960s, suggesting that sophistication had increased, or at least the findings of *The American Voter* came at an unusual low point (Pierce et al. 1982, chap. 7; Klingemann 1979). Other researchers argued that when measurement error is taken into account through the use of sophisticated multi-indicator models, the true stability and consistency of political beliefs is much stronger than simple correlational methods imply (Judd et al. 1981; Judd and Milburn 1980; cf. Converse 1980). Jon Krosnick (1991) shows that a branching method of asking issue positions produces even more reliable issue measures and higher levels of issue constraint than does the seven-point issue scales that are now the standard instrumentation on most election studies. The more things change... (*Plus ça change...*).

The more recent American literature on political sophistication has devoted less attention to assessing the absolute level of the public's political abilities and has instead focused on the manner in which individuals organize and process information. Donald Kinder (1983) advocated this approach to the study of belief systems in his chapter in the first edition of this volume, and it has been reinforced by Luskin's (1987) thoughtful review of the sophistication literature.

Generally identified under the heading of "schema theory," although this may be a misnomer, this research addresses two questions about political thinking. First, instead of viewing belief systems as interconnecting a diverse range of political attitudes (vertical linkage), analysts maintain that there is a network or (hierarchical) structure of beliefs within specific political domains. The conceptual structures used to organize information might also vary across individuals. Thus, the growing literature on schema theory attempts to identify specific cognitive structures (or schema) that are relevant for subsets of individuals; such as a foreign policy schema, or racial schema, or the schema for evaluating political candidates (Conover and Feldman 1984; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;

Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1984; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Rohrschneider 1992).

The other use of schema theory focuses on how citizens process political information (e.g., Lau 1986). Schema both assist in organizing existing knowledge and in processing new information. The detail and amount of information incorporated within these structures may vary widely across individuals, but the existence of such structures provides voters with a method of managing information and making political judgments. In other words, even if citizens are not sophisticated on all political topics, they may have logical and structured beliefs within specific domains that enable them to manage the political decisions they must make as citizens. But of course, even the more modest claims of schema theory have not escaped critique (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland 1991).

It is not surprising that this long debate has left many sophisticated political scientists uncertain about the actual sophistication of contemporary publics. Still, this debate has enriched our understanding of the nature of citizen politics. The research literature now yields a more positive assessment of the electorate. Modern electorates do not match the lofty ideals of classic democratic theory. Still, regardless of whether sophistication has increased over time in the United States, our best current measurement methodologies imply that estimates of political sophistication in the era of *The American Voter* were inaccurately low (Niemi and Weisberg 1993a, chap. 4).⁴ Moreover, schema theory argues that political sophistication should be studied within specific schematic frameworks, rather than in the global measures of knowledge, constraint, and sophistication introduced by early voting scholars.

The debate on the limited sophistication of the American electorate also generally ignores the cross-national evidence of significantly higher levels of political conceptualization and ideological awareness in non-American systems. Calculating a measure of ideological sophistication similar to that of *The American Voter*, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1979) finds that Italians are more than twice as likely as Americans to be classified as ideologues, and the Dutch and German electorates also display significantly higher levels of ideological awareness. Similarly, citizens in most other advanced industrial democracies are better able than Americans to explain concepts such as "Left" and "Right" (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). These Europeans are not cognitively more advanced than Americans, but the political environment in these systems sharply influences how these publics view the political world.

The cross-national evidence underscores the point that political sophistication is not a fixed or a

sharply restricted characteristic of mass publics in advanced industrial democracies. In addition, longitudinal surveys of the American public and European publics find that the levels of sophistication displayed by the citizens can change in response to the political environment, reviving V.O. Key's claim that the electorate is partially an echo chamber.

The debate on the political sophistication of contemporary electorates also highlights the assumptions about the nature of political decision making that underlie our models of electoral choice. The lofty ideals of classic democratic theory presumed a rational decision-making process by a fully informed electorate. Even given our more positive assessment about the nature of contemporary electorates, most voters (and even some political scientists) still fall short of the standards of classic democratic theory. However, we also understand that this maximalist definition of the prerequisites for informed decision making is unnecessary. One should not presume that there must be strong constraint across diverse issue domains or citizens must have textbook knowledge about the political process in order to participate in a knowledgeable way (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991). Instead, our models should look at whether citizens can manage the complexities of politics and make reasonable decisions given their political interests and positions. That is, we emphasize a *satisficing* approach to decision making; these models ask what are the pragmatic ways that individuals actually make their political choices. Through the use of political cues and other decision-making shortcuts, individuals can make reasonable decisions at modest cost and without perfect information.

The logic of satisficing decision making is apparent in the three disciplinary paths -- sociological, psychological, and economic -- that have defined the evolution of electoral behavior research. The next sections of this chapter review the evolution of each approach, and the contemporary controversies of the applicability of each model.

The Classic Studies of Voting Behavior

Most voting behavior research in the first half of the twentieth century employed the *sociological approach*. This was largely because the best available data were census data demographics, which could easily be compared to voting patterns. Thus, when the methodology of survey research first became available, it was natural that demographic variables attracted attention, as their role in shaping voting decisions had already been well established by sociologists.

The pioneers of electoral sociology were led by Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (1944) set out to understand how voting intentions changed during a campaign by interviewing a panel of voters repeatedly during the 1940 election year. Finding that relatively few voters switched back and forth, they fell back upon previously established demographic patterns of voting to explain their findings. In a subsequent study of the 1948 election entitled *Voting*, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee (1954) laid out a comprehensive sociological model of the vote decision. The bulk of their data, as the authors put it, related "either directly to primary groups or to clusters of them in the social strata" (Berelson et al. 1954, 301). The basic assumption was that voting is as much conditioned by who one is as by what one believes. In other words, sociological variables create common group interests that shape the party coalitions and define images concerning which party is most attuned to the needs of various types of people.

Social-group-based voting is an example of satisficing decision making because voters use sociological cues to guide their voting choices. Attention focuses on the party (or parties) that historically have supported the social groups to which a voter belongs. A voter can decide between competing parties based on cues such as the endorsements of labor unions, business associations, religious groups, and the like -- as well as the group appeals of the parties themselves. The stable group base of each party means that many voters develop standing partisan predispositions that endure across elections, further simplifying the decision process.

The sociological perspective of the Columbia scholars was paralleled by European electoral research of the period. For instance, a series of local surveys in Britain began to define the class bases of British electoral politics (Benney et al. 1956; Milne and Mackenzie 1954, 1959). The landmark in European electoral research was Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's (1967) study of party systems and voter alignments. They linked the development of party systems to a historical sequence of political conflicts and their attendant social cleavages. This rich theoretical framework was then integrated with some of the first results from national electoral surveys in Europe. In comparison to the United States, social forces seemed to exert an even stronger influence on the voting choice of Europeans, further underpinning the value of the sociological model. In echoing the historical emphasis of the Columbia researchers, Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50) voiced their now-famous conclusion that "the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with but few significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s."

Although the sociological model of voting provided a useful framework for identifying a set of social cues that structured electoral decisions, the model had several limitations. It was able to explain only a modest proportion of the vote among European electorates, and an even smaller proportion among the less polarized American electorate. In addition, a sociological approach emphasized continuity and stability, and thus had limited value in explaining electoral change.

The weaknesses in the sociological approach led investigators at the University of Michigan to focus more directly on the psychological processes behind the calculus of individual behavior. The publication of *The American Voter* in 1960 introduced an explicitly *social psychological model* of the vote (Campbell et al. 1960). The focal point of this theory was the mediating role of long-term psychological predispositions -- particularly that of party identification -- in guiding citizen action. As the authors stated at the outset, "Our hypothesis is that the partisan choice the individual voter makes depends in an immediate sense on the strength and direction of the elements comprising a field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as attitudes toward the perceived objects of national politics" (Campbell et al. 1960, 9).

Although conceding that sociological characteristics influence the development of party identification, the psychological approach argues that partisanship is more than simply a political reflection of a voter's upbringing and current social status. Correlations between demographic factors and the vote provide interesting information, "yet information pitched at a low level of abstraction" (Campbell et al. 1960, 36). Such social characteristics, moreover, have limited value in providing an evaluative structure the range of different phenomena that citizens encounter. Social class, for instance, does not provide voters with cues on issues that lack a class-referent. Thus, the sociological model has restricted applicability as a method of satisficing decision making, especially in our more varied and changing contemporary political world.

One of the strengths of the psychological model is that it described how most citizens possess a ready guide for judging most political phenomena. The psychological view holds that party identification acts to filter individuals' views of the political world, providing them not only with a means for making voting decisions (support one's own party) but also with a means for interpreting short-term issues and candidacies since parties are central actors in most political conflicts. In addition, psychological variables bear a direct relationship to the vote, as they are more proximally involved in the decision-making process. To routinely support one's preferred party, unless distinct candidate or issue factors

entered the decision field, was both an efficient and probably reasonable way for managing the complexity of politics for most individuals.

The psychological approach of *The American Voter* was rapidly exported to other democratic settings through a series of collaborative cross-national research projects in the late 1950s and 1960s. Converse and Dupeux (1962) compared the characteristics of American and French partisans, and cited their findings as evidence of the functional equivalence of the psychological model in the two societies. Butler and Stokes (1969) integrated sociological and psychological models in their surveys of British voters, and found that a "partisan self-image" helped Britons orient themselves to the complexities of politics. Similar collaborative studies were conducted in Sweden, Italy, Australia, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and a host of other democracies (e.g., Budge et al. 1976). The influence of this approach was so pervasive that party identification -- and the theoretical model it represented -- became the central theoretical concept in electoral research.

A third paradigm of electoral research, which we can roughly label an *economic approach*, developed at least partially as a logical extension of the sociological and psychological models. The former models both emphasized relatively stable sources of voter cues as befitting a satisficing model of voting. This third approach argued that citizens could develop simplified ways to use attitudinal factors, such as issue opinions and candidate evaluations, as a basis of their voting decisions.

This perspective was introduced in Anthony Downs's seminal 1957 book, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Instead of testing classical notions of democratic practice, Downs reformulates them according to modern economic theory's assumptions of rationality. The fundamental axiom of Downs's theory is that citizens act rationally in politics. When it comes to voting, Downs writes, "this axiom implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other" (p. 36). The key to this decision process is the voter's perception of expected utility. "As a result," Downs asserts, "the most important part of a voter's decision is the size of his *current party differential*, that is, the difference between the utility income he actually received in period *t* and the one he would have received if the opposition had been in power" (p. 40).

Although this approach asserts that citizens make voting decisions in a calculating manner, taking into account party promises as well as government performance, there is also a pragmatic aspect to this approach that fits our framework of satisficing decision making. For example, Downs devotes an entire chapter to how rational citizens reduce information costs (Downs

1957, chap. 12). Similarly, Downs does not engage in the debate on whether all voters are sophisticated on all issues; instead, he asks whether they possess an informed basis for making policy choices through their vote. For instance, this perspective assumes that people can evaluate past performance (or future promises) of the parties and use this as a basis for decision making. Alternatively, voters might use broad political symbols, such as "liberal" or "conservative" to orient themselves to politics and make their electoral decisions. In short, voters are seen as individual actors using the information they possess on the parties and candidates to evaluate what will be in their best interest.⁵

The next sections of this chapter discuss the development of these three competing paradigms in contemporary electoral research. Although all three processes are obviously at work within any electorate, the relative mix of these forces has fundamental implications for the nature of the public's electoral decisions. Are voters making satisficing decisions based on long-term social or psychological predispositions, or judging between current policy options? To answer this question is to begin to assess the "quality" of the democratic process.

The Decline of Social Cleavage Voting

Ironically, just as Lipset and Rokkan were discussing how Western party systems were frozen around the social cleavages of the 1920s, dramatic changes began to affect these same party systems. The established political parties were presented with new demands and new challenges. European party systems became more fractionalized through the fragmenting of established parties and the creation of new parties. Fluctuations in voting results increased in the United States as well as Europe, with inter-election vote shifts becoming more common at the individual and aggregate level (Crewe and Denver 1985; cf. Bartolini and Mair 1990).

Many scholars directly linked these shifting electoral patterns to ongoing changes in the nature of Western societies -- and thereby the bases of the sociological model of voting (Dalton et al. 1984; Inglehart 1977). For example, virtually all industrial democracies have shared in the increasing affluence of the postwar economic boom. The embourgeoisement of the working class narrowed differences in living conditions between class strata and attenuated the importance of class-based political conflict. The growth of the service sector and government employment further reshaped the structure of labor forces, creating new post-industrial societies. These changes in the makeup of

capitalist economies were paralleled by other shifts in the social structure. For instance, modern industrial societies require a more educated labor force and possess the resources to dramatically expand educational access. Changing employment patterns also stimulate increased geographic mobility and urbanization. The traditional closed community life -- be it in a rural farming village or working-class neighborhood -- was gradually supplanted by more open, urban, and cosmopolitan life styles.

These and other social forces profoundly transformed the social composition of contemporary publics from those of the electorates on which our early models of voting behavior were based. In 1948, for example, the number of Americans with only grade school education outnumbered those with some college training by about three to one; by 1988, these proportions had been almost exactly reversed. Similar or even greater educational changes occurred in other democratic societies. The social class, religious, and community bases of social structure have been altered in equally profound ways.

The Class Cleavage

The consequences of these societal changes for the sociological model of voting are most clearly illustrated by the case of the class cleavage. Social scientists have probably devoted more attention to social class than to any other demographic factor. This partially reflects the empirical importance of class cues in explaining the vote, as well as the centrality of class in Marxist theories of politics. At the time of the early voting studies, European political parties were often sharply divided on class-based issues, and even the two U.S. parties projected distinct class appeals during the New Deal period. Early survey evidence found large class voting differences in Britain and many other Northern European democracies (Rose 1974; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Seymour Martin Lipset's cross-national study of mass politics described the class cleavage as one of the most pervasive bases of party support:

Even though many parties renounce the principle of class conflict or loyalty, an analysis of their appeals and their support suggests that they do represent the interests of different classes. On a world scale, the principal generalization which can be made is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes (1960, 230).

Repeating this point, Arend Lijphart's (1981) overview of modern party systems identified the class cleavage as a

major dimension of ideological debate in virtually all democracies.

If one of the pillars of the sociological model was the importance of class voting -- the working class leaning toward left-wing parties and the middle class toward conservative parties -- then this pillar has cracked and crumbled over the past generation. There is a now well-known trend of decreasing class voting that is found in virtually every established democratic party system (Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992). The simplest and most frequently used measure of class voting is the "Alford index" which computes the simple difference between middle class and working-class support for left-wing parties (Alford 1963). For instance, in the 1957 West German election the two class strata differed by nearly 40 percentage points in their support for the Social Democratic Party; in recent German elections this difference has averaged about 10% (Dalton 1988). Similar declines are observed for other northern European democracies where class voting was initially strong, such as Britain, Holland, and Sweden. In nations where class voting was initially modest, such as France, it has weakened still further. Even in the unique Japanese party system, where social forces attenuate the class cleavage, class voting differences have also narrowed over the past decade (Watanuki 1991).

In the United States, there was a modest level of class voting during the New Deal period, which reached a peak in Truman's 1948 election. For most postwar elections, however, social class has exerted only a weak influence on the parties' long-term bases of support. The influence of class has ebbed and flowed in presidential elections, but never reached the degree of polarization witnessed during the New Deal (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 1991, 139-141).

In summary, just as Lipset (1960) previously claimed that class voting was a common aspect of electoral politics in most democracies, one can now make an equal claim that a decline of class voting is a common characteristic of these same party systems. Even the class-based rhetoric that has accompanied recent global recessions in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s has not revived class voting differences in the United States or other Western democracies. This result presents something of a paradox, because social class still has a clear and direct effect on individuals' life chances (Phillips 1990; Thurow 1987; Korpi 1983); the likelihood of university education, future employment, and even lifestyle choices. Yet, there has been an attenuation of the specific linkage between social class and electoral politics.

Given that class voting has been one of the most broadly analyzed aspects of modern electoral research, forecasts of its imminent demise have generated

substantial academic discussion and debate. One line of research argues that a crude dichotomous measure of social class does not capture the present complexity of social structure, and thus misses the continued relevance of class cues to voting. John Goldthorpe (1980), for example, proposed a new categorization of social class incorporating notions of job autonomy and authority relationships into traditional class criteria such as income level and manual labor. Other scholars have used occupational titles to create an expanded list of class categories that incorporate new social contexts, such as the new middle class or affluent blue-collar worker (Robertson 1984; Heath et al. 1985, 1991; Pappi 1990).

The reconceptualization of social class implies that social cues now function in more complex and differentiated ways than in the past. Yet the empirical reality remains: even these complex class frameworks have only a modest value in explaining how citizens vote. Rose and McAllister (1986, 50-51) compare several of these alternative models to British voting behavior in the 1983 election and find that all explain a very modest share of the vote.

Another response to the decline of class voting has been to explore criteria other than employment as potential new bases of socioeconomic cleavage. Some researchers have suggested that education might form the basis of a political cleavage separating the information-rich and technologically sophisticated from the information-poor and unskilled voter (Allardt 1968; Huntington 1968). Others have argued that conflicts between the public and private sectors are supplanting traditional class conflicts (Dunleavy and Husbands 1985). Some of the most innovative recent research attempts to define social position in terms of lifestyle characteristics, distinguishing between industrial employees and yuppies, for example (Gluchowski 1987; Hammond 1986; Delli Carpini and Sigelman 1986).

Again, the limitation of these alternative approaches is their power in actually explaining voting behavior. Despite the frequent discussion of education as *the* political cleavage of advanced industrial societies, its impact on voting choice has paralleled the decline of social class voting. There is little empirical evidence, with the possible exception of lifestyle models, that these alternative structures are a significant influence on the electoral choice of many voters.

The Religious Cleavage

If social class was one of the main pillars of the sociological model, then religion was the other. Dating from before the Columbia studies, early empirical research on voting behavior found that religious affiliations were often strongly linked to voting choice.

Supporting that position, Richard Rose and Derek Urwin (1969) compared the social bases of voting in 16 nations and found that "religious divisions, not class, are the main social base of parties in the Western world today" (p. 12). It appeared that religious cues were strongly related to vote choice despite the lack of explicitly religious issues in most campaigns.

Despite the above-mentioned evidence of religious voting, there are indications that the religious cleavage is following the same pattern of decline as social class. In most Western democracies there has been a steady decline in religious involvement over the past 40 years (Harding 1986). In the Catholic nations of Europe, for instance, frequent church attendance has decreased by nearly half since the 1950s. Predominately Protestant countries, such as the United States and the nations of Northern Europe, began with lower levels of church involvement, but nevertheless have followed the same downward trend. By definition, this secularization trend means that fewer voters are integrated into religious networks and exposed to the religious cues that can guide the vote.

In addition to this trend of secularization, the link between religious leaders and political parties has also weakened in most Western democracies. A generation ago, it was routine for a Dutch priest or a German pastor to remind their congregation of what God expected of them at election time. Now, direct church involvement in partisan politics is more often viewed as an intrusion of church influence. The starkest change has occurred in the Netherlands, where in a single generation the rigid system of religiously based "pillars" was replaced by a system of predominately secular social and political relations (Andeweg 1982). To a more modest extent, a similar process of secularization and rapprochement between the churches and Leftist parties attenuated the political relevance of religion in Germany, France, Italy, and other nations where religion was once a strong influence on voting behavior.

One major exception to the secularization trend has been the recent political emergence of evangelical groups in the United States. Groups such as the Moral Majority represented the potential development of a new religious cleavage -- one that cuts across traditional denominations, dividing the electorate according to the extent of the fundamentalism of one's religious beliefs. Christian fundamentalists can best be defined in surveys as having an unquestioning view of the Bible and considering themselves as "born again." Employing television and other means of mass communication, evangelical leaders such as Pat Robertson (a Republican presidential candidate in 1988) have mobilized such people on the basis of new policy issues dealing with matters of morality and traditional family values (e.g., abortion, school prayer, pornography, etc.). Miller and

Wattenberg (1984) isolate a significant subset of the electorate for whom fundamentalist religious beliefs have become politicized. These politicized fundamentalists now form a group of such size and voting cohesion that they have come to play a major role in the Republican coalition, as witnessed by their prominence during the 1992 Republican national convention.⁶ Still, longitudinal electoral studies fail to find a significant growth in the relationship between religion and vote choice; the impact of the fundamentalist revival is dwarfed by the ebb and flow of other electoral forces (Wald 1987; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 1991, chap. 5).

The decline of sociologically based voting is most apparent for the class and religious cleavages, but a similar erosion of influence can be observed for most other sociological characteristics. In most Western democracies, urban/rural residence displays only modest differences in voting patterns, and these differences have generally narrowed as the forces of modernization decreased the gap between urban and rural lifestyles. Regional differences have occasionally flared up over the past generation, especially in Britain, Belgium, and Canada, but in most nations region exerts only a minor influence on voting preferences (Rose 1982; Clarke et al. 1980; Inglehart 1977, chap. 9). Despite repeated proclamations of an emerging gender gap, gender remains a minor factor in voting behavior (Klein 1984; Farah and Klein 1989; Falter and Schuman 1990). Perhaps the only exception to the rule of declining social cleavages is the case of race and ethnicity, in which one can identify pockets of solid partisan support -- such as blacks for the Democratic Party in the U.S. (Carmines and Stimson 1989) and the voting patterns of immigrant workers in Europe (Hoskin 1991).

When all the evidence is assembled, one of the most widely repeated findings of modern electoral research is the declining value of the sociological model of voting behavior. The rate and timing of this decline varies across nations, but the end product is the same (Franklin et al. 1992). In party systems like the United States and Japan, where social-group-based voting was initially weak, the decline has occurred slowly. In other electoral systems, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy, where sharp social divisions once structured the vote, the decline has been steady and dramatic.

While the evidence is seldom in dispute, scholars do disagree on how to interpret the decline of socially based voting. The sociological model itself would suggest that cleavage-based voting emerges because parties need such frameworks to structure political competition and voters need such cues to simplify politics and guide their behavior. Thus, if older social cleavages are decaying, then we should look for newly emerging social cleavages to take their place. In the vernacular of this literature, the decline of established cleavages should

lead to (or foretell) an eventual *partisan realignment* in which new social divisions come to structure the vote. Realignments have been a regular feature of American electoral politics for well over a century (Sundquist 1973). Similar realignments have occurred in European party systems, such as the ascendance of the British Labour Party in the early twentieth century, or the Gaullist realignment in the French party system of the late 1950s.

The weakness of this realignment scenario is that the old cleavage structure has been decaying for quite some time without a new alignment emerging in its place. In the United States, for example, political analysts have forecast an emerging new alignment at almost every presidential election for the last two decades (Phillips 1969; Miller and Levitin 1976; Chubb and Peterson 1985). Similarly, electoral volatility and partisan instability has increased in most European party systems since the mid-1970s. Recent elections generally perpetuate this fluidity with little evidence that the old system of stable group alignments will be recreated in a new form. If anything, the emergence of green parties in the early 1980s and radical right parties in the early 1990s signals an acceleration of past trends toward partisan fragmentation and volatility.

A contrasting interpretation of these developments has recently been offered by Mark Franklin and his colleagues (1992). They argue that the goal of democratic politics is to resolve political divisions that exist within societies. To the extent that social cleavages reflect broad-based and long-standing social and economic divisions within Western democracies, then the declining electoral relevance of these cleavages signals success in resolving these political divisions. A consensus on the welfare state, for instance, presumably resolved old political conflicts between socioeconomic groups, just as an equalization of living conditions may have eroded urban/rural differences, and so forth.

While this is an appealing explanation, especially as Western democracies bask in their new-found self-esteem with the collapse of the Soviet empire, it suffers from the same problem as earlier "End of Ideology" thesis. Although Western democracies have made substantial progress in meeting their long-term social goals, social and political divisions have *not* come to an end. The global recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s renewed economic problems in most Western industrial countries, and problems of poverty, the homeless, and mounting crime rates persist. Similarly, current political debates over abortion, homosexual rights, and other moral issues reflect the value differences underlying the religious cleavage. Ideology and political conflict have not ended -- they are as much a part of politics as ever.

We favor an explanation that links the decline in the sociological model to the declining relevance of fixed social characteristics for contemporary electoral politics. Social cues may still be a potent influence on voting behavior for people who are integrated into traditional class or religious networks and who share the values of these milieu -- but today there are fewer people who fit within such clear social categories. This partially reflects a fragmentation of life spaces. For instance, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) find that the constituency of the U.S. Democratic party is now split along class, racial, and value lines. It is a monumental task to unite such diverse constituencies at election time, and even more difficult to sustain agreement during the governing process. A similar fragmentation of constituencies has impacted on social democratic and conservative parties in Europe (Kitschelt n.d.).

The weakening of social characteristics also occurs because fewer people are integrated into stable social structures, such as the working-class milieu and religious networks that originally furnished the basis of the class and religious cleavages. There are simply fewer people who can rely on such ready cues as a surrogate for political decision making.

Furthermore, the broadening of political discourse to involve a wider range of political issues and the increasing exposure to other information sources, especially the electronic media, erodes the value of fixed social characteristics as a guide to electoral choice. Economic conflicts are still salient, for example, but social class is a poor guide to determining one's positions on issues such as tax reform, privatization of government services, or deficit spending. For the majority of the electorate, therefore, social position and the attendant social cues no longer provide a very useful shortcut to political decision making. It is not that voters do not have a social location (of course they do), or that voters cannot identify the parties in terms of traditional class positions (they can)⁷ -- but that these cues are of decreasing relevance to contemporary politics.

Once these processes of social change begin to blur the lines of political cleavage, upon which many of the established parties were based, the parties are themselves forced to respond to these developments. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) show, the numerical demise of the working class forced social democratic parties to soften their class image and look to new sources of support in the middle class. Similarly, attempts to broaden the sources of political support are occurring among conservative parties as they observe their past social bases of support eroding. In other words, the parties are contributing to the demise of cleavage voting by their need to compensate for the changing social bases of advanced industrial societies.

In summary, it is not that cleavages have become entirely irrelevant. They have lost their hold among many voters. And for those voters with continuing cleavage ties, social identities are being fragmented across a range of class, religious, ethnic, and other reference groups. The blurring of party images further erodes the value of social cues as a guide to behavior. Thus social change is ending the simple structure of political cleavages that once framed party competition and provided many voters with an easy method of making their electoral decisions.

Party Identification and Partisan Dealignment

Compared to sociological influences on voting, psychological attitudes are more proximate to the vote and hence more closely related to it. The psychological model maintains that partisanship is continually relevant, because most elections are partisan contests. Citizens must usually make judgments about which party best represents their interests, and these perceptions guide individual voting behavior. Partisanship provides a clear and low-cost voting cue for the sophisticated and unsophisticated voter alike. It is also quite a reliable cue, with a candidate's party affiliation normally indicating a policy program that the candidate espouses.

Surveys generally find a close relationship between partisanship and voting in elections, especially in parliamentary contests. For example, only 11% of British partisans defected from their preferred party in the 1979 election, and only 5% of West German partisans defected in 1983. This is to be expected because the limited voting opportunities in most European nations lessen the separation between partisanship and the vote. In contrast, the American voter is faced with federal, state, and local partisan choices to make simultaneously -- with the parties often standing for different points of view at different levels. Consequently, the separation between party identification and voting is most noticeable in American elections. A similar situation exists in French presidential elections, where the two-candidate runoff is decided by the size of the vote the candidates can attract from parties other than their own. Still, even in the case of these two presidential elections, partisanship has a strong influence on American and French voting patterns. In sum, party ties routinely are one of the strongest predictors of voting behavior.

Besides its clear impact on the vote, scholars have also attributed a great deal of theoretical importance to the role of party identification in guiding citizen behavior. As Almond and Verba (1963, 86) wrote in *The Civic Culture*, "Open and moderate partisanship, then,

are essential to a stable democracy. They are the 'feeling correlates' of responsible majority and loyal opposition." Converse and Dupeux (1962) further argued that the likelihood of voters being attracted to "flash" parties and demagogic leaders -- such as the 1950s Poujadists in France or the supporters of Stanislaw Tyminski in the 1990 Polish presidential election -- is increased when many citizens fail to identify with one of the established parties. It is, of course, some sort of economic or cultural shock (such as economic crisis or the fall of communism) that opens the door for demagogic leaders. However, as Converse and Dupeux (1962) note, systems in which many voters do not have long-term partisan attachments are the most likely to be significantly affected.

In sum, widespread party attachments promote continuity in voting and reinforce the stability of the political process. If any change in this situation was foreseen by early researchers of the topic, it was a gradual strengthening of this partisanship model (e.g., Converse 1969).

It therefore came as some surprise when party ties abruptly began to weaken in many Western democracies during the 1970s. This development was initially seen as a temporary development opening the way for a new partisan alignment, but in many nations there has been an enduring erosion in partisan loyalties: a *partisan dealignment*. Credit for first using the term "dealignment" in print goes to Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein (1972) for their article contrasting the patterns of partisan decay in the American system with the growth of partisanship in the French system of the late 1960s. Two years earlier, Walter Dean Burnham (1970) extensively analyzed what he called the "long-term electoral disaggregation" and "party decomposition" in the United States. While neither of Burnham's terms caught on among political scientists, "dealignment" stuck almost immediately.

Whereas realignment involves people changing from one party to another, dealignment concerns people gradually moving away from all parties. Many scholars express concern about potential dealignment trends because they fear the loss of the stabilizing, conserving equilibrium that party attachments provide to electoral systems. This is especially the case in the United States, where political parties have always been uniquely weak in comparison to parliamentary systems.⁸ Because dealignment in the United States differs in both form and magnitude from that of the parliamentary democracies, we shall treat it separately.

The Decline of Partisanship in the United States

Mountains of survey evidence attest to Americans' declining concern with partisanship and the role of political parties in U.S. government. Some of the most frequently cited indicators are the rise of split-ticket voting, the decline of party identification, and the increase in neutral attitudes toward the parties — each of which will be discussed in this section.

Behind all these trends is the pervasive American belief that one should vote for the person, not the party. Even in 1956, when most people were still voting straight tickets, 74% of respondents in a Gallup poll agreed with this general belief; by 1968 this figure had risen to 84% (Dennis 1975). Most recently, a survey by Sabato (1988) found 92% agreeing with the statement, "I always vote for the person who I think is best, regardless of what party they belong to."

With such public opinion data, it can now be said that the principle of putting candidate ahead of party in voting has become a part of the American consensus. One reason is that political parties are not perceived as particularly meaningful in American politics. Indeed, a large percentage of Americans sees little need for parties altogether. Forty-five percent of the 1980 election study sample agreed that "it would be better if, in all elections, we put no party labels on the ballot." Most striking is that 30% agreed with the extreme statement, "the truth is we probably don't need political parties anymore."

Not only have voters increasingly said that they vote for the person rather than the party; they have actually done so with great frequency. Analysis of American voting patterns over the course of the twentieth century clearly reveals a steady trend away from party-line voting. As Burnham (1991) has shown, the shared variance between a state's vote for president and its vote for Senate, House, and governor has declined continuously throughout this century. He finds that at the turn of the century one could almost perfectly predict how a state would vote for Congress and governor by its vote for president. By mid-century a state often followed the same pattern in voting for president as for other offices, but with a fair number of exceptions. By the 1980s, knowing a state's presidential vote was virtually no help in predicting its vote for other offices.

These results are far from academic. They can clearly be seen in the unprecedented level of split party control of both the federal and state governments in recent years. In 1988 only 40% of the states had one party in control of both legislative houses and the governor's office (see Fiorina 1992). Not since the formation of the Republican Party in the 1850s can one find any comparable split in the history of state party

politics. Similarly, for the period between 1981 and 1986 different parties controlled the House and Senate for the first time since 1916. Most visible, of course, has been the division in partisan control of the presidency and the Congress since 1952. From 1952 to 1992 the same party controlled the presidency and the House for just 14 out of 40 years.

It would be an overstatement, though, to infer that even a majority of voters are now splitting their tickets between major federal offices. Rather, ticket-splitting between presidential and House voting has risen from 14% in 1960 to a high of 34% in 1980. (Because any vote for Ross Perot is by definition a split-ticket vote, the figure for 1992 will be even higher than in 1980.) Some have argued that such behavior is simply due to the nomination of presidential candidates whom many party identifiers could not support. Yet secular increases can also be found in measures that do not involve presidential voting, such as voting for House and Senate candidates of different parties. A 1990 study of voting behavior in Ohio found that a majority of the electorate voted for different parties in choosing five statewide officials (Beck et al. 1992).

Given the current American preference for voting the person rather than the party, there is good reason to expect that split-ticket voting may reach even higher levels in the future. The attitudinal potential for ticket-splitting has consistently been greater than its incidence, and one can reasonably interpret recent trends as reflecting the tendency for behaviors to eventually come into line with attitudes.

Accompanying the trend toward greater split-ticket voting has been a decline in party identification. Election studies during the period 1952-1964 found that approximately 75% of the electorate identified themselves as either Democrat or Republican. By 1972 the percentage of respondents identifying with one of the parties had dropped to 64%. What once appeared to be a continuing downward spiral no longer seems to be such, but instead a limited period effect in which there was a rapid decline followed by the development of a new, somewhat lower, level of stability. Since 1972 the proportion of the population identifying with one of the parties during presidential elections has held steady at between 63% and 65%. As the number of Democratic identifiers declined during the 1980s, the result was that by 1988 more people identified themselves as independents than anything else (see Wattenberg 1990, 140).

Some scholars have argued that the decline in party identification has been vastly exaggerated, because independents who report that they think of themselves as "closer" to one of the two parties have still been considered nonpartisans (Keith et al. 1992). According

to these scholars, the so-called independent leaners are not an uncommitted and unmobilized bloc, but are instead largely "closet" Democrats and Republicans. Although they may prefer to call themselves independents rather than Democrats or Republicans, when it comes to their voting behavior in presidential elections they tend to act no differently than weak party identifiers. If one considers independent leaners as simply partisans by another name, then the proportion of the population identifying with a party can hardly be said to have declined at all over the years.

This argument was first introduced by Keith et al. in a 1977 APSA convention paper, and immediately became influential in the field. Ironically, the book that evolved from the 1977 paper, Keith et al.'s *The Myth of the Independent Voter*, was released for publication in June of 1992 -- just when Ross Perot was leading in the public opinion polls. If ever there was a solid demonstration of the independence of American voters, the Perot phenomenon would be it. Analyzing the 19% of the electorate who voted for Perot, as well as the even greater percentage who at one point intended to vote for him, will no doubt be a prime topic for American voting behavior scholars in the coming years.

One theory concerning the meaning of party identification that is likely to get renewed attention in light of the Perot phenomenon is the multidimensionality of party identification (see Valentine and Van Wingen 1980; Weisberg 1980; Kamieniecki 1985). This perspective holds that the standard party identification measure taps two separate dimensions: 1) preference for the Democrats versus the Republicans; and 2) feelings of political independence. Rather than thinking of independent leaners as "closet partisans," this theory portrays them as people who have genuine feelings of independence, but who also maintain a general party preference. As Weisberg (1980) shows, many people who say they support one of the parties also report that they consider themselves political independents. Whereas Keith et al. (1992) regard the increase in independent leaners as inconsequential given their regular support for their preferred party, the multidimensionality theory would lead one to expect these voters to be more prone to support candidates such as Perot.

Yet another theory that could explain the growing volatility of the electorate is the dissipation of party images (see Wattenberg 1990). This theory holds that political parties have been declining in relevance to the American public for several decades due to changes in political communication and the way campaigns are now run. The best, supporting empirical evidence comes from open-ended questions asking people what they like and dislike about the two parties. Since 1952 the proportion of the electorate that can be classified as

having a neutral view of both parties has increased gradually from 13% in 1952 to an average of 34% in the 1980s. Virtually all of these individuals said that they neither liked nor disliked *anything* about the Democratic and Republican parties.

In Eisenhower's and Kennedy's eras, such a response pattern typically reflected general political ignorance. Most of these people had little to say about the candidates as well, and few voted. For instance, 84% of them in the 1960 NES sample were classified as "no issue content" on Converse's (1964) classic measure of levels of conceptualization. In contrast, in 1984 only 44% of those who had nothing to say about the parties failed to mention an issue when they were asked about the candidates. In the 1980s such individuals have tuned out the parties but not necessarily the candidates and the issues. Indeed, they are often considered the most important group in American electoral politics -- "the floating voters" -- presumably a group that was particularly open to the Perot appeal.

To summarize, many American voters now view parties as a convenience rather than a necessity. Yet, regardless of whether the American public recognizes it or not, parties are necessities for structuring the vote. Political scientists have long recognized the indispensable functions performed by parties, and dealignment has only reinforced this view. As Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984, 462) write, "Unless elections become purely contests of personalities, parties are likely to continue to play an important role in structuring political choices, even in a purely dealigned and issue-oriented electorate." In parliamentary systems, this is far more obvious, and we now turn our attention to these systems.

The Decline of Partisanship Outside the United States

Despite the conceptual and empirical value of party identification in American research, its export to other democracies initially highlighted the uniqueness of the American electoral system. In Britain, for example, Butler and Stokes (1969) found that it was difficult to separate party attachments from present voting intentions. Other scholars similarly found that it was hard to disentangle partisanship and the vote in parliamentary systems (Borre 1984; Baker et al. 1981). In addition, researchers noted that the concept of partisan "independence" was a distinct American political tradition without a clear equivalent in most parliamentary systems (Budge et al. 1976).

Still, most studies agreed that voters held some sort of party allegiances that endure over time and strongly influence other attitudes and behaviors (Miller 1976). The major problem appeared to be one of

measurement: finding an equivalent measure of partisanship in multiparty parliamentary systems or in nations where the term "partisan" held different connotations. One could not simply translate the American party identification question into French or German; one had to find a functional equivalent for the concept of partisan attachments.⁹ The resulting measures of partisanship appeared to display many of the same political functions as partisanship in the United States. (Baker et al. 1981; Gluchowski 1983; Converse and Pierce 1986; Butler and Stokes 1974).

Having established the validity of partisanship to European electoral research, trend studies in several nations began to find evidence of a weakening of partisan ties that was remarkably similar to the partisan dealignment in the United States. Over 40% of the British public were strong partisans during the late 1960s; this percentage was cut in half within less than a decade (Saarlvik and Crewe 1983; Abramson 1992). Partisan ties initially strengthened in postwar Germany as the party system grew along with the nation's democratic experience, but in the 1980s German attachments to the political parties also began to weaken (Dalton 1992). Longitudinal data from national election studies in France, the Netherlands, Italy, Scandinavia, and Australia display a similar erosion in the strength of party attachments over the past decades (Dalton et al. 1984; McAllister 1992; cf. Schmitt 1989 for an opposing view.)

The symptoms of partisan dealignment are visible in these nations in other ways beyond the public's attachments to the parties. For instance, the erosion of partisanship is visible in the declining stability of voting patterns (Crewe and Denver 1985). In addition, many of these voters have the same doubts about political parties that are harbored by American voters. Peter Gluchowski (1983), for example, found that a significant minority of Germans view parties as mere electoral conveniences. Finally, there has been a decrease in voting turnout in some Western democracies (see below), which is at least partially the result of weakened partisanship.

What is stunning about these findings, as with the weakening of the sociological model, is the relative simultaneity of political trends in various electoral systems. There are several explanations for the spreading pattern of partisan dealignment. One factor involves the declining role of parties as political institutions. Many of the parties' traditional input functions have been taken over by other institutions. A myriad of special-interest groups and single-issue lobbies have developed in recent years, and which are organizing to press their interests without relying on partisan channels. Similarly, the mass media are assuming many of the information and input functions that political parties once controlled. Party leaders are even losing some control over the selection of

elected party representatives. The most advanced example is the United States, where the expansion of open primaries and nonpartisan elections undermined the parties' hold on recruitment. The British Labour party has experienced a similar shift in nomination power away from the party in Parliament to party conventions and local constituency groups. And in Israel in 1992, an American-style primary was held to choose the leader of the Labor party, and the Likud followed with a similar primary in 1993. These and other developments lessen the importance of parties in the political process and therefore weaken the significance of parties as political reference points.

Partisan dealignment is also encouraged by the failure of parties to deal successfully with contemporary political controversies, ranging from economic issues to the environment and other quality of life issues. On the one hand, many European parties remain rigidly committed to outdated policies on the economic and welfare issues associated with the traditional class cleavage. On the other hand, the agenda of advanced industrial societies often appears unsuited for mass political parties. Many of these new issues -- such as nuclear energy, minority rights, university reform, or local environmental problems -- are too narrow to affect mass partisan alignments on their own. The rise of single-issue interests does not translate well into partisan attachments, because of the uncertain electoral impact of these issues and the difficulty of accommodating these issues within large political coalitions. In the United States, this has led to a proliferation of citizen interest groups and direct action politics; in Europe this has spawned similar groups as well as a variety of small green and libertarian parties (Mueller-Rommel 1989). Thus the larger established parties are not entirely fulfilling their critical programmatic function of aggregating and articulating political interests.

The decline of partisanship also appears to have a distinct generational component in most nations, suggesting that changes in the political environment are contributing to these trends. In the United States, it may have been the dramatic political events of the 1970s that turned many young people away from political parties. The anti-partisan sentiments stirred by the Vietnam War, Watergate, and similar crises kept new voters from developing the early-life partisan attachments which then could build over time (Beck 1984). Another interpretation is that the events *per se* were not as important as the candidate-centered way in which they were presented (Wattenberg 1990). With an emphasis on the actions of leaders rather than on parties, young voters failed to see any need to affiliate with a party.

In some nations, generational differences in partisanship also may reflect the growing ability of

younger and better educated voters to manage the complexity of politics without relying on inherited party leanings. This interpretation of partisan dealignment is supported by the pattern of weakening party ties. For instance, educational level is significantly related to dealignment in Britain. Between 1964 and 1974, the decrease in partisanship among British citizens with advanced education was three times as great as among those with minimal education (Alt 1984; for the United States see Beck 1984; for Germany see Dalton and Rohrschneider 1990). An extension of these analyses presents cross-national evidence of a new kind of nonpartisan in advanced industrial societies (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990, chap. 10). These *apartisans* are sophisticated and active citizens who remain unattached to any political party. In contrast to the traditional partisan independents, who were uninformed and uninvolved in politics, apartisans are active participants (though often outside party-related activities such as campaigns and elections). These new independents are also less consistent in their voting patterns because voting behavior is not dependent on long-standing party predispositions. Because apartisans are concentrated among the young, the better educated, and citizens with postmaterial values, the continuing socioeconomic development of advanced industrial societies may reinforce the dealignment trend that has emerged over the past decade.

These on-going debates about the nature and role of party identification suggest several priority areas for future research. First, rather than the static view of partisanship offered by *The American Voter*, current research recognizes the dynamic properties of partisanship. Party attachment is both a socialized political orientation and a summation of accumulated electoral experiences through one's adult life (Fiorina 1981; Jennings and Markus 1984; MacKuen et al. 1990; cf. Abramson and Ostrom 1991).¹⁰ In most instances adult electoral experiences reinforce early learning, and partisanship therefore strengthens with the passage of time. But we are witnessing a period when dominant patterns of electoral change often are retarding the development of partisanship. Determining the relative mix of stability and change in forming current partisan attachments has important implications for how we view partisanship as a guide to individual political behavior.

Once we accept that partisanship is a changeable political orientation, this prompts a revival of early research focusing on the functional basis of partisanship. Several scholars have focused on the distinction between affectively-based partisanship, that might be socialized early in life and relatively immune to subsequent change, versus cognitively-based partisanship, that is more likely to reflect current political beliefs (Miyake 1991; Wattenberg 1991; Gluchowski 1983; Richardson 1991).

Similarly, research on the (diminished) functional value of partisanship for the politically informed and issue-oriented apartisans will be an important part of this debate.

Finally, cross-national patterns of societal changes and the generational nature of partisan dealignment suggest that greater partisan fluidity will be a continuing feature of electoral politics in most advanced industrial democracies.¹¹ Realignment theorists have now waited nearly a generation for a new partisan order to establish itself; how much longer should we wait? We think it is unlikely that contemporary electoral systems will return to the stable, structured patterns of the past, in which social characteristics and an enduring sense of partisanship determined electoral behavior. With less reliance being placed on these simplifying guides for party choice, the question of how satisfying voters actually make their decisions becomes even more important.

The Resurgence of the Rational Voter Model

As the electoral impact of both sociological factors and long-term psychological determinants has eroded, many political scientists have emphasized a corresponding increase in the influence of issue opinions and candidate preferences on voting choices. These short-term factors have often been treated within the framework of the rational voter approach first introduced in Downs's classic *Economic Theory of Democracy*. This approach portrays the average voter as able to assess current political concerns such as party platforms, past performance, and candidate competence better than the voters portrayed in the Columbia and Michigan studies. This section examines the resurgence of the rational voter model, as seen through the evidence for issue and candidate voting.

Issue Voting

The study of issue voting has been closely intertwined with the scholarly debate on the political sophistication of contemporary publics that was discussed earlier in this chapter; researchers thus often differ in their evaluation of the extent of issue voting. In the 1950s the authors of *The American Voter* stressed that only a small percentage of the American electorate relied on issues to decide their votes (Campbell et al. 1960, chap. 6). *The Changing American Voter* challenged this claim, however, arguing that voters in more recent years had become more sophisticated about issues and better

able to use policy positions to gauge alternatives (Nie et al. 1976). Their analysis, in turn, has been challenged by many scholars (see Bishop et al. 1979; Sullivan et al. 1978; Smith 1989). In a rejoinder, other research argues that poor question wording and other methodological shortcomings led early researchers to significantly underestimate the role that issues could play in voting behavior whether or not the electorate has changed over time (see Niemi and Weisberg 1993a, chap. 4).

Regardless of whether voters are now more sophisticated about the issues, the unquestioned decline in long-term forces shaping the vote has increased at least the *potential* for issue voting. For if social cues and partisanship are less central in electoral decision making, then voters must be turning to other factors -- such as issues and candidates -- to make their political decisions. Thus, Mark Franklin (1985) showed that the decreasing influence of long-term forces on British voting decisions was counterbalanced by an increased impact of issues on the vote (also Baker et al. 1981, chap. 10; van der Eijk and Niemoeller 1983; Budge and Farlie 1983). In reviewing the findings from a recent comparative study of voting in seven Western democracies, Franklin (1992, 400) goes one step further, concluding: if all the issues of importance to voters had been measured and given their due weight, then the rise of issue voting would have compensated more or less precisely for the decline in cleavage politics."

One problem hampering the comparative study of issue voting, either across time or across nations, is the variability of issues across elections and across voters. One campaign might emphasize economic conflicts, and the next might stress questions of candidate competence. Moreover, there are a variety of issues that might influence the voting choices of contemporary electorates. Elections are seldom dominated by a single issue. Thus the impact of any one issue for the entire public is often modest because not even all the informed voters will be interested in it.

Although the issues of each specific election campaign are different, the general impact of policy preferences on voting behavior can be estimated by examining the relationship between Left/Right (or liberal/conservative) attitudes and the vote. Such ideological positions can be described as a sort of "super issue"; that is, a statement of positions on the issues that are currently most important to each voter (Inglehart 1984). Pamela Conover and Stanley Feldman (1981) see Left/Right images at the core of many political schema (also see Kerlinger 1984; Murphy et al. 1981; Rohrschneider 1992). Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1990) find that the citizens' interpretation of Left and Right changes over time to reflect the changing nature of political agenda. Furthermore, Downs

conceived of such political labels as a way to reduce information costs, rather than the fully informed ideological orientations presumed by his critics (Stokes 1966). As he explained (Downs 1957, 98), "With this shortcut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wide range of issues." The labels of "Left" and "Right" help voters in interpreting a wide range of political phenomena. The ability to think of oneself in Left/Right terms does not imply that citizens possess any sophisticated abstract framework or theoretical dogma. For many individuals, Left/Right attitudes are simply a kind of summary statement of their positions.

Studies in numerous countries consistently find that most citizens can position themselves along a Left/Right scale, and these attitudes are linked to specific policy views (Klingemann 1979; Inglehart 1984). In addition, when asked to place the major parties on such a scale, the mean placements are fairly accurate portrayals of actual party positions (also see Castles 1982). While some voters clearly guess at the Left/Right questions, there is much evidence to support the expected pattern of left-wing voters supporting leftist parties and vice versa.

Beginning with this observed relationship, research has moved in two different directions to extend these analyses. One approach has examined the changing meaning of "Left," "Right," and other political symbols to Western publics, in order to trace the changing bases of issue competition in Western democracies (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann 1990). Most prominent in this literature has been the argument that the basis of issue voting is gradually but systematically shifting from the economic and security issues that arose from the class cleavage and social divisions to the new post-material issues of advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1990; Dalton et al. 1984; Miller and Levitin 1976). Indeed, the rise of these cross-cutting issue interests is inevitably linked to the erosion of previous social cleavages (Knutsen 1987).

Ironically, this research on "new" issues has been paralleled by a revived interest in government economic performance as a basis for voting choice. Downs does mention performance considerations, but only as secondary considerations in assessing utility income. In his model, "performance ratings enter a voter's decision making whenever he thinks both parties have the same platforms and current policies" (Downs 1957, 44). Rational choice theorists who followed Downs have often reversed priorities, concentrating on the lowered information costs associated with performance as opposed to ideological factors. Given the public's limited attentiveness to politics, these theorists argue that it is sensible for most voters to pay more attention to results than to means. Fiorina (1981, 5) puts it best when he states that citizens "typically have one

comparatively hard bit of data: they know what life has been like during the incumbent's administration. They do not need to know the precise economic or foreign policies of the incumbent administration in order to judge the results of those policies." In other words, performance-based voting offers people a reasonable shortcut for ensuring that unsuccessful policies are dropped and successful policies continued.

Of course, one counterargument is that policies may be reversed as seeming failures when in fact they had little to do with subsequent developments. Nevertheless, this literature argues that it is only important that voters dispense electoral rewards and punishments—regardless of whether the policies and the outcomes are truly connected. Benjamin Page (1978, 222), for example, writes that "even if the Great Depression and lack of recovery were not at all Hoover's fault ... it could make sense to punish him in order to sharpen the incentives to maintain prosperity in the future." Acknowledging that blame may be placed unfairly, he notes, "To err on the side of forgiveness would leave voters vulnerable to tricky explanations and rationalizations; but to err on the draconian side would only spur politicians on to greater energy and imagination in problem solving."

Therefore, what is crucial to performance voting is that voters have a target for their blame when the government falters in some respect. Typically, this is due to poor economic performance, and the literature on economic voting has burgeoned in recent years. Much evidence exists to document the importance of macroeconomics on micropolitics, both in the United States (Tuftes 1978; Kiewiet 1983; Rosenstone 1983; Markus 1988) and Europe (Lewis-Beck 1988; Clark and Whitely 1990; Norpoth and Lewis-Beck 1991; Norpoth 1992).

If the importance of economically based evaluations of parties and candidates seems non-controversial, the evidence on the exact scope and nature of this influence remains a point of debate. One point of debate concerns whether voters base their political evaluations on their own personal economic situation (egocentric voting) or the performance of the broader national economy (sociotropic voting). Most of the evidence seems to suggest that voters follow the sociotropic model, which implies that policy outcomes rather than narrow self-interest is the driving force behind performance voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Lewis-Beck 1988). Researchers also disagree on whether voters evaluate past economic performance retrospectively or base their judgments on prospective expectations for the economy's future performance (see Fiorina 1981; Miller and Wattenberg 1985; MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1992).

It is now the accepted wisdom that incumbent parties are virtually impossible to beat during strong economic upturns and extremely vulnerable during recessionary periods. So important is the state of the economy that it can override other policy considerations. For example, many analysts have argued that right-wing governments in Great Britain and the United States were elected to office in 1979 and 1980, respectively, not for ideological reasons but merely because they were the only instrument available for defeating incumbents who had failed to deliver the economic goods (Crewe and Searing 1988; Wattenberg 1991). Four years after coming to power, both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were able to win reelection on the basis of improved economic performance (and the Falklands War in the case of Thatcher) — in spite of continuing policy differences with the majority of their country's voters.

While such a scenario for electoral change may not conform to democratic theory's emphasis on policy evaluation, it is defended as entirely rational by proponents of retrospective voting (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). Does it make sense, they would ask, to pay much attention to the positions of an ineffective administration that seemingly cannot make good on its promises and program? Retrospective voting theorists emphasize that the only really effective weapon of popular control in a democratic regime is the electorate's capacity to throw a party from power.

Candidate Evaluations

While issues have always been thought of as desirable influences on the vote, candidate evaluations have traditionally been viewed less positively by electoral analysts. Voting on the basis of personality characteristics has often been viewed in the literature as "irrational" (cf. Converse 1964; Page 1978). The popular cynical view of candidates is that they are attractively packaged commodities devised by image makers who manipulate the public's perceptions by emphasizing traits with special appeal to the voters. People's judgments about alternative candidates are, in this view, based on superficial criteria such as the candidate's style or looks (e.g., Sullivan and Masters 1988). Indeed, Rosenberg and McCafferty (1987) show that it is possible to manipulate a candidate's personal appearance in a way that affects voters' choices. Holding a candidate's issue stands and party identification constant, they find that when good pictures are substituted for bad ones, a candidate's vote-getting ability is significantly increased. Although a laboratory setting may not be representative of the real world, Rosenberg and McCafferty (1987, 44) conclude that "with appropriate pretesting and adequate control over a

candidate's public appearance, a campaign consultant should be able to significantly manipulate the image projected to the voting public."

Recently, a very different approach to candidate assessments has begun to appear in the literature. This emerging theory holds that candidate evaluations are not necessarily superficial, emotional, or purely short-term. Voters may focus on the personal qualities of a candidate to gain important information about characteristics relevant to assessing how the individual will perform in office (Kinder et al. 1980; Kinder 1986; Miller et al. 1986; Rahn et al. 1990). This new approach is largely based on the premise that individuals organize their thoughts about other people into broad preexisting categories. These category "prototypes" are then used in making judgments when only limited factual information is available. Kinder et al. (1980), for example, explore the features that may define an ideal president. They find that people can choose attributes they believe would make for an ideal president, but that these prototypic conceptions are related only to ratings of the incumbent president.

Miller et al. (1986) also present data to support a rational voter interpretation of candidate evaluations. They argue that "candidate assessments actually concentrate on instrumental concerns about the manner in which a candidate would conduct governmental affairs" (p. 536). Analyzing open-ended like/dislike data about the candidates from the American National Election Studies, they find that the three most important dimensions of candidate image for Americans are integrity, reliability, and competence. Such criteria are hardly irrational, for if a candidate is too incompetent to carry out policy promises, or too dishonest for those promises to be trusted, it makes perfect sense for a voter to pay more attention to personality than policies. Interestingly, both Glass (1985) and Miller et al. (1986) find that college-educated voters are the most likely to view the candidates in terms of their personal attributes.

The importance of performance-relevant criteria, such as competence and integrity, has also been shown for leader evaluations in the parliamentary systems of Canada (Brown et al. 1988), Australia and New Zealand (Bean n.d.). Whereas early electoral research on parliamentary systems tended to suggest that the impact of party leader images on voting behavior was very minor (Butler and Stokes 1969; Aitkin 1977), more recent research has found significant effects. Bean and Mughan (1989) find that the perceived effectiveness of party leaders was moderately important in the British election of 1983 and possibly decisive in the Australian election of 1987. This "Americanization" of parliamentary elections can also be found somewhat at the level of constituency candidates. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987) find

some evidence for the "personal vote" in Great Britain, although to a much lesser extent than in the United States—where incumbency advantage has recently risen to all-time heights at the congressional level (Fiorina 1989). In Japan's unique multi-member constituencies, Bradley Richardson (1988) has found that partisanship clearly outweighs candidate images in voting behavior, but nevertheless the role of candidates is substantial.

Perhaps the best place to look for candidate effects in voting behavior in the near future is in the newly democratizing countries of Eastern Europe. Unfamiliar with the concept of competing political parties, much less many of the individual parties themselves, the voters of these fledgling democracies have little to guide their decisions. One factor for them to fall back on is thus the most visible feature of the new parties—their leaders. This is especially likely to be the case when parties form around leaders as opposed to leaders emerging from a party organization. The fact that many of the new Eastern European democracies provide for the direct election of a president will no doubt facilitate a focus on the individual leaders such as Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa. Like American voters, who have been set adrift without the anchoring of partisanship, we expect the citizens of Eastern Europe to focus their choices on the character and competence of the contenders for leadership posts. Certainly, this should be an important focus for comparative voting behavior studies in the near future.

Who Votes?

The preceding sections of this chapter have examined the factors influencing people's decisions on how to vote, but there is an earlier decision that citizens must make: whether to vote in the first place. The dramatic events of the past few years suggest that the value of the ballot is seen differently depending on the individual and the political context. In Eastern Europe, citizens swarmed to the polls when first given the chance to vote in free elections, with turnout rates as high as 93% in East Germany in 1990. In contrast, in the well-established industrialized democracies the opportunity to vote is all too often taken for granted by many citizens. This is particularly true in the United States, where turnout in 1992 was a mere 55%.

To put these recent events into perspective, Table 1 presents the rates in voting turnout for the 21 industrialized democracies from the 1950s to the 1980s. One obvious feature in these data is the sharp cross-national differences in participation levels that exist among democratic polities. In the United States and Switzerland, for instance, participation in national

elections involves barely half of the eligible adults; in several European nations participation is nearly universal.

Table 1. Changes in Turnout From the 1950s to 1980s

	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s ^a
Australia	90	93	93	91
Austria	94	93	93	90
Belgium	88	86	86	87
Canada	74	77	73	73
Denmark	82	87	86	86
Finland	86	85	78	75
France	75	75	81	70
Germany (West)	84	85	90	86
Iceland	89	90	89	88
Ireland	74	74	76	74
Israel	78	80	78	78
Italy	90	90	89	84
Japan	76	80	78	78
Luxembourg	88	84	84	83
Netherlands	93	93	83	84
New Zealand	91	88	85	89
Norway	78	83	82	83
Sweden	78	86	90	90
Switzerland	68	63	53	47
United Kingdom	80	76	75	74
United States	61	62	54	52

Source: Mackie and Rose (1990) and data collected by the authors.

^a Figures represent the average in each decade for each country for elections to the lower house in the case of parliamentary systems and the presidency in the U.S.

Low levels of turnout in the United States have been in evidence throughout most of the twentieth century and are often cited as proof of the electorate's limited political involvement. But a more complex set of factors is at work (Powell 1980, 1986; Jackman 1987; Verba et al. 1978). Voter registration systems and other electoral procedures are a major influence on transatlantic differences in turnout. Most European citizens are automatically included on the roster of registered voters, and these electoral registers are updated by the government. Thus a much larger percentage of the European public is registered to participate in elections. In contrast, most Americans must take the initiative to register themselves to vote, which for one reason or another many eligible voters fail to do. By most estimates, participation in American elections would increase by at least ten percentage points if the European system of registration was adopted (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Turnout also is encouraged by the scheduling of most European elections on weekends, when more voters can find the time to visit the polls. In addition, most European electoral systems are based on proportional representation (PR) rather than plurality-based single-member districts, as in the United States. Proportional representation is generally believed to stimulate turnout because any party, large or small, can increase its representation in the legislature as a direct function of its share of the popular vote.

G. Bingham Powell (1980, 1986) and Markus Crepaz (1990) demonstrate that political competition is another strong influence on turnout rates. Sharp social or ideological cleavages between parties tend to stimulate turnout. The more polarized European party systems generally encourage higher voting rates than found in the United States. When European voters go to the polls they are deciding on whether or not their country will be run by parties with socialist goals or alternatively by conservative and, in some cases, religious parties. The consequences of their votes for redistribution of income and the general orientation of the government are far greater than the impact the ordinary American voter can expect. Robert Jackman (1987) has conducted complementary analyses which show that the structural incentives for voting strongly affect turnout rates. He finds that the number of party choices and the structure of legislative power in a system are direct predictors of turnout.

A final difference between the United States and most other democracies is that the American government asks its citizens to vote far more often. While the typical European voter may be called upon to cast two or three ballots in a four-year period, many Americans are faced with a dozen or more separate elections in the space of four years. Furthermore, Americans are expected to vote for a much wider range of political offices. With one

elected official for about every 500 citizens, and elections held somewhere virtually every week, it is no wonder that it is so difficult to get Americans to the polls. In contrast, local, regional, and even national elections in Europe and Japan normally consist of casting just a single ballot for a single office; the extensive list of elected offices and long ballots common to American elections are unknown in Western Europe and Japan. Thus, a distinctive aspect of American politics is the demands it places upon the voter to make political decisions on an array of political offices, government bond and tax proposals, and other policy initiatives. Making decisions in low-information contests, such as voting for local non-partisan offices, is a distinct challenge for American voters. It is probably no coincidence that the one European country that has a comparable turnout level to the United States -- Switzerland -- has also overwhelmed its citizens with voting opportunities, calling 89 national elections in the period between 1947 and 1975 (for other reasons why Swiss turnout is so low, see Powell 1982, 119).

Rather than counting only the number of people who vote in national elections, an alternative measure of participation suggests we focus on the amount of electing being done by the public (Crewe 1981). When the context of American elections is considered, the amount of electing is actually quite high. No country can approach the United States in the frequency and variety of elections, and thus in the amount of electoral participation that actually takes place. No other country elects its lower house as often as every two years, or its president as frequently as every four years. No other country popularly elects its state governors and town mayors, or has as wide a variety of nonrepresentative offices (judges, sheriffs, attorneys general, city treasurers, and so on) subject to election. Only one other country (Switzerland) can compete in the number and variety of local referenda, and only two (Belgium and Turkey) hold party "primaries" in most parts of the country.¹² Even if differences in turnout rates are taken into account, American citizens do not necessarily vote less often than other nationalities; most probably, they do more voting (Crewe 1981, 262).

The other significant pattern in Table 1 is the trend in participation rates over time. Comparing the two end points, one finds that ten of the countries have experienced turnout declines of more than 2%, eight have had virtually stable turnout levels, and three have witnessed a turnout increase of more than 2%. Thus, if there is any predominant pattern in voting participation in recent decades, it is one of declining turnout.

The decline in electoral participation presents a paradox. Education, access to political information, political interest, and sophistication have generally been

rising in recent decades, and it has long been established that such indicators are related to turnout. Why then is participation in national elections declining if the public's general level of political involvement is increasing?

Each of the three main theories of voting behavior -- sociological, psychological, and economic -- can offer an answer to this puzzle. Sociological factors are linked to life conditions and other factors that increase (or decrease) one's ability to cope with the demands of electoral politics. For instance, as citizens age they accumulate experience with political issues, as well as a greater stake in the community. Thus, turnout rates are linked to the age composition of the electorate. Psychological factors can provide the motivation to go to the polls. Interest in politics is strongly related to turnout, though turnout has been declining while interest has been rising.

Probably the least useful theory in understanding turnout is the economic one. Given the infinitesimal chance that an individual has to actually decide an election, the benefits of voting are so small that they will always be outweighed by the costs (Wuffle 1984). The economic model generally functions by assuming that by exercising one's citizen duty one contributes to the maintenance of the regime (Enelow and Hinich 1990; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Still, the general notion of costs and benefits is relevant in understanding why the U.S. has lower turnout than most democracies because the costs of participation are higher due to registration requirements.

The most extensive research on the reasons behind declining turnout has been done in the United States. One source of the decline has been the changing age structure of the American electorate, in part through demographic changes in the population and partially through a lowering of the voting age (Shaffer 1981; Teixeira 1992; Miller 1992). An even more significant factor was the public's changing orientation toward politics -- decreases in feelings of political efficacy and party identification that occurred over the past 20 years (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Teixeira 1987; Rosestone and Hansen 1993). Such disconnection from electoral politics naturally inhibits participation in the process.

While the specifics of the American case are well researched, a single-nation focus misses the point that such turnout declines are a common feature across advanced industrial democracies. Decreasing turnout does not mean that citizens are generally disengaging from politics, however, since there have been increases in other forms of political action (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jennings and van Deth 1990; Verba et al. 1978). Voting is an area where elites and political organizations traditionally were able to mobilize even disinterested citizens to turn out at the polls. High turnout levels often

reflect the organizational skills of political groups rather than the public's concern about the election (Uhlener 1989). Moreover, citizen input through this participation mode is limited by the institutionalized structure of elections, which narrows (and blurs) the choice of policy options and limits the frequency of public input.

Contemporary electorates may not rely on voting and campaign activity as the primary means of expanding their involvement in politics. Citizen participation has increased in areas where activity is citizen initiated, less structured, and more policy oriented. Thus, referenda are preferred over elections, and citizen-interest-group activity over campaign work. The use of referenda has, in fact, increased dramatically in Western democracies in recent years (Butler and Ranney 1981). Similarly, the activity of citizen lobbies, single-issue groups, and citizen action movements is increasing in nearly all Western democracies (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jennings and van Deth 1990; Ginsberg and Shefter 1990). Many Europeans believe that electoral participation might be reinvigorated by expanding the public's decision-making responsibilities to include primaries, preference-ranking mechanisms for party-list voting, or candidate ranking within party lists. However, it must be noted that such participatory opportunities have not served to increase turnout in the United States.

Overall, the limits of voting have led some critics to claim that by focusing mass participation on voting, parties and political elites are seeking to protect their privileged position in the policy process and actually limit citizen influence (Burnham 1980). Even if this skepticism is merited, voting will remain an important aspect of democratic politics, as much for its symbolic value as for its instrumental influence on policy. Voting is the one activity that binds the individual to the political system and legitimizes the rest of the democratic process.

The Changing Nature of Citizen Politics

The implicit argument of this chapter has been that one of the most difficult tasks that individuals perform is what some political scientists call "the simple act of voting." The choice of candidates and parties involves judgments about the course of society, evaluations of the performance of the incumbents, and projections about the future.

The debate about whether the public is up to this challenge is probably an unending theme in political research. The public is somewhat more informed and knowledgeable about politics because of the expansion of the mass media and the rising levels of education. At the same time, however, the process of electoral decision

making has become more difficult due to the proliferation of complex and often technical issues, such as nuclear power or industrial policy. Like Alice's experience in Wonderland, the voting public has had to run just to keep up.

While the debate about the abilities of the electorate is still ongoing, our description of the research literature has clear implications for the changing nature of electoral politics in advanced industrial democracies. Politics in most Western democracies traditionally has been highly structured and slow to change. Social institutions such as the unions and churches were major political actors, influencing both political elites and their membership. Because individuals were often ill-prepared to deal with the complexities of politics, they relied on the political cues of external reference groups in reaching political decisions. We have seen, however, that the decline of social-group-based voting is one of the common developments affecting virtually all advanced industrial democracies. This is one of the (nearly) indisputable findings from the last generation of electoral research. One's social position no longer determines one's political position as it did when social alignments were solidly frozen.

One possible benefactor from the erosion of social group cues could have been the political parties. Electoral politics is, after all, the primary mechanism of citizen participation in most democracies. And yet, the changing characteristics of Western publics have, in many instances, turned people away from partisan politics. The erosion of party influence involves their role as interest articulators. The established parties have been hesitant to respond to the public's expanding issue interests. Indeed, the rise of single-issue groups and non-ideological issues does not translate well into mass party politics. This has given rise to the fragmentation of old parties and the creation of new parties. Moreover, other institutions -- ranging from citizen lobbies to public-opinion-polling institutes -- have assumed some of the parties' prior role as representatives of popular interests.

Long-term electoral trends thus display an erosion of partisan attachments as a source of voting cues. Strength of party attachment has weakened in several Western democracies over the past generation. Even more common is the decrease in party-line voting and the increase in partisan volatility, split-ticket voting, and other phenomena that indicate the public is no longer voting according to a party line. Perot's strong showing in the 1992 American presidential election provides a graphic illustration of how weakened party ties open up the potential for substantial electoral volatility.

In summary, the trends we have described in this chapter lead to what we would call the "individualization of politics." One development is the shift away from the previous style of decision making based on social group

and/or party cues toward a more individualized and inwardly oriented style of political choice. Instead of depending upon party elites and reference groups, more citizens now attempt to deal with the complexities of politics and make their own political decisions. What is developing is an eclectic and egocentric pattern of political decision making. Rather than socially structured and relatively homogeneous personal networks, contemporary publics are more likely to base their electoral decisions on policy preferences, performance judgments, or candidate images.

The relationship between the individual and the media both contributes to these trends and reinforces them (Semetko et al. 1991; Miller 1990). The contemporary media provide voters with a greater variety of information sources, and potentially a more critical perspective of established political actors such as parties, labor unions, and industries. Access to a diverse media environment enables the public to become active *selectors* of information rather than passive *consumers* of political cues provided by others. In addition, the ability to see candidates and parliamentary leaders up close and personal on television has caused more attention to be paid to the personal attributes of politicians, such as competence and integrity. The expansion of the 1992 American presidential campaign into new media forums illustrates this point, and similar developments can be observed in other Western democracies, albeit in more modest form, as new communications technologies change the patterns of information flow.

The individualization of politics also displays itself in the increasing heterogeneity of the public's issue interests. Issues of environmentalism, women's rights, and lifestyles choices have been added to the already full agenda of advanced industrial democracies. In addition, schema theory argues that citizens are becoming fragmented into a variety of distinct *issue publics* (also see RePass 1971; Budge and Farlie 1983; Franklin 1992). Rather than politics being structured by a group benefits framework, which often reflected socially derived cues, citizens now tend to focus on specific issues of immediate or personal importance.

These developments have the potential to either improve or weaken the "quality" of the democratic process and the representation of the public's political interests. The nature of contemporary political beliefs means that public opinion is simultaneously becoming more fluid and less predictable. This uncertainty forces parties and candidates to become more sensitive to public opinion, at least the opinions of those who vote. Motivated issue voters are more likely to at least have their voices heard, even if they are not accepted. Furthermore, the ability of politicians to have unmediated communications with voters can strengthen the link

between politicians and the people. To some extent, the individualization of electoral choice revives earlier images of the informed independent voter that we once found in classic democratic theory.

At the same time, there is a potential dark side to these new forces in electoral politics. The rise of single-issue politics handicaps a society's attempts to deal with political issues that transcend specific interests, such as the U.S. budget deficit. A focus on issue publics also leaves the electorally inactive disenfranchised. Too great an interest in a single issue, or too much emphasis on recent performance, can produce a narrow definition of rationality that is as harmful to democracy as "frozen" social cleavages. In addition, direct unmediated contact between politicians and citizens opens the potential for demagoguery and political extremism. Both extreme right-wing and left-wing political movements probably benefit from this new political environment, at least in the short term.

The early empiricists called for a mix of stability and change in mass politics as an essential feature of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Berelson et al. 1954). Today, the balance of this mix has changed significantly for most contemporary democracies. It is unlikely that we will ever see the old electoral style of the past repeated, for the nature of electoral politics has permanently changed.

Notes

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1. In order to understand the dynamics of electoral choice, the interested reader should also consult the separate chapters on public opinion (Paul Sniderman) and political communication (Doris Graber) in this volume.

2. Faced with this empirical evidence, some scholars attempted to recast democratic theory to make a virtue of the public's apparently limited abilities. Berelson and his colleagues (1954, 315), for instance, maintained that the smooth functioning of democratic process required that most citizens remain politically aloof, providing some latitude for elites to act and avoiding excessive political conflict. Similarly, Almond and Verba (1963) cautioned that a democratic political culture required a mix of attentive and inattentive citizens that would enable the system to avoid the hyper-politicization and polarization that characterized unstable democracies, such as the Weimar Republic. For a critique of this argument see Barber (1984) and Dalton (1988).

3. Smith's analyses emphasize how much people say about politics, using the number of responses to the open-ended likes/dislikes question, rather than content of these responses. By substituting quantity for the quality of response, Smith ignores what sophistication is supposed to measure (see Luskin 1987).

4. For example, the methodological studies of the 1970s showed that the seven-point scales, now the preferred methodology of the

U.S. National Election Studies, yield higher levels of constraint than did *The American Voter's* scales (e.g., Sullivan et al. 1978), and Krosnick's (1991) new methodology yields even more reliable and stable issue measurement.

5. Downs's work has been used to justify much more demanding "rational choice" models of voter decision making that assume high levels of information and sophistication that are unmet by contemporary electorates. Unfortunately, Downs's sensitivity to the pragmatic limits of citizen action are often missing from this later work.

6. The 1988 *New York Times* exit poll found that white fundamentalist or evangelical Christians made up 9% of the electorate and voted 81% Republican.

7. Germans, for example, are increasingly able to identify the party leanings of unions, business, and the churches — at the same time that the social characteristics linked to these cleavages are having a decreasing impact on party choice (Dalton 1992, chap. 8).

8. From the European perspective, observers such as Philip Williams have been left wondering "how in the 1980s American political parties can be said to have lost power when they hardly ever had any" (quoted in Epstein 1986, 5).

9. For instance, the German version of the party identification question specifically cues the respondent that it is asking about long-term partisan leanings: "Many people in the Federal Republic lean toward a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you?"

10. See the excellent review of this literature in Niemi and Weisberg (1993b).

11. Bradley Richardson's (1991) research on the linkage between partisanship and social cleavage attachments suggests that the decline of cleavage alignments reinforces the trend of partisan dealignment (also see Franklin 1992).

12. A simple comparison of the electoral experiences of a typical European and American voter highlights this difference in the amount of voting. For example, between 1985 and 1990 a resident of Cambridge, England, was called to the polls to make four decisions; a resident of Irvine, California, could have cast several hundred votes in the same period. In one 1990 trip to the polls a voter in Irvine was asked to make 59 separate decisions on the ballot.

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The New Look in Public Opinion Research

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Research on public opinion in the 1970s tended, in its basic contours and style, to be continuous with the research of the 1960s, and indeed, very largely with that of the 1950s. One fundamental paradigm -- minimalism as it has been called -- dominated the work of the two decades. Mass publics, it was contended, were distinguished by (1) minimal levels of political attention and information; (2) minimal mastery of abstract political concepts such as liberalism-conservatism; (3) minimal stability of political preferences; (4) and quintessentially, minimal levels of attitude constraint. Research was mainly organized around the four poles of minimalism, with continuity very much the theme of overviews of research of this period (Abramson 1983; Converse 1975; Kinder 1983; Kinder and Sears 1985). Not that complete agreement prevailed by any means (e.g., Achen 1975; Pierce and Rose 1974; Converse 1975; above all, Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1979) -- but there was all the same consensus, if not on the answers to give, on the questions to ask.¹ In contrast, innovation -- new directions, new methods, new perspectives -- distinguishes the research of the last decade. I mean therefore to use this review essay as a platform to call attention to works that are, in point of view or in methodological approach, novel and fresh.

It would be wrong to imply that there was no continuity of concern or approach; still more so to suggest that the work of the 1980s disproved that of the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, the changes characteristic of the last decade illustrate a more interesting lesson to draw about the nature of scientific progress. The research of the 1960s and 1970s was very much preoccupied with whether the paradigm of minimalism should be accepted or not. In contrast, the research of the 1980s managed to get beyond minimalism precisely by accepting its fundamental thrust: ordinary citizens tend to pay attention to politics only fitfully, and possess in consequence a thin, rather than thick, knowledge of it.

It needed to be said that the ordinary citizen ordinarily pays only cursory attention to politics, and that there are in consequence a number of issues about which he or she does not have a considered opinion to offer. But viewed through the lens of minimalism, politics

shrunk in size, indeed threatened to disappear. Research on public opinion, given the dominance of its emphasis in the 1960s and 1970s on the limits of popular understanding, wound up repeating the curious point that the study of public opinion and politics was not, and should not be, concerned with politics. The thrust of minimalism as a research program in public opinion was instead to emphasize the frequency with which ordinary citizens failed to form even an opinion about many political issues and, still more commonly, to document the frequency with which they failed to put their ideas about politics together consistently. The primary message of minimalism was thus, to exaggerate only slightly, that ordinary citizens tended to be muddle-headed (lacking constraint), or empty-headed (lacking genuine attitudes) -- or both. The task of the public opinion analyst, it followed, was not to reveal what the public thought about an issue of public policy, but rather to repeat, for issue after issue, that the ordinary citizen was unlikely to have given it much thought.

In contrast, what defines the new look in public opinion research is the movement of politics from the wings to center-stage. Offering an account of public opinion entails weighing how the preferences and choices of ordinary citizens, uninterested as they often are in public affairs, can be conditioned by the political process itself. Consider, by way of a nearly ideal-typical example, Carmines and Stimson's (1989) landmark study of race and American politics. In an analysis remarkable for its range and coherence, their two-step argument begins with elite politics. With Goldwater's capture of the Republican presidential nomination in 1964, they argue, the party system turned on its axis. The Republican party, once the party of racial liberalism, emerged as the party of racial conservatism, and the Democratic party, only a few years earlier the bastion of southern segregationists, became the party of racial liberalism (see also Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). And with this change at the elite level, Carmines and Stimson maintain, the issue of race moved to the center of the political thinking of ordinary citizens in the mid-1960s, imposing unprecedented constraint on mass belief

systems. So viewed, the dynamics of public opinion are connected in a deep way with the dynamics of politics itself.

To understand the connection between the dynamics of public opinion and politics is a problem in political analysis. The study of public opinion too often has been treated as a branch of applied psychology, with progress to be made by importing the latest theory in personality or social psychology. Without minimizing the value of interdisciplinary scholarship, I want to insist both that the intellectual traffic has to run in both directions and that the point of departure has to be a recognition that it is specifically *political* behavior that stands in need of explanation. By way of example, consider a classic problem in public opinion -- the so-called "rally around the flag" effect. It has long been established (e.g., Mueller 1973) that the American public tends to swing to the president's side in a crisis. Indeed, even when he makes an obvious hash of things -- the Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example -- the president can wind up the winner in public opinion polls, with markedly more citizens saying that he is doing a good job during and (immediately) after the crisis than before it. There has been no reticence in offering psychological explanations of why citizens "rally around the flag." Brody and Shapiro (1989; Brody 1991), however, defining the problem as political rather than psychological, called attention to the public's responses: sometimes presidents benefit from a surge of support in a crisis, but sometimes not (see also Lee 1977; Sigelman and Conover 1981). Focusing on the variability of the public's response in different crises, Brody and Shapiro developed an original and elegant argument centered on the intervening role of opinion leadership. Rallying around the flag, they argue, is not driven primarily by emotional and irrational outbursts of patriotism; rather it is conditioned by the intervening reactions of media and political elites. If opinion leaders uniformly support, or at least refrain from criticizing, the president's actions, the public will support them, too; on the other hand, if there is prompt and large-scale criticism, there will be no "rally around the flag." The Brody-Shapiro argument thus directs emphasis away from reductionist psychological explanations to an explicitly political analysis centered on the dynamics of elite consensus and cleavage.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that it is politics that we need to take into account in explaining public opinion, and that in giving an account of public opinion it is politics that we are attempting to explain. Hence the interest in the reciprocal connection between politics and public opinion. Illustrating one side of the coin, Page and Shapiro (1992, 1983), in a study of longitudinal trends in public opinion which eclipses any predecessor in scope and detail, argue that changes in

public policy themselves are frequently a response to changes in public opinion (see also Burstein 1979). Illustrating the other side, Johnston, Blais, Brady, and Crete (1992), in the most original study of elections and voting since *The American Voter*, have driven home the impact of campaigns and campaign events on the dynamics of issue preferences and voting choices. It would be metaphysical to argue over whether the causal arrow runs from public opinion to elite politics, or the other way around. Manifestly, elite politics gets played out against the context of public opinion, and public opinion is constrained by elite choices.

There have been efforts before to insist on the centrality of politics in the study of public opinion. Nie and his colleagues (1979) in particular took issue with minimalism, arguing that its portrait of the minimally engaged and attentive citizen was a reflection of the irrelevance of the politics of the 1950s, contending instead that a more coherently organized politics would evoke a deeper and more coherent engagement with politics on the part of citizens. Research of the last decade, however, has hammered away at the Nie argument, confirming the continuing validity of the image of citizens as "low involvement" spectators of politics. Most synoptically, Smith (1989), concentrating on levels of conceptualization but taking account also of attitude consistency and political knowledge, has made a strong case for a "no change" thesis. Moreover, Bennett (1988) has begun a comprehensive assessment of levels of citizen awareness. He has shown that levels of political knowledge and attention are not altogether flat with respect to time -- in fact, there seems to be some responsiveness to levels of political stimulation, with citizens being more politically knowledgeable, for example, in presidential than in off-election years. But he has also demonstrated that minimal levels of political attention and information are a chronic feature of liberal democratic politics. Then, too, in a series of exemplary studies comparing samples drawn in 1954 and 1989, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1989, 1991) have scrutinized levels of public knowledge of public affairs, demonstrating that increases in awareness, insofar as they have occurred, are modest. Indeed, taking account of the increases in educational opportunity since 1954, it is Delli Carpini and Keeter's suggestion that the level of awareness about politics and public affairs may have actually declined (see also Neuman 1986).

What marks the new look in public opinion, then, is the denial not of the classic premise of minimal levels of information and attention of mass publics, but rather of the conclusion of minimal coherence and reasonableness in their thinking commonly drawn from it. Counter-intuitively, the emphasis on mass publics' minimal levels of information has given way to an

emphasis on how they overcome informational shortfalls. A concern to document the lack of organization of mass belief systems has been succeeded by a desire to discover the means by which they achieve a measure of coherence. An emphasis on the irrationality -- variously understood -- of ordinary citizens has been superseded by a more balanced recognition of their admittedly imperfect discharge of the duties of citizenship. I do not mean to leave the impression that the research of the last decade has been following a coordinated master plan. Certainly it is a mistake to attempt to crowd everyone under one tent: there are always and everywhere outliers. But there is also, from time to time, a central tendency, a common or characteristic research emphasis or style. And the dominant tone of the new look in public opinion is advertised in the titles of a wave of large-scale analyses of public opinion and politics which have just appeared or are just about to appear -- *Managing Complexity* (Elkins n.d.); *The Reasoning Voter* (Popkin 1991); *The Rational Public* (Page and Shapiro 1992); and *Reasoning and Choice* (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).

There is always a danger of exaggerated alternatives, and I do not mean at all to suggest that the image of ill-informed citizen has been replaced by that of the conscientious citizen. Perhaps the best way to indicate the thrust of the new look in public opinion is to highlight a problem central to it -- Simon's puzzle, as I have called it (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), in deference to Herbert Simon's pioneering work on decision making with limited information and processing capacity. Manifestly, on a range of issues -- affirmative action, legalization of abortion, increasing taxes, cutting social services -- substantial numbers of citizens know what they favor. The puzzle is, how can they manage this given the intermittent attention they pay to politics and the shallow fund of political knowledge they can consequently draw upon?

Take Simon's puzzle seriously -- accept, that is, that citizens characteristically are minimally involved in politics and that they nonetheless manage to make coherent sense of much of it -- and one has a new angle of attack on the nature of public opinion. There has thus been a new emphasis on how ordinary citizens can make sense of politics not by industriously accumulating information -- which they are not disposed to do except in the most uncommon circumstances -- about it but by selectively allocating their interest in it -- which they can easily manage and still maintain their ordinary routines. Elkins (n.d.), for example, has pressed the theme of specialization. Citizens, he argues, pick and choose the issues they care about. It only appears as if scarcely anybody knows scarcely anything if everybody is required to be knowledgeable about everything. A parallel argument, focusing more narrowly on the variations in

the personal importance of different issues, has been made by Krosnick (1990a). And the upshot of both is an insistence on the need to think in terms not of a mass public but of a myriad of issue publics.

Focusing of interest is one way to compensate for attentional and informational shortfalls. More provocatively, it has become common to argue that citizens can overcome their informational shortfalls and make sense of politics by taking advantage of judgmental shortcuts, or heuristics (Popkin 1991; Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). For example, Brady and Sniderman (1985) have shown that substantial numbers of ordinary citizens can make sense of where liberals and conservatives stand on major issues -- regardless of whether or not they can make sense of liberalism and conservatism as abstract political philosophies; and they can do this by taking advantage of the "likability" heuristic -- a rule of thumb that yields approximately accurate predictions of where politically salient groups stand on major issues. A pair of features of judgmental short-cut such as the likeability heuristic deserves to be underlined. First, to take advantage of the heuristic to predict the issue commitments of liberals and conservatives individuals need know only where they stand on an issue, weighted by the difference in how they feel about liberals and conservatives -- information they can easily have on hand even if they do not pay close and deep attention to politics. Second, it is *not* at all being asserted that people make up their minds about who stands for what politically simply on the basis of attributing to political groups they like positions on issues like their own. Rather the whole point of a judgmental shortcut like the likability heuristic is that by taking advantage of it people make inferences -- in this case about what others believe -- that are approximately right.²

It would be a mistake to take an emphasis on the use of heuristics as an argument on behalf of the ordinary citizen as an intuitive political theorist. And in speaking of citizens taking advantage of judgmental shortcuts, or heuristics, there is plainly a risk of a merely verbal solution to the problem of mass publics' knowledge of politics. If the question one wants to provide an answer for runs roughly like this -- how is it possible for the ordinary citizen, given how little he or she knows about politics nonetheless to figure out where he or she stands politically? -- and if the answer one puts forward runs roughly like this -- citizens manage to compensate for informational shortfalls by taking advantage of heuristics -- then this surely prompts another question in turn -- namely, how do they manage, knowing as little as they do about politics, to come up with clever shortcuts to compensate for informational shortfalls?

Citizens can organize and effectively simplify political choices just insofar as those choices are organized and simplified for them by the political process itself.³ In the American party system, liberal is opposed to conservative, Democrat to Republican, with the pairs of opposites -- and this is the crucial point -- themselves paired. It is thanks to this simplicity of the structure of political conflict that substantial numbers of ordinary citizens can compensate for informational shortfalls by taking advantage of a judgmental shortcut like the likability heuristic (Brady and Sniderman 1985). From another angle, it has become increasingly evident that the public's weighing of political choices is tied to the framing of these choices; indeed, the burgeoning research on issue "framing" has driven home the extent to which responses of citizens to problems of public policy are contingent on the semantic description of policy problems and issue alternatives (e.g., Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1990; Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz, and Wiley 1991). It cannot be said that the notion of issue "framing" has been given a rigorous interpretation, although particular attention should be paid to a quite original exploration, initiated by Jacoby (1990), aimed at gauging the relative aperture of the alternatives in terms of which political issues are posed in public opinion studies.

The presumption that the making of political choices consists in an interaction of situationally defined alternatives and enduring individual characteristics is a prominent feature of the new look in public opinion research; a feature which illustrates the intimate interdependence of substance and methodology. For the new look owes much to the fusing of experimental design and survey research particularly through computer-assisted interviewing. To be sure, experiments have been part of the arsenal of public opinion analysts for at least a generation (e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981). But they have operated under a double constraint in survey research, partly because of self-selected focus on narrowly methodological rather than broadly substantive questions, partly because of the severe restrictions of the classic "split ballot," paper-and-pencil technique. The requirement of producing physically distinct versions of a questionnaire, one for every version of a question wording, order or format, imposed a ceiling on the complexity of experimental designs, as a rule restricting the number of parallel forms to two. Now, in large part thanks to the computer-assisted interviewing, complex experiments can be unobtrusively embedded in public opinion surveys, throwing new light on how citizens arrive at their political positions. More broadly, thanks to the new flexibility in the conventional public opinion interview, there has been a burst of innovations, among them, experiments on "priming" and "agenda-setting" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991); "source

manipulations," assessing the power of political figures and reference groups to shape public opinion (Smith and Squire 1990; Johnston et al. 1992; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Feld 1991); the so-called "stop-and-think" manipulations, to ferret out considerations underlying political preferences (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992); and the "counter-argument" technique -- deliberate attempts to talk people out of the positions they have just taken on public issues through counter-arguments (Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989).

In canvassing the new flexibility in public opinion interviews, I would especially stress the subtlety of the interplay of substance and methodology, of change and continuity. Commentators who have trafficked in Kuhnian notions of paradigms and paradigm shifts have much to answer for, not the least being the swaggering presumption that new analytical and operational approaches make their way by displacing old ones. The dialectic of scientific advance is more subtle. In fact, some of the classical themes of a minimalist perspective have been further cemented through the development of new and more flexible interview procedures. Consider the notion of non-attitudes, the idea that substantial numbers of citizens take a position on an issue in the course of a public opinion interview, not in order to express a belief they have formed, but on the contrary to conceal the fact that they have not troubled to form one (Converse 1964). The notion of non-attitudes, fairly obviously, can serve as a summary metaphor for the minimalist perspective on public opinion; and one of the most compelling validations of the continuing utility of the notion of non-attitudes has been supplied by Fletcher and his colleagues (Fletcher and Chalmers 1991; Bassili and Fletcher 1991), in a striking new line of studies combining counter-argument techniques and breakthrough developments for the measurement of reaction time.

I want to underline the substantive contributions of the new methodological practice of fusing experimental design and survey research, but an overall grace note is in order. The analysis of public opinion had become standardized, routinized. Public opinion research consisted for a generation of the analysis of standard data sets, the design of which had in the largest measure been fixed two generations earlier. There is now a new element of originality. It is difficult to exaggerate the ingenuity and verve of the best of the new experimental studies. It should be mandatory to read, for example, Kuklinski's "deliberation" manipulation, which assesses the impact of reflection on support for free speech (Kuklinski et al. 1991), and his still more ingenious "list" experiment (Kuklinski and Hurley 1991), which permits -- for the first time in public opinion surveys -- the unobtrusive measurement of racial resentment.

The new methodology, moreover, operates in the service of supplying a more nuanced account of political thinking on the part of ordinary citizens. A part of the nuance, as I have been emphasizing, arises from a recognition of the variations from one situation to another in the responses of the very same individual. But another part arises from a new appreciation of the variations among individuals, particularly depending on the extent to which they are aware, educated, or politically informed. The approach to the study of public opinion dominant through the 1970s had rested on a central, albeit unspoken, premise. Citizens, it was assumed, tend to make up their minds in more or less the same way; indeed, so much so that only one causal model is required — one set of causal factors, the same for all members of the public, arranged in one causal sequence, the same for all. But if one begins to take politics seriously in the study of public opinion, the assumption of causal homogeneity loses its persuasiveness. Why take for granted that different members in the public make up their minds about political issues in the same way? Surely the person who takes politics seriously will weigh his or her political choices differently than the one whose interest in public affairs is altogether superficial.

I do not mean they will always go about the business of decision making differently — there may well be a tendency to commonality when information is plentiful (Rahn et al. 1990) — but the politics of key issues — race and AIDS, among them — can take on the complex character they have precisely because key segments of the public go about making up their minds in systematically different ways (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). This notion of causal heterogeneity (Rivers 1988) will come up at various points, most notably in the discussion of political ideology and the so-called “innocence of ideology” thesis, and so I want here only to put it on the record. It may sound innocent to say that the politically sophisticated and the politically indifferent make up their minds about political choices in different ways, but this is, I am obliged to say, an example of a wolf’s claim in sheep’s clothing. If correct, standard accounts of public opinion are misspecified. For the controlling assumption in these accounts has been that ordinary citizens, whether highly involved in politics and well informed about it or completely detached from politics and ill-informed about it, go about making up their minds in the same ways — that is, they take account of the same considerations, and attach the same weight to them. If one wants to understand how politics engages citizens, it is indispensable to appreciate that they come to terms with it in different ways depending on the information and assumptions they bring to it.

Having sketched some of the broad themes of the new look in public opinion research, I want now to spell

out some of the details. From a minimalist perspective, it made only modest sense to ask how mass belief systems are organized, since the point precisely to appreciate was how ill-organized they tend to be; just as it made similarly modest sense to ask how a change in one of their elements could induce a change in another, since exactly the point to grasp was how tenuous connections among mass belief system elements tended to be. However, once one is willing to take seriously the notion of belief *systems*, a pair of master-problems stand out. The first is to characterize the structure of mass belief systems; the second, to give an account of their dynamics. The analysis of the structure of belief systems requires identification of their principal parts and how they are connected one to another. The analysis of the dynamics of belief systems requires examination of changes in belief both over time and across situations. The analysis of dynamics, so understood, is a natural extension of the analysis of structure, for both involve a common emphasis on the role of context in political thinking.

Given the new centrality of politics to public opinion research, I want to organize the discussion of the structure and dynamics of mass belief systems by re-visiting the “innocence of ideology” thesis. Then, in calling attention to a (relatively) neglected element of belief systems, namely values, I shall concentrate on two domains in which personal and political values are complexly implicated — political tolerance and race. For that matter, in considering the dynamics of political belief systems, I shall stress the new contextual rather than the more familiar temporal variations, since I want to call attention to the light that the dynamics of political belief can throw on the dynamics of politics itself.

Manifestly, the twin problems of the structure and the dynamics of mass belief systems are not exhaustive. To give a fuller sense of the range of issues at the center of research on public opinion over the last decade, I want to devote the last section to a discussion of citizenship. A variety of specific themes fall under the heading of citizenship, including the role of groups in individual citizens’ thinking, the problem of political legitimacy, contrasting conceptions of democracy, justice as a principle in political thinking, and — not least important — the re-conceptualization of public opinion at the macro rather than at the individual level.

Structure of Mass Belief Systems

No organizational net, however tightly woven, will scoop up everything. I mean accordingly to concentrate on central themes of research over the last decade or so, chief among them ideology and values.

The "Innocence of Ideology" Thesis

Reviewing research on public opinion a decade ago, Kinder (1983) took as the master question, How far are Americans' ideas of politics shaped by ideological conceptions? After making concessions on specific points -- particularly exaggerated estimates of the prevalence of "non-attitudes" -- Kinder's verdict was that Americans are "innocent of ideology": they do not make use of the larger and more abstract political ideas that make up ideologies like liberalism and conservatism in organizing their political responses, even if they could make use of them -- which far and away most of them cannot.

The innocence of ideology thesis is only one plank of the minimalist platform, yet it raises deep questions, normative as well as empirical, about the competence of citizens to act as citizens. To say that they lack ideological ideas is not to say that they lack political ideas altogether. But it is to say that citizens cannot take part in the discussion of political choices in the terms that the people who make these choices, political elites, evaluate and debate them. It is as though public discourse in democracies is carried out in two different languages, with citizens unable to make sense of the one in which consequential public judgments are framed, debated, and manipulated.

Kinder's assessment of the record of research on the ideological competence of mass publics is a measured one. But in asking whether Americans are innocent of ideology, the problem lies not in the answers he and others have offered but, more fundamentally, in the way they posed the question.⁴

The question, as Kinder frames it, is whether Americans are innocent of ideology. Putting the question this way suggests that the task is to characterize the competence and habits of the public taken as a whole. And, indeed, in representing the organization of mass belief systems, it has been taken for granted that measurements of their organization (e.g., constraint coefficients) should be computed for the mass public taken as a whole. Opposing verdicts might be rendered, with the public being judged by some to be innocent of ideology and by others capable of it under propitious circumstances (e.g., Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979), but the essential premise, accepted by people on all sides of the debate over the thesis of ideological innocence, is the appropriateness of making judgments about the public as a whole.

But why suppose that everyone adopts a position, or makes a choice, for the same reasons? And more specifically, why suppose, given the striking differences in political information and sophistication *within* the mass public, that the citizen who is politically aware and attentive makes up her mind in the same way as the

political ignoramus? Consider the classic problem of the bearing of ideology on issue preferences in mass publics. From the minimalist perspective, this is a two-variable problem, a question of covariation, the task being to measure the covariation of overall political orientation and specific issue position. From the new perspective, it is a three-variable problem, a question of interaction, for the question to ask has become, "Under what conditions is ideology related to policy preference?" In particular, evidence has thus accumulated of a systematic interaction between political sophistication and political reasoning. Luskin (1987), in a finely filigreed account of political sophistication, documents the variation in density, range, and constraint of political cognitions with political sophistication, variously measured, while Krosnick and his colleagues (1990b) have initiated a genuinely interdisciplinary research program centered on the notion of political expertise, driving home that how people reason about a problem depends on how much they know about it.

It may now seem self-evident that how people work their way through a political choice hinges on their level of political information or sophistication, but the implications of this change in perspective are far from clearly established. Two theses can be distinguished -- weak and strong. The weak thesis holds that the belief systems of the more politically aware and sophisticated are more organized than those of the less aware and sophisticated. The strong thesis holds that the belief systems of the less politically aware are not only less but also differently organized than those of the more politically aware.

The weak thesis was put by Stimson (1975) in an inexcusably neglected article. Yoking together measures of political information and education into an overall index of "cognitive ability," Stimson focused on the covariation of attitude constraint and political sophistication, demonstrating that the preferences of the politically aware members of the mass public were well-organized by any reasonable standard, those of the politically unaware ill-organized. And the consequences of this go deep. For Stimson's findings make plain that any effort to characterize the mass public *as a whole* will be systematically misleading: it will misrepresent the thinking of the more politically aware citizens, or of the less aware, or of both.

There cannot be just one portrait of the public, because if there is a systematic interaction between the organization of political opinions and the level of political sophistication, there is more than one pattern. In an original variation on the sophistication interaction hypothesis, Knight (1985) crystallized an important line of research, demonstrating that the degree of organization of belief systems (as indexed by constraint coefficients),

plus the centrality of ideology as a decision criterion in voting, varies provocatively with citizens' levels of conceptualization (see also Cassel 1984). Jacoby (1986, 1988, 1991), in particular, following up Knight's lead in a series of well-crafted studies, has strongly buttressed the sophistication interaction hypothesis, showing (among other things) that ideology plays a differentially important role depending on individuals' levels of conceptualization and that the complexity of political reasoning -- as indexed by levels of conceptualization -- cannot be reduced to individual differences in formal education. Moreover, in a parallel but independent line of research, Lodge and his colleagues (Norpoth and Lodge 1985; Hamill and Lodge 1986; see also Lau and Sears 1986) have demonstrated the role of political sophistication in encoding and retrieving politically relevant cues. Taking advantage of experimentally designed studies of recognition and distinguishing between schematics (those who are expert or at any rate knowledgeable about politics) and aschematics (those who are neither), Lodge and his colleagues show that the former are markedly more likely to recognize and to understand political concepts and leaders. What is more, they have developed a causal model of ideological sophistication, out of which falls the tantalizing result that cognitive ability (as assessed by education and a vocabulary and abstract symbols test) powerfully influences ideological sophistication but that political experience (as assessed by political interest, media usage, and political activity) does not.

All these studies add up to strong confirmation of the weak version of the sophistication thesis. There is also evidence, although weaker, in behalf of the strong version of the thesis. The strong version, like the weak, holds that the more politically aware and sophisticated citizens are, the better organized their political ideas and preferences. However, the strong version of the sophistication interaction hypothesis holds that the less politically aware and sophisticated, in addition to being more vulnerable to failing to organize their thinking, may also organize it in different ways. In consequence, they are not only less likely to have reasons for the positions they take on public issues, but in some politically consequential situations, they may also have *different* reasons for the positions they take than the politically aware and sophisticated (cf. Moon 1990).

I want to offer an example of the strong version of the sophistication hypothesis, if only to make plain what is being argued here. Consider the positions white Americans take on government assistance for blacks. Viewed at a distance, several considerations fairly plainly lie behind decisions to support or oppose such assistance for blacks, among them, their propensity to favor or oppose such governmental action in general and, of

course, their feelings toward blacks. It is thus perfectly obvious that the more politically liberal whites are, the more disposed they are to approve of an array of welfare and assistance programs for blacks, just as it is perfectly obvious that the more they dislike blacks, the more likely they are to disapprove of such programs. So defined, the view at a distance is correct -- except that it obscures a crucial detail. The importance of both ideology and affect toward blacks as factors fixing positions on issues of race varies systematically: the better educated whites are, the larger the role of ideology and the less consequential that of affect toward blacks; conversely, the less educated, the larger the role of affect and the less consequential that of ideology (Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski 1984; Moon 1990). And so far as this holds, the forces shaping the politics of race -- indeed, the very meaning of the contest over one and the same public policy -- can differ in character across the American public (Sniderman and Piazza 1992).

It is to be emphasized that whichever version -- strong or weak -- of the interaction hypothesis is adopted, the "innocence of ideology" thesis is misspecified. Simply put, it is systematically misleading to declare that mass publics *en bloc* are "innocent of ideology," because it is systematically misleading to characterize the political reasoning of mass publics *en bloc*.

Values

It made little sense to explore the structure of mass belief systems when the principal point was to repeat that they are poorly organized. Only if one concedes that ordinary citizens can figure out where they stand politically does the question even arise of how they can organize and make connections among their various beliefs and feelings and aims.

Traditionally, the study of public opinion has concentrated on the smallest units of belief, located at the fringes of political belief systems -- specific opinions about particular issues. But ignoring the larger elements, nearer the core of political belief systems, has favored an exaggerated impression of the political incompetence of the general public. It is as though people were judged not to know much about their economic assets, all in all, because they do not know how much small change they carry in their pockets on any given day. People may be fuzzy about narrow, transient opinions, yet clear-sighted about their basic values.

Analytically, values have a perfectly obvious explanatory appeal because they are obvious consistency generators: rather than ginning up separate reasons why people may take consistent stands on issues of welfare, health and education, crime and standard of living, it is more economical to invoke a value like equality.

Feldman (1988), for example, puts the argument in terms of a consistency conundrum. On the one hand, a small mountain of evidence demonstrates that mass publics do not organize their issue preferences consistent with a "crowning posture" or "superordinate value," such as liberalism-conservatism; on the other hand, ordinary citizens frequently do figure out where they stand politically. How then, Feldman asks, is it possible for them consistently to work out their reactions to political choices given that they do not do so constrained by a single, overarching posture or value?

By relying on "core beliefs and values," he answers. And what are examples of such core beliefs and values? Equal opportunity, economic individualism, and a belief in free enterprise are the three that Feldman singles out, showing that two at least play an organizational role, constraining policy preferences, presidential performance evaluations, and candidate preferences, not simply at the zero order, but net of both demographic variables and more familiar political orientations, such as party identification.

Rasinski (1987) independently makes a similar analytic move. There are, he argues, two principal anchors of judgments of social justice -- equity and egalitarianism. Equity refers to the importance attached to assisting the disadvantaged and less fortunate. Drawing on a number of independent samples, Rasinski shows that judgments on a range of social policies as well as on the perceived fairness of presidential candidates -- all tend to be rooted in deeper-lying considerations of equity and equality.

Both these studies are inventive in the measures of values they deploy, and persuasive in making a first-order case for the role of deeper-lying values as consistency generators. Yet, it needs to be emphasized that this conception of the role of values is a narrow one, and does not push the causal explanation to a markedly deeper level: people are said to favor more egalitarian policies because they are egalitarian -- not a stunning explanatory gain. By way of illustrating the deeper role of values in the structuring of political belief systems, I want to suggest that, paradoxically, ordinary citizens' political preferences appear ill-organized, their opinions on specific issues seemingly having little to do with one another, in part because their opinions are organized by deeper-lying values.

Consider the structure of political belief systems as represented at the height of minimalism (Converse 1964). A fully formed belief system is two-tiered. The bottom tier consists of specific opinions, covering an array of political issues. The top tier is made up of an abstract, superordinate concept -- usually, but not necessarily, liberalism-conservatism. The idea of this arrangement, of course, is to suggest that insofar as

specific opinions on particular issues exhibit coherence and consistency it is because they follow -- indeed, have been deduced -- from a superordinate ideology. Or rather, from a minimalist perspective, the point of representing political belief systems as capped by ideology is to drive home why the opinions of ordinary citizens show such minimal constraint. For the whole thrust of minimalism as a perspective on public opinion is to make plain the implausibility of supposing that the average citizen would be able or motivated to "deduce" rigorously the positions he or she should take on a gamut of specific issues in light of a large, complex, and abstract ideology like liberalism or conservatism. And as Levitin and Miller (1979), among others, have ably shown, the covariation of ideology and issue preferences in mass publics is thin indeed.

Thanks to a pioneering line of studies by Peffley and Hurwitz (1985; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), however, the structure of belief systems can be seen in different terms -- as triple rather than double tiered. People, the Peffley-Hurwitz model suggests, do not move from political abstractions to specific issue preferences in one fell swoop. Rather, they move in smaller steps -- first, working their way from a superordinate value (like liberalism-conservatism) to an intermediate one (such as general economic attitudes); then, moving from the intermediate value to an opinion about a specific issue. The idea of constraint, it follows, must be construed in two quite different ways. Introducing the term, Converse (1964) represented it analytically in terms of vertical linkages -- between "crowning postures" and specific policy preferences -- but construed it operationally in terms of horizontal linkages -- between pairs of specific issues. Driving home this distinction between types of constraint, Peffley and Hurwitz demonstrate that the weak "horizontal" linkages recorded in previous studies are quite compatible with strong "vertical" linkages. Still more broadly, they show how it is possible for both the links between end points in a chain of inference and also the constraint across issue positions to be weak *even though each and every link in the chain is strong*. It becomes possible, in turn, to see how the minimal levels of constraint routinely observed for issue preferences in mass publics, rather than being testimony to an "innocence of ideology," can be compatible with the operation of ideology.

A model recommends itself partly by disposing of old questions, partly by raising new ones. If there is a second tier in mass belief systems of general orientations or values, intermediate between a "crowning posture" and specific issue preferences, then the question becomes how these orientations or values are themselves interrelated. Curiously, though people manifestly have more than one value, it has been customary to consider values only one-

at-a-time. I think particularly in this respect of the work of Inglehart on post-materialism (e.g., 1977, 1990). I know of no one who has more assiduously pursued a line of argument in the field of public opinion, illuminating the politics of half a dozen countries; and notwithstanding criticism of some of his broader theses on political culture and generational change (e.g., Flanagan 1987, 1982, 1980; Clarke and Dutt 1991). This measure of materialist and post-materialist values surely captures something telling. But here, given our special concern with the problem of multiple values, one aspect of his approach stands out.

Inglehart is, above all, concerned with a particular value orientation — "postmaterialism" in his terms — and the object of his research program is to show how the political sentiments and choices of ordinary citizens have increasingly come to be shaped by it. But what is crucial is his way of framing the question. In focusing on post-materialist and materialist values, Inglehart sets out a set of values — for example, controlling inflation or protecting free speech — classifying people as post-materialist or materialist depending on which of the competing values they designate as personally the most important. But proceeding this way constrains analysis of the connections among values. And what I want to suggest is that once one concedes that people have more than one value, then in order to understand the role of values in belief systems, it is not enough to explore the relation between specific opinions and deeper values — *taken one at a time*. It is necessary to take account of the relations of values to one another.

The proposition that people have multiple values I want to dub "value pluralism."⁵ People, manifestly, care about more than one thing — indeed, are, simultaneously and sincerely attached to values that clash. So one and the same person can care for both liberty and order, or for that matter, for both materialism and post-materialism. Regrettably, we know little either about the structural organization of values — that is, their relation one to another — or their relation, taken more than one at a time, to specific opinions and attitudes. There is, however, a striking line of studies on value pluralism. The central proposition, roughly put, is this: belief systems differ not only in the priority attached to core, or terminal, values (Rokeach 1973), but also in the degree to which these terminal values are, and are acknowledged to be, in conflict or tension (Tetlock 1986a, 1986b). So viewed, when high priority is attached to only one value or to one consistent set of values, belief systems may be classified as "monistic." Alternatively, when high priority is attached to values acknowledged to be capable of conflicting with one another belief systems are "pluralistic." The causal story that Tetlock urges is that

proponents of pluralistic ideologies, by virtue of having to adjudicate among competing values, are more likely than holders of monistic ideologies to appreciate the range of considerations one has to take into account, the complexity of their interconnections, and the trade-offs deserving consideration; hence the proponents of pluralistic ideologies are likely to be more complex in their thinking.

The focus on integrative complexity, unlike a host of companion studies in social psychology, has consequential political implications because it calls attention to the connection between the structure of political thinking and the substance of political thought. There is of course a long line of studies relevant here, beginning with the argument advanced by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) that the political right is distinctively predisposed to think in either-or terms, dividing up the world into friend-and-foe, to interpret the world in conspiratorial and Manichean terms, to be rigid, intolerant of ambiguity, intolerant through and through, hostile and prejudiced towards others whose beliefs, appearance, background or manners were different or merely unfamiliar (Altemeyer 1988). The "rigidity-of-the-right" hypothesis in turn met with a powerful critique. Shils (1954), Eysenck (1954), and Rokeach (1960), among others, contended that ideologues shared intemperateness and sectarianism, whether they were on the left or the right. Then the revisionist position was itself revised, the scholarly pendulum moved back to the original position, as Brown (1986) and a host of others contended that there was a fundamental asymmetry between ideology on the right in the form of fascism and ideology on the left in the form of communism. On this view, there is an authoritarianism on the right but not an authoritarianism of the left (see also DiRenzo 1974; Barker 1963; but also Ray 1983).

Tetlock's special contribution has been to break out of this seesaw argument. Reanalyzing the in-depth interviews of British M.P.'s conducted by Putnam (1973), Tetlock demonstrated that of four ideological groups, extreme conservatives and extreme socialists were the least integratively complex in their thinking, moderate socialists and conservatives the most and the former still more than the latter (Tetlock 1984). The validity of the symmetry position has subsequently been replicated by McClosky and Chong (1985), who have added the intriguing methodological observation that the apparent rigidity of the extreme right-wing believer in previous studies arises from the greater difficulty of inducing extreme left-wing believers to participate in public opinion surveys.

There is something appealing in the idea of value pluralism as propounded by Tetlock, to a student of political theory as well as of public opinion. The whole

thrust of the position is to suggest that awareness of multiple considerations promotes complexity of reasoning and moderation of positions. So conceived, the value pluralism model presents a formulation in social-psychological terms of a classic argument from political theory on the nature of pluralism as a democratic value (Berlin 1969). But familiar as this argument is, a central aspect of it has gone unexplored.

Consistent with the idea of value pluralism, it is commonplace to speak of the tradeoffs of values that political choices impose -- between liberty and equality, for example, or between liberty and order -- to talk, that is, of political choices taking the form of balancing or weighing competing values. But this representation of choice deserves attention. Consider an issue of civil liberties -- say, a specific question of whether a demonstration against the Vietnam war should be permitted, given that it is to be held in a part of a town strongly committed to the war, deeply offended by protests against it, and quite likely in consequence to respond with outrage and, possibly, even violence. (cf. Gibson and Bingham 1985). It is common to speak as though a decision about an issue like this turns on the weighing of competing values: a commitment to free speech, say, as against an appreciation of the risks of violence and the importance of order. But this way of speaking of natural pairs of competing values, however familiar, can be systematically misleading. For the decisive point is that these ostensibly competing values are, in fact, negatively correlated: the more importance a person attaches to the value of freedom of speech, the less he or she attaches to the value of order, and vice versa. And insofar as such values as liberty and order are negatively correlated, the pair tends to be self-reinforcing rather than self-contradictory (McClosky and Brill 1983; McClosky and Zaller 1985; Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, Tetlock, and Gaines 1991). Indeed, it is in part thanks to the coherence of people's values -- to their placing a high value on liberty and a low one on order, and a high value on order and a low on liberty -- that they react consistently to civil liberties issues even in the heat of specific controversies.

A crucial feature of the architecture of political belief systems is thus the tendency of people to strive for consistency, if not at the level of specific issues, then at any rate at the level of values. And the failure to appreciate this striving for value consistency, imperfect though it is, has given rise to a series of pseudo-problems. For example, it is often said that a racial policy such as affirmative action requires the citizen to balance off the competing claims of liberty and equality. In fact, the more committed a person is to the value of liberty, the more likely he or she is to support affirmative action (say, in the form of support for freedom of speech), the more committed he or she will tend to be to

the value of equality (say, in the form of acting to see that the worst off are better off). In short, the people who are most likely to attach importance to core values are precisely those who are most likely to have organized their values in a way that minimizes the conflict of values that many political analysts have emphasized.

Value coherence should not be overstated. Even granted a predisposition to consistency, people can find themselves in situations that activate competing values. Indeed, in sorting out the competing theoretical claims of value pluralism vs. value consistency, the issue is not deciding which is true, and which false, but rather specifying the conditions under which one or the other holds. A rough, but serviceable, rule is this: value consistency tends to be the rule for "top-of-the-head" responses; an appreciation of the tension among values, and a willingness to engage in value trade-offs, is more characteristic of behavior in situations that unequivocally activate competing values, permit some time for a weighing of alternatives before having to manifest a response, and encourage a self-critical mental set -- for example, when one expects to justify one's views to someone whose own views are unknown and one is not constrained by past statements or commitments (Tetlock 1983; Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger 1989).

It deserves emphasis that values count twice over in political analysis, as both explicans and explicandum, and by way of underlining this duality I want to comment particularly on two domains -- political tolerance and race.

Political Tolerance

The relevance of politics -- even to the conceptualization of political tolerance -- has been driven home by the pioneering research of Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982). Invoking the origins of the doctrine of political toleration in the religious controversies of the seventeenth century, they argue that tolerance consists in a willingness to put up with ideas or people or acts that one dislikes or fears. The research program of Sullivan and his colleagues (see also Sullivan et al. 1985; Barnum and Sullivan 1989; Shamir 1991) is easily the most imaginative rethinking of the idea of political tolerance since Stouffer's (1955) seminal study -- and one of the most elegant, for that matter, given that their original operational definition falls so naturally, even self-evidently, out of their conceptual definition. This is the so-called "content-controlled" method, which requires that respondents first identify (usually from a fixed list) a group they dislike, then face a set of standard interrogatories on their willingness to support rights of members of *this* particular group.

The content-controlled method has proven controversial (e.g., Gibson 1992; Mueller 1988; Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, and Hout 1989), but the controversy has been excited, not by exotic methodological qualms, but rather by the implications of alternative conceptualizations of political tolerance for the theory and practice of democratic politics. Consider the role of education in a democratic society. The classic studies of political tolerance, which had concentrated on tolerance of groups on the left (communists, socialists, atheists), had suggested strongly that education is an engine of tolerance: the more formal schooling a person has had, the wider the range of both political groups and political acts that he or she is willing to accept as legitimate (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). In contrast, the findings of Sullivan and his colleagues suggest a far more modest role for education. It is a major determinant, they argue, not of how tolerant one is, but of whom one is prepared to tolerate. The better educated, in the Sullivan view, have misleadingly given the appearance of being markedly more tolerant politically only because classic studies of tolerance (e.g., Stouffer 1955) have focused on groups on the left -- which, as it happens, are the groups that the less educated are more likely to dislike (Sullivan et al. 1982, 114ff; but see Bobo and Licari 1989; Gibson 1992). Analogously, in the Sullivan view, liberals have misleadingly given the appearance of being markedly more tolerant than conservatives in the classic studies of political tolerance, but this reflects not a stronger principled commitment to the value of tolerance on the part of liberals, but only their natural inclination to accept as legitimate groups on the same side of the political fence as themselves -- which, as it happens, were the groups on which the classic studies of tolerance focused.

Being myself a participant in some of these skirmishes (Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, and Hout 1989), I don't want to pretend to an above-the-fray disinterestedness. But it is important to underline how deep, both conceptually and normatively, the issues go. There is, at the core, one issue in particular which merits mention -- the so-called unity thesis. The Sullivan approach takes as its central premise the disjunction of political tolerance and nonpolitical forms of tolerance. Individuals should be said to be tolerant politically, according to the Sullivan view, if and only if they dislike a group and nonetheless support the political rights of its members. Whatever sense this makes for political tolerance, it makes no sense for other forms of tolerance. Who would insist that, in order for a person to be characterized as racially "tolerant," it is necessary that he or she dislike blacks? Surely, the notion of tolerance in a variety of its forms -- with respect to gays, for example, or to women, or to Jews -- carries with it the

understanding that disliking, or fearing, or holding in contempt a person because of the color of his skin, or sexual orientation, or religious convictions -- is in and of itself a manifestation of intolerance. These conceptual tangles to one side, proponents of the unity thesis thus hold that the various aspects of tolerance, political as well as nonpolitical, are tied together causally: on this view, factors that increase political tolerance (e.g., education) tend to have a spillover effect, encouraging a variety of specific forms of tolerance, including racial and religious tolerance.

The fate of the unity thesis matters on more than one front, but not the least important is its buttressing of the role of values in political reasoning. Although the dominant theme in research on tolerance remains the limits of popular understanding of, and commitment to, civil liberties and civil rights (McClosky and Brill 1983; Sullivan et al. 1979; Gibson 1992), a new theme has been emerging in counterpoint. A substantial fraction of the general public, it is now being argued (Bobo and Licari 1989; Sniderman, Tetlock, et al. 1989) has formed a genuine -- albeit imperfect -- commitment to the value of tolerance, and their commitment to the value of tolerance is a primary -- although obviously not the sole -- determinant of their reactions to specific issues of civil liberties (see also Sullivan et al. 1983).

The classic studies of political tolerance (e.g., Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964) had focused on the sources of support for political tolerance as a value. Studies of the last decade have broadened this focus to incorporate the consequences of political tolerance as well as its causes. It can be shown to matter, in ways not previously appreciated, whether citizens place a high value on political tolerance or not. For example, in a quite original line of argument, Gibson (1992) has shown that a natural concomitant of a person's desire to restrict the range of permissible behavior of others is a willingness to restrict the range of his or her own permissible behavior. There is thus a perverse dialectic of intolerance: wishing to restrain others, to confine them to a narrow and safe ambit, the citizens prone to intolerance restrain themselves, confine themselves to a narrow ambit of what they may say and do. More programmatically, Gibson and his colleagues have proposed a contextualized analysis of the politics of tolerance, focusing on actual (and not merely hypothetical) clashes of views over civil liberties, such as the dispute in Skokie, Illinois over the first amendment rights of a group of Nazis (Gibson and Bingham 1985), or the clash in Houston over the rights of homosexuals (Gibson 1987). By contextualizing his studies, by grounding them in specific events and particular controversies, Gibson revived a practice of "firehouse" studies, surveys focusing on events in the headlines, a

practice initiated in the heyday of McCarthyism with Stouffer's (1955) heroic study of political tolerance, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*.

Contextualizing the study of political values like tolerance helps take politics out of the background. Among the several senses in which this is true, one I would particularly stress is the following. As students of politics, what we care about is how citizens will react in actual controversies; indeed, one reason the concept of values seems analytically compelling is precisely because it provides a way to account for how citizens hold their ground in the face of significant pressure to qualify or abandon their positions on issues of civil liberties. It would exaggerate to say that a compelling case has been made for "values as stabilizers," although the evidence now at hand suggests the hypothesis deserves to be taken seriously. The outbreak of AIDS, for example, supplied a grotesque, but instructive, opportunity to assess citizen responses under stress; and taking advantage of a serendipitous "before-and-after" design, Sniderman and his colleagues demonstrated the extent to which citizens would maintain their commitment to the value of tolerance — and specifically in this instance, to the civil liberties of homosexuals — even when confronted suddenly, unexpectedly, and undeniably by a deadly threat (Sniderman, Wolfinger, Mutz, and Wiley 1991).

Specific threats to one side, the premise of research on political tolerance has been that a fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between mass publics and political elites. Inattentive to politics, ignorant of political ideas, the ordinary citizen, according to classic studies of political tolerance (Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964), tends to have only a superficial commitment to democratic values. In contrast, political elites tend to have a markedly deeper commitment to the whole array of civil liberties and civil rights; indeed, so much so that McClosky, in a famous phrase, declared that they "serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the Creed" (1960, 374).

I want to refer to the idea that democratic polities keep their bearings in crises thanks to the special devotion of the politically articulate and influential to civil liberties as the thesis of democratic elitism. Needless to say, the label is for convenience only, and is not intended to be in any way pejorative. The thesis of democratic elitism has become part of the stock of received knowledge, partly because of the excellence of the original studies (Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964), partly because of the repeated corroboration of subsequent studies, one or two exceptions (Israel, for example) notwithstanding (Stouffer 1955; McClosky 1964; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; McClosky and Brill 1983; and Sullivan et al. 1982).

Broadly, two explanations of elite-mass differences have been staked out. On the one hand, it is suggested that political elites are more likely to serve as faithful "repositories of the public conscience," because they have been more thoroughly exposed and have more deeply learned civil liberties by virtue of their involvement in politics — the "political socialization" hypothesis. Alternatively, it is contended that they are more deeply committed to democratic values because of other characteristics associated with their elite status — for example, education — having nothing inherently to do with politics — the "selective recruitment" hypothesis. Each hypothesis has had its supporters: McClosky and his colleagues being perhaps the most unqualified advocates of the political socialization hypothesis (McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983), and Jackman (1972), one of the earliest and most effective exponents of the selective recruitment hypothesis. The truth, to judge from Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum, and Gibson's (1992) overarching analysis of four countries, appears to be a mix of the two.

But if the fact of greater elite commitment to democratic values is not in dispute, the meaning of the fact continues to be debated. For example, Gibson (1992), in a re-analysis of Stouffer's original data, has shown that there is a marked correlation between the "repressiveness" of a state's public policy and the mean level of elite intolerance but not the mean level of public intolerance — a finding which suggests that the legal McCarthyism of the period was undertaken in response to the demands less of ordinary citizens than of political elites.⁶ Beyond this, the thesis of democratic elitism presupposes that the decisive contrast is between the values of political elites and those of mass publics, suggesting that if a choice between the two has to be made, elites are a better bet to back democratic values in any specific controversy than are ordinary citizens. But in liberal democracies, the choice is not between the views of the public at large and those of elites taken as a whole: it is instead between groups of elites, organized around political parties and competing for political power through elections. Partly because of the incentives of electoral competition, partly because of the constraints of political ideology, there tend to be pronounced cleavages in beliefs about civil liberties among partisan elites; so pronounced that the key to the politics of civil liberties can be just which group of partisan elites wins office. To take a specific example, McClosky (1960), in a classic study, showed that Democratic and Republican activists — as a composite — were more committed to civil liberties than the general population. But the choice of who will be president or senator is not between political activists and ordinary citizens: it is between Democratic and Republican aspirants for public office, and there is a marked difference between the two in support for

democratic values in specific controversies. To translate the terms slightly, Democratic activists tend to be predominantly liberal, Republican activists overwhelmingly conservative, and as Sniderman, Fletcher (1991), drawing on McClosky's published results, have shown, conservative elites are no more committed to civil liberties than are ordinary citizens who are conservative - *and significantly less committed than ordinary citizens who are liberal* (see also Gibson and Duch 1991). The classic contrast between elites and mass publics is, in consequence, systematically misleading. So far as the normative thrust in formulating and implementing civil liberties policies, what counts is not a mythical choice between an "average" political elite and an "average" citizen but rather the consistent and striking difference in the importance attached to civil liberties between the actual groups of elites competing for political power. The electoral system operates to choose among, not to average across, competing sets of elites, and the fallacy of democratic elitism consists precisely in its indifference to which set of elites prevails.

The Politics of Race

Another expression of the new interest in the stuff of politics is the burgeoning research on race as an issue in contemporary American life. The impetus to this research field was supplied in a significant degree by Sears and his colleagues. In a research program now extending over two decades, they have developed a distinctive account of the politics of race — the "symbolic politics" perspective. Since this symbolic politics perspective is intended as a systematic perspective on issues of race, I shall set out some of its central tenets, although it should be borne in mind that there are differences in emphasis and nuance from one researcher to another.

The starting point, and a continuing focus, is a strategic contrast between a "self-interest" account on the one side, and a "symbolic politics" account on the other. A quasi-paradigmatic explanatory perspective emphasizing rational choice and utility maximization has recently emerged. It represents voters as making judgments both about policies and politicians on the basis of their tangible self-interest (e.g., Downs 1957; Page 1978; Fiorina 1981). As against this rational choice perspective, Sears and his colleagues (e.g., Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1982; Lau, Brown, and Sears 1978) juxtapose a "symbolic politics" perspective. The heart of the symbolic politics argument is a triple-barreled contention: first, that a limited number of affective orientations or predispositions (e.g., party identification, liberal or conservative ideology, racial prejudice) are

central to the political thinking of ordinary citizens; second, that these affective orientations tend to have been acquired in childhood and maintained ever since; and third, that responses to new policy issues are made on the basis of "the similarity of symbols posed by the policy issue to those long-standing predispositions" (Sears et al. 1980, 671). The central thrust of the symbolic politics research program, accordingly, has been to conduct horse races between measures of self-interest on the one side and of symbolic predispositions on the other, to determine which accounts for the lion's share of the variance in either policy preferences or voting choices. A considerable amount of political terrain has been traversed in this fashion, including a variety of policy domains (e.g., national health insurance, busing, government-guaranteed jobs, law and order); of indicators of self-interest (including employment, short-run trends in family finances, medical insurance, having a child in public school, and so on, the relevant indicator of self-interest varying appropriately with the particular policy domain); and symbolic predispositions (including ideological self-identification, party identification, and racial prejudice). And the findings have been impressively consistent across a range of policies and data sets. The impact of self-interest tends to be modest, not only in the mass public as a whole but in strategic segments of it one might have expected to be especially motivated to make up their minds on the basis of their material well-being. On the other hand, symbolic predispositions have characteristically exerted a substantial impact both on policy preferences and voting choices. Without denying that immediate tangible self-interest can play a role in shaping political belief and perhaps, still more, political behavior, the symbolic politics perspective has made a valuable contribution in demonstrating that its impact is more narrow and more circumscribed than had ever been supposed.

The symbolic politics model represents a general approach to the study of public opinion, accenting the limited number of enduring and general predispositions organizing political thinking. A specific implementation of the general model, applied to the politics of race, is the "symbolic racism" perspective. Briefly, the symbolic racism argument runs as follows. Old-fashioned racism — overt, crude, offensive on its face — has largely disappeared. Which is not to say that racism has disappeared. It has instead become less obvious, more subtle. This new, more subtle racism — or "symbolic racism" or "modern racism," as it is variously called — consists in a conjunction or fusion of prejudice and a quintessential American value, individualism. From the symbolic racism perspective, a genuine alliance of prejudice and individualism has been effected: white Americans resist racial equality in the name of self-

reliance, achievement, individual initiative, and they do so not merely because the value of individualism provides a socially acceptable pretext but because it provides an integral component of the new racism.

The symbolic racism argument has, not surprisingly, proven controversial (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985; Weigel and Howes 1985; Bobo 1983; and Sniderman and Tetlock 1986a, 1986b; but see also Kinder 1986; McConahay 1986; and Sears 1988). It is all the more important, therefore, to distinguish two very different grounds on which arguments have been conducted. One concerns the politics of race specifically; the other, the nature of political thinking generally.

To take the issue of race itself first, it is important to underline how far-reaching is the argument of symbolic racism. Its principal claim is that racism is the product not of an historical or external contingency, nor is it an expression of a regrettable but universal aspect of human nature; it is instead the result of the "finest and proudest of American values" (Sears 1988, 54). Racism is, in this view, as American as apple pie or Horatio Alger. Empirically, the nub of the issue is the relation between individualism and contemporary racism, with evidence accumulating in two opposing piles. On the one side, a series of studies have shown that sentiments, which deliberately confound anti-black affect and a reference (direct or indirect) to the value of individualism (e.g., "If blacks would only try harder, they would be just as well off as whites"), are strongly correlated with the positions whites take on a number of racial issues (e.g., Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980; and Kinder and Sears 1981). On the other side, a series of studies have shown that individualism (measured directly) has little to do either whites' attitudes toward blacks or their position on public policies dealing with blacks (e.g., Kluegel and Smith 1983; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1992). No consensus on the issue has yet been reached (but see Sears 1988; and Sears and Kosterman 1991).

There is, though, a deeper level at which the symbolic politics argument deserves to be engaged. It offers a general model of political thinking maximally in contrast with the minimalist perspective. To offer a stylized account, minimalism puts its emphasis on the transitoriness of public opinion, with large numbers of ordinary voters unable even to remember the position they took on an issue the election before. In contrast, the symbolic politics perspective rests on a radical persistence hypothesis. Taking as its theme the Jesuit adage that whoever controls the education of the child controls the thinking of the adult, the symbolic politics perspective holds that citizens respond to contemporary issues on the basis, not of "the current informational environments," but of the social and political circumstances and sentiments that prevailed when they were children (Sears

1983, 80). It cannot be said that there is anything like the evidence required to demonstrate persistence on this scale,⁷ although it is important to distinguish between failing (so far) to establish the validity of a hypothesis and demonstrating its falsity. Moreover, I want to concentrate on the nature of political thinking viewed from a symbolic politics perspective. Central to this picture of political thinking is a limited number of symbolic predispositions acquired in childhood, and not significantly modified or updated since. Weighting so heavily the role of childhood sentiments and needs as determinants of adult beliefs and choices, the symbolic politics argument represents a revival of a classic tradition in public opinion accenting the irrationality of mass publics (cf. Lippmann 1922; Adorno et al. 1950).

The symbolic politics perspective deserves serious attention because it represents an effort to work out a model of political thinking that is general, coherent, and distinctive. By way of underlining both its coherence and distinctiveness, I want to contrast it with the research program on "issue pluralism," which represents a very different perspective on the politics of race (Sniderman, Tetlock, Carmines, and Peterson n.d.; Sniderman and Piazza 1992). The "issue pluralism" perspective offers a policy-centered account of the thinking of ordinary Americans about issues of race. To say that the account is policy-centered is not to deny that whites base their reactions to issues of race in part on enduring dispositions such as racial stereotypes and political ideology; but the vital point is that which dispositions matter, and how much they matter, varies from one racial policy to another. It was once supposed that when whites were asked to respond to racial policies, what mattered to them was not *what* was to be done by way of policy but rather for *whom* it was to be done: as Converse put it in a classic expression, different racial policies

would tend to boil down for many respondents to the same single question: 'Are you sympathetic to Negroes as a group, are you indifferent to them, or do you dislike them?' The responses would be affected accordingly. (1964, 235)

This rings true as an account of the politics of race in the 1950s and 1960s. But the premise of the issue pluralism approach is that the politics of race have changed, and it is of course a change-oriented argument that the symbolic politics perspective, with its commitment to the fixity of controlling predispositions acquired early in life, is not well positioned to deal with. How has the issue of race changed? According to the issue pluralism argument, there no longer is *one* issue of race, but a number of them, and notwithstanding some common elements, their politics are distinct. Broadly speaking, a trio of policy agendas can be distinguished --

social welfare, equal treatment, and race consciousness, all concerned with race, each politically distinct nonetheless. From this point of view, the crucial fact to recognize is that the politics of racial welfare policies and those of affirmative action are by no means the same, and the politics of fair housing is different yet again (Sniderman, Tetlock, Carmines, and Peterson n.d.; Carmines and Merriman n.d.; Sniderman and Piazza 1992). There is in this emphasis on the distinctiveness of policy agendas the thread of a larger argument, being made independently and on fronts having nothing to do with race. Thus, Hamill, Lodge and Blake (1985), taking advantage of the language of schema theory, drive home the point that the schema used to structure policy attitudes are domain specific. Moreover, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990; and Peffley and Hurwitz n.d.), have seized on the natural contrast between how people think about foreign and domestic policy concerns, illustrating the distinctive values (or "postures") structuring responses to foreign policy issues, demonstrating in the process the utility of domain-specific analyses.

The symbolic politics and issue pluralism approaches, though manifestly different, are not mutually exclusive across-the-board. It is too easy to go astray by insisting that one or the other is true. The question is instead which, for any given problem, is more useful. Given the underidentification of theories across-the-board, truth is utility in context. Moreover, both approaches agree on a vital point: that it is useful to take seriously the structure of mass belief systems. Having concentrated to this point on the structure of political belief systems, I want now to turn to their dynamics.

Dynamics

Temporal vs. Contextual

Public opinion, through the 1960s and 1970s, was largely conceived in static terms. There was, to be sure, a prominent strand of panel studies of the dynamics of political attitudes (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 1981; Converse and Markus 1979). But notwithstanding the important contributions of these studies, the problem of change was given strict construction. Relying on panel studies embedded in either a cross-electoral or generational design, it became commonplace to equate the dynamics of political belief with the natural decay of political opinions over extended periods of time.

Given this history, and with an eye to expanding the range of variation relevant to political analysis, I want to introduce a distinction between two ways of construing dynamics. Dynamics may refer -- indeed, in the heyday of minimalism, it nearly always referred -- to changes in

belief over time. But it may also refer to variations in belief across situations. This second sense of dynamics -- contextual rather than temporal -- has come increasingly to the fore.

Given the new prominence of politics, I want to illustrate how the notion of dynamics -- construed as contextual rather than temporal variation -- throws light on political thinking. I remarked earlier on the shifting fortunes of the "rigidity-of-the-right" hypothesis, which holds that there is an asymmetric relation between ideology and extremism (the right being more prone to rigidity), and the "ideologue" hypothesis, which holds that the relation is symmetric (both left and right being vulnerable). Tetlock, however, has shown that it is a mistake to think only in trait terms, as though people who fell on the far right -- or far left -- were marked by distinctive personality characteristics or cognitive styles *regardless of their political circumstances*. In particular, Tetlock argued, people's readiness to recognize and respect the complexity of political choices under debate had much to do with a pair of features of the political context -- first, whether they could be held accountable politically for the choice, and second, whether a particular choice was important to them given their political orientation and value priorities. What emerges from this contextualist account is a demonstration that the political left *or* right can be disposed to more (or less) complex political reasoning depending on political circumstance and context (Tetlock 1981, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, and 1988).

A quite different way of representing the contextual character of political judgments is suggested by the longstanding argument over whether people rely on "pocketbook" or "sociotropic" judgments in evaluating leaders. The scholarly debate has concerned which judgment type dominates the other, but as Mutz (1992a) has cleverly shown, framing the analytic issue in either-or terms is a mistake. When media coverage is heavy, personal experiences are 'depoliticized' and people rely more on perceptions of collective experience derived from mass media; on the other hand, when media coverage is low (and among those low in exposure to it), people are more likely to rely on personal experiences as the source of information underlying their political preferences. Two points in particular deserve to be made. First, at the level of the phenomena themselves, Mutz's findings, which jibe nicely with those of Weatherford (1983) and Conover and her colleagues (1991, 1992), suggest that people who are not tied into the beliefs and experiences of the larger collective through regular media consumption will "default" to more parochial sources of information such as personal experience as a basis for their political judgments. Second, at a more 'meta'-level, Mutz's focus on the

conditional character of political judgments in situations of high and low media coverage can serve as a mini-sermon, in itself, on the importance of not staging simple contests between "alternative" hypotheses and focusing instead on the conditions under which one or the other may be the more useful.

Variation across situations thus operates as one dimension defining the dynamics of political belief. Variations across individuals define a second dimension. It follows that specification of the rate and processes of diffusion of political preferences, across the general public, is very much at the center of analysis of the dynamics of public opinion. There is not a well-developed set of conventions about how to talk about variation in diffusion rates and processes within mass publics, and so by way of a talking-point, I want to call attention to a model of persuasion and attitude change -- the so-called "two-step reception-yielding model," first formulated nearly a generation ago (McGuire 1964; Converse 1964).

The heart of the two-step model is a distinction between reception and yielding. To be persuaded to adopt a belief or opinion about an issue, according to the two-step model, it is necessary *first* to be exposed to it, *then* to be motivated to accept it. Interpretations of the two-step model usually are quite straightforward (McClosky and Zaller 1985; Zaller 1992), though not less valuable on that account. But taking seriously the sequential character of the process -- first exposure, then acceptance -- yields striking results. The best known of these is Converse's (1962) classic argument on the floating voter. Arguing that the probability of receiving a persuasive political message is positively related to a voter's level of information, but that the probability of yielding to it is negatively related to their informational level, Converse made a specimen case for the curvilinearity of persuasive effects with those who are neither high nor low in information being most likely to defect in an election. More broadly, the two-step model helps illuminate a classic paradox in social influence and democratic theory -- the paradox of conformity. The paradox is a general one, but it is useful to focus on a specific expression of it -- the connection between personality and commitment to democratic values. A lack of self-confidence and self-esteem increases the desire to conform to social norms. On the other hand, a lack of self-confidence and self-esteem interferes with a person learning the values of the larger society. Hence the paradox: the very factor that motivates people to want to conform -- a lack of a feeling of self-worth and a desire for acceptance -- leads them to deviate (DiPalma and McClosky 1970; Sniderman 1975).

The two-step model to one side, there is a heightened attention to the interdependence of political

elites and mass publics. Public opinion, in this view, takes on coherence and politically relevant properties precisely because it is shaped by elite politics. Smith and Squire (1990) have come up with an especially elegant demonstration of the interdependence of mass beliefs and elite actions. Focusing on public reactions to judicial nominations and tax referenda, they document the impact of calling attention to the political sponsors of public acts, demonstrating, for example, that the public's response takes on a markedly more political character when ordinary citizens (and particularly the less educated) know the political provenance of judicial nominations or tax policy recommendations (see also Zaller 1992).

These results can be read as an exercise in simple persuasibility, but this mistakes the thrust of the analysis. It is more instructive to observe that ordinary citizens appear to miss the point politically *sometimes* because the questions put to them in conventional public opinion surveys are framed in ways that obscure or omit the political context. For example, Sigelman, Sigelman and Walkosz (1990) offer a striking account of the nuances in the judgments of ordinary citizens about the responsibilities of leadership (especially whether leaders should comply with an "instructed delegate" or an "independent trustee" model), putting into effect an exceptionally nuanced experimental design. For political judgments to be recognized as political they must be rooted in a political context.

It should be emphasized that in highlighting the contextual character of political responses the overriding objective is to call attention to the dynamics of politics. Thus, Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Feld (1991) have investigated whether more public support for racial policies can be generated by an appeal to the law as a persuasive symbol, demonstrating that a non-trivial fraction of the public can be induced to support a racial policy like set-asides by means of an appeal to law as a persuasive symbol. More striking, if one cares about real politics, is the analysis of who is more persuasible on this issue. It turns out that an appeal to law as a persuasive symbol is most effective in changing the minds of those who start off less rather than more sympathetic to racially liberal policies. It can pay politically to preach to sinners -- or at any rate to those who start off on the opposite side of an issue.

My sense of the initial stream of studies on political persuasion and attitude change is that they represent a new field of study in the making. Politics is about how you get people who start off in one corner of a room to move to another. What is necessary now is systematically to investigate who can be talked out of what political positions, and why. In pursuing this, I should emphasize the need to avoid an application of the latest fashion in social psychology. It is politics and

political behavior we are attempting to get a grip on, and explanations must take this as their starting point.

I have offered a number of illustrations of the theme "politics matters," but I should like to offer one more in the context of political persuasion and attitude change. Fairly obviously, the position any given citizen takes on a political issue may be influenced by his or her perceptions of the positions others take on the issue. Far less obviously, as Mutz (1992b) has shown, the direction of a response to the social influence process can vary with the degree of commitment to the initial position taken on the issue, with the weakly committed moving in the direction of the perceived majority while those strongly committed tend to move in the direction opposite that of the cue (Mutz 1992b). Notice Mutz's double-barreled message of social influence and political reasoning. First, on her causal story, the result of social influence exerted in favor of one side of a political issue can be an increase in the proportions strongly committed on both sides of the issue. Second, again on her causal story, social influence on political reasoning is *not* a reflexive process whereby people blindly follow a bandwagon, adopting the position of others reflexively either in order to relieve their personal anxiety or to obtain social approval. Rather, the notion is that when people hear the positions others have taken on an issue they respond by thinking about the reasons that might have led all those others to hold their views; and by bringing cue-consistent thoughts to the fore, they are essentially engaged in a self-persuasion process, with their own views moving in the direction of arguments that otherwise would not have come to mind. This, then, is a thumbnail sketch of a number of themes we have been talking about, among them, the capacity of citizens for deliberation and the importance of the substance of politics in organizing the thinking of citizens about politics.

By way of balance I want to call attention to a more traditional account of the dynamics of political preferences. Taking advantage of a National Election Pilot Study, Zaller and Feldman (1992) asked people what ideas they had in mind about an issue either before or after choosing a position on it. Underlining the number of responses produced on opposing sides of an issue like government's responsibility to assure people that they have a good standard of living, they read this as evidence that a fundamental feature of the steady state of mass belief systems is instability and inconsistency. Respondents do not express fixed preferences; they construct their judgments, on the spot, sampling stochastically from among the miscellany of ill-organized and somewhat conflicting associations they carry about mixed with an over-sample of considerations stimulated by the particular question put to them. The Zaller-

Feldman "sampling model" represents a step forward in the treatment of the dynamics of political belief, not least because the metaphor of sampling allows for a degree of explicitness not reached before. But it also reaches back. Its predominant emphasis is on the vagaries, instabilities, and inconsistencies of the survey response. Its controlling presumption is the appropriateness of a common account of how citizens *taken as a whole* reason about political choices. Its principal objective is to re-focus attention on the fringes of belief systems — the smaller, more distal, more specific particles, in the form of discrete issue preferences and top-of-the-head justifications of these preferences — not the core of political belief systems — the larger, more central, and more enduring elements, in the form of personal and political values.⁸

A different analytic tack has been taken in the development of "on-line" accounts of impression formation. It had been customary to assume, until recently, that voters' evaluations of candidates are formed roughly as follows. Voters make a number of separate judgments about a candidate — whether he or she is honest, broadly likeminded, sincere, competent, and so on. This mix of judgments, some positive and some not, is then stored in long-term memory, and subsequently retrieved following some algorithm or other when it comes time to vote, or to provide a summary evaluation of candidates. In contrast, Lodge and his colleagues, stimulated by the work of Hastie and his colleagues (Hastie and Park 1986; Hastie and Pennington 1989), have developed a research program focusing on on-line processing. As against memory-based judgments, which hinge on retrieval of already stored information, on-line impressions are formed as a person receives fresh information. The intake of fresh information, as a moment's reflection will suggest, requires smoothing out. Hence the notion of a "judgment operator" (Hastie and Park 1986). The judgment operator keeps, as it were, a running tally in working memory, and when voters encounter new information about candidates, the judgment operator is activated and updated. The distinction between on-line and memory-based impression formation, which falls out of the notion of a judgment operator, is an important one.

There is, returning to the sophistication-interaction hypothesis, a pivotal — and quasi-paradoxical — problem in modelling the dynamics of political belief systems. The belief systems of the politically sophisticated exhibit a pair of features that appear contradictory at first impression. On the one hand, the more politically aware and sophisticated a person is, the more likely he or she is to show ballast in their political beliefs: rather than gyrating erratically in response to any gust around them, their political convictions, their

political likes and dislikes, show impressive continuity over time. On the other hand, it is equally plain that the politically aware also distinguish themselves by the extent and rapidity with which they update their political preferences. The hypothesis of on-line impression formation centered on a "judgment operator" provides an attractively simple mechanism first for modelling the inertial component in political preferences -- and the study of the dynamics of political belief will not progress far without nailing down, by way of a baseline, a continuity component -- and second for modelling the intake of new information. It is also worth remarking, in considering the compatibility of the Lodge model of on-line impression formation and the Zaller-Feldman sampling model, that the "judgment operator" model fits better the more politically aware and sophisticated individuals are (Lodge, Stroh, and Wahlke 1990; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990), suggesting that the two approaches can be integrated under some version of the "sophistication interaction" hypothesis.

There are points to be made in favor of both approaches, though the balance of advantages depends on whether it is useful to stay within the world of minimalism or to move beyond it. It is not obvious that it pays to take as a primary focus of analysis the reasons people may give for the positions they take on political issues -- as opposed to the positions themselves -- if only because there is good reason to doubt that people are adept at analyzing or remembering the reasons for their preferences or choices (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Indeed, just because of this, the account of Lodge and his colleagues has a natural verisimilitude. They depict after all, a world in which individuals can remember where they are politically without having to remember exactly how they got there. It is possible to know what one believes without being able to say, on the spot, exactly how one came to form or maintain these beliefs.

However this may be, we cannot make sense of how substantial numbers of citizens make sense of politics if we suppose that they manage this drawing solely on their own resources. I have already remarked on the interdependence of citizens' judgmental shortcuts and the structuring of the political choices that confront them. Now, moving from large contexts to small, I want to say a word about the nature of the public opinion interview as a conversation.

The Public Opinion Interview as a Conversation: A Gricean Perspective

The importance of variation in the immediate context of the interview has long been recognized. It is, for example, well-established (Schuman and Presser 1981; Sudman and Bradburn 1982) that even seemingly

trivial changes in the wording, ordering, or formatting of questions can affect the responses made in the course of a public opinion interview. But more often than not, such sources of variation in public opinion responses have been viewed as measurement error, to be purged before a substantive account can be given. In contrast, the new look in public opinion research is marked by a shift in perspective; a shift nicely caught by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988, 301), who remark of themselves that they "try to find the substantive meat in what others may well regard as methodological poison."

A signature feature of the new look in public opinion research is thus the treatment of variation within the interview, not as methodological noise to be suppressed or isolated, but rather as substantive variance to be analyzed and explained. More specifically, it is necessary to recognize that a public opinion interview is a conversation. Respondents have *in part* appeared erratic and inconsistent in their political preferences because analysis has proceeded as if they are talking to themselves. But two people -- respondent plus interviewer -- are talking to each other. What we are trying to make sense of is not a monologue but a dialogue.

In treating the public opinion interview as a conversation, I want to invoke a broadly Gricean perspective. Conversations, Grice (1989) maintained, have a logic; and just insofar as a public opinion interview approximates a conversation, it follows that the positions taken in an interview, the emphasis and qualifications attached to them, the readiness to stand by them or to give them up are constrained not merely by formal logic but also by the informal logic of conversations. Rather than responding mechanically to the presence (or absence) of artificially manipulated symbols, respondents tend to be guided by a number of general maxims -- for example, that they should say what is true, that they should try to be informative and to avoid mere repetition in giving answers, and that in determining what it means to be responsive to a question, they have to give weight to what the questioner has already said -- or failed to say.

A public opinion interview is a form of conversation. It is worth underlining that just because conversations have their own logic to respondents -- viewed only as speaking to themselves -- they can appear illogical, their opinions may appear to be readily, almost indefinitely, pliable (e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). But in addition, remembering that the public opinion interview is a conversation helps dispel some of the mystery of when respondents both change *and* do not change. Consider, for example, "source" effects -- the consequences of attributing a position to a positively valenced source, a

neutral source, or a negatively valenced source. There is certainly no shortage of theoretical reasons (Janis and Hovland 1959) to expect that the attribution of a position on a political issue to a high prestige source, for example, would induce a significant number of respondents to endorse it. But as it turns out, attribution of a position to a range of *diffusely* prestigious sources (e.g., "thoughtful people" or "concerned citizens") -- rather than specifically politically prestigious sources -- makes no difference to the position citizens take on a range of issues (Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989). *Pace* Grice, however, it makes a substantial difference if respondents are presented with relevant reasons for changing their mind. Thus, taking racial politics as an example precisely because of the common presumption that here, if anywhere, citizens have their feet firmly planted, one can show that on a number of racial issues (though not all) a large chunk of the public (approaching one in every two) can be induced to give up their positions in the face of a counter-argument (Sniderman and Piazza 1992).

It is, I want to suggest, of fundamental importance that respondents start from the premise that they are being given a relevant reason to modify their political views, even if it does not necessarily follow that they modify their views for *that* reason. And in construing the notion of relevance, it needs to be emphasized that a public opinion interview is not a conversation about anything and everything; it is, and is recognized to be, a conversation about public affairs. And because a public opinion interview is a conversation of a certain kind, then reasons of a certain kind matter. Respondents declare their preferences in the context of what they think is good and what is right, expressing what they regard as not only desirable but justifiable. Stoker (1992), in my view, has ingeniously caught the special mixture of preference and justification that marks the public discussion of public affairs in a contemporary democracy.

It will pay to take seriously the idea that public opinion interviews represent conversations of a special kind. To do this requires re-thinking the interview itself. The conventional public opinion interview is designed to assess the individual differences in political preferences relative to a specific and relatively idiosyncratic social situation. The controlling aim has been not merely to standardize but ideally to eliminate pressure on respondents to favor a given response. But this is, if one stops to think about it, an odd situation in which to find oneself. In real life people tend to find themselves subject to a variety of forms and degrees of social influence. And if we want to know what people believe and how they act once they have shown the interviewer to the door or hung up the phone, then we shall have to put them

quite deliberately into a variety of circumstances in the course of the interview itself -- and this can only be done by re-working the conventional public opinion interview to incorporate suitably complex experimental designs. For example, in an investigation of racial double standards, the characteristics of the person who had lost a job were manipulated, with race, gender, age, marital-parental and work history being systematically varied: only a single question was asked -- but one which took on 96 different forms (Sniderman, Tetlock, Piazza, and Kendrick 1991). It is in the and essential to sample both individuals and situations, for people's behavior is a function of the circumstances in which they find themselves as well as the dispositions and aptitudes they bring to these circumstances.

Citizenship

I want, finally, to single out for particular mention a number of intellectual forays into new territory. Without giving a false impression of a common purpose to these expeditions, I think it is useful all the same to call attention to the way they are mapping out new aspects of the idea of citizenship.

Citizenship in liberal democracies has been given, over the last generation, a construction that has been both conspicuously narrow and impressively unbending. Perhaps because of the ascendancy of individualism in the American political culture, perhaps because of the hegemony of survey research in the study of public opinion, the basic unit of political analysis has been the individual. New lines of research, however, are getting underway which propose to assign ontological parity, if not priority, to groups.

It is not that calling attention to the role of groups is itself novel. On the contrary, the role of groups is a long-standing theme in public opinion research, the major chord having emphatically been struck by the so-called Columbia school in the 1940s (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), a minor chord less conspicuously by the so-called Michigan school (Campbell, et al. 1960), with the literature on "group consciousness" (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1986; Conover and Feldman 1984) offering recent variations on the minor chord in particular. It has, however, become clearer that exploring the role of groups in political thinking offers an especially well-located platform for the study of strategic calculation in political thinking. Lupia (n.d.), for example, has shown how citizens learn to take positions on public propositions by taking into account the groups endorsing and opposing them. There is, on this revisionist view of political

thinking, no imputation that a person's likes (or dislikes) strategic political groups are "emotional" or "irrational," and certainly not that they are invariant over time. On the contrary, it is explicitly supposed that ordinary citizens, by focusing on their likes and dislikes of strategic groups, have in their hands a powerful tool for mapping the structure of issue conflict.

Beyond this, there has been an imaginative rethinking of the idea of legitimacy norms, keying on the role of groups in political thinking. In a conspicuously fresh and appealing approach, Dennis (1987) contrasts three norms of legitimate forms of political activity -- majoritarianism, individualism, and pluralism. As Dennis argues, pluralism, the notion that groups enjoy and confer legitimacy on political activity, is hemmed in, in the American ethos, on both sides -- by majoritarianism on the one pole, and individualism on the other. It is, I think, original and clever to suggest that an account of what citizens take to be fair can be specified, not in terms of their "values," but instead on the basis of what they believe the role of groups in political life ought to be.

There is, obviously, nothing novel in an interest in the issue of political legitimacy, its place on the modern research agenda being established by a trio of pioneering studies (Easton and Dennis 1969; Greenstein 1965; Finifter 1970). An enormous parade of research on trust in government and political alienation subsequently got underway during the years of discord in the late sixties and early seventies (e.g., Miller 1974; Citrin 1974; Abramson 1983). Then the parade unexpectedly halted, an odd straggler or two aside (e.g., Sniderman 1981; but see Weatherford 1992).

Unexpectedly perhaps, but not inexplicably. The argument over legitimacy had become posed in increasingly hyperbolic terms, and with one camp taking the position that the decline in trust in government in the 1960s signalled a fundamental crisis in the American political system (Miller 1974), and with the opposing camp contending that the wave of public cynicism amounted to no more than hot air, akin to baseball fans shouting "Kill the umpire" (Citrin 1974). The research agenda of the 1960s and 1970s, in retrospect, ran aground on two reefs. The more pronounced the emphasis on extreme political attitudes and behavior, the more pronounced the methodological mismatch: the standard national general population sample is ill-suited for the study of rare behavior, which through political disaffection and protest tends to be on a national, cross-sectional basis -- even at its height. Normatively, rather than presupposing that political cynicism and protest was necessarily a threat to governance, it became increasingly evident that a democratic politics not only need not be put at risk by periodic waves of political protest, but may even profit from periodic outbursts of distrust and protest: who, after all, could have taken the idea of

democratic citizenship seriously if after the political debacles of the 1960s and 1970s -- the race riots, assassinations, undeclared wars, prominent politicians unfrocked -- ordinary citizens had lost not a jot or a tittle of trust and confidence in their political leaders (Sniderman 1981)?

An interest in issues of legitimacy, however, has re-emerged, now framed to highlight aspects of democratic citizenship in a fresh way. For example, Finifter and Finifter have offered a sensitive reappraisal of citizens' political identities and attachments to a political order, examining the interplay of exit from one polity and engagement with another (Finifter and Finifter 1989). Departure from one political society, and identification with another, has been seen as a fundamentally discontinuous process -- the replacement of one political identity with another. In contrast, Finifter and Finifter, examining American migrants who have taken up Australian citizenship, accent the element of continuity, showing how the political engagement of these new citizens proceeds in part from their previous political attachments and ideological orientation, in interaction with *political* features (e.g., the relative strength of political parties in their new state) of their new environment.

Finifter and Finifter (1991) are in the process of drawing a portrait of citizenship from a fresh perspective, looking particularly at Americans who not only left America but decided to become Australian citizens. The world of general population surveys is the world of the commonplace, and it should not come as a surprise that when special purpose samples are constructed to enlist respondents with relatively rare attributes, the picture of political loyalty changes. Finifter and Finifter present a finely spun analysis of the array of specific motives and incentives offered by new citizens as the basis of their new citizenship, categorized for convenience into two large classes of reasons: "intrinsic" reasons, that is, reasons that are "self-directed, endogenously related to citizenship, and community-oriented" and "extrinsic" reasons -- that is, reasons that are "dependent on external contingencies, are exogenously related to citizenship and are self-oriented." Without minimizing the issue of external validity -- the politics of the years of discord in the 1960s and 1970s supply a special context to the study of citizenship -- it does not seem unreasonable to expect that our sense of the dynamics of identification with the political order will be deeper when this study is done.

In the meantime, the research agenda on legitimacy has been extended thanks in part to the ironies of the competition between research agendas. Rational choice conceptions, having gained enormous prominence over the last decade, have come to be a foil for competitive perspectives, the irony being that the

empirical pay-off of rational choice -- for the study of mass opinion -- has chiefly been in consequence of critical reactions to it.⁹ Thus, in a quite self-conscious reaction to rational choice's emphasis on the contemporaneous and immediate rewards and punishments shaping behavior, there has been a resurgence of interest in the normative antecedents of a variety of types of politically relevant behavior including rule following (Tyler 1990), decision acceptance (MacCoun and Tyler 1988), voting behavior (Rasinski and Tyler 1988), and general political activity (Rasinski 1988). Studies have further linked normative judgments of legitimacy and trust to normative judgements about the political world. Tyler, Rasinski, and MacGraw (1985), for example, demonstrated that general evaluations of the justice of government social and economic policies influenced citizens' trust in government, independently of any effects of self-interest. Beyond this, a number of studies have demonstrated that the effects of personal experiences with governmental authorities on attitudes about the legitimacy of government are based on evaluations of the justice of those experiences, not the favorability of their outcomes (Lind and Tyler 1988). These include studies of legal trial procedures (e.g., Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, and Thibaut 1980), of other nontrial procedures used in resolving legal disputes, such as plea bargaining (Houlden 1980; Casper, Tyler, and Fisher 1988) and mediation (Adler, Hensler, and Nelson 1983; MacCoun and Tyler 1988), studies of police officer dealings with citizens (Tyler 1988, 1990; Tyler and Folger 1980), and studies of citizen experiences with political officials (Tyler and Caine 1981). These studies, and an array of others, provide a deepening elaboration of the idea that in making evaluations of political outcomes, citizens often are undertaking an effort to determine what is fair, and not simply what is to their advantage; an idea that deserves consideration not least because it underlines the role of political process -- perceptions of how things came to be decided -- in the shaping of judgments both of political outcomes and political authorities and institutions (Tyler and Lind 1992).

Cutting in quite a different direction, there is a research project on the nature of citizenship in the United States and Great Britain that demands mention because of its freshness and imaginativeness. Rather than relying on either the standard public opinion survey or the conventional in-depth interview, Conover, Crewe, and Searing (1991, 1992) have taken advantage of focus groups -- group conversations rather than individual assessments, primed by a common set of inquiries, followed up catch-as-catch can. Scrutinizing these group conversations, Conover and her colleagues describe the discourse of democratic politics in Great Britain and in

the United States, the two countries holding down -- for heuristic purposes -- the two poles of communitarian and contractual democracy. Their account of these conversations contrasts the rights of citizens understood, in the United States, as civil rights and, in Great Britain, as social rights. From this they unfold a fan of distinctions, contrasting rights and benefits, equality of opportunity vs. entitlement to assistance, as well as more obliquely contrasting conceptions of citizen duties, all of which -- to the credit of the investigators -- line up only imperfectly with respect to their initial contrast of communitarian and contractual democracy.

A final line of argument requires mention. Its distinctiveness lies not in what it examines, but the level at which it conducts its examination. An assemblage of scholars -- chief among them, Stimson (1991), Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) (also Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989; and Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987) and Page and Shapiro (1992, 1983) -- working independently but also taking account of each other's work, are putting together a distinctive and powerful new view of public opinion. Their work is marked by a trio of interlinked features. First, it moves away from a concern with variations among individuals, making instead a strategic choice to work at the aggregate level. The emphasis is on aggregating over discrete individuals, and to a lesser extent over distinct issues, to capture, in Stimson's phrase, the public mood. Second, as against the analysis of cross-sections in citizens taken as individuals, the focus is instead on the analysis of variations of the public taken as a whole or in large blocs, either over time or across consequential political units -- for example, states. And third, the aim of the game is to give an account certainly of the making, and possibly also of the implementation, of public policy.

The work of scholars contributing to this new point of view throws a searching new light. Page and Shapiro (1992) and Stimson (1991) emphasize the aggregate analysis of swings in the public's preferences over time, in the process sharpening notions of change and trend and introducing to the analysis of policy formation the rhythms of public moods. In contrast, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1987) focus on the variations in public opinion and policy across states, in the process exposing how, once the dynamics of parties' responsiveness to public opinion and the exigencies of office are taken into account, linkages between partisan politics, political ideology, and public policy become evident. Putting to one side details of specific studies, it is, I think, a good bet that this aggregate approach will have powerful impact over the next decade, not least because it goes beyond an interest in public opinion in its own right to focus on the connections between public preferences and public policy.

A Last Word

The idea of the new in science is, or ought to be, nuanced. Research in public opinion over the last decade or so has exhibited a fresh and distinctive flavor, and I have tried to convey this. But viewed over a longer perspective, what is just as evident is the continuing exploration of the implications for democratic politics of the constraints on information and information processing of mass publics. From this angle, what is most original and telling in research in public opinion has manifestly come about by responding to what was most original and telling in the work of the classic analysts of public opinion -- Converse, McClosky, Stouffer, and Verba, among them.

Notes

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1. Among the several excellent research summaries, Abramson (1983) stands out for the scope of his treatment -- covering party loyalties, feelings of political efficacy, political trust, and political tolerance -- and the detail of his independent analysis.

2. For the record, the feature of the likability heuristic that operates to yield accurate attributions is the weighting of issue attributions by the *difference* in people's feelings toward polar groups like liberals and conservatives. For the hook-up between individual organization and political organization, see the argument on bipolarity below.

3. I am deviating, it should be noted, from what has been the dominant view, both in the study of public opinion and psychology, which has stressed how the perceptual world is a buzzing, booming Jamesian chaos. It seems to me utterly implausible to concede (as I do) that the average citizen pays little attention to politics and then go on to argue that he or she is nonetheless miraculously adept at figuring out effective simplifications. Following Gibson (1979), I am inclined to think that people can effectively pick up information from their environment insofar as that environment is organized.

4. Converse (1964), who first raised the innocence of ideology thesis, put the issue in more nuanced terms, calling attention to the marked variations in informational level and organizational patterns *within* mass publics.

5. The research of Philip Tetlock has had a major impact on the terms in which this section is put, even when the specific assertions depart at points from his. See Tetlock, 1986a and 1986b.

6. This analytic move, aggregating by states, is ingenious on Gibson's part, though it carries with it heavy risks, not least because the original samples were not designed with this maneuver in mind.

7. A particularly strategic contribution, comparing the stability of so-called symbolic and non-symbolic attitudes, has been made by Krosnick (1990a), showing that non-symbolic attitudes are as stable as symbolic ones once differences in reliability of measurement are taken into account. It should also be remarked that the proponents

of the symbolic politics model are committed to a strong version of a persistence model, asserting that people hold central political orientations (such as party identification and ideology) *without updating them to any significant degree*.

8. Feldman and Zaller (1992), it should be remarked, take the same variability in response reviewed in Zaller and Feldman (1992) but construe it as evidence not of a lack of crystallized attitudes but rather as evidence of complexity in political reasoning. It will be interesting to see how the interpretations are reconciled in the course of this research program.

9. No criticism is intended here of rational choice: merely a contention that its value for the study of *mass public opinion* remains largely a matter of asseveration, not demonstration. For a major step forward in interweaving rational and causal accounts at the individual level, see Brady and Ansolabehere, 1989.

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Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries: Black, Latino, and Racial Minority Group Politics in Political Science

Paula D. McClain and John A. Garcia

Introduction

Political science as a discipline historically has not seriously concerned itself with the politics of America's various minority groups,¹ particularly black and Latino politics. In fact, there was tacit, if not expressed, agreement that some groups within the American political spectrum were not legitimate subjects for political scientists to study. Matthew Holden, Jr. (1983) reports that at a 1941 conference on the Interdisciplinary Aspect of Negro Studies, Ralph J. Bunche, the first black American to receive a Ph.D. (1934) in political science,² lamented that the publication prospects in political science for works on the political behaviors of Negroes were somewhat limited. Bunche continued:

In some field[s] this [publishing] is relatively easy. Anthropologists deal with the Negro as a respectable topic, and the journals of anthropology take such articles without hesitation. In respect to my own field, which concerns the status of the Negro, except insofar as papers having to do with colonial problems and the like are involved, there isn't a very cordial reception for papers dealing with the Negro (quoted in Holden 1983, 34).

Professor Emmett E. Dorsey, the late chair of the department of political science at Howard University, was quoted by Walton (1986, xi) to have said, as late as 1964, "Negro politics was long considered an offbeat field of political science." Many viewed it as an "academic graveyard for any young scholar who sought academic respectability..." (p. xi). Holden (1983, 34) has characterized the attitude within political science, as well as other social science disciplines, as an attitude of non-interest in "all this stuff about Negroes." Further,

Holden observes that political scientists "did not perceive those black-white relationships in American society to raise *critical intellectual problems* for scholars, in contrast to raising 'social problems' for social activists." The attention paid to the problems of Latinos within the American political system, as well as Latino-white relationships, was equally nonexistent.

This chapter principally traces and examines the development of the fields of black and Latino politics and their entrance into the realm of appropriate topics for political scientists to study. Current trends and future directions of the two subfields are also explored. Two other emergent fields of study, American Indian politics and Asian-American politics, are addressed as well, but not to the same depth and extent as the other two areas. Our brief discussion of these two subfields is not meant as a comment on the importance and significance of the areas, but is reflective of the paucity of research thus far.

An undertaking of this kind is replete with pitfalls. Principal among them is how one surveys a body of literature to provide a descriptive history of the development of the subfields, while at the same time establishing the analytical and methodological linkages between the various historical periods.³ Moreover, the importance of political events to the intellectual development and growth of black and Latino politics must also be acknowledged and integrated. Thus one's organizational approach is important.

We have chosen to discuss the subfields separately, focusing on concepts and/or theoretical approaches that characterize the literature at various points in time. There is a tendency within the discipline to assume that similarities in racial minority group status within the United States result in similarities of experiences and behaviors; consequently, blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians are merged under the category of minority group politics. Yet, while there may be similarities in racial minority group status, there are fundamental differences in their experiences,

orientations, and political behaviors. Nevertheless, while we handle the subfields separately, an attempt is made to identify linkages between the various subfield areas.

The first part of the chapter is concerned with the field of black politics. Black politics is the oldest of the subfields; therefore it has the largest body of literature. This section is organized in two ways -- the theoretical paradigms that dominated particular generations of research, and the various topical areas which employed those paradigms. Part two examines the field of Latino politics. This section is also structured around theoretical paradigms that have been employed in the research, and the principal concepts that have dominated the literature, but the literature is not explicitly delineated in generational terms.

Part three provides brief overviews of the emerging fields of American Indian and Asian-American politics. This section reviews the subject areas most often covered, and, where possible, the theoretical frameworks employed. Part four discusses the potential patterns of inter-minority group interaction that may result in coalitional or competitive behavior. Additionally, the four subfields are summarized and similarities and differences among them are highlighted.

Part I. Black Politics: Race and Political Science

Matthews (1969, 113) noted that while the "Negro problem was the most important unresolved domestic problem confronting the nation," American political scientists did not engage in research on race politics or race relations. The resistance of political science to issues of race cannot be viewed in isolation but must be viewed through the lens of the external environment in American society and its effect on changes in the discipline (Walton et al. n.d., 6). Walton et al. contend that political science's attitude toward race was influenced by the theories of social Darwinism, as reflected in the work of John R. Burgess. Burgess "...applied the concept of social Darwinism to political science and jurisprudence," concluding that only Aryan nations were capable of political organization (Walton et al. n.d.).

This particular perspective on the political capabilities of various racial groups influenced the direction of development of the discipline of political science, as reflected in the pages of the early professional journals. Matthews (1969) found that between 1906 and 1963 only 13 articles with the word "Negro," "civil rights," or "race" in the title appeared in the *American Political Science Review*. Wilson (1985, 604) contends that political science classically studies elites, decision-

makers, and the uses of power, and since blacks are not usually found among the elite power brokers, "political science doesn't study black politics." Katznelson (1971, 56) suggests that social (political) scientists only became seriously interested in race relations after "American blacks, using the most effective tactic available to the powerless, that of disruption," were able to make inputs into the political system.

This obstinacy of the discipline to the inclusion of black politics as legitimate political science sparked an intellectual as well as a political battle. The intellectual battle, begun by Ralph J. Bunche and the first generation of black political scientists in the 1940s, continued into the 1980s, culminating in the recognition of black politics as a field of study on the American Political Science Association's listing of specialties. The political battle erupted at the 1970 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles over the role of black political scientists and their research within the discipline. The on-site boycott of the meeting resulted in the creation of the Committee on the Status of Blacks in the Profession within the American Political Science Association. Moreover, the 1970 boycott led to the official formation of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists as a separate organization.⁴

First Generation Research: The Modern Beginnings

Walton, McLemore, and Gray (1990) identify the early intellectual basis of black politics as stemming from the pamphlets written during the early 1800s by *Freemen of Color*, e.g., David Walker and Henry Highland Garnet and Martin R. Delany, exhorting blacks to fight against the oppression of slavery, and from the early memoirs of black congressmen during Reconstruction. Walton, discussing the importance of these early works, suggests that "[w]hile these writers about the American political system may have not known that they were laying the very bases and foundations for black politics as an intellectual area, they did know -- particularly the former black elected officials -- that the black political experience in government was worthwhile noting..." (Walton et al. 1990, 197). While there were numerous writings on various aspects of the black political experience, the intellectual grounding of black politics as an academic field, as we presently conceive it, may be traced to the scholarship of Harold F. Gosnell and the scholarship, as well as activities, of Ralph Johnson Bunche.

While William F. Nowlin's *The Negro in American National Politics* appeared in 1931 and represented the first major work by a black political scientist (Walton et al. 1990), Gosnell's 1934 *American*

Political Science Review article, "Political Meetings in Chicago's Black-Belt," and 1935 book, *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago*, were the first works by a mainstream political scientist on the political struggles of African Americans. Gosnell's focus on blacks in Chicago was a logical extension of his interest in urban and machine politics, and he used empirical data to analyze the political behavior of African Americans. Gosnell's intent was to "throw light upon a number of hypotheses that might be formulated regarding the role of minority groups in the democratic process" (Gosnell [1935] 1967, 12).

Gosnell purposefully avoided utilizing any of the existing political science paradigms as a theoretical framework to guide his study; instead he posited a series of research questions predicated on the assumption that minority status and oppressive conditions would result in a variety of political relationships between white power structures and the Chicago black community. Moreover, these same conditions would result in certain types of political relationships between various groups within the black community. *Negro Politicians* systematically probed, over a five-year period, various facets of the black political experience in Chicago, e.g., office holding, relationship to machine, civil service positions, appointive positions, and so forth. Essentially, the book was a black community study that developed a broad portrait of black Chicago politics. Moreover, Gosnell made no attempt to generalize his findings beyond Chicago.

Ralph J. Bunche's contributions to the modern foundation of black politics followed three paths -- scholarship, university administration, and political activism. As a young instructor in the Division of Social Science at Howard University, Bunche published a little-known, yet extremely significant, article in 1928, entitled "The Negro in Chicago Politics." This article represents the beginning of Bunche's scholarly writings on the political condition of African Americans. In expressing the importance of studying the political behavior of blacks, Bunche states:

The negro electorate of Chicago affords an interesting study....Any minority group which can and does control a mayoralty election in the nation's second largest municipality must be of more than passing interest to the student of political affairs (1928, 261).

It would seem that the growing activity and influence of the negro electorate portends a new era of negro political development. The twelve millions of negroes in this country, approximating one-tenth of the total population, must inevitably wield a more

proportionate and equitable degree of influence in the political affairs -- local, state, and national -- of the nation (1928, 64).

Bunche's 1928 article predates Gosnell's work, and a check of the references of *Negro Politicians* indicates that Gosnell was aware of Bunche's early work.

Several themes were prominent throughout Bunche's work -- strategies for overcoming political exclusion, as well as the recognition that the interaction of economic conditions and race were critically important in understanding the situation of the American Negro. (This latter perspective represents the early development of a Marxist analysis of black politics with origins in what has recently been dubbed the Howard School of Thought [Henry 1992].) These themes are evident in a 1935 article, "A Critical Analysis of the Tactics and Programs of Minority Groups," and a 1936 piece, "A Critique of New Deal Social Planning as It Affects Negroes." In particular, the 1935 article describes the various approaches by Negro organizations, e.g., racial separatism, economic passive resistance, interracial conciliation, and so forth. Kirby (1990) suggests that Bunche placed all of the "Negro ideologies on the Negro question" into the category of "accommodationism."

In 1939, the Republican National Committee asked Bunche to conduct research on why the black voters defected from the party in the two previous national elections (Rivlin 1990, 8-9). Additionally, between 1939 and 1940, Bunche became part of the Carnegie study, "The Negro in America," directed by Gunnar Myrdal, and produced a number of memoranda on Negro leadership, ideologies and tactics of Negro organizations, the political status of Negroes, and conceptualizations of the Negro problem, much of which was incorporated into the original study. In 1941, he published an article, "The Negro in the Political Life of the United States," which was based on his research for the Myrdal study.

Several of Bunche's themes were prominent in Myrdal's 1944 *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* -- Negro leadership styles and the hypocrisy of American democracy in its treatment of Negro citizens. The concept of Negro leadership styles produced one of the first dominant paradigms to guide the scholarship on black politics -- the protest versus the accommodation approach to black political leadership.⁵ At the same time, the hypocrisy of American democracy led to the development of a theoretical framework, referred to as the moral dilemma perspective, for assessing race relations in the United States. Clearly the moral dilemma approach has been important in the development of the race relations literature. Notwithstanding, its use in the research on

black politics has been limited, partly because of criticism from Cox (1948) and others that Myrdal ignored the problem of power dynamics in American society. Hence, it will not be discussed.

The publication of V.O. Key's *Southern Politics* in 1949 also played an important role in the early paradigmatic themes that evolved in the next generation of black politics research. Of note is the evolution and refinement by Key of several concepts and theories originated by Bunche in his manuscript "The Political Status of the Negro." Key references the Bunche unpublished manuscript on several occasions (Walton n.d.). In *Southern Politics*, Key discussed the importance of black concentration to the political fabric of the South and the centrality of the "Negro question" to Southern politics -- "...the presence of the Negro has created conditions under which the political process operates" (Key 1949, 671). However, he gave little attention to black voting because, at the time, he saw it as being of little consequence to the politics of the South -- "[s]o few have been Negro voters in the South that to estimate their number seems futile" (Key 1949, 517). Key's admonition of the futility of studying the black vote, coupled with Bunche's and Myrdal's categorizations of black leadership, generated a body of research referred to as Negro leadership studies. The leadership studies initially defined the field of black politics and set the early boundaries -- blacks could not vote; therefore the focus of scholarly research must be shifted elsewhere.

Second Generation Research: Protest/Accommodation Paradigm

Several seminal works on black politics (Wilson 1960; Ladd 1966; and Matthews and Prothro 1966) crafted in the protest-accommodation paradigm formed the foundation of the Negro leadership research (Wilson 1961; Walker 1963; Killian and Smith 1960; Dunbar 1961; Tilman and Phillips 1961; and Burgess 1962). The general concept of leadership in these studies was ambiguous and reflected a wide variety of definitions (Smith 1982, 3). Smith (1982, 4) argues that while there was no consensus on the definition of Negro leadership, the literature seemed to agree that "(a) leadership involved affecting the attitudes and behavior of Negroes insofar as social and political goals and/or methods are concerned; and (b) Negro leadership is not limited to Negroes but may and indeed does include whites." The three seminal works, two of which are principally black leadership studies, are James Q. Wilson's *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (1960); Everett C. Ladd, *Negro Political Leadership in the South* (1966); and Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (1966).

Wilson's *Negro Politics*, like Gosnell's earlier work, was on black Chicago politics. Unlike Gosnell's work, however, Wilson's portrait of black political leadership was unflattering and extremely critical. Walton et al. (1992) suggest that Wilson started from a preconceived set of conclusions about black Chicago, then proceeded to work backwards from the conclusions. Wilson perceived the black community as having no political life that was not a reflection of white politics within the city. For the most part, Wilson saw Negro community leaders as ineffective, partly because Negro leadership could not agree on goals, which for Wilson were categorized as welfare goals and status goals.

Each of these goal orientations was attached to a particular leadership style -- the militant or protest style (status goals) versus the moderate or bargainer style (welfare goals). While all of Negro leadership was ineffective, the moderate leaders' (in Bunche's term, the accommodationists) welfare goals would produce more tangible improvements for the community, even though, as Wilson acknowledges, "they are on a segregated basis." On the other hand, the militant leaders pursuing status goals would bring blacks closer to integration but produce less tangible improvements for the community.

Ladd's *Negro Political Leadership in the South* examined the thesis that Negro leadership is primarily a response to particular societal conditions. The major portion of the book focused on race leadership and only incidentally on political leadership. Ladd concluded that Negro political leadership was issue-based leadership that through successive racial confrontations would produce important changes in the Negro leadership personnel. Building on the categories developed by Myrdal (1944) and adapted by Wilson (1960), Ladd identified three types of Negro leaders: (1) Conservative leaders who are established older men who focus on welfare goals for Negro people; (2) militant leaders who are principally younger men with low incomes and an uncompromising commitment to status goals for Negroes; and (3) moderate leaders who are of all ages and balance welfare and status goals. Unlike Wilson, Ladd sees utility in all three of these styles, depending on the response of the white community to the demands of blacks.

Matthews and Prothro's *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* departed from the restricted focus on black leadership as the core of black politics. Their study centered on "Negro political participation and its consequences" (Matthews and Prothro 1966, vii). Using behavioral research techniques, they examined black voting and other aspects of political participation, controlling for demographic characteristics (regardless of levels of political information, blacks with high incomes engaged in political activity more often than blacks with low incomes), black political organizations (must be

created and maintained if blacks are to become a significant force in southern politics), and black leadership styles. For Matthews and Prothro, leadership was reciprocal in nature -- in order for someone to lead, others had to consent to follow. Thus those people most thought of as leaders by black citizens were, in fact, the leaders. Based on the community identification of black leaders, Matthews and Prothro developed their categories -- traditional, moderate, and militant -- which were heavily influenced by Wilson's original formulation (Matthews and Prothro 1966, 189; note 22). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Matthews and Prothro were the first to study the black student sit-ins and protest activity as black political leadership and to estimate their influence on black political behavior in general.

Criticisms of the protest/accommodation dichotomy, particularly as utilized by Wilson, were numerous. For some, the Negro leadership studies put black politics on a path that focused exclusively on the personality and style of certain individuals, rather than on behaviors of the larger black community. Moreover, the criticism was leveled that some of these works utilized theoretical frameworks developed from research on groups who had access to the political system and, therefore, that they were devoid of the black experience in the United States.

Several political, as well as intellectual events, signaled the demise of the leadership studies as the primary form of black politics research. These events were the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the urban riots of the 1960s, and the ascendancy of pluralism as the dominant paradigm in political science. The Voting Rights Act provided an important avenue for black political participation, particularly for southern blacks. With the right to vote came the intellectual opportunity to examine questions about black voting behavior and black elected officials. The urban riots focused attention on the frustrations and conditions of urban blacks, and the use of protest to address policy concerns (Sears and McConahay 1973; Lipsky 1968, 1970; Eisinger 1974). Likewise, pluralism and black politics research, growing out of the New Haven studies (Dahl 1961), became inextricably entwined. The pluralist notions of the lessening of group identity and interests over time through assimilation into the political mainstream found its expression in the ethnic politics model.

Ethnic Politics Approach

The ethnic politics model attempted to draw parallels/comparisons between the political progress of white ethnics in urban cities and American blacks, in

urban areas as well as the South (Litt 1970; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). The argument developed in this approach is that ethnic integration is unavoidable in a pluralistic democracy. Through electoral competition and economic development, immigrant ethnic groups would find themselves assimilated into the mainstream of both the urban political and economic life. Vigorous electoral participation was a guarantee of political power, and continued economic development was the key to economic assimilation. Attendant to political and economic assimilation was the eventual disappearance of ethnic identity and ethnicity as an organizing principle for political activity.

Mack Jones (1972) was particularly critical of the predominance of the ethnic politics approach as a framework for examining the black political experience. He argued that superficial comparisons of blacks with white ethnics ignored the unique and peculiar condition of African Americans in the United States. Moreover, the comparison resulted in the accomplishments of the white ethnic group, without the historical and extant constraints imposed on blacks, serving as the standard against which the political progress of blacks was measured.

Jones was not the only critic of pluralism in general and the ethnic politics approach in particular as appropriate frameworks for black politics. Other examinations of black politics have drawn similar conclusions about the two approaches (McLemore 1972; Holden 1973; Morris 1975; Barker and McCorry 1980; Pinderhughes 1987), which are captured by Hamilton's (1981, 168, quoted in Pinderhughes 1987, 38) declaration, "The political situation of black Americans always posed a special problem for the pluralist system." Manley (1983, 368) recently suggested that "pluralism...fails to account for the reality of political and economic inequality in the United States."

Dissatisfaction with the theoretical approaches, and the direction of research in and development of the field of black politics, gave rise to a new generation of research by black political scientists. The work of Mack Jones, coupled with that of Hanes Walton, Jr., and Matthew Holden, Jr., pushed, or some might argue pulled, the fledgling field of black politics into a new era. The research of this period sought to move black politics toward definition and rigorous theoretical development, while simultaneously attempting to direct the field away from the "ambiguous concepts" of the protest/accommodation paradigm and the ethnic politics/pluralism approach.

Third Generation Research: Power Relations Paradigm and Field Definition

The appearance in 1967 of the book, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*, by Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton served as the bridge between the second and third generation black politics research. Carmichael and Hamilton offered a forceful critique of pluralism-ethnic politics and coalition theory and their relationship to black political power in the United States. They argued that blacks should control their own organizations and communities and only enter into coalitions with others (whites) from a position of strength and power, variously defined (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967, chaps. 2 and 3). They stated that "[b]lack power recognizes...the ethnic basis of American politics as well as the power-oriented nature of American politics" (p. 47). The concept of power was central to their proposals for achieving broadened political participation of blacks in the American political process. This book, while activist in orientation, gave rise to the power relations paradigm in the scholarly black politics literature.

Jones (1972), following the lead of Carmichael and Hamilton, constructed a frame of reference for the study of black politics that he felt was consonant with the black political experience in the United States, one that would facilitate the understanding of blacks in the American political system. Jones concluded that within the United States there is essentially a power struggle between blacks and whites, with whites trying to maintain their superordinate position vis-à-vis blacks. Consequently, "since the political system is the arena in which societal conflicts are definitely resolved, black politics should be thought of as a manifestation of the power struggle between these two groups" (Jones 1972, 9).

Jones, however, adds one very important caveat to this power struggle – the ideological justification for the superior position of whites is the institutionalized belief in the inherent superiority of that group. Using this conceptualization of the power dynamic as the orienting concept, a theoretical framework, augmented by the concepts of dominant and submissive groups, was developed that could be subdivided into a schematic of goal directed patterns of activity and policy proposals. Jones explicitly sought to refine the "ambiguous concepts – status and welfare goals, race man, militant" that evolved from the black leadership studies era (Jones 1972, 17).

The power dynamic paradigm, while forceful, was not successful in totally redirecting research in black politics away from the use of traditional political science frameworks and toward the search for alternative

frameworks. Walton (1972a), drawing from Jones, also sought to introduce the black/white political conflict system as a framework for analysis, but like Jones's attempt, met with little success. Walton, however, was successful in broadening the definition of what activities and behaviors among black Americans constituted the field of black politics.

Redefining Black Politics

Prior to the 1970s, Walton (1972a, 9) observed, the study of black politics, which he defined as "the attempts of one group of individuals in the American political system to implement their preferences as public policy," had been constricted by what he saw as a very narrow conceptualization of the field. From Walton's perspective, politics encompasses a variety of activities and behaviors, e.g., actions of legislative assemblies, political parties, and other aspects of modern government, yet "the beginning and end of studies on black politics have been primarily from the electoral angle" (Walton 1972a, 2). Most previous studies of black politics started from the assumption that "if blacks could not vote, they had little chance to have any meaningful effect on the political process" (p. 2). Consequently, Walton concluded, "students of black politics tend to feel that the alternative devices (e.g., lobbying, pressure groups, demonstrations, etc.) derive much of their value and significance from the existence of the vote" (p. 2).

The study of black politics, suggested Walton, was much more than electoral participation, and scholars should broaden their definition. Black politics as a field of inquiry should encompass the range of nonelectoral activities, e.g., community organizations and protest activities, in which black Americans participate and which affect their daily existence (Walton 1973). Moreover, Walton suggested that in addition to expanding the research focus beyond the vote, black politics should not be viewed as a monolith, but that patterns of behavior and activities should be expected to vary depending on regional as well as urban location.

The effort to broaden the definition of the field of black politics was joined by Matthew Holden, Jr. (1973). Holden focused on the organizational aspects of, what he labeled, the black "quasi government" and the potential public policy outputs and implications of the "quasi government's" activities. According to Holden's view of the field,

black politics actually takes place through a fairly well-defined and stable set of relationships which one may call the black 'quasi government.' One can observe the stability of this quasi government by

observing patterns of interdependence between institutions in black communities both local and nationwide; by observing the consistency of symbolism in black politics; and by observing the remarkable stability in groups of people who provide leadership (Holden 1973, 3).

The success of Walton and Holden in broadening the definition of the field of black politics and shifting the spotlight beyond the ability to vote, coupled with a series of political events, generated a fourth generation of research covering a broad spectrum of black political life.

Fourth Generation Research: Multiplicity of Topics and Approaches

This present generation of research is characterized by its diversity of scope and heterogeneity of approaches. Research on various aspects of black political life is abundant.

Urban Politics. The election of big-city black mayors and city council persons, beginning in 1967, resulted in increased attention to black political aspirations and successes in urban politics. The early mayoral research identified the similarities and differences in the election of black mayors in predominately white versus predominately black big cities (Preston 1976, 1983, 1987, 1990; Preston et al. 1987; Jones 1978; Nelson and Meranto 1977), while the later research focuses on the question of what difference have big-city black mayors made in urban politics (Nelson 1990; Rich 1989; Persons 1985, 1987, 1993; Perry 1990). Research on black representation on city councils found a significant relationship between the size of the black population and black success in winning council seats; significantly increased chance of election when elections were held by district rather than at-large; and a modest significant relationship between black socioeconomic resources and city council representation (Cole 1974; Karnig, 1976, 1979a, 1979b; Karnig and Welch 1980; Karnig and McClain 1985; McClain and Karnig 1990; Pinderhughes 1987; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1990; Engstrom and McDonald 1981, 1982; Robinson and Dye 1978). Recent research based on 1980s data argues that although at-large systems still have negative effects on the ability of blacks to be elected to city councils, the effects may be lessening (Welch 1990) or have disappeared entirely (Bullock and MacManus 1987). This last assertion has been hotly contested.

Voting Rights and Public Policy. The electoral opportunities created by the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its extensions led to research on their effect on election of local black officials and

empowerment of black electorates, particularly in the South (Grofman and Davidson 1992; Gomes and Williams 1992), and various provisions of the Acts themselves (Foster 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986; Pinderhughes 1990). Some of the literature suggested that many southern jurisdictions found ways around the Act by adopting massive resistant strategies to nullify the impact of the black vote (Parker 1990). The passage of various civil rights statutes also drew attention to a variety of public policy issues of concern to or affecting blacks (Barnett and Hefner 1976), for example, to name but a few, health care (Rice and Jones 1984; Jones and Rice 1987), implementation of civil rights statutes (Walton 1989), urban violence (McClain 1992), and public employment (Preston 1984). More recently, the public policy research has begun to focus on the black administrators who increasingly have responsibility for crafting and implementing public policies that directly affect black Americans (Karnig and McClain 1989; Smith 1984; Henderson 1978, 1979).

Presidential Politics. Research on black participation in presidential politics has argued that blacks have successfully used strategic voting in presidential elections to leverage their influence but have failed in many instances to have their policy interests satisfied (Walters 1988; Henderson 1987; Walton 1992). Jesse Jackson's 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns spawned debate within the literature over the advantages (Barker 1988; Barker and Walters 1989; Morris 1990) or disadvantages (Reed 1986) of Jackson's candidacy. Moreover, the question of whether or not Jackson had an effect on black voter registration and turnout in 1984 and 1988, and on the Democratic party, has also been hotly debated (Tate 1991, 1992). Census Bureau data on voter registration and turnout in the 1988 presidential election indicate that black voter registration and turnout were higher in 1984 than in 1980, but black registration and turnout levels in 1988 dropped below 1980 levels (United States Bureau of the Census 1989).

Political Socialization and Attitudes. Political socialization research identified black school children as feeling less politically efficacious and trusting than white school children. Abramson (1977) found that studies of black political socialization tended to use one of four explanatory theories for racial differences in political efficacy and trust. The first, the political education explanation, contended that racial differences resulted from differences in political education within American schools (Greenberg 1970; Orum and Cohen 1973; Rodgers 1974). Social deprivation, the second explanation, argued that racial differences resulted from social structural conditions that contributed to low feelings of self-confidence among blacks (Rodgers 1974; Abramson 1972; Lyons 1970). The third explanation,

intelligence, suggested that differences resulted from differences in intelligence. While this explanation was based on suggestions that, apart from age, intelligence was the best predictor of sense of political efficacy, little research support was found for intelligence as an explanation of racial differences in political attitudes. Finally, the political reality explanation argued that racial differences in political attitudes resulted from differences in the political environment in which blacks and whites live (Prestage 1968; Sears and McConahay 1973; Rodgers and Taylor 1971). Although political socialization was the focus of research in the early 1970s, little research on the topic has been conducted since then.

The small black sample size in national surveys (Walton 1985) limited research on aspects of black political attitudes; however, a significant body of literature emerged nonetheless. Research in the 1970s found that overall blacks tended to participate less than whites; yet, when differences in socioeconomic status were taken into account, blacks tended to participate more (Verba and Nie 1972; Olsen 1970). However, more recent research has found that blacks tend to participate at the same rate as whites of comparable socioeconomic status, but a new dimension, level of black political empowerment, appears to have a strong effect on levels of black political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). In addition, in early research, a strong group consciousness or ethnic identity was identified as being a strong catalyst to increased black political participation, although it was much more important in explaining behaviors of lower-class blacks than it was for middle-class blacks (Shingles 1981). For the most part, recent research contends that the majority of blacks remain strongly group-oriented (Tate 1993), but that changes in the socioeconomic and political situation of blacks may have reduced the importance of black consciousness as a principal factor in black political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990), or that racial consciousness is more multi-faceted than previously thought and manifests itself on several dimensions (Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990).

Studies of ideological orientations among blacks have concluded that the assignment of liberal or conservative labels to the opinions of black Americans often results in more confusion about black opinion than clarification that the labels are intended to convey. The reasons are that black public opinion is not consistent; black opinion may fall on the conservative end on personal behavior social issues, e.g., abortion and prayer in school, but on the liberal continuum on increased government involvement in rectifying societal ills (Welch and Foster 1987; Seltzer and Smith 1985a, 1985b; Smith and Seltzer 1992; Sigelman and Welch 1991). The National Black Election Study (NBES), collected during the 1984 and 1988 national elections, has overcome the problem of small black sample sizes and provided the

vehicle for expanded study on the numerous facets of black political behavior (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989; Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990; Welch and Foster 1992; Tate 1991).

The NBES data portray a black electorate overwhelmingly identified with the Democratic party, but not as strongly attached as popular wisdom would have one believe; however, intensity of attachment was stronger in 1988 (Tate 1992) than was true in 1984 (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). The history of African American relationships with the major political parties and third parties in American politics suggests a tenuous and contentious union on a number of dimensions (Walton 1972a, 1972b, 1975). The realignment of blacks from the Republican to the Democratic party occurred over a hundred year span, and the NBES data reveal an electorate not enamored with the notion of forming a separate black third party (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989).

Black Women and Gender Issues. The growing research on black women and politics, and the salience of gender issues for African Americans, has provided a much needed and different dimension to black politics (Prestage 1991, 1984, 1977; Darcy and Hadley 1988; Bryce and Warrick 1977). The research cautions that generalizations based on studies primarily of black males do not necessarily hold for black females. For instance, while the urban research has found that the election of blacks, primarily males, to city councils is facilitated by single-member systems, electoral structure does not substantially affect black women's representation. Black women are under-represented on city councils in all electoral systems -- single-member, multi-member, and at-large systems (Herrick and Welch 1992). In addition, the salience of gender issues and differences in political behavior between black males and females have also been explored. Research, as well as census voting and registration data, suggests that black females register and vote in higher numbers than do black males (Williams 1987), that more black females than white females consider themselves feminists (Mansbridge and Tate 1992), and that the interaction of race, class, and gender produces a dynamic for black women's political behavior that is absent in the behaviors of white females (King 1973; Lewis 1982; Palley and Preston 1979). However, the limited evidence thus far does not support the existence of a black gender gap in voting (Welch and Sigelman 1989; Lansing 1977). Nevertheless, the convergence of race and gender in the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings has directed attention to issues of sexism and gender equality within the African American electorate (Mansbridge and Tate 1992).

Congress and Courts. The increase in the number of black Congresspersons, which is related to the

issues of redistricting and reapportionment (Grofman 1990; Hill 1992), and the creation of the Congressional Black Caucus directed attention to Congress (Barnett 1975, 1977, 1984; Levy and Stoudinger 1976, 1978; Smith 1981, 1988). Much research has also appeared in areas of the court system and black America (Hamilton 1973b; Barker and McCorry 1980), particularly on decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court (Barker 1973, 1992a; Barker and Combs 1987). Once again, the recent confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court have refocused attention on judicial selection and the future direction of the Court (Barker 1992b).

Approaches in Fourth Generation

While broadening the breadth of the research in black politics, the fourth generation research also resulted in the re-emergence (some question whether it actually disappeared) of pluralism as one of the primary frameworks in black politics research. Dawson and Wilson (1991, 200) suggest that while many of the challengers of pluralism found that the paradigm was "inadequate to rectify the massive problems facing the black community," they nonetheless worked on the same terrain as the classic pluralists. However, the ethnic politics approach, prominent in the Second Generation, has been almost universally rejected as an appropriate framework for analysis in black politics.

Another approach for examining black politics, with origins in the race and class analysis of Bunche, that matured in the Fourth Generation, is Marxist analysis (Marable 1983; 1985; Robinson 1983). Race, as identified by Dawson and Wilson (1991, 205), has never been central to Marxist analysis; however, when the latter is applied to the study of black politics, the view of the role of blacks in society has been fixed and non-contradictory. According to Dawson and Wilson, the Marxist paradigm has traditionally viewed "...African-Americans as being economically marginal, politically backward, and noncentral to the major questions of class conflict and accommodation facing the American working class" (p. 205). Black Marxist scholars who study black politics, they argue, have taken a slightly different perspective suggesting that "organizations based on opposition to racial and sexual oppression not only have a progressive role to play in the period before successful transformation of society and seizure of state power, but would have a progressive role to play in the postrevolutionary period" (p. 205).

A more recent approach is rational choice theory and formal modeling. While still on the periphery, rational choice theory has begun to find its way into the research on black politics, particularly in explanations of

group behavior and group consciousness (Dawson and Wilson 1991, 212). This foray has not been without controversy as many scholars believe that rational choice, with its focus on individual actors, eliminates the contextual aspects so important to an understanding of black politics in the American milieu.

The plethora of approaches and topics covered under the rubric of black politics in this generation has led to the Dickensian paradox -- it was the best of times, it was the worst of times. The tremendous increase in the literature coupled with the respectability and acceptance of the field as "legitimate" political science gives those in the field reasons to rejoice. Yet this very circumstance of abundance and acceptability has led to a renewed questioning -- What is really the locus and focus of the field of black politics? Is having blacks as the population under study in any category of political science research a sufficient condition to lead one to conclude that it qualifies as black politics? Or are there necessary conditions that also must be met for the research to be considered as falling under the rubric?

Who's on First? Current Status of Black Politics

The above questions are extremely difficult to address. The argument could be made that one defines black politics by subject matter, i.e., various aspects of black political life and the centrality of race in American politics. However, some scholars who have focused on issues of race in American politics stridently argue that their work should be placed in categories other than black politics -- "we shall have much to say about race, but the issue itself is not our principal focus" (Carmines and Stimson 1989, xiii).

For others, however, Carmines and Stimson's assessment of their work as other than black politics would be appropriate. Mack Jones (1990), in a speech during the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the founding of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, lamented that initially the field of black politics was conceptualized as one whose purpose was "critically examining the politics internal to the black community and assessing its relevance for the ultimate objectives of the [black] struggle [for freedom]" (Jones 1990, 6). He argues that black political scientists, and one could infer he would include black politics, have been mainstreamed. There is an absence of discussion about alternative frameworks through which to view black political behavior and a lack of challenge to the principal assumptions of political science as they apply to the study of African Americans.

The current controversy surrounding the concept "deracialization" is an example of Jones's charge that black politics has been mainstreamed. Once again, political events have led to a fierce debate over the scholarly boundaries of the academic subfield of black politics. Originally developed by Hamilton (1973a, 1977) in the 1970s and calling for the Democratic party to emphasize issues that appealed across racial lines, deracialization, as currently used, refers to an electoral strategy by black candidates which avoids "explicit reference to race-specific issues, while at the same time emphasizing those issues that are perceived as racially transcendent" (McCormick and Jones 1993, 76). This strategy permits black candidates to appeal to and mobilize a broader segment of the population for purposes of winning or maintaining elective office.

For some, the victory of L. Douglas Wilder as governor in Virginia and Norman Rice as mayor of Seattle signaled the maturation of black politics. Perry (1991) opines that some have suggested that deracialization represents the future of black politics. He argues that the principal force behind contemporary black politics has been the election of black public officials from majority black districts, but that situation is about to end. There are few remaining majority black districts that have not elected black officials; thus if the number of black elected officials is to increase, they must be elected from majority white districts (Perry 1991, 182).

For others, however, deracialization is contrary to the fundamental essence of black politics (Starks 1991) and signals the death of black politics (Smith 1990). Starks (1991, 216) suggests that deracialization diverts "from the substance of what constitutes African-American politics -- using electoral politics as a lever to maximize group power in the fight against racism, exclusion, and marginalization while promoting African-American-specific policy preferences within the political system." Walters (1992) forcefully questions whether deracialization should even be identified as black politics, while Smith (1990, 160) sees an analogy to the deracialization of black politics in the adaptation of black music by black artists to cross over to mainstream white society. He states:

The new black politics initiated in the late 1960s, like the music of the era, was conceived as a social change agent, the continuation of movement politics by other means. It would indeed be sad if the conditions for its success require it to become a "deracialized" mainstream shell of itself.

This particular debate, which goes to the fundamental foundation -- What is black politics? -- will undoubtedly continue and grow in intensity over the next decade.

What standard does one use to assess the status of a field? There are a variety of ways; however, the one that seems to be the most appropriate is: Can one discern, based on several generations of research, the development of a cumulative body of knowledge about black politics? The answer is a resounding -- maybe! In some subject areas, for instance, black mayors and city council members, there is a cumulative body of knowledge based on the testing and retesting of hypotheses over a period of time. However, in others, for instance, black political behavior, the knowledge is disparate and evolving. There is no one dominant theoretical framework that delineates the field, a plus for the development of different perspectives on the African American political condition. But, more importantly, there is no serious questioning of the utility of standard political science frameworks for understanding the black political condition (Jones 1992), a negative for the perspective that the black experience in the United States must be incorporated into frameworks for analysis of their politics. Based on a review of the extant literature in the fourth generation, it could be argued that the orientations of the individual researchers, rather than the questions under study, determine the choice of theoretical framework.

These intellectual battles, instead of being dysfunctional for the field of black politics, may prove to be dialectic. Black politics as a field is clearly not in a moribund condition; its dynamism has generated argument over the definition of black politics as an area of study. Whether or not individuals will agree on the precise boundaries of the field is open for debate. Nevertheless, even if consensus were reached, changes in the political environment and political condition of African Americans, as well as the introduction of new paradigms and methodologies would compel renewed discourse. Ideally, however, the discourse within the field of black politics over content and theoretical frameworks will continue to be spirited and ongoing.

The question of a catholic or parochial definition of the field should be constantly argued. Ralph J. Bunche would certainly have been in agreement with sustained debate. It seems fitting and appropriate to end this section of the chapter by drawing on a quote by the modern founder of the field that addresses the limitless potentialities of black politics. Bunche ends his first article on black politics in 1928 thusly:

It would seem that the growing activity and influence of the negro electorate portends a new era of negro political development. [Negroes]...must inevitably wield a more

proportionate and equitable degree of influence in the political affairs – local, state, and national – of the nation. Perhaps not in this generation, nor in the next, but ultimately (1928, 264).

Clearly, the centrality of race to American politics suggests that there is more research that needs to be done and, inevitably, will continue to be done.

Part II: Latinos and Politics in the U.S.

Introduction

We will now focus our discussion of race and ethnicity in the U.S. on the Latino, or Hispanic, populations. Generally, the term Hispanic/Latino refers to individuals whose cultural heritage traces back to a Spanish-speaking country in Latin America but also includes individuals with links to Spain or the southwestern region of the U.S. when under Spanish or Mexican rule (Bean and Tienda 1987, 2-3). We begin our discussion with a brief history of the political science discipline and the inclusion of the study of Latinos as well as the participation of Latino political scientists. The development of the study of Latinos and the political system is examined in the next section. Finally, we focus on specific political concepts, activities, and patterns examined by political scientists and describe the status of the subfield and future directions and implications.

A Brief Institutional History

The development of Latino politics and involvement of Latino scholars in the political science profession have been recent phenomena. The themes of exclusion, marginality, and absent bodies of knowledge are central issues in any discussion of Latino politics. The origins of the subarea of Latino politics under the field of racial and ethnic politics are associated with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Mexican Americans in the Profession (1970). This committee was concerned about the absence of scholarly and analytical works on the Mexican origin population living in the United States. A related concern was the lack of significant recruitment and training of Mexican Americans in the political science profession. Obviously, the lack of participation by Mexican Americans within the academy was associated with the paucity of research on America's second largest minority group.

The Ad Hoc Committee concluded:

There is something wrong with political science when we (1) fail to adequately interpret the political presence of eight or more million people, and (2) when we fail to recruit and train more than a handful of their representatives. This, of course, means a substantial loss of our body of knowledge and beyond this, it may represent a serious insensitivity, on our part, to the contemporary problem of mankind (Ad Hoc Committee on Mexican Americans in the Profession 1970, 352).

In 1970, there were only four Mexican American Ph.D.s in the country, and two of these individuals were employed in the federal government. Articles dealing with the Mexican origin population in the U.S. were virtually non-existent until the 1970s.⁶ Recently, Manuel Avalos (1991) published an article in *PS* focusing on the status of Latinos in the profession, particularly on recruitment, retention, and scholarly publications. He referred to an earlier report by the Western Political Science Association (WPSA) on the status of Chicanos (J.A. Garcia 1975) in which the Committee noted the need for more courses, students, and faculty in the area of Chicano politics in most schools in the western region. The WPSA report concluded that most political science departments were not interested in altering or reassessing their policies regarding student and faculty recruitment.

In addition, questions were raised by departments as to the merits and legitimacy of Chicano politics as an area of inquiry. Avalos looks at these issues in the contemporary period by analysis of publications focusing on Latino politics in the major political science journals from 1964 to 1988. Over this time period, one article was published in the *Journal of Politics*; none, however, have appeared in the *American Political Science Review* or the *American Journal of Political Science*. By contrast, the *Western Political Quarterly* published nine articles in the area during the same time period. Obviously, the WPSA Best Paper Award in Chicano Politics (initiated in 1975) contributed to the number of articles published. Overall, the total percentages of all articles on race, gender, and ethnicity in the major political science journals ranged from 1.9% (APSR) to 6.8% (JOP) to 6.2% (WPQ).⁷ Within political science, the analysis and conceptualization of Latino political attitudes and behavior, and political issues important to the Latino population, received virtually no attention.⁸

Certainly, race and ethnicity are both important subjects to study in the development of this nation. Within political science, race and ethnicity have been utilized as key independent variables in the study of community power, voting behavior, political attitudes, and political mobilization (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Parenti 1967; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Yet, specific focus on Latino groups has not been the subject of articles commonly found in the major journals of political science.

Latino politics moves from the analysis of Chicanos to an "umbrella" alignment of different Spanish origin groups. The more recent development has been the recognition of the broader configuration of Hispanics/Latinos, which includes persons of Spanish origin from many national origins. Designating a subfield of Latino politics also raises concerns -- is it more realistic to deal with specific national origin groups or to treat persons of Spanish origin as a viable, cohesive political community in the United States? Yet the common thread exists in the delineation of a population with distinct histories and experiences in the United States, a cultural milieu with a strong resistance to assimilation, and structural relations which are characterized by subordination, marginality, and discrimination (Alvarez 1973; Jennings and Rivera 1984; Estrada et al. 1981).

The history of Latinos in the profession is characterized by the motivation for recognition as an important segment of American society. This emphasis has encouraged more systematic analysis by political scientists. In addition, the increased presence and participation by Latinos in the profession have served to expand the conceptual and theoretical perspectives and discussions of power, authority, social change, and participation.

Chicano Politics: Origins in the Southwest

The analysis of Latino politics is one which parallels the rise of the Chicano movement of the mid-sixties. The petulance of youth and the frustration over the lack of timely social change (Muñoz 1989) serve as primary motivators for protest politics and direct action efforts by Chicanos in the Southwest. Alvarez (1973) defines this process as an evolutionary one in which growing populations become more aware of the inconsistencies between the American creed and the realities of Chicanos in urban barrios and rural communities (Barrera 1979). The themes of internal colonialization (Almaguer 1971; Blauner 1969), exploitation and resistance (Estrada et al. 1981), and racial and class segmentation (Barrera 1977) characterize scholarly analyses of Chicanos' political and social life.

This characterization of the Mexican origin people focused on both an indigenous and an immigrant population (Acuna 1981).

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo became the starting point for formal relations between Chicanos and the U.S. political system. Political relations were characterized by subordination, legal manipulation of property rights, and overt hostility. During the Manifest Destiny period, Chicanos were relegated to being an elastic labor force in an expanding agricultural and mining economy (Barrera 1979). Gomez-Quinones (1990) characterizes these developments as efforts by the Mexican community north of the Rio Bravo to engage in an economic and cultural struggle, although this community was viewed as passive, apolitical, politically ineffective, and non-participatory.

In particular, the theory of internal colonialization served as a major analytic framework for the study of Chicano politics. The conquest of Mexico converted a significant portion of the Mexican republic into the southwestern portion of the United States. The internal colonialization process included: an external administration of governance; racial oppression and racial ideology of domination; colonized individuals as a source of labor; and economic exploitation as the basis of the colonizer-colonized relationship (Moore 1970). Thus the goal of politics for Chicano communities became de-colonialization, that is, a politics of liberation from external controls and domination -- economic and political.

Accompanying this analytical framework were theoretical perspectives focusing more on the economic relationships between the Mexican origin population and the U.S. capitalist system (Barrera 1979; Katznelson 1973). The reason for the economic expansion of the U.S. during the middle of the nineteenth century was seen as expanding borders to find more territory, develop the natural resources therein, and open trade routes. The defeat of Mexico left the Mexican people as a "proletariat" to develop the new industrial and economic sectors. Segmentation of this population involved economic arrangements and dependencies that were legalized and institutionalized over the latter half of the nineteenth century.

More contemporary analysis of the Latino experience has used an economic and Marxist interpretation for Puerto Ricans (Bonilla and Campos 1981) to understand their migration to the U.S. and their experiences in the U.S. economy. The emphasis on economics and politics in Latino populations has been a continual theme in the development of this area of study. Particular attention to the patterns of international migration has emphasized the economic inter-dependencies between the United States and countries in Latin America (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Portes and Bach

1985). The concepts of reserved labor pools, elastic labor force, labor segmentation, and secondary labor markets have been central to the understanding of the Latino experience. Immigration becomes both a critical condition and a frame of reference for Latino politics. It is important because many nationality groups, under the Latino umbrella, have been more recent immigrants in the past three decades. The distinction between native-born and "foreign-born" Latinos reflects cultural ties, behaviors, and political linkages (J.A. Garcia and de la Garza 1985). The issues of naturalization, legal status (undocumented, permanent resident alien, etc), political loyalty to the U.S., and acculturation and assimilation are relevant to the examination of Latino politics (de la Garza et al. 1991; J.A. Garcia 1987; Jennings and Rivera 1984). We will discuss this aspect of Latino politics further in the section on specific political issues. However, immigration is less a formal issue for Puerto Ricans, as commonwealth status conveys U.S. citizenship. Nevertheless, the distinction between Puerto Ricans born on the mainland U.S. vs. those born in Puerto Rico has real implications for the adaptation process (J. A. Garcia 1986a).

Our discussion will now focus on critical areas involving Latinos and the political system. These include the concepts of assimilation, acculturation, and cultural pluralism; culture and identity; nativity and political integration; political participation and behavior; and political attitudes and values.

Dimensions of Latino Politics

Assimilation, Acculturation, and Cultural Pluralism

The models of internal colonialism and Marxism provide critical foundations to define the political status and origins of Chicano politics. The models' perspectives look at the dynamic processes of social change, adaptation, and ethnic persistence. Theoretically, the concepts of assimilation and acculturation (Gordon 1964; Keefe and Padilla 1987) serve to examine the impact of life in the U.S. for the Mexican origin population, and other Latinos. Wolfinger (1965) and Parenti (1967) have focused on the persistence of ethnicity in American politics, particularly in the electoral arena. While the ethnic groups they focused on were European in origin, the dynamics of assimilation and acculturation were critical factors to explain ethnic persistence. Gordon's (1964) differentiation of the many dimensions of assimilation (i.e., cultural, marital, economic, political, etc.) clarifies the ways in which groups accommodate the mainstream culture; yet there were also cultural expressions of resistance to assimilation. Works by Amado Padilla (1980a, 1980b)

were directed toward the examination of cultural changes among the Mexican origin populations and how cultural distinctiveness can and does continue. The issue is not whether assimilation has occurred but, more, how cultural survival has taken place in light of cultural, marital, and identificational assimilation.

F.C. Garcia and de la Garza's (1977) work on the Chicano experience uses three models -- pluralism, elitism, and internal colonialism -- to evaluate various dimensions of Chicano politics. Culture and ethnic identity serve as two critical ingredients in how the Chicano community views itself in the larger society, as well as how they are viewed by the non-minority population. The idea of cultural pluralism and its political manifestations (Foster 1982) has been developed in the comparative politics field; here cultural diversity and minority institutions are recognized by establishment political institutions and the legal system. Questions of nation building, political integration, ethnic conflict, and social and political stratification serve as critical issues related to ethnic persistence (Horowitz 1985).

More recent works on pluralism (Walzer et al. 1982) discuss the concept of corporate pluralism, in which formal relations are established with the state apparatus assigning political roles to ethnic "corporations." The effect of this type of recognition would be to institutionalize cultural differences and, potentially, intensify these differences. Yet, the concept of pluralism and the state usually entails the government protecting the collective and individual rights of minority groups and the state expanding its official celebrations (Walzer et al. 1982, 19-20). In addition, the passage and implementation of public policies now more reflect the needs and interests of ethnic communities. For Latino groups, public policies that use race and ethnic status as determinants for protected group status or special programs are examples of policy demands and responses.

Often, the success of assimilation could be reversed by differential treatment and designation by social agents such that a "dis-assimilation" process occurs (Hayes-Bautista 1974). That is, minority group members, whether they choose to or not, are differentiated by institutional actions and programs. As a result, these individuals reexamine their historical and cultural origins and begin to reinstitute a sense of ethnicity. In the Hayes-Bautista (1974) work, Chicano medical students are seen to be supported by special educational and other support systems by the medical school. As a result of institutional perceptions of minority status, these Chicano students are treated differently by this educational institution, and this treatment makes them intensify their own minority group loyalties.

Thus discussions of pluralism within a Latino context involve historical analyses of the initial contact between the cultural group and the American political and economic system and reactions to this contact. Secondly, ethnic persistence must be studied in relation to the state's responses to race and ethnicity (laws, public policies, and cultural recognition). Finally, the diligence of ethnic communities must be explored in terms of mobilization, leadership, organizations, and a discernible political and economic agenda. While no one conceptual framework or paradigm dominates the field of Latino politics, the dimensions of critical structural analysis, self-determination, and equality serve as a major "corpus" that is at the heart of any study of Latinos in the United States. In most cases, research in these areas has been limited to specific Latino national origin groups, and an overall analysis of Latinos as a distinctive "ethnic" group is not viewed as viable because of key historical and structural differences (F.C. Garcia et al. 1991a). Therefore, whether or not a unified and distinctive Latino community exists is a major research question in this subfield.

Latino Politics: Culture and Identity

Associated with a discussion of pluralism has been the concept of ethnic identity and its possible dysfunctional role in nation building and allegiance. Works by J.A. Garcia (1982), Portes and Mozo (1985), and Padilla (1980a, 1980b) address factors (individual, experiential, and structural) that influence ethnic identity (J.A. Garcia 1986b) and the effect of identity in the political process. At times, structural conditions and prevailing attitudes can force citizens to choose an ethnic identity and establish rigid distinctions among different ethnic identities.

Analysis of the Latino experience in the U.S. centers on the role of cultural values, attitudes, and behaviors that identify a social structure, networks, and lifestyle. These factors can affect residential patterns, views about government and politics, and political behaviors. A substantial amount of intellectual and analytical energy has been directed by social scientists and others to identify and define the cultural milieu of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans (Keefe and Padilla 1987; Levine 1979; Rogler et al. 1980; Arce 1981). This focus on ethnicity and identity revolves around the interplay between cultural origins in one's "mother country" and life experiences in the United States. Cultural patterns such as Spanish language use, ethnic holiday celebrations, and primary social networks comprised of fellow Latinos serve to establish group boundaries and community. Thus the existence of ethnic identity resides in the manifestation of cultural persistence

among Latinos and the types of interactions Latinos have with the political system. The concept of multiplicity of ethnicities suggests ethnic attitudes, knowledge, behaviors, and preferences; thus it is a broader concept than merely ancestry and national origin.

The multidimensionality of ethnic identity (J.A. Garcia et al. 1992) has its link with politics through the concept of "ethnic political consciousness" (Miller et al. 1981; Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Gutierrez and Hirsch 1973). The persistence of ethnic group identification is a precursor to political consciousness. The additional dimensions of social change orientations and collective action also are part of the combinations that dictate motivations for political action (Gurin et al. 1980). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the use of ethnic labels with attached meanings by Mexican origin individuals was purported to be associated with specific political ideologies and political activities — whether conventional or unconventional (Gutierrez and Hirsch 1973; Foley et al. 1988). A sense of urgency and political activism characterizes Chicano militants. Protest, direct action, and immediate social change are their political expressions. Ethnic identity serves as the basis of psychological grounding, group attachment, and motivation for political involvement.

The thrust of ethnic identity research in the 1980s was analyzing parallel developments of identification among Puerto Ricans (Rodriguez 1989; Rogler et al. 1980) and Cubans (Portes, Parker, and Cobos 1980; M.T. Garcia and Lega 1979). In addition, the concept of Latino identity (Padilla 1984) was introduced as a situational identity. That is, national origin identity among the Latino subgroups continues to persist; yet there now existed a functional utility to define group identity in broader terms. The political capital gained by defining Latinos as an umbrella term for all persons of Spanish origin helps to expand the size of the group and hence defines a larger national constituency to be represented. Latino identity means creating a new sense of identity to expand the community base for Latinos. Implicit in this concept was the assumption of common cultural attributes and behaviors (i.e., language, shared histories, and traditions) across Latino nationality groups. Also, similar characteristics of community status were implied by shared common experiences of immigration, occupational positions, residential location, and discrimination against Latinos. Thus a Latino identifier is used for its political capital as representing a growing population and emerging political agenda.

The basis for a Latino community has been established by Padilla (1985). His study develops the concept of "situational identity," in which Latinos recognize the political utility of defining group boundaries in broader terms. As a result, Latino identity can be acquired by emphasizing common cultural values and

practices and similar socioeconomic and political conditions. Yet the actual dynamics of how and whether a Latino community exists is just now being subjected to systematic analyses. The National Latino Political Survey (de la Garza et al. 1992a) represents the first national probability survey of persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban origin living in the United States. One of the primary foci of this survey is to analyze the foundations for a cultural and political community. Early results (J.A. Garcia et al. 1991) suggest that the primacy of national origin status and identity is still the dominant mode, rather than a pan-ethnic identity. There is some awareness among Latino group members of the other Latino groups in terms of common concerns, issues, and cultural origins. Certainly, the evolution of Latino groups as cultural and, potentially, political communities becomes one of the questions for investigation. Correspondingly, the implications for Latino community building and greater involvement in the political process would be influenced by organizational efforts, leadership cadres, and heightened political partisanship.

Latinos and the Political System

Much attention has been given to the growth in the Latino population in the United States. The expected rise in the Latino population as the nation's largest minority, early in the twenty-first century, is recognized as contributing to their growing political impact. Yet there exists a body of literature that reveals their levels of political participation to be low. Most of the works have focused on Mexican Americans, and have been restricted geographically to the southwestern United States. Only recently have political analyses of Cubans and Puerto Ricans been added to the research literature on Latinos (Welch and Sigelman 1990; Fitzpatrick and Parker 1981).

Political Participation

For the most part, the research studies have been limited to political participation, especially electoral and organizational participation (McCleskey and Merrill 1973; Levy and Kramer 1972; F.C. Garcia and de la Garza 1977; Miyares 1980). Lower levels of voter registration and turnout have been the political pattern since the collection of voting data by the Census Bureau (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989). Registration and turnout differentials between Latinos and Anglos and African Americans range from 10 to 25 percentage points. Wrinkle and Miller (1984) present data from southern Texas to indicate that much of the registration differential between Mexican Americans and Anglos is related to socioeconomic status and the significant presence of non-citizens in the former group.

More generally, explanations for lower levels of registration and turnout among Latinos include higher levels of political cynicism and alienation (Buzan 1980; Comer 1978; Welch et al. 1973); lower rates of naturalization among its resident alien population (J.A. Garcia 1981a; Pachon 1987); structural barriers to registration and voting (Brischetto 1982; Jennings 1977); low levels of information and interest in the U.S. political system (Portes, Clark, and Lopez 1982); and lower socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972; de la Garza and Brischetto 1983). There has been some oscillation in Latino voter registration and turnout in presidential elections during the 1980s, while there has been a slight decline for African-American registration and turnout rates.

Within the Latino umbrella, there are some inter-group differences in terms of voting. Mexican Americans continue to lose some of their voting potential since a substantial portion of their population are non-citizens (J.A. Garcia and de la Garza 1985). Recent organizational efforts to promote and inform Latino nationals of the naturalization process, however, have had some positive impacts (Pachon 1987). Regarding Cuban refugees, their unique political status and strong anti-communist orientations have served to produce high naturalization rates (Portes and Mozo 1985; Portes 1984). Because over 80% of the Cuban population residing in the United States was born in Cuba, naturalization remains a salient issue for Cubans. The Puerto Rican population enjoys American citizenship status due to commonwealth origins. Yet very different voting patterns exist among the Puerto Ricans who live in the U.S. and those who live in Puerto Rico. Greater voting participation occurs in the Commonwealth than in the United States (Falcon 1985). Explanations for this phenomenon have included the cultural and political isolation and alienation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. compared with the relative political affinity and efficacy among Puerto Ricans in their home country (Jennings and Rivera 1984; Falcon 1985).

Naturalization among Mexican Americans, Cubans, and other Latinos has been the focus of the Latino National Immigration Survey (LNIS) under the direction of Harry Pachon and the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO). This probability telephone survey of Latino immigrants in 45 metropolitan areas explores the extent of and reasons for or against naturalization and the extent of political involvement (Pachon et al. 1990). The slower rate of naturalization among Latinos is attributed to lack of knowledge about the naturalization process, distrust of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), no perceived benefits of naturalization, and distance from the political system. The area of naturalization is a critical issue for most

Latino groups, and they are now actively promoting naturalization, because the connection between naturalization and Latino political empowerment is recognized (Pachon 1987).

Political Mobilization

Voter political mobilization is determined by individual characteristics (i.e. social class, participatory attitudes, economic status, leisure time opportunities, and ethnic identity) and structural conditions and catalytic agents (i.e., organizations and leaders). The linkage between the Latino population and the political system is bridged by organizations, community, and national leaders. These organizations have represented a variety of institutions, ranging from organizations that focus on social and cultural adaptation to those advocating a third party (Williams et al. 1973; Sassen-Koob 1979; Acuna 1981; I.M. Garcia 1989). Organizations like the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, American GI Forum, National Council of La Raza, Cuban National Planning Council, and Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund focus on civil rights issues, community empowerment, and public policy issues like education, immigration, and bilingualism (Sierra 1987; Allsup 1982; San Miguel 1987).

The resilience of Latino organizations has been affected by the availability of economic and human resources within the Latino community, stability and continuity of organizational leadership, strength of organizational bases, and extent of controversy and resistance by the majority population. The more recent challenges confronted by Latino organizations have been the expansion of their constituencies across established national origin boundaries and the redefinition of their political agenda to include more diverse communities. The former deals with the existing organizations that are confined to specific Hispanic groups rather than advocacy and representation of a broader-based Latino constituency.

The latter area centers on the effectiveness of organizational leadership to present a policy agenda to both Latino communities and policy-makers. Organizational adaptation has been affected by the expansion of more inclusive group membership and a national agenda-setting strategy. For the most part, the elements of that evolving national policy agenda include education (access, quality, bilingualism); immigration (access and impact on residential and undocumented Latinos); political recognition of group status; and economic growth and development (F.C. Garcia et al. 1992).

The area of political mobilization, beyond the examination of formal organizations, has also been a critical arena for the study of Latino politics. Ortiz

(1980) shows the importance of urban political systems for Latinos since they represent the critical battleground for political struggles over important economic and political issues. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's work (1979) uses the concept of political incorporation to examine the involvement of African Americans and Latinos in San Francisco Bay Area local governments. Leadership styles, mobilization strategies, political strengths, and institutional responses are defined by the current state of incorporation for each minority group. For Latinos, the incorporation process entails internally oriented mobilization and the achievement of recognition as a political player in the local political arena (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1979).

Similarly, Rogler (1968) and Jennings and Rivera (1984) discuss the urban condition and political arena for Puerto Ricans, concentrated in the northeastern section of the United States. Racial and economic isolation and a sense of estrangement serve as major obstacles for effective mobilization. International migration of other Latino groups, (i.e., Dominicans, Colombians, Salvadorans, etc.) into the northeastern U.S. has resulted in more competitive inter-group relations with local governments and political organizations. Local arenas become grounds for political empowerment and conflict resolution (Bonilla and Campos 1981; Ortiz 1980).

For Cubans, their concentration in southern Florida has served to enhance their economic mobility through business activity in ethnic enclaves and conversion of acquired socioeconomic attainment obtained in Cuba (Portes, Clark, and Lopez 1982; Moreno 1990). Early waves of Cuban refugees had advanced human capital resources, and their location in southern Florida allowed them to start small businesses and employ fellow Cubans. Quick and substantial political success for Cubans has been credited to higher socioeconomic status, salient participatory political attitudes, and economic penetration into the local economy (Pedraza-Bailey 1985; Portes and Mozo 1985).

Political Ideology and Values

With regard to ideology and partisanship, Latinos have been characterized as moderate to liberal, with Cubans being the most conservative. Yet recent studies by F.C. Garcia et al. (1991a) show a more moderate to conservative ideological self-placement by Latinos. In this study, Mexican Americans most closely reflect the ideological spectrum of Anglos, while greater percentages of Puerto Ricans and Cubans fall toward the conservative end of the continuum. When specific attitudes and roles for governmental intervention are introduced, Latinos seem to be more in favor of greater governmental involvement than Anglos (F.C. Garcia et

al. 1991a). Salient policy issues for Latinos tend to focus on domestic economic issues (i.e., employment, inflation, economic development), public safety (i.e., police relations, crime, drugs), and civil rights (i.e., discrimination, access, etc.).

A recent work by de la Garza et al. (1991) examines some core political values (i.e., economic individualism, political tolerance, trust in government, and patriotism) among Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Anglos. In most of the areas, differences between Latino groups and Anglos are very slight. In fact, Latinos, with the exception of Puerto Ricans, have higher levels of trust and patriotism than their Anglo counterparts (de la Garza et al. 1992a). Earlier works by F.C. Garcia (1973) and Lamare (1977, 1982) support the thesis that Mexican American children and youths are supportive of the U.S. political system. Levels of cynicism enter into the process when individuals accept the "American creed" and experience contradictions (Gutierrez and Hirsch 1973, 1974). The result is heightened activism and unconventional political behavior.

The acceptance of a core of shared political values is more the case between Latino groups and Anglos when sociodemographic factors are controlled (de la Garza et al. 1991). Yet there are some differences -- Cubans tend to be more trusting of government, less politically tolerant, and more supportive of economic individualism than Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. As a group, Puerto Ricans are farther away from "internalization" of core political values. These results reinforce the need for inter-group analysis of specific national origin groups under the Latino umbrella.

Political Partisanship and Voting

The conventional wisdom is that the partisanship of Chicanos and other Latinos is Democratic party affiliation (Levy and Kramer 1972; McCleskey and Merrill 1973). More recent surveys by de la Garza et al. (1984) and Brischetto (1988) indicate continued Democratic affiliation among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans (over 65%); Cuban party identification is overwhelmingly Republican. It has been suggested that Republican positions against communism and for an individual self-help philosophy have appealed to Cuban voters (Moreno 1990). On the other hand, traditional Democratic support for social and welfare programs and civil rights programs has kept the loyalty of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans (F.C. Garcia et al. 1991a; de la Garza and Brischetto 1984). Finally, Latinos exhibit "a bifurcated" electorate in presidential vs. state and local elections. That is, Republican presidential candidates have received a proportionately greater

percentage of Latino votes (i.e., among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans) than their partisan affiliations would suggest.

The Latino voting behavior literature tends to depict Latinos as voting less than Anglo voters and African Americans. Besides the important factors of socio-economic status, other factors such as the ethnic consciousness model or ethnic community thesis contribute to the understanding of Latino voter turnout (Lovrich and Marenin 1976; Welch et al. 1973). A critical dimension of Latino voting has to do with ethnic voter polarization (J.A. Garcia 1977; de la Garza 1974). Latinos tend to vote for candidates of the same ethnic background. They demonstrate greater interest in elections when Latino candidates are running, although the level of Latino group bloc voting is not as high as that among African American voters (Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Wrinkle and Miller 1984). Recent work by F.C. Garcia et al. (1992) suggests that the factors of socioeconomic status, ethnicity, political ideology, and partisanship play different roles for and have different effects on Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Party identification remains a factor for Latinos in presidential and congressional elections.

A more recent occurrence in politics is the presence of Latino voters as a swing voting bloc in urban areas. Latinos are urban dwellers (over 85%) and tend to be concentrated in central cities. Mayoral elections in Chicago, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles have established the pattern of a swing vote between white and black candidates (Salces 1978; Falcon et al. 1991). As a result, issues of coalition formation, inter-group networks, and inter-minority cooperation have become very salient issues for minority communities (Davidson and Gaitz 1973; Jackson 1988; Jackson and Preston 1991; Villareal and Hernandez 1991). The question of inter-group coalitions will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

The other factors affecting voting patterns are structural conditions and rules of the game (Gomez-Quinones 1990; Brischetto 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Factors such as registration systems, poll taxes, literacy tests, off year vs. even year elections, multi-member vs. single member districts, and at-large vs. ward elections have a direct bearing on registration and turnout levels and minority representation (Taebel 1978; Davidson and Gaitz 1973). Recent research on structural and legal factors has focused on bilingualism and access to the ballot box and challenging at-large election systems (F.C. Garcia 1988). Changes to district- or ward-based systems and reapportionment (MacManus and Cassel 1984; Brischetto 1982) have contributed to gains in Latino political representation (J.A. Garcia 1986b; Guerra 1987).

Discussions on the Voting Rights Act and its extensions have centered on maintenance of the bilingual provisions as a critical component to increase registration levels among Latinos. However, results from the limited research have identified a weak association between language provisions and increased registration rates.

Latinas and Gender Issues

Sierra and Sosa-Riddell (n.d.) see a virtual absence of literature on political behaviors, attitudes, and experiences of Latinas. They argue that the scholarly focus within Latino politics on electoral participation results in the exclusion of other types of activism in which Chicanas are more actively involved, e.g., community-based organizations, labor unions, and grass-roots mobilizations. Moreover, when gender has been included in analyses as one of several determinants of political behavior, few significant differences have been identified; therefore, "...the political orientations and electoral behavior of Chicana women have not commanded much attention" (Sierra and Sosa-Riddell n.d., 7). In addition, Sierra and Sosa-Riddell suggest that the underrepresentation of Chicana scholars in political science also contributes to the lack of scholarly attention to the Chicana experience. Nevertheless, they identify an evolving literature on Chicana politics that has found exceptions to the conventional wisdom of the absence of gender differences.

Although Brischetto and de la Garza (1983) distinguished no significant gender differences in voter registration, turnout, and working in political campaigns among Mexican Americans in East Los Angeles, when controls for marital status were introduced, married men were more likely than married women to register and vote. Yet the opposite was true for unmarried individuals — women were more likely to register and vote than were men. Using national exit poll data for the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential elections, Welch and Sigelman (1992) found Latina women to be more liberal and pro-Democratic than Latino men, although the differences were fairly small and inconsistent. Sierra and Sosa-Riddell (n.d.) identified one study that found that Mexican American women's voter registration and turnout rates increased so dramatically over a ten-year period that their participation rates surpassed those of Mexican American males (MacManus et al. 1986).

Latino Politics and Policy Issues

Latino politics, particularly since 1965, could be portrayed as internally focused endeavors of infrastructure building (i.e., organizational base and structures, political awareness and identity, and leadership cadres) with a strategy to impact the political arena at the

local and state levels. The 1980s were a period of expansion, both in terms of group numbers (i.e., Latinos rather than specific national origin groups) and involvement in national politics. The "Latino" umbrella became more of a medium and formal governmental designation than a social and political reality for the masses of Spanish origin persons. The politics of Latinos has only recently focused on creating a broader national Latino community. With this community established, a common and consensual agenda can be developed by national organizations and a network of diverse Latino leaders.

Some of the policy arenas that might be included in the agenda are immigration reform (Sierra 1987; Polinard et al. 1984); education access and quality (San Miguel 1987; Meier and Stewart 1991); political representation and access (de la Garza and DeSipio 1993; Hero 1991); and economic well-being/social welfare policies. Recent work by de la Garza et al. (1992c) suggests that variation among Latinos regarding less restrictive immigration policy is based on degree of political incorporation into American society. For the most part, Latinos generally support greater governmental spending on domestic policy areas and Latino focused policies, while they are less supportive of national defense and foreign aid spending (F.C. Garcia et al. 1991a). Cubans tend to have lower levels of support for domestic governmental funding than do Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. The question of a definable policy agenda and the degree of consensus among Latino elites and masses is still less clear, given the lack of regularly collected public opinion data from Latinos (de la Garza and Brischetto 1987).

Connected to Latino public opinion, policy agendas, and political representation are the behavior of elites and policy outcomes. Gains in Latino political representation have been noted during the 1980s (J.A. Garcia 1986b), yet little research has been done on the policy effects of this increased representation. Mindiola and Gutierrez (1988) examined the policy outcomes in the Texas legislature and outcomes related to activities of Chicano legislators. Conclusions suggested marked expansion of legislative initiatives by Chicano legislators on both Chicano focused issues and on social areas with a high impact on Mexican Americans.

Welch and Hibbing (1984) noted that Hispanics who have been elected to Congress tend to have liberal voting records which are similar to the voting records of all Congressional representatives with a sizable Latino constituency. They attribute the Latino representatives' motivation for political involvement and advocacy on behalf of Latinos to early socialization experiences (de la Garza and Vaughn 1984). Elites who experience differential treatment because of their ethnicity are more likely to be active on behalf of other Latinos. The role

of elites in affecting the policy agenda and outcomes for Latinos represents another under-researched area.

Latino Politics, the Discipline, and a Future Agenda

Our discussion of Latino politics began with the activism of a small group of Chicano political scientists raising issues of under-representation and non-involvement by Chicanos and a paucity of research directed toward the Mexican American community. Over the past twenty years, the recruitment and retention of Latinos in the discipline and the legitimacy of research on Latinos are still salient issues for political scientists. Recently, the name of the APSA Committee on the Status of Chicanos was changed to the Committee on the Status of Latinos. Originally, the Chicano Caucus agreed to expand the scope of the Committee, yet retain the designation of Chicanos along with the recognition of other Latinos. The objective was to maintain a historical link to the APSA by the Chicano Caucus.

In preparing this general survey on Latino politics, we noted an extensive body of research. Recently, F.C. Garcia et al. (1991b) published *Latinos and Politics: A Selected Research Bibliography*, in which over one thousand citations are identified with annotations on various aspects of Latino politics. Two major conclusions were determined through this compilation. The extensive literature on Latino politics is found, mostly, in a variety of social science journals, with only very minimal inclusion in political science journals. As a result, research on Latino politics is relatively invisible in our discipline. Moreover, invisible within the Latino politics research, as identified by Sierra and Sosa-Riddell (n.d.), is research on Latina women as political actors.

The second conclusion lies with the breadth of perspectives and variables that are examined. The discussion of Latino politics considers culture, historical relationships, economic factors, and individual ascriptive characteristics. Thus, the investigation of Latino politics takes a more interdisciplinary approach than many other subfields in the discipline. As a result, scholars of Latino politics deal with concerns of the legitimacy of their research as well as the substance of their inquiries.

Substantively, research on Latino politics has shifted from an examination of the politics of the Mexican American community to a more inclusive investigation of more diverse Spanish origin groups and the politics of Latino subgroups combined. Also, specific studies of the Latino subgroups continue to demand attention by scholars. A central issue for the study of Latino politics lies with the configuration of the "national" Latino community and factors that contribute

to its development and operation as a cohesive community.

Does a cohesive and identifiable Latino community exist such that its political mobilization and policy agenda have an impact on the U.S. political process? The issues of community of culture and interests (J.A. Garcia and Pedraza-Bailey 1990) among the Latino subgroups remain a central focus of inquiry. That is, the pervasiveness of perceived and practiced cultural values and behaviors among Latino subgroup members serves as one element for national community building. The community of interest dimension pertains to common conditions and situations such that Puerto Ricans share common experiences and perspectives with Mexican Americans, Cubans, and other Latino national origin groups. These common experiences could be differential treatment in the labor market, educational institutions, social organizations, and governmental institutions and policies. Realization of a viable Latino political community will depend on further organizational development and leadership skills. In addition, institutional responses and social movements reacting to the growth of Latino communities may also serve as motivations for greater Latino mobilization (Smith 1990). The research agenda on Latino politics centers on the translation of significant population growth among all Latino groups into a more cohesive and focused political force.

More specific areas of Latino political research would include electoral strategies for Latino candidates at the state and national level; expansion of the Latino electoral base by incorporating the sizable non-citizen element; Latina political attitudes and behaviors and the salience of gender issues; coalitional strategies involving inter-Latino communities (i.e., across national origin groups) and other minorities for common political concerns; examination of the political activation process for individual Latinos; the interplay of culture and political participation; and structural conditions and political involvement. Thus the future of Latino politics entails continued systematic examination of these political phenomena, as well as theoretical and conceptual frameworks in which to understand and analyze race and ethnicity in a political context.

Part III: American Indian and Asian-American Politics

We now turn to a condensed examination of the fields of American Indian and Asian-American politics. As we asserted at the beginning of the chapter, the brevity of the discussion is not meant as a comment on

the importance of the areas, but simply reflects the limited research in these two developing fields.

American Indian Politics

American Indian politics is a nascent, yet solidly grounded, field of study. Like Latino politics, it should be understood that the broad term, American Indian politics, covers a variety of tribes, each with its own history and different structural relationships with the U.S. government. Chaudhuri (1989, 190) argues that the relationships between American Indians and the U.S. governmental process "...touches on practically every operational point in democratic theory." Yet in the vast array of research on American Indians "political scientists are part of the last group of scholars to enter into the vineyards of Indian affairs scholarship." Although anthropology has long studied American Indians, one of the major criticisms of that work has been that it "...show[s] almost no evidence of any Indian perspective, nor [is it] useful for highlighting the policy issues involved..." (Chaudhuri 1989, 192). Deloria (1969, 81) is more forthright in his criticism of and disdain for the work of anthropologists, charging that "behind each policy and program with which Indians are plagued, if traced completely back to its origin, stands the anthropologist."

Central to the development of the field is the work of Vine Deloria, Jr. His 1969 seminal protest work *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* was one of the first works on American Indian politics. Deloria forcefully argues that the politics of American Indian peoples includes not only the relationship of the various tribes to the U.S. government but also the various political histories that have shaped the worldview of the tribes (Deloria 1969, 11). Tribes were organized into confederacies throughout the country, and many tribes exercised the principles of democracy *prior* to contact with whites (Deloria 1969, 11-12). Numerous aspects of American Indian affairs are explored. In the end, Deloria calls for a redefinition of Indian affairs on the part of the U.S. government, in light of the fact that urban Indians far outnumber reservation Indians. This redefinition "would concentrate its attention on the coordination among the non-reservation peoples and the reservation programs..." (Deloria 1969, 257).

Chaudhuri (1989, 193) maintains that in dealing with American Indian politics one needs to distinguish between "issues that are common to the tribes and those that are region-specific or tribe-specific." Moreover, distinctions must be made between reservation (rural or urban) and urban Indians. Chaudhuri (1982), in discussing Indian law, also argues that central to any

discussion of Indian politics are the questions: Who is an Indian? Who is subject to Indian law?

While political science has dealt with issues of ethnic consciousness relative to political participation, the heart of the "Indianness" question lies not with Indian peoples themselves but with the federal government. In fact, the answer is entangled with and central to the relationship of the U.S. government with the various Indian peoples. Chaudhuri (1982, 13) states:

Historically, of course, Indians knew they were Indians, and self-identification is still a matter of great pride as identity is traced through descent, lineage, clan and acceptance in specific tribes. But the Anglo-American preoccupation with formal definition poses a whole host of problems.

Problems occur because federal, state, and tribal definitions of Indian identification have wide variations. In fact, Chaudhuri (1982, 13) states, "the legal definition of Indian-ness is complexly contextual."

The question of who is subject to Indian law also depends on the relationship of the tribe to the federal government and whether or not the federal government recognizes the tribe (Chaudhuri 1982, 11). There are various forms of federal recognition based on the legal nature of the land status of the tribe (treaty based reservations); reservations directly created by Congress; and reservations created by, or tribes recognized by, states. In addition to federally recognized Indians, there are "hundreds of bands of Indians in the U.S. who do not have federally designated trust land" (Chaudhuri 1982, 12) but are Indian peoples nonetheless and are recognized as such by other Indian peoples.

Whereas black and Latino politics has utilized variants of standard political science frameworks for analyses of the groups' political behavior, this does not appear to be as prevalent within the field of American Indian politics. The assumption has been that not only do these frameworks not apply to the study of Indian peoples but that the historical relationship of Indian peoples to the American governmental structure is so singular that, in many ways, Indian peoples are truly outside of the American political system. Therefore, the generalizations developed about citizen participation of other groups in the political process simply do not fit. Chaudhuri (1989, 190) summarizes this position:

American Indians historically were outside of the social contract because Indians were in America before there was a contractual America. Consequently, beginning with the legitimacy of the social contract, every other democratic concept including consent, rights, obligations, taxation, voting, education,

privileges, immunities, and property could be examined in the context of U.S.-Indian relations.

Deloria (1981, 149) emphasizes that Indian peoples do not want to be a part of pluralist American society. The great fear of Indians, he says, "is that they will in the years ahead move from their plateau of small nationhood to the status of another ethnic group in the American melting pot."

A focus on specific issue areas characterizes the research in this field. Natural resources and resource policy are essential to Indian politics (Deloria 1981, 1984; Van Patten, 1982), primarily "because all the resources of America were, at one time or another, associated with Indian tribes" (Chaudhuri 1989, 193). U.S. Indian policy, such as termination of federal responsibility to the Indian, is also a focal point of much of the research in the field (Deloria and Lytle 1983; Cadwalaer and Deloria 1984; Deloria 1985; Chaudhuri 1982, 1989; Gross 1989; Deloria 1991).

The issue of social/political movement activity, particularly the concept of pan-Indianism is another thread through the research (Deloria 1969; Nagel 1982; Van Patten 1982; Mason 1984; Gross 1989). The black civil rights movement had an impact on Indian peoples producing comparative work on the similarities and differences in the black, Latino, and Indian situation (Deloria 1969). A focus on institutions (tribal + government and sovereignty) is also present in the research (Melody 1976; Deloria and Lytle 1984; Holm 1985; O'Brien 1989), as well as the Indian presence in the federal bureaucracy (Sigelman and Carter 1976).

Little research has been done on political behavior and attitudes of Indian peoples (Peterson 1957; Deloria 1974; McCool 1982; Murdock 1983). Peterson (1957), in an early effort to analyze the political participation of American Indians, recognized the difficulty of defining and studying American Indian political participation because "[t]he problem has always been one of relating Indian political forms to the general governmental framework of the United States..." (p. 116). The fact should also be noted that native-born American Indians were not officially granted U.S. citizenship until the Citizenship Act of 1924, and thus, except in special circumstances, were denied the right to vote. Even with the passage of the Act, many states through their constitutions continued to deny Indians the right to vote (Peterson 1957).

McCool's article on Arizona Indians is one of the few pieces on the voting patterns of Indians (Deloria 1982) in nontribal elections, national and state. A survey of reservation precincts found significant differences in party affiliation across tribes. For example, over time, the Navajos have shifted from Republican to Democratic

and during the Reagan years slightly back to the Republicans in national elections; yet they remained fiercely Democratic in Arizona state politics. On the other hand, since the 1956 presidential election, the Papagos have consistently voted Democratic. Even though McCool's article could be classified as traditional political science, he does not approach the subject from a traditional political science perspective. As he points out: "No other minority group voting data is comparable to the Indian experience, however, nor can the same generalizations be made about Indian voting" (McCool 1982, 111).

Research on the effects of electoral structure on the election of American Indians to political office is virtually nonexistent. However, a recent article by Engstrom and Barrilleaux (1991) examined the effects of cumulative voting on the school board elections in Sisseton School District, the headquarters of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux tribe in South Dakota. Engstrom and Barrilleaux found that the cumulative voting system provided the vehicle for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux to elect an individual to the school board in the at-large election system. Furthermore, their data indicated a high degree of understanding and approval of the cumulative system among the Sioux, providing them with a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice to the board.

So far, at least from the extant literature, the debate over the boundaries of the field, like that raging in black politics, does not appear to be present. Possibly, the infancy of the field has arrested the jurisdictional controversy that is certain to arise. While the number of scholars writing in the area is modest, there is a robustness to the field.

Asian-American Politics

The newest field to emerge in the minority group politics arena is Asian-American politics. While Asian Americans have been routinely elected to office in Hawaii, and interest in electoral politics can be traced to the early twentieth century, the scholarly research is a very recent phenomenon (Nakanishi 1986, 1-2). One of the earliest works by a political scientist was Yung-Hwan Jo's (1980) anthology, *Political Participation of Asian Americans*. As with Latino and American Indian politics, the term Asian-American politics encompasses a multiplicity of ethnic-origin groups — Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Filipinos, Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders, and East Indians (Kitano 1981).

Nakanishi (1986, 3) suggests that Asian-American politics should explore those areas that are considered to be traditional political science, such as electoral participation, voting behavior, resource

mobilization for campaigns, and election and appointment to political office. In addition, Nakanishi argues that the field should also include examinations of the barriers which have prevented Asian Americans from significant participation in and influence on political parties and governmental decision making. Moreover, like the argument made by Walton (1972a) in broadening the definition of black politics, Nakanishi's argument maintains that Asian-American politics must also focus on nonelectoral activities, e.g., community organizations, internal community political structures, and political protest, as well as labor protest activity (Nakanishi 1991, 31). In essence, Nakanishi (1986, 21) argues for an "intentionally all-encompassing" definition of the field. This broader conceptualization of Asian-American politics takes into account historical circumstances that created structural and legal barriers to Asian-American participation in the political system. Moreover, according to Nakanishi (1991, 33), it guards against unwarranted generalizations being drawn from "political behavior based solely on their relatively low rates of electoral participation."

The emerging, yet limited, research in political science thus far tends to address traditional political science questions – political behavior, partisanship, policy preferences and political attitudes, and urban politics.

Political Behavior. The research to this point is relatively consistent. Asian-American voter registration and participation are extremely low (Stokes 1988), a pattern that still exists after controls for a variety of other factors are introduced (Uhlener, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). Between-group comparisons suggest that Japanese, Koreans, and Filipino Americans are less likely to register and vote, while Chinese Americans are more likely to register and vote (Stokes 1988). Additionally, Asian men are more likely than women to register, contribute money, work in groups, and contact news media (Uhlener et al. 1989).

Partisanship. In the aggregate, Asian Americans appear to be more Republican than Democratic, with Chinese Americans being more Republican than other groups (Stokes 1988; Cain and Kiewiet 1986; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlener 1991). However, some feel that partisan attachment is weakly held and either party could benefit from Asian-American support, conceivably giving Asian Americans swing voting potential, depending on each party's position on key public policy issues, such as English-only (Nakanishi 1991).

Policy Preferences and Political Attitudes. California data indicate that Asians were less likely to favor bilingual education and ballots than were Latinos and were more supportive of a ban on handguns and less

supportive of prayer in schools than were whites, blacks, and Latinos (Cain and Kiewiet 1986).

Urban Politics. The only study we were able to identify that examined the factors that contribute to the election of Asians to city councils concluded that (1) the percentage of the city population that was Asian was a crucial element; (2) electoral structure had no significant effect on Asian electoral success; and (3) Asians' chances of gaining a council seat improve the greater their median family income relative to white income, and Asian education had a significant effect (Alozie 1992).

Other Areas. Much of the extant research has also been comparative with black and Latino political outcomes, behaviors, and attitudes (Parrillo 1982; Cain and Kiewiet 1986; Uhlener, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; and Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlener 1991), and some have directed attention to the effect international events in home countries have had on the behaviors of U.S. citizens who trace their ethnic origin to those countries (Chang 1988).

"Model Minority" Concept

Given the recent appearance of the field in political science, it is difficult to discern if there are controversies emerging. However, the "model minority" label that has been attached to Asian Americans has been highly controversial and severely criticized (Suzuki 1977; Chun 1980 cited in Nakanishi 1991) "because of its simplistic implication that other minority groups can overcome racial and other discriminatory barriers by following the example of Asian [Americans]." The term "model minority" was first used to refer to Japanese Americans in a 1966 article by William Petersen in the *New York Times Magazine* (Petersen 1966 cited in Roger 1988). Petersen, at the time a faculty member at the University of California at Berkeley, was upset with the student radicalism and counter-culture of the 1960s. As a way of criticizing African Americans and Latinos, he held up Japanese American socioeconomic success as a "model" for how minorities could make it in the United States without much government assistance. Roger (1988) argues that Petersen used the term "model" in two ways:

[F]irst, as a way of praising the superior performance of Japanese Americans; and second, as a way of suggesting that other ethnic groups should emulate the Japanese American example. The unstated major premise of Petersen's argument was that Horatio-Alger-bootstrap-raising was needed for success by such "non-achieving" minorities as blacks and Chicanos, rather

than the social programs of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society (Roger 1988, 318).

Petersen, assuming a lack of "Americanness" on the part of Japanese Americans, attributed their success to their links "with an alien culture" (Petersen 1966 quoted in Roger 1988, 319). Roger contends that once the "insidious theme" of the "model minority" concept took hold, it has been perpetuated by a host of conservative publicists and academics, particularly the conservative black economist Thomas Sowell (p. 318). Critics of this concept argue that it misleads society into believing that discrimination against Asians has not been extensive or, if it existed, it is a thing of the past. (Even though rejected by scholars of Asian-American politics, the "model minority" concept is emerging, in the work of Thomas Sowell [1975, 1978] and other conservative scholars, as the new ethnic politics approach against which to measure the political progress of blacks and Latinos. As with the original ethnic politics model, this one is almost certain to be soundly rejected by black politics scholars as well.)

Part IV: Inter-minority Group Relations: Coalition or Competition?

The various subfields have developed separately but in parallel fashions. Black politics as the oldest field has formed the comparative base for the fields of Latino, American Indian, and Asian-American politics. While in many instances the comparisons have proved useful, in many more instances, the differences in historical relationships with the dominant white community and the resultant governmental structure have yielded very different experiences and different political objectives and behaviors.

However, the similarities in status have led to a great deal of research on the potential for political coalitions between various groups, principally blacks and Latinos (Henry 1980; Sonenshein 1990; Muñoz and Henry 1990). The assumptions of the coalition research is that the relationship between these two groups will be one of mutual respect and shared political goals and ideals. In some instances, status similarities have led to coalition politics between blacks and Latinos. The emphasis on poverty issues in the 1960s promoted unions between blacks and Latinos, particularly Mexican Americans (Estrada et al. 1981), and there is ample indication of coalition building between blacks and Latinos (see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1990).

Over time, nevertheless, the policy preferences of the two groups diverged. Policies designed to foster equal access and equity were often in conflict; Falcon (1985), for example, notes that blacks were concerned

with desegregation and were not supportive of bilingual education because they feared a diversion of resources from black concerns. Recently, blacks have not been supportive of issues that Latinos have considered important -- the "English Only Movement," employer sanctions, and immigration reform. These policy differences, as well as the increasing tensions present in many urban communities, have resulted in a pattern of interaction between the various minority groups that is one of conflict, confrontation, and competition, rather than coalition. This competition, rather than stemming from status differences, is the product of status similarities of the two groups, both striving for finite political and social resources. This set of dynamics has spawned a small, but increasing, array of research on the possible competition that may arise between blacks and Latinos when each has different goals, when there is distrust or suspicion between the two groups, or when the size of one group is such that it becomes unnecessary to form coalitions with other minority groups to gain political success (McClain 1993; McClain and Karnig 1990; Falcon 1988; Warren, Corbett, and Stack 1990; Meier and Stewart 1990).

Coalition behavior, therefore, can be viewed as situational and cooperative activities between two or more distinguishable groups with their own political resources who share *similar* conditions, experiences, and agendas. Coalitional efforts, accordingly, are specific, focused, and usually short-lived. Thus another line of research is to explore the conditions under which coalitions form, how they function, and what outcomes are achieved, examining not just the common objective that initiated the coalition but the establishment of networks across groups for future coalitional efforts (Jackson and Preston 1991; Guerra 1987).

Conclusion

We now return to our initial question -- What is the status of racial minority group politics in political science? Overall, we must conclude that the fields of black, Latino, American Indian, and Asian-American politics are continuing to develop, albeit at different rates and with different emphases. In brief summary, each field may be characterized, historically and contemporarily, by a set of critical concepts, pressing issues, and methodological controversies.

Black politics research in its first generation focused on the interaction of economic factors and race, as well as the importance of blacks to the politics of the South, northern urban centers, principally Chicago, and styles of leadership exhibited within black communities. The second generation research was dominated by the

protest/accommodation paradigm found primarily in Negro leadership studies.

A push for definition and rigorous theoretical development consonant with the black experience in the United States epitomizes the scholarship in the third generation. This body of work challenged the use of the ethnic politics paradigm for examining black politics and pushed for the development of frameworks grounded in a power relations dynamic. For all of the effort in the third generation, the preponderance of the research in the current generational phase is more closely tied to mainstream political science than to the scholarship of previous generations. Moreover, the research more readily utilizes traditional political science frameworks for explanations of black political behavior. The mainstreaming of black politics is the source of controversy and fierce debate among African-American political scientists.

Initially, Latino politics was synonymous with Chicano politics, and the development of the field paralleled the rise of the Chicano movement in the 1960s. The themes of internal colonization, exploitation and resistance, and racial and class segmentation were prevalent in the early research. Additionally, Marxist analysis provided the early theoretical paradigm for much of the research. Moreover, the majority of the research was published in journals of social science disciplines other than political science.

The focus of present research has shifted to ethnic identity and its effects on the political behavior of the various ethnic origin groups that fall under the Latino politics umbrella. The advent of Hispanics as a larger ethnic category has prompted examinations of inter-group differences on various political dimensions. The importance of Latino organizations is another theme that characterizes the current body of research. While black politics rejected the ethnic politics model, Latino politics has incorporated it into its array of theoretical frameworks. Unlike the field of black politics, however, questions of and concerns for research legitimacy persist for Latino scholars and Latino politics.

Central to the field of American Indian politics is the nature of the relationship of the various tribes, i.e., sovereignty, to the U.S. government and the question of redefinition of Indian affairs in the presence of the preponderance of non-reservation Indians. The research in the field has not been characterized by the use of traditional political science frameworks for explanation of the politics of Indian peoples. Of the four fields covered, American Indian politics, more than any other, has specifically avoided their use, finding the frameworks inappropriate, given the unique historical circumstances of Indian peoples in the United States.

The newest field, Asian-American politics, is in the process of defining the content and boundaries of the

field. The direction appears to be moving toward a broad definition of the field that takes into account historical circumstances that created barriers to Asian-American participation in the political system, as well as electoral and non-electoral activities. The controversial issue is the "model minority" concept, which obscures the racism and discrimination experienced by Asian Americans.

The process of reconstructing the history of the development of these fields brought two points sharply into focus which must be underscored — the reaction of political science to the fields and the role of minority political scientists in the development of the fields. Despite the historical and continuing centrality of race and ethnicity to the American political fabric, political science has demonstrated a marked reluctance to acknowledge as legitimate the study of the politics of America's various racial minority groups. To rephrase Emmett E. Dorsey's comments on Negro politics, assuming that the sentiments could be assumed to have been similar relative to other racial minority groups, political science viewed these fields as "offbeat," and any young political scientist interested in a career would steer clear of research in these areas.

Fortunately, a number of scholars ignored the warning and made racial minority politics their intellectual specialty. It is evident from the historical development of the fields of black and Latino politics, and more recently American Indian and Asian-American politics, that the impetus for the legitimization has come, to a large extent, from racial minority political scientists themselves. While political science has been more accommodating of late to the study of the politics of America's racial minorities, there is still the struggle to convince the discipline to view the fields as separate entities with distinct and very different intellectual histories and foundations. For example, black politics is different from the other three areas in that ethnic differences within the group are not a prominent dimension, as in Latino politics, which subsumes Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other ethnic Latinos.

Also evident is that there are more differences between the fields than there are similarities. While having some things in common, e.g., group minority status, racial minorities differ in their political attitudes and behaviors. For example, presently blacks are primarily Democratic and overwhelmingly vote as such in presidential elections; Mexican Americans identify as Democrats, but many more vote for Republican presidents than one would think; Cubans are primarily Republicans; and Puerto Ricans are Democrats. Asian Americans are mostly Republican, except for Japanese Americans who are more Democratic, and, to date, there has been no major study that has examined partisan

identification among the various American Indian peoples. Ideological differences are also in evidence. African Americans are difficult to pinpoint ideologically because they may be liberal on government involvement in certain areas but conservative on some social issues. Mexican Americans are just as likely to be moderate as conservative, while Cubans are conservative on foreign policy issues but somewhat liberal on some social issues. Asian Americans are more conservative on economic issues but liberal on many social issues. Consequently, it should be recognized that generalizations developed from the study of urban African Americans should not be expected to hold for southwestern Mexican Americans. Moreover, it should not be assumed that a scholar whose specialty is black politics is automatically an authority on Latino politics, or vice versa.

The first edition of this book, published in 1983, did not contain a chapter on racial minority group politics. Our task for this edition, therefore, necessitated the reconstruction of the history as well as a delineation of current themes and directions prevailing in each field. Projecting into the future, what would we expect this chapter to contain and how would it be structured in the third edition?

First, we anticipate that the developments in each field, particularly black and Latino politics, will require separate chapters, clearly signifying their acceptance by the discipline. Second, some of the questions currently plaguing the fields will have been resolved, but in keeping with the dynamism of the areas, new ones will have surfaced. For instance, scholars in black politics will once again seriously question the appropriateness of traditional political science explanations for the political attitudes and behaviors of African Americans. Latino politics will no longer suffer from lingering concerns about legitimacy, and inter-group political differences will be more sharply focused. Many more scholars will focus on the politics of American Indian peoples but, heeding the mistakes made by anthropologists, will approach the subject from frameworks that account for the uniqueness of the situation of Indian peoples in the United States. In addition, the "model minority" paradigm in Asian-American politics will have gone the way of the ethnic politics approach in black politics.

Finally, and most importantly, the chapters in the third edition will, we hope, no longer talk about the small numbers of minority political scientists in political science generally and the even smaller number writing in the various areas specifically. For it is our hope that the numbers of black, Latino, American Indian, and Asian-American political scientists, especially females, will increase as the discipline's recognition and commitment to the study of the politics of America's racial minority groups grow.

Notes

We would like to thank Steven Tauber, research assistant in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, for his invaluable assistance in locating much of the research referenced in this chapter.

1. There is debate over whether the concept of "minority" politics is a theoretically useful category for conceptualizing and organizing the political experiences of all non-white groups in the United States. We acknowledge this controversy, but do not intend to enter the debate in this chapter, which would require more time and space than has been allocated.

2. It should be noted that Bunche was the first black American male to receive a Ph.D. in political science. The first black American female was Jewel Limar Prestage, who received her Ph.D. in 1954 from the University of Iowa.

3. We have purposely confined our discussion of black and Latino politics to attitudes and behaviors related to the United States domestic political arena. While there is a modest literature on black and Latino participation in foreign policy, we decided not to include that dimension. Although one could argue that foreign policy issues should be a concern of the subfields, to date it has not been an overriding concern in either area.

4. In 1969, a preparatory conference was called at Southern University to discuss professional problems of black political scientists within the discipline, in general, and within the American Political Science Association, in particular, as well as to discuss the political science curricula at historically black colleges and universities (Jones 1990).

5. Between Bunche's work and the Negro leadership studies of the 1960s, several of Bunche's students, principally Robert E. Martin, continued to research and publish in the emerging field of Negro politics. Martin conducted early empirical research on black voting in the Agricultural Adjustment Programs. Given the unreceptivity of political science journals to Negro politics, Martin's studies were published in other disciplinary journals (Martin 1938, 1942, 1951, and 1953).

6. Popular knowledge among many Latino scholars contends that a reference to Douglas Week's article in the 1930s supposedly appeared in the *American Political Science Review*. Our search for this reference for the documentation of this chapter proved unsuccessful.

7. Latino politics, during this time period, is synonymous with Chicano politics.

8. If Avalos had included the *Social Science Quarterly*, especially since 1970, he would have noted the significant inclusion of articles on Mexican Americans. In many respects, the early development of Chicano politics emanated from an interdisciplinary perspective and many social science disciplines. Given the central mission of the *Social Science Quarterly*, there was a greater receptivity by this journal and its editor for submissions in this field.

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Citizens, Contexts, and Politics

Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague

Politics is about winners and losers, influence and coercion, exchange and bargaining, coalitions and factions, conflict and compromise. All these topics involve individuals and groups tied together in complex relationships that defy easy disaggregation and reaggregation. Yet, when we address the topic of citizen politics in the mass, the temptation appears overwhelming to shift the level of understanding and analysis to that of independent individuals -- individuals abstracted from time, place, and setting. Indeed, opinions, interests, preferences, attitudes, beliefs, and values are readily defined with respect to individually defined circumstance. Rich people are Republicans, black people are Democrats, educated people participate more, and so on, but such an analysis frequently lacks the capacity to reconstruct a compelling account of political life. Contextual analysis provides one antidote to this common analytic disjuncture between individuals and politics -- to the gap in our understanding between micro and macro analyses of political life. Contextual theories of politics are built on an assertion of behavioral interdependence: the actions of individual citizens are to be understood as the intersection between individually defined circumstance and the circumstances of surrounding individuals. The distinguishing irreducible element of a contextual analysis is that, in addition to measures of individual properties and preferences, the political behavior of individuals is characterized as contingent on the environment. Measurements on the environment, as well as theoretical arguments based on the environment, occupy fundamental positions in the logical structure underlying theories of individual political behavior that appeal to explanatory contextual hypotheses.

A number of consequences follow from this thesis. Contextual theories of politics are inherently multi-level -- they require cross-level inference -- and hence have consequences for the ways in which politics is conceived at multiple levels of analysis and meaning. First, this means that the political choices of individuals are best and most fully understood in relationship to the surrounding environment. But, second, it also means that

politics in the mass is not simply an additive consequence of individually discrete interests and impulses. Rather, mass politics is understood as the end product of these intersections between groups and individuals within a particular time period and a particular place.

This paper presents a comprehensive view of contextual analysis. We elaborate the idea of behavior in context as an explanatory concept, as well as the intellectual roots that give rise to multi-level contextual analysis. Contextual analysis is construed here as a line of attack upon the more general problem of cross-level inference, and we argue that ecological fallacies arise only when a contextual effect is present. Finally, attention is given to alternative mechanisms of interdependence -- to alternative micro theories of contextual influence.

Modern Intellectual Roots

The modern intellectual roots of contextual analysis can be located in the work of Emile Durkheim, Herbert Tingsten, V.O. Key, and the early election studies of several Columbia University sociologists -- most notably, but not exclusively, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), followed in the same tradition by Ennis (1962), Segal and Meyer (1974), and others. These efforts articulated several themes that continue to provide a focus for contextual theories: behavioral interdependence, multiple levels of observation, and problems of cross-level inference. These themes were set in a somewhat broader context by Harold Lasswell (1966 originally published 1939), and Lasswell's relevance to the theoretical aspects of contextual analysis is repeatedly touched on by Eulau (1986) in a work that includes systematic development of contextual analysis.

The general topic of contextual analysis is vast and spreads across many fields. This review is selective and focuses on the usefulness of context in the analysis of political behavior. In sociology and particularly in the sociology of education there has been extensive work,

both theoretical and empirical, elaborating the opportunities and also the problems presented by the idea that behavior is not independent of the context in which it occurs. The modern canon in sociology is best dated from the seminal writing of Blau (1960a), early inference models by Davis, Spaeth, and Huson (1961), work by the French sociologist Boudon (1963), critiques by Hauser (1974), Hannan's monograph on aggregation (1971), and continuing down to the present in the perhaps controversial thesis about the underclass currently under intense intellectual and scholarly scrutiny (Wilson 1987). Related to the concerns of sociology have been those of criminologists, where a long tradition of contextual analysis has been operative since the work of Burgess and his colleagues at Chicago on delinquency in the early part of this century. A recent, and chilling, example is Rose and McClain (1990, 47-102). And if comprehensive searches are conducted, examples may be turned up of contextual analyses of religion, gerontological issues, health issues, and even of burial practices (Isambert 1960). These riches are mentioned here to emphasize that this review by and large ignores these other areas in order to provide essential focus on politics in context. We return to Durkheim, Tingsten, Key, and the early Columbia University sociologists.

In his classic study of suicidal impulses, Durkheim (1951, originally published 1897) examined perhaps the most individualistic of all acts -- taking one's life -- and argued that such behavior could best be understood as socially contingent. That is, the same person with the same characteristics and predispositions was more or less likely to engage in the act, depending upon social surroundings -- in this case, he argued, the extent to which Catholics and Protestants were surrounded by those of similar or divergent faith and confession. Contextual analysis in particular, and structural analysis in general, has moved far beyond the initial work of Durkheim, but he made the crucial observation that it is meaningful to understand social (and hence political) reality as occurring simultaneously and interdependently at multiple levels, and these multiple levels lie at the heart of contextual analysis even today (Harder and Pappi 1969; Boyd and Iversen 1979; Iversen 1991).


Durkheim's analysis of suicidal impulses has been praised for its path-breaking ingenuity in the use of empirical evidence, but his efforts were limited by data availability -- a curse that continues to afflict the possibilities of contextual analysis. Cross-level inference lies at the heart of contextual analysis, and such inference is furthered by observation at multiple levels. Most commonly this involves observing individuals at the same time that we observe the collective properties of the aggregates within which individuals are imbedded. Such data are not typically available, and they are frequently

obtained through good luck and heroic effort on the part of particular social scientists. The earliest efforts at cross-level inference involved measurement at a single level but inference across levels. This usually meant that social scientists observed in the aggregate but theorized about individuals whose behavior varied as a function of the environment -- an enterprise that was called into question by a subsequent concern with ecological fallacies (Robinson 1950; Goodman 1953, 1959; Hannan 1971; Hannan and Burstein 1974; Alwin 1976; Achen 1986; Shively 1969, 1974; Hanushek, Jackson, and Kain 1974).

One of the earliest and most influential efforts at this sort of cross-level inference can be seen in Tingsten's (1937) analysis of socialist and working class voting patterns in Stockholm during the 1920s and 1930s. Figure 1 is a graphical presentation of Tingsten's data on working class support for the socialists, and it shows that the socialist vote increases in working class precincts. But the significance of these data extends far beyond this simple observation. First, notice that the data of Figure 1 are best described by an s-curve (a logistic distribution fits these data with extraordinary accuracy). If the probabilities of socialist support among workers and nonworkers were constant, i.e., if each person had a fixed individual level probability of supporting the socialists, given his or her class membership status, then the data should be clustered around a straight line. (We have imposed the line of perfect proportionality, or uniform returns to scale, $Y=X$, as an aid in studying the plots.) Tingsten recognized the import of these data and offered several suggestions to account for the s-curve pattern. The important point here is that individual propensity to vote socialist cannot be constant across precincts and also yield the pattern exhibited in Figure 1. Furthermore, the nonconstancy is systematic, i.e., in precincts with high working class densities the socialists get a disproportionate share of the vote and the converse holds in precincts with low working class densities.

Figure 1 provides data at only a single aggregate level and even though these Stockholm precincts are very small aggregate units, we are thus forced to theorize regarding the individual level effects that might generate such a pattern. In contrast, Tingsten also offers evidence regarding turnout among Stockholm workers that does not require such an inferential leap because it provides what is, in essence, observations at two levels. As luck would have it, Swedish census officials reported the individual level rate of participation among those classified as working class by precinct; Tingsten had the good theoretical sense to consider that rate as a (linear) function of working class densities within the precinct. In considering these class-specific turnout rates, we are not required to infer the behavior of workers on the basis of the population at large. We observe this rate directly and see that it varies as a function of working class

Figure 1: TINGSTEN'S PRECINCTS



densities. There is no ecological inference problem or compositional measurement problem in these data. And thus Tingsten's work signifies a breakthrough. His combination of aggregate observation with individual level inference explicitly recognized the nonadditive consequences that derive from behavioral interdependence, and his analysis of voting turnout is the earliest cross-level analysis with individual level measurement that we have been able to identify in the literature.

Geographically it is a great distance, but conceptually only a step, from Tingsten and Stockholm to V.O. Key and the American South. Key's work consistently displays a sensitivity to multiple levels of analysis and meaning, but nowhere is this more true than in *Southern Politics* (1949). One of the most compelling analyses of structural influence in political life comes in Key's demonstration that white racial hostility in the South varied as a function of black population concentrations. He demonstrated, for example, that southern whites were more likely to participate in politics if they lived in counties with higher concentrations of black citizens -- a pattern that often continues to the present (Alt 1992). Indeed, Key explains much of the internal variations in southern politics according to the presence or absence of black populations. It is not an exaggeration to say that the central theme of *Southern Politics* revolves around this disjuncture between the politics of the black belt counties and the politics of counties where white populations were numerically dominant.

By contemporary standards, Key's (1949) methodology was fairly primitive and limited by the availability of data, although surely of extraordinary originality. But his insights have stood the test of time and replication, both inside and outside the South, in studies conducted by Matthews and Prothro (1963), Sears and Kinder (1971, 1985), Wright (1976, 1977), Giles and Evans (1985), Bobo (1983, 1988a), and Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt (1989). White racial hostility is a common feature of American political life, and it frequently varies as a direct function of blacks' presence in the population.

Furthermore, when Key investigated the problem of racial hostility in the post-World War II South, he saw it through the lens of politics and purpose. In particular, he saw it in terms of a white population that was taking political steps to realize its own interests. According to Key (1949, 5) the central problem in the black belt was "the maintenance of control by a white minority." Thus, in Key's analysis, political self-interest is the concept used to explain racial hostility -- even racial hostility that is contextually contingent. By avoiding an explanation rooted in the social psychology of prejudice, Key shows us that contextual analyses of politics are not necessarily

wed to social psychology. Rather, a contextual analysis might be thoroughly political in its focus upon interests and the mobilization of interests. This is theoretically significant for contextual analyses since it offers a conjunction of motivated behavior, driven by a social condition, with political consequences. In his analysis Key wed rationality and social context as jointly required to give an adequate theoretical account of the politics under analysis.

A final building block for the foundation of contextual analysis was laid when, first, Lazarsfeld introduced the sample survey as a tool of serious social science and, second, the Columbia sociologists used it to demonstrate the importance of social influence in election campaigns. While Tingsten and Key used aggregate data to make inferences regarding the behavior of individuals, the Columbia sociologists used individual level data to make inferences regarding social processes and the dependence of individual behavior upon larger social aggregates. The most sophisticated empirical analysis of the early Columbia tradition occurs in the work of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) -- a 1948 community-based presidential election study located in Elmira, New York. While the authors do not explicitly state the problem as one involving multiple levels of analysis and observation, and while nearly all of their observation is at the level of individuals, it is clear that they place the distinction between the individual and the aggregate at the forefront of their theoretical efforts. In their own words (1954, 122): "Whatever the psychological mechanisms, the social and political consequence is much the same: the development of homogeneous political preferences within small groups and along lines of close social ties connecting them. During a campaign political preferences are 'contagious' over the range of personal contacts." While Tingsten and Key recognized the importance of behavioral interdependence in making inferences from aggregates to individuals, the Columbia sociologists recognized its importance in making inferences from individuals to aggregates. In both instances, the foundation was being laid for a contextual, multi-level understanding of politics.

Too much has probably been made of the disjuncture between the Columbia and Michigan schools of electoral research. Certainly the authors of *The American Voter* gave clear recognition to the importance of both individuals and groups within democratic politics. It is still the case, however, that the Columbia school established a tradition of electoral research that has operated concurrently and yet apart from the dominant Michigan tradition. What sets this Columbia tradition apart? The Columbia sociologists largely ignored the issue of national representativeness in their effort to

locate the structures and environments of the individual citizen. The Michigan social psychologists, although not ignoring the importance of contexts, structures, and environments, traded off a local focus in order to obtain a representative picture of the national American electorate. Some accommodation of these traditions can be found in Popkin (1991).

What then is the legacy of these earlier efforts? First, individuals are viewed as interdependent, and individual choice is seen as partially contingent upon the choices or presence of other individuals. Second, the socially contingent nature of political choice leads to a conception of political behavior that is characterized by multiple levels: individuals are to be understood within the larger social aggregates of which they are part, and aggregate behavior is to be understood as more than the simple accumulation of individually determined preferences. Third, and finally, there is a methodological imperative -- measurement which informs political relationships is to be taken at multiple levels if cross-level inferences are to be rooted in observation. But even if observation occurs at a single level, attention is directed to the cross-level consequences of interdependence.

Cross-Level Inference and Contextual Analysis

Two events that occurred during the post-war era redirected the research focus of contemporary political science. The first was the adoption of the national random sample survey as a means of data collection in serious scholarly research on mass political behavior, especially voting behavior. Prior to this time, empirical studies of electoral politics relied most heavily upon aggregate data obtained from the public record -- election returns and census data. There were, of course, notable exceptions to this reliance upon aggregate data: the early Columbia studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968 originally published 1944), the imaginative efforts of Harold Gosnell, especially his experiment in stimulating voter participation (1927), and others as well. But with the increased availability of Michigan-based survey data, and particularly with the establishment and growth of the American National Election Study series, the focus of electoral politics research began to shift from the electorate to the voter, from the aggregate to the individual. Thus, at the beginning of the 1950s, a methodological innovation made it possible for political scientists to adopt the framework of individual psychology as a primary element in their arsenal of explanatory devices.

At the same time that mass political psychology became a methodological alternative, the practice of

political sociology was rendered suspect among many scholars. The catalytic event for the eclipse of political sociology among political scientists was the publication of W.S. Robinson's (1950) critique of aggregate data analysis and cross-level inference in his exposé of the ecological fallacy. Robinson's argument continues to provide a conundrum for many political scientists. Indeed, 40 years after its publication, a small group of methodologists are still struggling at coming to grips with its implications (Erbring and Young 1979; Achen 1986; Shively 1987; Hanushek, Jackson, and Kain 1974).

We do not intend to recapitulate the entire argument surrounding Robinson's original article and its later critiques and extensions. But the general problem lies at the core of contextual analysis, and to the extent that the ecological fallacy poses a problem, contextual analysis provides the solution. Our discussion begins by borrowing the logic of Przeworski and Teune (1970) but proceeds to carry that logic to its natural culmination.

For purposes of demonstration, suppose that the empirical issue concerns the relationship between individual income and support for a particular Republican gubernatorial candidate. That is, we are interested in the manner in which citizen support for the candidate in an election varied as a function of citizen income level. A number of research strategies are open to us. We might simply regress the candidate's vote proportion within counties on the mean income level within the counties. Alternatively, taking Robinson's admonition seriously, we might contract a polling firm to conduct a random sample of citizens, and in that survey we might ask respondents how strongly they support or oppose the candidate. Remember that in both instances we are interested in the behavior of individual citizens. Is the aggregate strategy as bad as the ecological fallacy makes it seem? Is the survey of individual citizens the solution to our problem?

Consider first the aggregate strategy. What stands in the way of inferring individual behavior on the basis of aggregate data? For purposes of illustration, we select three hypothetical counties with three respondents in each county and construct scenarios on that basis. In order to facilitate comparison, we assume (1) the survey question provides an unbiased estimate of the individual probability that each respondent voted for the candidate and (2) correspondence between aggregate measures for the counties and respondent means within the counties.

Figure 2 is a scatterplot of candidate support on income: each observation is an individual respondent, and each county sample is enclosed by an ellipse. In each panel of Figure 2, a line is drawn to represent the regression of the county mean for candidate support on the county income mean, and thus we can easily compare the aggregate relationship for the county means with the individual relationships within counties. Only in the first

panel would we correctly infer a positive individual level relationship within counties on the basis of the positive aggregate relationship. In the second panel we would infer a positive relationship when, in fact, the relationship within the counties was flat, and in the third panel we would infer a positive relationship when the individual relationship within counties was negative.

There is, of course, nothing new to any of this. These are simply variations on the scenarios that drove many political scientists to reject aggregate analysis and embrace individual level data as a cure. But are they a cure? Do individual level data solve these problems?

Returning to the three panels of Figure 2, what would happen if we estimated a single individual level model on the basis of pooled individual level data for the three counties? Figure 2 is redrawn as Figure 3, absent the county means, but with lines drawn to represent the individual level regression of y on x for the pooled sample. What is the result? As before, for each panel, we would obtain a positive slope, even though such an individual level relationship held only within the counties of the first panel.

None of this is anything more than conjecture and line drawing, but it serves to illustrate an important point: the potential for an ecological fallacy is not logically different from the attendant potential of an individual level fallacy (Brown 1991). Suppose that the third panel of Figure 3 is accurate. Is it meaningful to argue that higher income is related to a higher level of support when, in fact, the relationship is reversed within counties? In this particular instance, the pooled individual level model corresponds to the aggregate model, but one model would produce an ecological fallacy, the other would produce an individual level fallacy, and both would be wrong.

The scenarios of Figures 2 and 3 are only the tip of the iceberg. We could continue to generate a long string of observational perversities with respect to relationships within, between, and across the three counties. Fortunately, Boyd and Iversen (1979) have provided a canonical and straightforward formulation for examining a range of possibilities. Following Boyd and Iversen consider first a simple individual level model:

$$y_{ij} = a_j + b_j x_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where y_{ij} and x_{ij} are the candidate support scores and the income levels for the i th individual in the j th context. Even if the requisite individual level data are available, there may be some profound dangers in ignoring the contextual dependence of a_j and b_j on their local environments by simply regressing y on x using the pooled individual level data. (For example, the intercept varies as a function of $x_{.j}$ in both the second and third

panels of Figures 2 and 3.)

The simplest Boyd-Iversen solution is to express both the slope and the intercept of the individual level model as a linear formulation of the group means.

$$a_j = a' + a''x_{.j} \quad (2)$$

$$b_j = b' + b''x_{.j} \quad (3)$$

Substituting equations 2 and 3 into equation 1 produces the single equation form.

$$Y_{ij} = a' + a''x_{.j} + b'x_{ij} + b''x_{.j}x_{ij} \quad (4)$$


The resulting multi-level model can be estimated in several different ways (Boyd and Iversen 1979; Alwin 1976; also Iversen 1991), but most important for present purposes, notice what the model demands in terms of evidence. Not only are observations on individuals required, but also observations on the aggregates of which they are a part.

The important point of this exercise is that contextual theories of politics grant no particular epistemological status to the ecological fallacy. Rather, the ecological fallacy and the individual level fallacy are both examples of specification error (Hanushek, Jackson, and Kain 1974). As a logical matter, it is no more dangerous to infer individual behavior from aggregate level data than to infer any one person's behavior from individual level data. Indeed, if a'' and b'' are both zero, then either aggregate or individual level data will provide equally revealing inferences regarding the behavior of individuals. It is only when contextual effects are present ($a'' < > 0$ and/or $b'' < > 0$) that either the ecological fallacy or the individual level fallacy pose a problem. Stated somewhat differently, ecological fallacies and individual level fallacies are both the result of unspecified contextual effects.


Contexts, Structures, and Environments

What is a contextual effect? How does context differ from structure or environment? Various labels have been applied to individually exogenous factors that serve to influence individual behavior, and the broadest definition of a contextual effect is tied to any such factor extrinsic to the individual. According to such a definition, a contextual effect operates when individual behavior depends upon some individually external factor after all individual level determinants have been taken into account. That is, a contextual effect exists when factors intrinsic to the individual cannot account for

Figure 2: POSSIBLE AGGREGATION FALLACIES



**Figure 3: POSSIBLE
INDIVIDUALISTIC FALLACIES**



systematic variations in behavior across environments (Hauser 1974).

Such a definition is certainly appropriate for many purposes, but it is broad, including within its coverage a wide range of disparate environmental factors: institutional variations, media coverage, and social network effects. A more focused definition, building upon the work of Przeworski and Teune (1970) and Eulau (1986), suggests a distinction that establishes contextual effects as a subset of environmental effects (Huckfeldt 1986, 13). Przeworski and Teune (1970, 56) define contextual factors as aggregates of individual properties and argue that the importance of these factors arises through social interaction. Eulau defines an environmental effect as any behavioral influence that arises from factors external to the individual. Contextual effects as construed here are due to social interaction within particular environments, and social contexts are created as a result of these interactions. (For a somewhat different approach, see Books and Prysby 1991.)

The primary advantage of more narrow definitions of context is that they serve to build upon the intellectual foundation laid by Durkheim, Tingsten, Key, and the Columbia sociologists -- a foundation that was renewed by Blau (1956, 1957, 1960a, 1960b), Davis (1966), and Davis, Spaeth, and Huson (1961). Blau was fundamentally concerned with the individual consequences arising due to location in populations with different social compositions. He identified such effects as structural effects, but their similarity to the contextual effects of Eulau and Przeworski and Teune is clear (Blau 1957, 64). In their extension of Blau's work, Davis and his colleagues (Davis, Spaeth, and Huson 1961) argue that calling such effects structural effects confuses these factors with the broader range of phenomena generally included within the boundaries of social structure. For example, the fact that more highly educated people tend to earn more money can be seen as an effect of social structure, but that is not what either Blau or Davis has in mind when they speak of structural effects, and thus Davis and his colleagues adopt the term compositional effects.

Where does this leave us? An environmental effect is any effect on individual behavior that arises because of extra-individual factors. In contrast, a contextual effect is any effect on individual behavior that arises due to social interaction within an environment. We adopt that view here. Both effects are more generally seen as being structural consequences of individual standing and location within particular social and political orders, and thus they can be seen as components of social and political structure.

In the discussions that follow, we will not always constrain ourselves to contextual effects thus defined but

will incorporate more general considerations of other environmental influences as well. Moreover, our definition of contextual effects leaves several issues unaddressed. What constitutes social interaction? And how are contexts and contextual effects different from networks and network effects?

Contexts, Networks, and Social Interaction

When we argue that contextual effects on political behavior operate through social interaction, we are not saying very much. Social interaction can be characterized along a variety of dimensions: intimacy, frequency, political content, the extent to which the interaction is purposeful or recreational, the extent to which it is voluntary or coerced. At one extreme, social interaction occurs when lovers hold hands while they stroll in the park. At another, it also occurs when one neighbor sees a political yard sign on another neighbor's lawn. The relative political impact of these various interactions is an open question. But it would be a gross error to believe that social interaction is politically relevant only when it occurs among intimates who interact on a voluntary basis (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991). In this impersonal sense, then, we can say that the county level racial hostility effects documented by Key were due to a process of social interaction. In yet a different way, the autoworker who involuntarily shares a workplace location with a co-worker whom he finds obnoxious may still learn a great deal about politics, one way or another, through an ongoing and continual process of social interaction.

For many purposes it is useful to contrast voluntary and involuntary social interaction and to use that distinction to characterize the difference between networks and contexts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). Contexts are not the same as networks at a conceptual level. And at the level of measurement, it is a mistake to think of contexts as simply an easy measure of networks, obtained on the cheap. It is probably best to illustrate these matters with an example -- the classic study of associational patterns among autoworkers conducted by Finifter (1974). Finifter investigated friendship patterns at the factory and produced an important result. In these overwhelmingly Democratic workplaces, Republicans were more selective than Democrats in their choice of workplace friendships. This result is consistent with theoretical arguments and empirical work from quite different quarters (Coleman 1964; Huckfeldt 1983; Noelle-Neumann 1984). Taking this result as prototypical of many contextual effect situations produces further ramifications.

In Finifter's study it is useful to think of the factory as an environment with an attendant context created by the distribution of political preferences among a population that is located within a particular set of factory walls. In this sense, then, the context is imposed upon the people who work at the factory. Once they decide to take the job, or once a person decides to attend a church or live in a neighborhood or bowl in a league, they have little control over the people they encounter as part of their activities within the boundaries of the environment. Thus, contexts are external to individuals, even if the composition of the context depends upon the mix of people contained within it (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).

This is not to say that citizens are necessarily the helpless victims of a social reality that lies beyond their control. Finifter's Republican autoworkers were surrounded by Democrats, and their response was to create friendship groups that served as protective environments. If we think of a friendship group as one part of a social network, this means that networks are subject to individual control in a way that contexts are not. Indeed, the network can be seen as the end result of efforts made by individuals to impose their own preferences upon their social contexts, and the composition of networks is subject to the multiple, interdependent, cascading choices of people who share the same social space — the people who compose the context.

At the same time, these associational choices are best seen as operating probabilistically (Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). Personal choice is not determinant in the construction of a social network for two reasons. First, the choice of an associate operates within the constraints imposed by a context. To present an extreme example, a 1988 Dukakis voter was unable to discuss politics with another Dukakis voter if she was located in a context where everyone else supported Bush. Alternatively, if there is only one Republican working at the automobile factory, he will either eat lunch with other Democrats or he will eat alone. And thus, the probability that the choice of politically like-minded discussants will be realized is subject to the distribution of politically like-minded discussants within the context. Choosing a place of residence is self-selection, of course, but it also is constraining and leads to non-self-selected information exposure (T. Brown 1981, 1988). Similarly, employment may be freely chosen, but once work is begun many subsequent choices are circumscribed by the particular workplace setting — the dilemma of Finifter's Republican autoworkers.

A second reason that associational choice is probabilistic is that it responds to multiple preferences, with different weights, many of which are unformed or at best poorly formed. All of us want friends who are

smart, pleasant, great bridge players, Dodger fans (the authors are of different minds on this point), and politically enlightened. But only political scientists are likely to put an overwhelmingly important weight on political enlightenment. Indeed, many citizens have uninformed and perhaps unformed political preferences that become articulate only after associates are chosen and persuasion and education and social learning occurs.

To say that associational choice is probabilistic is not to say that it is unimportant or inconsequential. An important area of research in contextual analysis is the investigation of the relationship between contexts and networks and the role that various selection criteria play in translating contexts into networks. Indeed, the evidence suggests that political minorities are more aggressive in their exercise of choice, even as they face the daunting and inevitably defeating task of maintaining political cohesion (Miller 1956; Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).

In summary, social networks and friendship groups are the interdependent products of individual choice operating probabilistically within the boundaries of externally imposed contexts. The context presents a menu of choices that is inherently stochastic as well: if you move into a Democratic neighborhood, the odds are that you may live next door to a Democrat and his yard signs and bumper stickers (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992), but maybe not. The important point is not that choice and control are lacking, or that individual preference is socially determined (Key and Munger 1959), but rather that choice operates probabilistically within an externally imposed, systematically biased, and necessarily stochastic environment. Hence, even voluntary forms of social interaction typically reflect the composition of a larger, involuntarily imposed social context — the context is contingent and hence also the choices made within it.

Principal Findings in the Contextual Analysis Tradition

This is not the place for an extended literature review detailing the extensive substantive findings of contextual research. Such reviews are certainly available, and interested readers might consult the works of Books and Prysby (1991) or Huckfeldt (1986). A vast literature on school effects was noted above. Our goal here is to outline several basic thrusts found in the empirical literature which we believe to be of special theoretical relevance as a motivation for the systematic discussion that follows — a reason, perhaps, for the reader to pay attention to the sequel.

An overarching methodological lesson emerges from considering many of the works cited above, here,

and below. Cross-level effects frequently exhibit interaction in the statistical sense. Hence, to the extent that contextual effects are interactively operative in an investigatory situation, individual effect models are necessarily not linearly additive. The fair implication is that substantive explanatory or statistical models that ignore contextual effects, under conditions where contextual effects can be persuasively established, are, in a technical sense, not correctly specified. This conclusion rests on considering a broad array of substantive results.

Social Interaction and Context

Patterns of social relationships are neither wholly stochastic nor wholly determined on the basis of individual choice. As a result, the likelihood of social contact with various social and political groups lies between a prediction based wholly on environmentally bounded, random interaction and an alternative prediction based wholly on individually constructed social and political worlds. (See Putnam 1966; Huckfeldt 1983, 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988.)

Political Minorities and Context

The stochastic nature of social interaction creates a political bias favorable to political majorities and, thus, rather than being cohesive and resolute, political minorities suffer from the debilitating consequences of social bombardment by political messages that run counter to their own political inclinations. Such a consequence flows directly and inevitably from the reality of, and perception of, social interaction with political content. In order to survive the loaded dice of social interaction within a bounded environment saturated with stochastically biased information - skewed partisan messages - political minorities may resort to withdrawal from the surrounding context. (See Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Miller 1956; Putnam 1966; Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988.)

Multiple Levels of Social and Political Reality

While it is often convenient from a measurement standpoint to characterize the social context at a single level -- counties, neighborhoods, churches, workplaces -- it is clear that these multiple levels of meaning and reality impinge on each other to interact in politically significant ways. The effect of the neighborhood depends on the county, the consequences of the church depend on the neighborhood, and so on. People reside and live day to day in complex social and political spaces that are

ineluctably interdependent and that serve to mold and shape particular political realities. (See Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990; Fuchs 1955; Segal and Meyer 1974; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990, 1991, 1992.)

Individual Discretion and Control

The accumulated evidence offers scant support for a view that interprets individual citizens as the passive victims of an environmentally determinate process. Instead, individual discretion, individual characteristics, and individual behavior serve to define the position of the individual citizen with respect to environmental circumstances. This is perhaps most obvious with respect to migration and residential relocation: for often complex and apolitical reasons people choose where they will reside, but, willy nilly, these choices expose them to particular political messages. Organizational memberships also serve to shield individuals from some sources of environmental influence (the neighborhood) and expose them to others (the county). As yet another example, the regularity with which people attend their churches may determine the extent to which they are affected by the climate of political opinion that is present among parishioners. Finally, a wealth of research shows that the strength of various contextual effects depends on individual characteristics, and some evidence even suggests that the direction of contextual effects depends on individual status. (See T. Brown 1981, 1988; Finifter and Finifter 1989; Cox 1974; Segal and Meyer 1974; Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Giles and Dantico 1982.)

Individual and Environmental Contingencies

The net yield of work on the effects of context is a conception of political behavior as contingent on a variety of interdependencies among social and political structures and individual properties and behavior. The social context is not a single context but rather a series of intersecting, overlapping, and mutually interdependent arenas of political information -- both targeted and accidental political messages. Individual characteristics and individual choice play crucial roles in locating the individual within these complex webs of social relationships and informational environments. Individual characteristics will in part determine how the information is sampled and processed, or even noticed at all. At the same time individual choice should not be viewed in a simple-minded fashion. Adults do not make fundamental life choices regarding church, home, and residential area on the basis of party identification. Rather, partisanship and political preference provide yet another set of contingencies conditioning the manner in which social and

political influence is realized. Contextual theories of politics and political behavior are built on the stochastic and contingent nature of social and political life. Such theories allow no simple, mechanical determinism either at the level of the environment or at the level of the individual. From this perspective, politics and political behavior emerge as located at the multiple points of intersection between individual citizens and the contexts wherein they live and work. (See Boudon 1986.)

Micro Theories of Contextual Influence

The individual provides the ultimate unit of analysis in any contextual theory of politics, and individual choice is viewed as located at the intersection between individual purpose, individual cognition, individual predisposition, and individual preference, on the one hand, and environmental opportunities and constraints, on the other hand (Przeworski 1985). Citizens are always understood within a particular setting -- a setting that attaches probabilistically to the menu of choices that is available to the individual. Indeed, this joining of biased environments to rational individual political decision making was modeled in a persuasive fashion by McPhee and his co-workers three decades ago in his dynamic model of the voting process, a model specifically designed to incorporate the idea of the influence of a stochastically biased information environment (probabilistically) sampled by the individual citizen (McPhee and Smith 1962; McPhee and Ferguson 1962; McPhee, Smith, and Ferguson 1963; McPhee 1963).

At the same time, contextual theories of politics resist radical methodological reductionism and with it the idea that any explanation of political phenomena must be judged by its ability to get inside the heads of the individual voter. In other words, a contextual analysis of politics is not coincident with the effort to reduce politics, always, to its smallest discrete units. Such an effort is inconsistent with the premise of contextual analysis that the interdependence of individuals is the key to a compelling explanatory reconstruction of political behavior. And thus politics can be understood from the vantage point of the individual psyche, but only as individual psyches interact to produce political outcomes. Correspondingly, once a contextual analysis of politics is subsumed under the effort to understand based solely on individual motivation, it ceases to engage in a multi-level analysis and hence ceases to be contextual.

The importance of micro theories to contextual analysis is not that they explain individual behavior, but rather that they more fully articulate the nature of

interdependence among citizens and hence add to our understanding of politics as a corporate outcome -- the level at which politics has meaning and substance (Eulau 1986). This task -- the specification of behavioral interdependence -- lies at the heart of contextual analysis. The questions become: Under what conditions does one citizen affect another? And what are the circumstances that give rise to interdependent behavior? Stated somewhat differently, what are the individual and corporate mechanisms that translate the context into a force operating upon individual behavior?

There is no silver bullet that serves as the answer to all these questions -- there is no official micro theory of contextual influence. This is particularly the case because there are a range of divergent forms of contextual influence and appeals to an explanatory contextual hypothesis. V.O. Key (1949) and Matthews and Prothro (1963) demonstrated that southern whites were more likely to engage in racial oppression if county populations were more heavily black in their racial composition. Butler and Stokes (1969) demonstrated that British workers were more likely to vote Conservative if they lived among middle-class populations. Langton and Rapoport (1975) demonstrated that Santiago workers were more likely to be class conscious if they lived among other workers. Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrated that a reorganization of civil rights voting cleavages in the Congress led to a reorganization of these cleavages in the population at large. All of these can be seen as contextual effects, but there the similarity ends. Some of these contextual effects involve assimilation between individuals and groups, while others involve conflict as the product of group intersection (Huckfeldt 1986). Some of these contextual effects involve fundamental social and political loyalties, while others involve more ephemeral judgments and attachments. We could extend the list to include even more disparate effects due to the context, e.g., civil burials in Paris which might be viewed as a religious consequence of political belief and class (Isambert 1960), but the point is that no single mechanism of influence is responsible for them all. Rather, a range of alternative mechanisms is inevitably involved. We address the main alternatives here, and our consideration begins with the null model.

The Null Model

A null model warns us against the contextual fallacy of wrongly and prematurely imputing a contextual effect (Hauser 1974; Alwin 1976; Prysby 1976; Burstein 1978; Weatherford 1982; Stipak and Hensler 1982; Boyd and Iversen 1979; Iversen 1991). Such a mistake can be made in a number of ways. If low-status individuals

living in low-status contexts are more likely to be Democrats than low-status individuals living in high, status contexts, it may be due to a social interaction effect. But it might alternatively be due to higher income levels among lower status people living among higher status individuals, or it might be that we have better measures on contextual status than we have on individual status. In short, before a contextual effect can be asserted, Hauser (1974) argues, individual level alternatives must be constructed and considered.

Hauser's admonition is fair enough, even though a contextual argument might make a similar counter point: individual level effects should be subject to the same scrutiny. During the past 15 years, contextual analyses have become more conceptually and statistically sophisticated in entertaining alternative, rival, individual level explanations for the behaviors in question. Perhaps more important, to the extent that political scientists have become more attentive to the mechanisms of interdependence that drive contextual effects, important individual level explanations are less likely to be ignored (Huckfeldt 1984; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).

A second serious issue in the formulation of an appropriate null model turns on the interpretation of measurements taken at the individual level. Many measures of individual characteristics are better conceived as indicators of a collective social experience, e.g., religious confession, or even as indicators of a broad range of regular social experience, e.g., education. Educational level, that most powerful of social background measures in social and political research, surely proxies in central tendency many things besides knowledge and word skills. Is education more important as an indicator of (1) cognitive efficiency, or (2) a person's knowledge base, or (3) a person's class membership, or (4) a person's social experience -- the sorts of persons one interacts with in varying social contexts? Two further examples may fix ideas -- inherited party and inherited religion. What is the measurement level of such individual properties? How are they to function in explanations? Suppose one's father was a Democrat and a Catholic and the individual identifies herself as a Democrat and a Catholic. Measurement is easy. Theoretical interpretation is, however, not so clear. It is difficult to argue that being brought up in a Catholic and Democratic household is an intrinsic property of the individual. It is surely an indicator of his or her experience. Indeed, interest in such measures rests on arguments about the context in which religion and politics is learned, perhaps precisely the theoretical opposite of individual property effects. By no means do we intend to suggest that individual level factors should not be taken into account but only that the meaning of

many individual level factors is, on reflection, not always straightforward.

There remains a literature devoted to demonstrating that the null model is always correct. Two examples are perhaps sufficient: Tate (1974) and Kelley and McAllister (1985). The general analytic strategy of such pieces is to combine contextual level measures with an exhaustive list of individual level measures in a regression set up to assess whether or not the effects of contextual measures wash out statistically. The two studies just identified find that the contextual effects disappear. By contrast, Abowitz (1990) uses a similar approach and finds that contextual effects on political participation are not effectively controlled by individual level measures. Similarly, Straits (1990) reevaluates an old and robust result of Glaser (1959) on spousal effects on voting and finds the result still persuasive. There are a number of substantive studies that identify contextual effects, but readers should also be aware of a thread of extreme skepticism in the methodological literature on contextual effects, the classic statement of which is found in a series of articles by Hauser (see Hauser 1974 for a summary).

The Self-Selection Model

At one point in time, self-selection was seen as a negation of contextual influence (Hauser 1974). The contextual argument might be people who live in the midst of group X tend to act in ways similar to group X. And the self-selection counter argument would be people who act in ways similar to group X locate themselves in the middle of group X, and thus the behavior predates the location in social structure. Problems such as these befog a great deal of causal reasoning in the social sciences. Absent a longitudinal design, there is little hope for resolving these issues, although some progress has been made in incorporating time-ordered measurements into a dynamic explanation of contextual influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990; C. Brown 1991; T. Brown 1988; Kohfeld and Sprague 1990).

A solution to the problem of confounding effects from self-selection goes deeper than time-ordered measurement, however, and the issue is exacerbated by the primitive conceptualization of contextual influence implied by the formulation above. Presumably, people choose contexts not just because they are comfortable but because they are viewed as being potentially consequential in the future, long after the original choice is made. But there is nothing inconsistent between explanations that appeal to contextual effect theoretical hypotheses and the idea that people choose contexts. The

contextual explanation offered above is anchored in an important idea, but it is a crude statement of contextual influence. More sophisticated contextual arguments take account of the fact that people choose environments as well as being influenced by them (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988). Contextual effects also may operate quite objectively, more or less, without any occasion for choice at all (Kohfeld and Sprague 1990).

Moreover, is the self-selection argument really a repudiation of contextual influence? If a citizen behaves similarly to group X, why would he feel the need to be surrounded by members of group X? The plausible answer is that he might be uncomfortable being surrounded by people who behave differently. That is, he might be influenced by them. One important aspect of self-selection surely must be the two-sided motivation to avoid (always probabilistically) influence on you or your family arising from some contexts, while encouraging (always probabilistically) influence from other contexts -- the contexts you choose. Self-selection into particular contexts is rational because contexts are influential, not because they are not (Westfield n.d.).

Furthermore, when a context is chosen for its suitability on some characteristic or set of characteristics, there is no guarantee that it will be suitable on all relevant characteristics. Politically relevant social contexts come to us in lumpy fashion like physical plant capital for economists. You cannot get just a little bit of a context but rather you get the whole thing. Finifter's Republican workers provide an excellent example. The factory setting was unavoidable and full of Democrats, and, consequently, the Republican workers developed a systematic strategy of friendship choice (Finifter 1974).

There are other problems with simple versions of the self-selection argument as well. To what extent do people choose their locations in the social structure? How many of us really choose our workplace colleagues, our coreligionists, our neighbors? To the extent that we are able to exercise control over our surroundings, do we use political criteria in exercising such choice? Or do we choose a job because it pays well? A church because our parents raised us in it? A neighborhood because it has good schools? And then we take the politics that accompanies the choice. Thad Brown has shown (1981, 1988) that residential choice is independent of partisanship -- choose a residence on the basis of good schools or convenience to your job and then put up with the Socialist next door.

Once again, a contextual theory of politics confronts the intersection between individual choice and environmentally circumscribed alternatives. And citizens certainly exercise choice when they confront the alternative sources of political information that are available to them. This creates a potential tension between individual preference and the political content of

social interaction. The important point is that any theory of contextual influence must incorporate the possibility of such a tension -- it must take account of citizen efforts at self-selection.

Taking account of self-selection in econometric work has been a topic of rapid development in the past decade. The locus classicus is Maddala (1983) on limited dependent variables (also see Achen 1986). Self-selection is a problem in sampling described as incidental truncation, and the solution is clear in principle. Model the self-selection process along with the substantive model of interest. A succinct review is Greene (1990, 715-753; also Achen 1986). Another form of this problem arises when the discussion context is putatively measured directly by obtaining interviews with members of respondents' social network, and the problem in analysis becomes one of sorting out, methodologically, the inherent reciprocities (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1991; Gilbert 1990; Kenny 1989). In this latter situation statistical strategies can be employed to alleviate the simultaneity. We have not identified contextual analyses employing explicit modeling of self-selection processes in the literature, except for treatment of simultaneity.

Finally, when contextual analysis becomes elaborate and very explicit theory is invoked, the self-selection argument emerges, we believe, as largely irrelevant. A particular example may drive this remark home. Kohfeld and Sprague (1990) disentangled the parameter identification problem in assessing the deterrent effects of police behavior on criminals (burglars) by resort to drastic spatial and time disaggregation of criminal event records and police arrest records. A dynamic model of police and criminal interaction in a metric of weeks, with appropriate lags and some other side conditions, was identified and estimated. The study was able to demonstrate large amplification and attenuation effects on the deterrence parameter as demography was varied -- a theoretically expected contextual effect. Changes in police and criminal dynamic interactions over a short time period cannot be driven by demographic changes that are altered only slowly. It is difficult to formulate a criticism of this demonstration of contextual effect based on self-selection arguments. Did the criminals (burglars) choose to live in certain neighborhoods in order to enhance their response to police arrest behavior? The question may not be absurd, but it certainly is peculiar.

We suspect that many of the self-selection criticisms that appear plausible in the abstract (and when simplified) break down when applied to theoretically well grounded, statistically well designed, and carefully reasoned contextual analyses. In any event, if self-selection is a serious contender as a competing explanatory hypothesis, the appropriate methodology is clear. Statistically model the selection process along with

the contextual model. This procedure should allow the investigator to draw conclusions with respect to both the significance of self-selection and the significance of contextual effects in the particular investigation.

Reference Group Models

Interestingly, reference group explanations for contextual influence have decreased in popularity during the same period of time in which their popularity has generally increased among scholars of mass political behavior (Kelley 1952; Davis 1966; C. Brown 1981; Lau 1989; Kenny 1989; Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero 1989; Penning 1988). Explanations of mass behavior have increasingly turned to group-anchored opinions and attitudes. But scholars of contextual influence have become less likely to point toward reference group formation as the tie between individual behavior and the social context. Why?

First, many reference group arguments for contextual influence are especially vulnerable to counter arguments based on self-selection. Is the appropriate question: why do individuals who live among workers identify as workers? Or is it: why do people who identify as workers live among workers? Stated in this manner, it may become difficult to decide which question needs to be answered first.

Second, a combination of scholarly efforts has pushed contextual arguments in the direction of political information and behavioral mechanisms of transmission as opposed to the transmission of social loyalties. An explicit focus of the late 1970s and the early 1980s posed a choice between behavioral contagion on the one hand and social transmission on the other (Sprague and Westfield 1979a, 1979h; Erbring and Young 1979; Huckfeldt 1983). In the discussion of these choices, behavioral transmission tends to win out. Erbring and Young refer to social composition arguments as being rooted in social telepathy -- a label reflecting their dissatisfaction with the specification of the interdependence mechanism. And at an empirical level, support tends to be stronger for arguments rooted in behavioral transmission (Huckfeldt 1984), with one important exception.

Racial hostility has repeatedly been shown to depend on context, but it is difficult to construct a contextual explanation for racial conflict that does not depend upon some sort of explicit or implicit reference group explanation (Key 1949; Heard 1952; Matthews and Prothro 1963; Wright 1976, 1977; Giles and Evans 1985; Sears and Kinder, 1971; Bobo 1983, 1988b; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). The argument generally flows along these lines: whites who interact with blacks tend to

become more racially conscious, threatened, and hostile. And they are likely to act politically in ways that reflect this hostility. Why? Whites identify with whites, they compare their status with blacks whom they believe pose a threat, and they react accordingly. A variation on this general argument is that whites observe the Democratic voting behavior of blacks, they believe that their interests run counter to those of blacks, and they vote in an opposite direction (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989).

Either variation points toward the importance of racial reference groups as the mechanisms of contextual effects, but this reference group function is very different from social telepathy. In an early and influential work Kelley (1952) usefully contrasted two different functions of reference groups -- the normative and comparative functions. The normative function is being called upon when a reference group argument asserts that people who live among workers tend to identify as workers and accept working class norms. The comparative function is being called upon when a reference group argument asserts that whites who live among blacks compare their own status (or interest) with that of blacks and react accordingly.

Behavioral Contagion and Social Learning Models

Behavioral contagion as a micro mechanism of contextual influence is articulated best in terms of a social learning process (Sprague 1982; McPhee 1963). According to this view, citizens are rewarded or punished for political viewpoints that agree or conflict with the viewpoints of other people whom they encounter. The process is repetitive in time and subject to the reinforcement schedule that is probabilistically characteristic of a particular context. That is, white voters in Mississippi experienced distinctive reinforcement schedules in the 1984 presidential election when roughly 85% of them voted for Ronald Reagan. Black voters in Mississippi encountered dramatically different reinforcement schedules in 1984 when roughly 90% of them voted for Walter Mondale.

For some people, learning theory conjures up images of Skinnerian rats being manipulated in a maze, but such a connotation need not be attached to learning theory as it is applied to politics. Citizens certainly make efforts to control their own reinforcement schedules -- there were probably some white Mondale voters in Mississippi who were able to surround themselves with associates who also voted for Mondale. And, thus, the schedule of reinforcement can be seen to vary across both individuals and contexts.

Moreover, a learning theory maintains its focus upon individuals as their own preferences and predispositions collide with those of other individuals. Reconsider McPhee's (1963) vote simulator, which serves as a starting point for Sprague's (1982) work: (1) An individual receives a piece of information from the larger (biased) political environment; (2) He then forms a response based upon his own predisposition; (3) He shares that response with others; (4) The others then reward or punish that response with agreement or disagreement; (5) If disagreement occurs, he samples his (biased) information context broadly conceived, reconsiders his opinion, and shares it once again; (6) And so it goes.

This model has several important advantages. First, it allows both individual predisposition and context to be incorporated within a micro theory of contextual influence. Context enters as the information environment and also as the specialized population from which the individual samples associates with whom to share opinions and responses. Individual predispositions enter as the citizen processes information, formulates an initial response to external political stimuli, and responds to disagreement. The motor that drives the model is disagreement. Only through disagreement does change occur, and, thus, to the extent that people are part of politically homogeneous populations, we see less change. It is not insignificant that recent efforts aimed at examining the political content of social interaction show levels of political disagreement that are perhaps surprisingly high (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).

Another advantage of a learning theory model is that it leads directly to a series of expectations regarding the circumstances under which contextual influence should be most pronounced (Sprague 1982). First, the efficiency of learning increases as the delay in reinforcement decreases and the frequency of reinforcement increases. On this basis we might expect that routine, ongoing, social contacts should be especially influential (McClosky and Dahlgren 1959; Straita 1990). Second, continuous reinforcement over a short period of time produces dramatic effects that decay rapidly at the end of reinforcement. Hence, individually idiosyncratic political opinions that are exposed to social influence during an election campaign should be especially subject to change, but the opinions are likely to become individually idiosyncratic once again at the end of the campaign period (see Berelson et al. 1954). Third, individual motivation plays a crucial role in learning efficiency -- motivated citizens make efficient learners. And thus it is not at all clear that only disinterested, uninformed citizens should be subject to social influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1990). As Converse (1962) and Orbell (1970) remind us, however, incoming information must compete with stored information, and thus the

long-term and short-term consequences of motivation are complex and interdependent.

Rational Choice and Cognition Models

Rational choice theory is sometimes read as excluding the possibility of contextual effects and hence excluding contextual analysis, but there is nothing about social influence that is inherently at odds with a rational choice interpretation of politics. Contextual theories do not argue that citizens are irrational but only that they are interdependent. As Key (1949) shows us, one aspect to the evil logic of the old South was that the racial context stimulated a racial hostility effect among whites through their own perceived self-interest. Moreover, various forms of interdependence can be instrumental for many citizens in many circumstances.

Anthony Downs (1957) argued that citizens are faced with an important dilemma when they seek to become informed about politics. They need information to realize where their interests lie, but information is costly. Indeed, even modest information costs can swamp the benefit that is likely to be obtained through politics, once individual acts are discounted by the likelihood that they will have political consequence. Given such a problem, rational citizens seek to reduce their information costs -- they seek to obtain political information on the cheap -- and one effective way to realize that goal is by obtaining information from other individuals. Information obtained in this fashion may, of course, be biased and partial to others similarly situated, but nonetheless useful (Calvert 1985).

Socially obtained information results in several efficiencies. First, the information comes tailor made. If a citizen wants to know about the current status of nuclear arms reductions talks, he may or may not find relevant information in the newspaper or on the television news, but he can formulate an explicit informational request to an associate who might know. Second, citizens might exercise control over the source. Most citizens have little control over the bias of the evening newspaper or the network news. But they are likely to exercise more control over the bias of their personal information sources. That is, citizens can request information from people who, based on their joint history in some common context, are known to have general viewpoints similar to their own.

A variation on the Downsian view is offered by various cognitive models of decision. Inspired by the early work of Simon (1957), this general viewpoint recognizes the inherent limitations upon the capacities of citizens to make informed choices in complex areas and focuses on the short-cuts citizens employ to make

reasonable and informed decisions (Ottati and Wyer 1990; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). One short cut is to obtain information from trusted sources (Carmines and Kuklinski 1990), and one of the trusted sources might be another citizen (Mondak 1990). Thus a cognitive model of decision making might potentially complement a contextual theory of politics and indeed might offer a micro theory to explain contextual effects.

A point of potential divergence between these various viewpoints and a contextual theory of politics lies in the underlying conception of choice and control over political information. Downs's views informational choice as being determinant: he implicitly assumes that people have the freedom to choose their own sources of information with certainty, and thus social influence becomes a direct reflection of the citizen's own prior beliefs. Correspondingly, many cognitive models stress the extent to which individuals engage in selective information seeking and interpretation (Ottati and Wyer 1990; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989), thereby screening and reinterpreting incoming information within the general context of their own preexistent orientation (or schema). And thus it is not clear that influence occurs at all, at least to the extent that the target of influence exercises direct or indirect control over the message that is received. Such conceptions of information processing have the potential to deny interdependence -- to deny (1) that an individual's behavior is fundamentally predicated upon the behavior of other individuals, and (2) that explanations of an individual's behavior must look beyond the individual in question.

Microsociological Models

Most advocates of a micro theory for contextual effects look toward psychology or economics as sources of inspiration in constructing a mechanism to explain structural influences upon individual behavior. As Raymond Boudon (1986) informs us, however, the individualistic tradition in sociology also supplies a micro theoretical alternative, with roots that trace to the work of Weber (1966). This tradition is sociological in its emphasis upon the extra-individual factors that impinge on individual behavior, but its unit of analysis is the individual, and it incorporates some form of methodological individualism as a micro theory of human behavior.

Microsociological reasoning can be illustrated with respect to personal influence in politics. What makes for political influence in personal relationships?

The implicit (social psychological) assumption carried over from many political socialization studies is that intimacy is responsible for personal influence on political orientations, even though socialization research offers little support for such an assertion (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Tedia 1974). Even without empirical support, a reliance upon intimacy continues to drive a great deal of reasoning regarding social influence and contextual effects (Eulau and Rothenberg 1986). Following the lead of Burt (1987), we refer to arguments relying upon intimacy as social cohesion models. In contrast, a microsociological explanation would point toward the social locations of both the target and the source of influence. For example, a structural equivalence explanation pursues the notion that a citizen should have more influence over another to the extent that they share the same locations in social structure (Burt 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991). Such reasoning provides an entirely different vantage point from which to assess contextual effects in politics.

Consider neighborhood effects from the cohesion perspective: why should citizens be influenced by the politics of the neighborhood when we know that, in the modern world, neighbors are seldom friends but merely residents of the same social space? Certainly, neighborhood effects are difficult to explain from a social cohesion perspective. But reconsider neighborhood effects from the vantage point of structural equivalence: neighborhoods may be important because residents share common structural locations. If this is the case, it is not cohesion, discussion, and persuasion that are at issue but rather information. When I see the yard signs and bumper stickers in my neighborhood, I am being informed regarding the political preferences that are appropriate for someone who is like me (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).

What is the individual level motive force for conformity? Burt (1987) argues a form of status anxiety in his reanalysis of the Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1966) study of diffusion patterns in the medical community's adoption of a medical innovation. Boudon (1986) draws on Weber (1966) to urge the adoption of a rational actor motivation and a conception of contextually bounded rationality. Our own position is that different motives are better equipped to explain different behaviors. In the case of yard signs and bumper stickers, it seems reasonable to assume that their informational value is best explained on the basis of shared interests. When we drive down the streets of our neighborhoods and see Democratic yard signs, or when we see co-workers wearing Democratic campaign buttons, or when we see Democratic bumper stickers in the workplace parking lot, we are being informed regarding the political preferences of people with whom we share interests. The

influence of such information is independent of intimacy -- indeed it may not even be verbally transmitted -- but it is entirely reasonable that citizens pay heed.

Viewed more generally, how does the microsociological model of political information processing differ from that of the economist or the cognitive psychologist? First and foremost, a microsociological argument views choice and control over information as being incomplete and probabilistic (Huckfeldt 1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). It is not that people do not intend to collect information about politics that corresponds with their own political biases and predispositions, but rather that they are frequently unable. This means, in turn, that (1) socially obtained political information (indeed all political information) is not simply a reflection of prior preference, (2) people obtain discrepant information that has influence potential (Sprague 1982), and hence (3) individual citizens are interdependent.

Why might the choice and control of political information operate probabilistically? First, the control over information is probabilistic because the search for information is expensive. Remember what we are addressing. The location of an informal source of information means finding someone with whom to discuss matters of interest, or at least someone from whom to gather information. If choice operates deterministically, citizens would not share their concerns with others until they have located the correct bias. If the correct bias is hard to find, the search must continue. Who is willing to pay the social cost of such an extended search? People who demand conformity in surrounding social relationships are the most likely candidates, either because of their own lack of tolerance for discrepant views or their own commitment to a particular bias or their being rejected by others when conversation exposes their differences from others (Finifter 1974). This means, of course, that the extent to which choice is probabilistic depends upon the strength of an underlying preference. Some people are more discriminating than others, but no one exercises complete and total control over incoming information because, if for no other reason, they must determine the bias of potential information sources in the first place in order to discriminate.

Second, informational choice is probabilistic with respect to any particular preference because it responds to multiple preference dimensions. We often discuss politics with the same people with whom we discuss baseball and fly casting. This is not to say that social relationships are not specialized but only that specialization adds to the cost of information search, and thus one more way to economize is to make a single source serve multiple functions. Some specialization is inevitable -- most of us have good friends with whom we would never discuss

politics. But specialization comes at a price. In general, life is easier when one contact serves as a source of information for fly casting and politics. Thus, when we choose a contact, we are often implicitly optimizing in several directions and compromising among them all, further attenuating individual control and increasing the probabilistic component of choice with respect to any single underlying preference.

Third, informational choice is incomplete because so much of it is obtained inadvertently. When we see a respected co-worker wearing a campaign pin, we have collected an important piece of information. We know that someone with good judgment, and with a particular set of interests, has decided to support a particular candidate. We did not ask him for his opinion -- we did not even exercise choice in collecting the information -- but the import of such information should not be ignored.

Fourth, control over informally supplied information from social sources is also incomplete because the basis of informational choice is absent -- the underlying preference upon which choice rests is incomplete. In other words, we should not forget that it is possible to ask honest, naive questions with little preconception regarding how such information might be reconciled with some preexisting political bias. None of this is meant to deny the existence or importance of a bias either on the part of the sender or receiver of the information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991). Rather, it is only meant to suggest that such biases are incomplete and capable of being informed. And since they are incomplete, they cannot serve as iron-clad criteria in the discrimination among all information sources.

Finally, informational choice is probabilistic because some information is better than no information. Citizens are able to take account of the source's own bias when they evaluate information, or at least they believe that they can. And thus it makes eminently good sense to collect information even if it comes from a wrong-headed source. This does not mean that such information does not have an impact, or that social influence is nullified, but only that people may indeed purposefully expose themselves to information that comes from a source that runs counter to their own bias.

If citizen control over information operates deterministically, then the composition of the incoming stream of information becomes inconsequential for the composition of the information that is ultimately obtained. To the extent that citizens enforce their political predispositions upon informational choice, the menu of informational alternatives no longer matters. Citizens simply wait it out -- they refuse to choose an information source until they find one that they like, even if this means never locating an information source. Such a model of information control produces its own

byproducts, of course. To the extent that citizens exercise such control, they are more likely to extend their search for information, to be unable to locate reliable information sources, and thus to be politically isolated (Huckfeldt 1983).

Alternatively, to the extent that informational choice is probabilistic, the incoming stream of information becomes a crucial consideration. What affects the content and composition of this incoming stream? The answer lies in media exposure and in the multiple bases of social experience to which citizens are exposed, and a steadily accumulating body of evidence points to the importance of these various bases of experience for political information and the formation of political preference.

The Multiple Bases of Social Experience

The political influence of social experience is best understood relative to the various bases of this experience. At one and the same time, citizens live in households, among immediate neighbors, located in the middle of larger neighborhoods, surrounded by a city, a county, a state, and a region. Coupled with these relatively inescapable geographically based environments are a whole series of less geographically dependent environments: workplaces, churches, taverns, bowling leagues, little leagues, health clubs, and so on. And each of these environments, whether it be geographically or nongeographically based, serves to establish constraints and opportunities acting upon social interaction.

None of these environments is necessarily more important than any other in influencing citizen behavior. In particular, it is a mistake to believe that more intimately defined environments are more important than environments that are larger and more impersonal. Indeed, the work of Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989) and Wright and Berkman (1986) demonstrates quite persuasively that the state is the most appropriate environmental unit for many purposes of political analysis. The important point is that opportunities for social interaction are circumscribed by availability, availability is influenced by a range of environments defined at various levels, and thus social experience arises in a particular place and time.

Just as individual choice is not determinant in the selection of information sources, neither is the environment. Citizens do not simply roll over and accept whatever comes along in terms of social interaction opportunities. All of us avoid association with some individuals while we pursue it with others. And thus individual social experience is best seen as the end result

of a complex interplay between individual choice and environmental supply. Just as the environment is composed of multiple and intersecting dimensions of experience (work, neighborhood, church, tavern), so also is individual associational preference multi-dimensional, responding to a range of different goals and objectives. To the extent that social experience carries political content, these life domains become important to the diffusion of political information and to the resulting preferences and choices of citizens.

In short, individual discretion plays an important role in defining social space and thereby determining social exposure. Learning theory points toward the importance of exposure, and a range of empirical findings show that, for example, organizational involvement can serve both to shield individuals from and expose individuals to contextual influence (Putnam 1966; Segal and Meyer 1974; Cox 1974). In point of fact, social contexts are created at least in part by an individual's construction of a social space. And thus the social context reflects a series of socially structured decisions regarding where to live, work, worship, drink beer, bowl, and so on. The social context experienced by any individual is the point of intersection between all these environments. As an empirical matter, we will be fortunate if we can obtain contextual measures on one or two environments at a time (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990), but the inconveniences of measurement should not obscure the underlying theoretical issues.

Conclusion: Putting the Puzzle Back Together

Of what value is a micro theory of contextual influence? We have already denied that its utility must be evaluated in terms of explaining individual behavior, but rather that it lies in the specification of interdependence. Of what value is the specification of interdependence?

An important dimension of contextual analysis is the effort to deduce the aggregate consequences of interdependence. These efforts are typically modeling enterprises that ask a series of "what if" questions. If the mechanism of contextual influence is social learning or behavioral contagion or social reference groups, what are the consequences for the form and dynamic of public opinion (Sprague 1982; Huckfeldt 1983; MacKuen 1990; MacKuen and C. Brown 1987)? What difference does it make if the source of working class consciousness is to be located in exposure to the working class or in exposure to class-conscious working class behavior (Przeworski and Soares 1971; Przeworski 1974)? If citizens are affected both by the groups to which they belong and by the groups to which they do not belong,

what are the consequences for the observation and measurement of contextual influence (Sprague 1976)? If compliant, law-abiding behavior on the part of citizens depends on the distribution of that behavior among others, what are the consequences for the organized coercive efforts of governments to maintain public order and control (Salert and Sprague 1980; Huckfeldt 1989; Huckfeldt 1990)? How does the micro environment shape the development of public attitudes toward law (Franklin and Kosaki 1989)? How does the competitive campaign environment affect the dynamics of money raising and candidate interaction (McBurnett and Kenny 1992)? How does class consciousness affect the potential of social democratic parties to expand the class basis of their support (Przeworski and Sprague 1987)? If political competition occurs between racial groups within the same party coalition, what are the consequences for racial polarization between parties (Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989)?

These modeling enterprises occur in various modes using various methodologies. Some are aimed at fitting models to aggregate data (Brown 1991). Others are aimed at exploring aggregate dynamic consequences (Przeworski and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989). But in every instance they are concerned with the political consequences of interdependence among citizens. In short, the specification of interdependence is not an end in itself. Rather, it serves as a vehicle that makes it possible to move back and forth between levels of analysis. Lacking a specification of interdependence, we are unable to move from the individual back to the aggregate. The analytic journey that culminates in an individual level analysis of political behavior becomes a one-way trip. We develop a more complete understanding of the individual psyche and individual motives, but we are unable to relate these parts to the whole. But interdependent electorates, rather than individual voters, shape the course of democratic politics, and it is the task of contextual hypotheses and theories to specify and explain those politically relevant interdependencies.

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Political Communication: Scope, Progress, Promise

Doris Graber

Introduction

What is "political" communication? It is the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of messages that are likely to have a significant impact on politics. The impact may be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed. Direct messages may relate to political activities, such as an appeal for votes, or an appeal for support of a policy, or for compliance with a particular law. In the indirect mode, messages may create images of reality that then affect political thinking and action by political elites and mass publics. The message senders may be politicians, journalists, members of interest groups, or private, unorganized citizens. Their identity does not matter. The same holds true for message receivers. The key element is that the message has a significant political effect on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals, groups, institutions, and whole societies and the environments in which they exist (Berelson 1948; Lasswell 1969).

Karl Deutsch has called political communication "The Nerves of Government," suggesting that political messages are the stimulus that produces political behavior. He might just as well have called it the lifeblood or mother's milk of politics because communication is the essential activity that links the various parts of society together and allows them to function as an integrated whole. The substance and form of political messages circulating in a polity, and the images that they evoke, determine the thrust and quality of political life. This is why the study of political communication is an extremely important subfield of political science.

One may question whether political communication is a genuinely distinct field of study, or merely a particular context in which one examines various communication phenomena. This is a legitimate question. The answer is that it needs to be treated as a distinct research focus because communication in political contexts presents many unique challenges for scholars that require specialized knowledge of subject matter and

of particular research techniques. Because of its significance to a full understanding of politics, and because of past neglect, much effort is needed to explore all the facets of the subfield.

Political communication is a field with fluid boundaries that is interdisciplinary as well as intercultural. It is interdisciplinary because the questions raised by it require political scientists to draw on sister disciplines, including communication, psychology, and sociology. It is intercultural because political communication features vary among cultures so that it is important as well as instructive to examine them from various cultural perspectives (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990).

Looking at the subfield from a historical perspective, it is one of the oldest. Scholars from early times on have studied political communication. Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) taught about aspects of political communication. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) and Pliny (62-113 A.D.) concerned themselves with the persuasive powers of political oratory. Niccolo Machiavelli argued in *The Prince* in 1513 that rulers must study human nature so that they can successfully communicate with their subjects in order to manipulate their thoughts and emotions. Machiavelli provided detailed suggestions about the manner in which princes might do that.

Princes and other practitioners of the art of politics have been keenly interested in political communication from early times on, knowing well that success in politics demands that politicians master the art of political communication so that they can influence their constituents' views about the political world. They have attempted to foster the construction of favorable images in the minds of their subjects through various types of verbal and nonverbal messages, including the symbolism of majestic architectural creations and elaborate public ceremonies, and public speeches. They have also sought to mold human minds through brainwashing tactics and terror, particularly during periods of internal struggles and external wars. They have used propaganda of various types and public relations tactics and political advertising

as gentler forms of political persuasion. They have attempted to shape the flow of political communication through laws designed to control communication flows, including mass media offerings, in their society. Control over mass media, which generally are the most prolific sources of political messages, has ranged from government ownership and operation of various mass media institutions to various forms of explicit censorship of the news media, as well as censorship through informal social pressures.

The Study of Political Communication

Although political communication is one of the oldest areas of political studies, as a subdisciplinary area of political science it is one of the youngest. Despite its youth, it has made remarkably fast progress in exploring a variety of topics such as analyzing communication by political leaders, examining images created by the mass media and other sources, and probing how people process information. Political communication researchers have laid the groundwork for comparative research, examining audience behavior in diverse societies and studying the motivations of communicators cross-culturally.

Though progress has been fast and furious, it has been uneven. Certain areas have received the lion's share of attention while others have been neglected. Among the areas that have been widely researched is electoral politics. Political scientists have been greatly interested in the impact of various types of communications during campaigns and elections. Since most election messages are shaped and transmitted by the mass media, a great deal of attention has also been given to their role. Neglected areas include the role played by political communication in political socialization, the significance of informal dissemination of information via 'leaks,' and the impact of communication factors on the conclusion of international agreements. But it seems petulant to complain about uneven progress in a field that has made such rapid strides in a brief period of time.

How does one review such a growing, highly fragmented field? There is, of course, no ideal answer. The order adopted here rests on a paradigm developed by Harold Lasswell for the study of communication factors. Lasswell suggested that it was important to seek answers to five questions. One needs to know who (meaning the sender), says what (meaning a message), in what channel (meaning the mode of transmission), to whom (meaning the message receiver) with what effect (meaning the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of the message) (Lasswell 1969). Accordingly, this essay will deal with senders and receivers of political messages, with message meanings and modes of transmission, and with message

effects. In addition, the conceptual bases of the subfield will be reviewed, as well as its major research methods.

As is true of most interdisciplinary fields, a survey of research that encompasses the full array of work in all of the component fields would be unwieldy. At the same time, ignoring work by scholars from other disciplines would deprive readers of the chance to experience the richness of the field. As a workable compromise, this essay focuses primarily on the work done by political scientists, but it will also sample major studies from communication, sociology, and psychology. Space limitations also make it necessary to trim the edges of the field somewhat. For this reason, some areas of study that overlap substantially with other subfields have been excluded. Examples are problems of language heterogeneity in political communities, which are amply covered in reviews of ethnic politics and international relations, and comparative studies of documents, such as the comparative analysis of the English and Japanese versions of the Japanese constitution, which are covered by constitutional law experts (Weinstein 1990; Inoue 1991; Lukes 1987).

Because of the richness of the field, the essay focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on developments of recent decades. Only selected publications will be cited in the text as illustrations of various types of research trends. The bibliography ranges much more widely. But though it presents several hundred sources, it merely scratches the surface of published books and, especially, articles. The number of publications, in itself, is testimony to the vigor of the subfield that includes many scholars who do not ordinarily consider themselves political communication researchers, but whose needs to fully explain their own subfields draw them into the realm of political communication.

Conceptual Underpinnings

As might be expected from an interdisciplinary field, the conceptual underpinnings of political communication studies are diverse and largely borrowed from sister disciplines, especially psychology and communications. Most theories relate to individual-level phenomena, especially the persuasive effects of messages on individuals. For example, hypotheses regarding attention to political messages draw heavily on selective choice theories and uses and gratifications theories. Selective choice theories try to explain why people do not pay attention to most of the information to which they are exposed. According to such theories, people feel uncomfortable -- experiencing cognitive dissonance -- when exposed to ideas that call the validity of their own

ideas into question or offend their feelings and tastes (Festinger 1957). To avoid discomfort, people select information that is congruent with their existing beliefs and shut out discordant messages. Currently, the selectivity phenomenon is regarded as far less prevalent and potent than originally believed. The reason is that numerous studies of the phenomenon, most of them in the election context, have supported the theory only weakly or even contradicted it (Weiss 1969). Nonetheless, selectivity theories are still widely used to explain selective attention (Graber 1988).

Proponents of uses and gratifications theories contend that individuals are active information selectors who ignore messages that are not relevant to their concerns or that are unattractively presented. They pay attention only to messages that are useful and gratifying, provided that the expense in time and effort seems reasonable. The uses to which people put messages and the gratifications they derive from them may be emotional or intellectual. For example, people may pay attention to messages that help them in voting or in gaining a sense of political adequacy. Uses and gratification theories have been tested repeatedly and refined in line with the findings (Rosengren et al. 1985).

When political communication studies started in the mid-1940s they were based largely on 'hypodermic' theories. In contrast to the view that audiences are active, earlier hypodermic theories were predicated on the notion of audience passivity. Exposure to a media message was equated with its absorption by the receiver in its original form. Armed with such hypodermic theories, political scientists began to investigate the impact of mass media stories on voting decisions. They expected media impact to be profound. Unfortunately for the progress of political communication research, the voting studies, including work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), Berelson et al. (1954), Campbell et al. (1954, 1960), and Campbell (1966), did not find the expected effects. Consequently, hypodermic theories became discredited and 'minimal effects' theories came into vogue. According to these minimal effects theories, applied primarily to mass media messages, election news was insignificant, compared to other choice criteria such as party or group allegiance. The minimal effects argument tied in well with persuasion theories about the weaknesses of impersonal messages that cannot address the needs of specific individuals, elicit direct feedback, or even assure the attention of the audience. Disappointed political scientists therefore largely abandoned political message research, especially when it involved mass media messages.

The study of mass media influence on elections resumed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely because the notion of media impotence in election contests clashed with appearances and the intuitions of practicing

politicians (Nie et al. 1976; Miller and Levitin 1976; Patterson and McClure 1976). These renewed investigations, rather than looking for universal effects, tried to discover under what conditions effects might occur. For instance, interested voters and political experts might be more and differently affected by media than disinterested citizens and political novices. This new approach to research, which confirmed such differential effects, coincided with major social and political changes that affected the interaction between media and politics. Party influence on candidate selection had declined sharply. The slack provided a real opportunity for television -- the newly popular mass communication medium -- to become an important force. It therefore comes as no surprise that studies since the revival of interest in the impact of mass media messages have overturned many of the earlier minimal effects findings.

The new studies have created a strong base of research findings that establish that the mass media influence elections in many important ways. Nonetheless, many political scientists continue to belittle media impact because it rarely is the sole cause of observed effects and because they have been disappointed in their search for statistically significant numbers of voting shifts attributable to media messages. They have slighted the significance of impacts on voter attitudes and feelings or on the conduct of campaigns. Even when media effects are statistically negligible, they may be politically significant in a close election or referendum where a small number of votes can change the outcome.

Many scholars also fail to credit media messages with indirect effects. For instance, if the political climate created by media influences turnout, as appears to be the case, and turnout then influences election outcomes, these outcomes deserve to be attributed at least partially to media influence (Abramson et al. 1990). Similarly, stories about the economy or world affairs that are published during an election campaign may influence the interpretation and impact of election news even when these stories say nothing about the election (Graber 1987b).

The predominant theoretical approach to analyzing the impact of media messages on the electorate is agenda-setting. The credit for starting agenda-setting research accrues chiefly to two communications scholars, Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs, who publicized the approach in a 1977 study of North Carolina voters (Shaw and McCombs 1977). However, there are important political science godfathers. They include Bernard Cohen (1963), who pointed out that the mass media are powerful in focusing audience attention on selected topics, even though they may not determine what the audience will think about these topics. Norton Long (1958, 256) ascribed to newspapers "a great part in

determining what most people will be talking about, what most people will think the facts are, and what most people will regard as the way problems are dealt with...to a large extent it sets the civic agenda."

Agenda-setting theorists contend that it is far less likely that attitudes and behaviors will be changed by media messages than that the audience's knowledge base for making decisions will change. When media call attention to selected issues and events -- one of their chief functions -- they affect the audience's priorities of concerns. Researchers should therefore study to what extent media messages change the knowledge and priorities that enter into the audience's decision making or 'prime' audiences to view events in light of the context suggested by prior stories (Iyengar 1991).

Rather than focusing on the effects of mass media in specific contexts, some scholars took a broader view and theorized about their more general social effects. Harold Lasswell, in his pathbreaking essay on "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society" (1969) pointed out that media perform three functions that are of major importance to society. They acquaint audiences with ongoing events as part of their agenda-setting role. They also interpret the meaning of messages, thereby shaping the perspectives from which the world will be viewed. In the process, they also socialize individuals into their cultural settings. These functions suggest three major areas of political communication research: the need to examine what types of political images mass media select for wide dissemination, the importance of assessing the interpretations suggested by mass media stories and, finally, the need to assess the impact of media messages on political socialization. Political scientists have done comparatively little to follow up on these suggestions. Sociologists, psychologists, and communications scholars have helped in filling some of the gaps (Nimmo and Sanders 1981; Swanson and Nimmo 1990).

Aside from theories employed in mass media studies, various persuasion theories and mass society theories have been used to analyze the impact of psychological warfare and propaganda messages (Neuman 1991; Beniger 1986). Many of these studies were sparked by an interest in understanding how Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and other leaders of modern dictatorships had used propaganda to achieve their goals. Wartime concerns about the effects of indoctrination of troops on their performance on the battlefield and in prisoner-of-war camps also spurred numerous investigations.

The theories discussed thus far are in the prevailing objective, positivist vein of current social science research. A set of subjective theories, some of them very critical of current politics, have also come into vogue, particularly in the communication discipline. Adherents of this 'interpretist,' or 'deconstructionist,'

perspective deny that reality exists in the positivist sense. Rather, reality arises from the shared perceptions developed by people who communicate with each other. What matters most from a subjective perspective is how people perceive and conceptualize their world, quite aside from the world depicted through empirical studies. Therefore, communications studies should focus on perceptual elements. For example, instead of studying the text of a message, scholars should investigate how the text is perceived.

When interpretists think in the 'critical' vein, their research turns to the social consequences of communication, especially the role it plays in subordinating various groups in society, such as women and minorities (Hall 1989). Critical theorists look for message constructions that lead to quiescence and submissiveness by mass publics who are then repressed by dominant groups because of their acquiescence (Edelman 1964, 1988). Messages circulating in organizations serve to instill a submissive spirit in the workforce and perpetuate a repressive capitalist system (Putnam and Pacanowski 1983). Elections are viewed as dramatized rituals that legitimate the existing power structure, rather than genuine expressions of the public's wishes (Ginsberg 1986; Nimmo and Combs 1990). Critical researchers believe that scholars should be political activists who advocate changes in communication patterns designed to liberate workers and create a socialist society.

Besides the individual-level theories discussed thus far, the subfield has also made use of group-level and systems-level theories. Since their use has been far more limited, they will be discussed briefly when relevant research is discussed below. Overall, the various theories that pervade the subfield add up to an embarrassment of riches. There is no single trend. As is true of evolving fields, there still are unbridgeable disagreements about many fundamental issues. Theorists disagree about the focus of research and whether it should be predominantly objective or subjective. They advocate an array of perspectives from which political communication should be studied, ranging from research that focuses on individuals, groups, or entire institutions to studies of the total system in which various institutions are embedded.

Research Methods

Methodologically, political communication research is also diverse, ranging from primarily qualitative to primarily quantitative methods. The most widely used research technique for examining political messages is content analysis. The predominant methodology for examining message effects is survey research, although experimental designs are being used with increasing frequency.

Content Analysis

Content analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative. Preferably, it is a mixture of both. Using trained human coders to identify textual elements still is the most common approach, although computer coding is becoming more effective and more widely used. The two methods can also be combined, taking advantage of the strengths of each. When voluminous data sets need to be analyzed, content analysis is a very time consuming, tedious, and costly technique. For this reason, few political scientists have used it, mostly in its simplest forms. Like other research methods, content analysis has several serious deficiencies that impair the validity of its results. For example, different investigators do not ordinarily use uniform coding categories in their studies. Therefore research is not as comparable as would be desirable. Another problem is the significance assigned to high and low frequency of coded items. In general, high frequency of mention is equated with high significance, while rare mention is equated with lack of significance. Yet, in reality, a single message that points to a major political blunder may have far more significant consequences than hundreds of messages indicating satisfactory performance.

The validity of content analyses is also impaired when text is only partially or incompletely examined. For example, in newspaper research, investigators often check only headlines and front pages on the flawed assumption that they reflect all significant stories. Similarly, an entire story is often coded as a single topic even though coding by paragraphs, for example, would show that most stories contain multiple topics. Such restricted approaches to content analysis severely distort the actual content. Content analysis that codes news content fully and pays heed to non-verbal information in televised news is almost non-existent.

Most content analyses deal with denotations of words and phrases and themes, rather than with their connotations. Connotation research has been avoided because all messages are polysemic, conveying multiple meanings to various audiences. Notwithstanding this difficulty, ascertainment of connotational constructions cannot be skirted if scholars want to know what meanings are actually conveyed to particular audiences (Cohen 1989). The possibility of multiple interpretations of messages does not mean that senders cannot convey consensual connotations. It merely means that senders must know how their audiences are likely to interpret messages and tailor them accordingly. Content analysts also should probe the contexts in which messages were received because it affects interpretation. This is rarely done. The consequences can be disastrous.

Coding of audio-visual information has presented major problems in the past because of the richness of pictorial detail offered by television and related media. These problems can be overcome by focusing coding on the meanings conveyed by audio-visuals rather than coding discrete pictorial elements. However, thus far, very few political scientists have tackled audio-visual coding techniques or have included the meanings conveyed by the visual aspects of messages in their analysis of political messages (Sullivan and Masters 1988; Graber 1988). This is a major omission in understanding the important audio-visual political messages conveyed to Americans, particularly in the context of elections. The establishment of archives for audiovisual materials has made them much more readily accessible to researchers. Among the major ones are the archives for television news broadcasts located at Vanderbilt University, the archives for C-SPAN broadcasts at Purdue University, and archives for political commercials at the University of Oklahoma.

Surveys, Interviews, and Experiments

For surveys and interviews designed to assess the impact of various political messages on audiences, both cross-sectional and panel designs have been used. Panel designs are gaining in favor because they are better suited for tracking attitudinal changes over time (Patterson and McClure 1976; Patterson 1980; Miller and Levitin 1976; Nie et al. 1976). Sample sizes have ranged from several thousand respondents interviewed in a single wave or multiple waves, to intensive work done with small panels or even single individuals (Neuman et al. 1992; Gamson 1992).

Survey research designs employed in impact studies have had a number of serious weaknesses. Investigators usually are not able to confirm that their respondents have actually been exposed to the information stimuli whose impact is being tested. In the majority of instances, investigators do not even examine these stimuli in detail and do not ask to what specific messages the respondents have been exposed. Secondly, survey researchers rarely know what information respondents already held prior to exposure to the stimuli under investigation. Hence there is no baseline for measuring message-induced changes in perception and behavior. Researchers rarely ask open-ended questions that allow respondents to report what they have learned from the messages to which they have been exposed and how these messages meld with their own mental states and feelings. Better ways to ascertain meanings that respondents construct from questions and answers are urgently needed, but none seem currently in the offing despite

more careful pretesting, more open-ended questions, and better interviewer training.

While survey research remains the dominant mode for investigating message impact, several other approaches have made inroads. They are based on the idea that understanding message impact requires looking closely at the ways in which individuals process them. Such thinking has led to intensive analyses of small numbers of individuals, using depth interviews of small groups of people, focus groups, and various psychological testing devices (Graber 1988; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Neuman et al. 1992; Gamson 1992; Rosenberg 1988). Among intensive analysis techniques, Q-methodology appears to be particularly well-suited for political communication research. It measures clusters of subjective reactions to information stimuli, based on individual scores rather than on a mean drawn from a large population. The technique enables researchers to detect types of individuals most likely to exhibit particular patterns of reactions to specific messages (Brown 1980; Nimmo and Savage 1976). Interesting results have been obtained also through ethnographic studies, in which researchers observe how people communicate about political matters in natural settings. However, political scientists have largely shunned this approach as too impressionistic.

Political scientists are turning increasingly to purely experimental studies to probe media impact. Mostly such studies have involved exposing small groups of people to carefully selected information stimuli. Investigators have then measured their subjects' retention of the information or assessed attitudes and opinions, or changes in them, generated by the messages (Meadow and Sigelman 1982; Iyengar et al. 1982; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Rosenberg 1988; Neuman et al. 1992). Such research has helped in discovering message and context factors that aid or deter learning. It has shown that cognitive skills and high interest in messages contribute significantly to effective information processing although, at best, much information fails to be internalized and all is reshaped to fit into each individual's thinking structures. It has also disclosed the prevalence of priming and framing phenomena whereby prior messages or associations suggested by messages become potent interpretation contexts (Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991).

The principal advantage of experimental studies is the researcher's ability to control the stimuli to which research subjects are exposed. These controls avoid the stimulus adulteration that occurs in natural settings where many stimuli are present and interact with political messages. The chief problem posed by experimental research is the fact that the context is artificial. Message impact may be quite different in controlled laboratory settings than in natural situations. Experimental studies

and small group intensive research both run the risk of being unrepresentative of external realities. Their findings cannot be attributed to larger populations without further testing. Nonetheless, they represent attractive, low-cost alternatives to large-scale surveys. If successful, they often serve as pilots that pretest hypotheses for studies done on a larger scale. Findings from experimental research and depth interviews may also broaden the insights gained from larger surveys and fill gaps. For example, extensive probing of the thinking behind a respondent's answers to survey questions, which is possible in small-scale research, can help in interpreting survey responses. A combination of these complementary research approaches is therefore ideal, though expensive.

Investigation of political symbolism has relied on yet another set of research tools, most of them qualitative. They include dramaturgical analysis and fantasy theme analysis, which involves exploring the dramatic and fantastic themes in political life, and hermeneutics, which is the study of the verbal construction of social meanings. They also include ethnomethodology, which is the study of explanations people give about their daily experiences, and symbolic interactionism, which assesses how people use symbols to communicate with one another. Nimmo and Combs (1990), for example, have used a dramatist perspective to examine election communication. Elections were conceptualized as dramatic rituals played for the audience of prospective voters to show the protagonists locked in a heroic struggle. Audiences perceive these rhetorical visions as reality and gear their expectations of future performance to these visions.

Advances in the techniques for cross-cultural and comparative studies are also shedding important new light on communication processes (Blumler and Gurevitch 1988). Election messages and depictions of public officials have been compared in various countries (Hallin and Mancini 1984; Semetko et al. 1991). They have cast the spotlight on variations in different countries in the discretion enjoyed by journalists in setting the daily news agenda. They have also revealed the impact of differences in party structure and media organization on stories about candidates and elections. Using television news as the media stimulus, Tamar Liebes (1992) compared coverage of the Intifada and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israel television. She concluded that journalists in both countries sanitized the activities of their own military while demonizing the enemy's activities.

Is there anything new on the methodological horizon? The answer seems to be that the basic research approaches used in recent decades will remain intact, but that they will continue to undergo constant refinement. As has happened in the past, new statistical analysis procedures, such as Probit, Logit and Lisrel analysis, will

bloom and fade, as will survey and interview techniques in message effect studies. Electronic monitoring devices and computer simulations are likely to grow in importance in research into brain functions. Human coders of political messages will be increasingly replaced by computers which can now be programmed to detect words and their synonyms as well as contextual and network patterns that determine the meanings that the words convey. There will be more research that employs a multiplicity of methods in data gathering and analysis, part of it borrowed from other disciplines and subdisciplines. Currently loosely defined concepts, such as 'attention' to messages, will undergo clarification. However, giant methodological leaps will probably remain in the realm of wishful thinking.

As future research progresses, new paths of inquiry that have not been pursued in the past should be explored along with retesting old findings to ascertain their validity under changing technological and political conditions (Ahramson et al. 1988). For example, the opportunities for narrowcasting created through cable television and satellite technology may fracture mass consensus on many political issues and may herald changes in media message effects that need to be investigated (Neuman 1991). Future research should encompass a better melding of quantitative and qualitative research methods, more interdisciplinary cooperation, and more attention to both micro-level and macro-level effects of political messages.

We are now ready to turn to political communication research targets and findings.

What Is the Message?

Political messages are a crucial aspect of politics because the bulk of politically relevant information is conveyed through messages about happenings, rather than through direct experiences. Things that occurred in the past and projections of future events are only available through indirect messages (Boulding 1956). As Kenneth Burke (1966, 5) has noted, most of our reality is verbally created. "And however important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand, the whole overall 'picture' is but a construct of our symbol system." For abstractions like 'democracy' or 'justice,' and a large number of political phenomena, there is no empirical referent. Understanding depends completely on verbal symbols that lack extra-verbal reality. This is true of a large number of political phenomena.

The kind of information that one gains from politically relevant messages provides guidelines to politicians and private citizens about the current state of politics and about the kinds of messages that achieve

particular political objectives, if the time and audience are suitable. Leaders may gain or lose office and power depending on their oratorical skills, including their ability to classify political phenomena. Freedom fighters' halos may tarnish when they are dubbed 'terrorists.' When opposition to the state is called 'treason' it is treated differently than when it bears the label 'civil disobedience.' All sorts of helpful conceptual linkages can be constructed when it becomes important to legitimate actions. For example, government-sponsored job creation may fare differently in the political arena depending on whether it is linked to morality, to overall economic health, to psychological welfare, to partisan fortunes, or to other causes. Mass audiences may be informed or misled, empowered or subjugated in the wake of the images that have been created (Corcoran 1990).

The Scope of Content Studies

The list of renowned humanists and social and behavioral scientists who have examined the impact of verbal pronouncements on politics is long. It includes Harold Lasswell and associates who authored *The Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics* (1965), Edward Sapir who wrote about *Culture, Language and Personality* (1962), and Kenneth Burke who described *Language as Symbolic Action* (1966). It also includes Ernst Cassirer who wrote *Language and Myth* (1946), Alfred North Whitehead who studied *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (1958), and Susanne Langer's thoughts expressed in *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Sociology of Reason, Rite, and Art* (1951). Other members of the club are Kenneth Boulding who wrote about *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (1956), and Murray Edelman who interpreted political reality, as expressed through political symbols in his widely cited book on *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1964).

In the wake of political culture changes in the United States, there has been a great deal of interest in verbally and visually created images of selected politically disadvantaged groups, such as American blacks, or urban squatters, or women (Entman 1992; Van Dijk 1988). Images of social phenomena, like poverty or terrorism, have also received attention (Van Dijk 1988; Alali and Elke 1991). Some scholars have undertaken comparative studies of images. For instance, media images of the Soviet Union and Soviet leaders in the American press have been compared to media images of the United States and its leaders in the Soviet press (Dennis et al. 1991). Students of political linguistics have investigated what meanings the various images conveyed to the audience and to the stereotyped group.

In recent years most content research has focused on political messages relating to real-world

political events in mass media stories. However, the focus is expanding so that more scholars now study messages from the realm of entertainment, including fictional movies, situation comedies, and docudramas (Lichter et al. 1991; Parenti 1992). Much of this work seeks to identify how various groups in society, such as business people, or physicians, or unionized workers are depicted. It also tries to discern the ideological perspectives underlying fictional presentations. Frequently, the conclusion is that media perpetuate the status quo by implicitly and explicitly depicting it as legitimate and desirable and by ignoring other possible scenarios (Manheim 1991; Morley 1990). Alternatively, the conclusion has been that the media endanger the status quo by allowing the non-traditional, often left-wing preferences of media personnel to color their presentations (Lichter et al. 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988). Sociologists, psychologists, and communications scholars have led the way in exploring the content of visual and verbal messages about deviant behaviors and have speculated about the consequences.

Up to now, most image research has remained largely descriptive. There have been few systematic attempts to discern what features are routinely depicted when disadvantaged groups or political leaders, or political phenomena, are discussed and what features are omitted and what political consequences ensue. Scholars have devoted little attention to determining the usefulness of various types of information for making political decisions. For example, we do not know very well whether the kinds of qualities that are stressed for various political leaders are genuinely relevant to understanding the leader's character and performance. More systematic understanding of the information needed to assess politicians during their candidacies and their incumbencies might lead to improvements in their publicized images, a more adequate information supply and improvements in government.

Similarly, American political scientists have rarely examined the reality images that politicians try to convey. Historians, rhetoricians, and communications scholars have done most of this work with a slight assist from political scientists (Edelman 1964; Entman 1989; Bennett 1988; Rothman 1992). In sociology, ethnomethodologists have studied news as a mode of reality construction (Tuchman 1978). They have examined the ideological slants of that reality. Political scientists have not followed in their footsteps, aside from general statements about political orientations and an occasional study of the slant of coverage of a particular event, such as the Watergate affair (Lang and Lang 1983).

Drawing Inferences from Content

Political scientists and other social scientists have made numerous systematic attempts to draw helpful inferences from political messages. For example, the content of political messages has been used to ascertain the values and mores embedded in the social context in which the message has been disseminated (Bennett and Edelman 1985; Paletz and Guthrie 1987). In the 1950s and 1960s, a group of prominent social scientists collaborated in what came to be known as the Hoover Institution's RADIR studies. The initials stand for *Revolution And Development of International Relations*. The studies rested on the assumption that the knowledge and value structures and priorities prevalent in various nations could be inferred from the images disseminated through their mass media. If these mental environments were known, one could forecast future political developments in these nations (Lasswell et al. 1952; Pool 1952, 1959). Although there are many cautions, presumably "the sequence of movements in history can be conveniently read by scanning the dominant symbols of successive periods" (Lasswell et al. 1952, 505).

The RADIR scholars examined mass media output from five countries over a sixty-year period. They checked 25,000 editorials in prestige newspapers in France, Germany, England, Russia (and the successor Soviet Union) and the United States between 1890 and 1950. They found 416 distinctive verbal symbols relating to the status of the society and therefore deemed worthy of tracing. On the basis of this massive body of evidence, the RADIR group concluded that there were considerable differences among countries and time periods in the nature and frequency of the use of political symbols. Totalitarian societies, for example, concentrated on a much smaller array of symbols than their democratic counterparts.

Karl Deutsch (1957, 1967) thought that it would be possible to trace cohesiveness and value sharing among nations through an analysis of their communication flows and an analysis of mass media and elite images (Deutsch 1957, 1967). He and Richard Merritt analyzed the impact of unfavorable publicity on national images (Deutsch and Merritt 1965). Follow-up on this type of work has been meager. Moreover, most later studies have been largely descriptive without any attempt to analyze the political inferences that might be drawn from verbal images (Adams 1981, 1982).

Studies of message content can also be used to provide data from which psychologically oriented social scientists can infer the psychological characteristics, beliefs, motivations and strategies of political leaders (DeMause 1986; Robinson and Levy 1986; Winter and Carlson 1988). Even when the psychological

characteristics remain obscure, valuable inferences can be drawn about power configurations by knowing which political personalities are cited and in what connections their messages are reported. Public figures whose messages are widely quoted are often able to determine the labels and classifications of people and phenomena in their political environment. This greatly enhances their political influence because names and classifications may determine how people and phenomena will be treated.

Strategic Uses of Communication

Election Campaigns

The forms that political messages take hinge on their strategic goals and the political contexts in which they must circulate. Researchers have paid most attention to strategies used in the electoral context. Campaign messages have been examined mostly at the presidential level, but studies of congressional campaigns are increasing. The pickings have been slim when one dips below that level to state campaigns, even at the gubernatorial level, and to local campaigns, including mayoral races (Goldenberg and Traugott 1984, 1987; Vermeer 1982, 1987; Graber 1983). Because this has been such an active research area, substantial progress has been made and is continuing. Since later studies often refine earlier ones, the current body of knowledge remains in flux (Arterton 1978; Robinson 1981, 1987; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Patterson 1980; Nie et al. 1976; Nimmo and Combs 1990; Nimmo and Savage 1976; A. Miller et al. 1985; Ranney 1983; Nimmo 1981; Adams 1983; Graber 1986).

Political scientists have been especially interested in the substance and frequency of messages about political candidates, deeming them crucial to a candidate's electoral success or failure. However, the precise role played by media-created images seems to vary depending on the contexts in which elections take place. As Bartels (1988) has noted, contrary to classic public choice theory, elections are dynamic situations where individual preferences often change, making collective decisions unpredictable. Researchers concur that winner and loser images are very important because the American public loves winners; but no magic formulae for constructing successful candidate images have as yet been discovered (Orren and Polsby 1987). The concern about winning and losing has focused a large portion of election coverage on horse race aspects of the election. Prophecies about winning and losing become important factors in the contest because they are often self-fulfilling. Similarly, news stories create expectations so that subsequent events are then judged in light of these expectations. A candidate who does better than expected wins more approbation

than a rival who obtained more votes or more favorable ratings in public opinion polls, but did not exceed expectations.

Content analyses have revealed the major characteristics of the news supply available to the public for voting decisions. Stories about candidate qualities and qualifications are more prevalent than stories about the candidates' stands on issues. In presidential campaigns, the balance has hovered around two to one. In general, news stories depict only a limited number of the personal and professional attributes of candidates. Personal qualities, such as trustworthiness, strength of character, leadership abilities, and compassion are stressed most (Patterson 1980; Weaver et al. 1981; Graber 1986; Robinson and Sheehan 1983).

Messages about issues are generally superficial. They focus on current problems and avoid discussions of complexities. Genuinely significant points that bear on the candidates' ability to govern are often sacrificed to the desire to tell interesting tales. This is why news people try to frame most issues as conflicts among the candidates. Television stories emphasize issues for which good pictures are available.

Few political scientists have investigated coverage of specific issues during election campaigns, such as the dealings of the United States with Iran or the formulation of energy policy. Their analyses routinely point to major deficiencies that impair public understanding of the issue in question (Sahr 1983). Scholars who have scrutinized political debates, particularly during presidential election years, have bemoaned the time and format constraints that prevent adequate issue discussions during these events. Nonetheless, most researchers agree that the debates attract large audiences and therefore serve as an important last minute rehearsal for voters, particularly undecided ones, who need help in reviewing the campaign (Kraus 1988; Jamieson 1990). Debate studies have been most prominent at the presidential level, with most studies limited to post-Labor Day debates. The limitation is unfortunate because it seems likely that pre-Labor Day debates may have a greater impact because they occur before voter opinions have hardened. It would also be useful to study debates at the subnational level and comparatively in American and foreign contexts.

When questions arose about the impact of political advertising, numerous researchers turned their attention to this long neglected array of messages (Devlin 1989; Diamond and Bates 1988; Jamieson 1992). Advertising content has been examined, with particular emphasis on the balance between issues and images and on the messages conveyed by visual images. Issue content in longer advertisements often has been quite high compared to issue content of television news stories.

Political commercials also appear to be an important source of information for disinterested, poorly informed voters (Owen 1991; Kaid et al. 1985). Nesbit (1988) has noted the importance of a candidate's video style, which is a combination of verbal and nonverbal content of visuals and film and video production techniques. Apparently, incumbents and challengers employ different video styles in their attempts to sway voters, as do male and female candidates. Challengers, for example, often need to be more aggressive, striving for a 'fighter' image, to overcome the advantages of incumbency. What matters most is the lasting image created by the candidate's video performance, rather than the specific information conveyed to the audience. The position of candidates in relation to the camera and candidate facial expressions have been especially closely scrutinized (Masters and Sullivan 1989; Kepplinger 1990).

Public Information Campaigns

Besides election campaigns, messages in several other types of politically important campaigns have also been studied. Scholars of comparative government have considered information campaigns in developing countries essential for rapid development (Pye 1963; Pool 1963). In the 1960s, these scholars believed that major political processes such as political socialization, and political participation and free circulation of information throughout the country all hinged on the nature and quality of the country's political communication system. If information flowed properly and generated adequate feedback, political systems could be steered towards growth and development. Characteristics of sound information flows included clear and timely messages about internal as well as external happenings, encoded in ways that were comprehensible to intended recipients. Daniel Lerner (1958), for example, studied mass communication in the Middle East believing it taught people how to empathize with and adopt new lifestyles. Gabriel Almond (1960, 46) considered political communication the "crucial boundary maintenance function" because all political functions are performed through communication.

But, as with other effects, it soon became clear that media effects were much more elusive than had been anticipated because they hinged on a variety of contextual factors. Although development scholars were ultimately disappointed about the efficacy of communication to produce rapid growth, interest in campaigns to improve the life of mass publics has continued. In recent decades, it has been largely directed to public health issues. AIDS, population control, anti-smoking, anti-alcohol, and drug campaigns are examples. Typically, messages constructed for such campaigns try to persuade target publics to adopt behaviors that will lessen risks. Behavioral changes

advocated in the messages range from simple steps recommended in a no-littering and Smokey-the-Bear fire prevention campaign, to very difficult behavior modifications required in anti-smoking or AIDS prevention campaigns. Objectives range from composing messages that will arouse the attention of target audiences to behavior-reinforcing messages that are needed after the suggested behavior has been adopted.

Success rates have run the gamut from nearly complete success to nearly total failure. The quality of the campaigns, the receptiveness of the audience, and the ability to get at the root of the problem have been important determinants in the outcome. Knowledgeable audience members are more likely to learn campaign messages than people who lack information into which these messages can be incorporated. Consequently, as 'knowledge-gap' theories predict, the knowledge-rich are likely to become richer while the knowledge-poor fall further behind (Tichenor et al. 1980). Given the importance of such campaigns to public welfare, increased research attention is likely so that factors that produce campaign successes can be more fully understood (Rice and Atkins 1989).

In the decades surrounding World Wars I and II, persuasive messages, including propaganda and psychological warfare messages, were widely studied. The landmark work on government-sponsored propaganda in totalitarian societies is a three-volume collection edited by Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier in 1980. It provides a historical account of worldwide propaganda activities. Wartime analysis of the content of German radio news is also an important example (George 1959). The U.S. government commissioned such research to infer conditions inside Germany from the thrust of the propaganda messages. Postwar analysis confirmed 85% of the inferences. Later studies have focused primarily on Soviet, Nazi, and Chinese propaganda (Liu 1971; Zeman 1973). Psychological warfare and brainwashing have been studied largely by psychologists. Jay Lifton, for example, examined mental manipulations in China and Fagen did the same thing with respect to Cuba (Lifton 1963; Fagen 1969). There has been a lull in that kind of academic research. However, in the wake of the many controversies about political advertising, interest in persuasive communications appears to be rising again (O'Keefe 1990; Kern 1989; Jamieson 1992).

The Art of Wheeling and Dealing

While it would seem to be exceedingly important for political leaders at all levels of government to know how to structure their messages effectively, the political science community has given relatively little guidance. Scholars have been reluctant to research this matter, fearing accusations of fostering misleading propaganda

and mind manipulation and even brainwashing to control audiences. That specter has been raised repeatedly, exposing how ill-defined the boundary lines are between ethical and unethical uses of persuasive messages in political discourse (Edelman 1971; Parenti 1986).

William Riker (1983) has recommended political science research of 'heresthetics,' – the manipulation of the structure of preferences and alternatives within which decisions are made. Politicians should try to construct suitable environmental contexts for political negotiations and bargaining that will strengthen one contender and weaken the opposition. This is not the same as political rhetoric which seeks to persuade through its own force. Studies that deal with the message environment that is involved in deterrence policies belong to this genre. Creating an impression of invincibility or impending doom for the opponent can lead to major political victories (Jervis et al. 1985).

In the same vein, a few political scientists and economists have used game theory concepts to analyze political negotiations (Schelling 1968; Corsi 1981; Druckman and Harris 1990). Some have examined the ways in which agendas are prepared during negotiations and how initial arguments structure subsequent discourse (Ikle 1964; Welton et al. 1988). Comparisons have been made between what was said and how it was said and what could possibly have been said but was omitted. Since excuses and justifications require important strategic considerations in public discourse, blame avoidance strategies have garnered attention (McGraw 1990, 1991). Much more needs to be done.

Research on the role of language strategies in more general political wheeling and dealing has been sparse. The effectiveness of messages has been studied, but usually in a general, rather than a strategic, context. Information flow studies, for example, have stressed the need for timeliness, clarity, completeness, and accuracy in message construction so that the senders' intentions are correctly transmitted to receivers at the appropriate time (Deutsch 1966; Wilensky 1966). Opportunities to misunderstand and be misunderstood are legion in a society where the contexts in which messages are framed and received vary greatly and may be in constant flux. Congressional hearings during the Reagan administration exposed many instances of incomplete, inaccurate, and unreliable foreign affairs information circulating at the highest levels of government.

Analysis of communication flows during political encounters, such as legislative sessions or executive branch deliberations, could reveal under what circumstances information is likely to be withheld or misinformation circulated for strategic purposes. During the Reagan presidency, for example, National Security Council personnel withheld information from the

president about diversion of proceeds from arms sales to Iran to Nicaragua's anti-communist rebels. Similarly, Congress was kept uninformed and misled by false testimony. Important documents were shredded so that they would be unavailable once an investigation had gotten under way. Structural reforms to minimize such occurrences depend on greater insights into past problem situations (Knocke and Kuklinski 1987; Kessel 1983, 1984).

Politicians' Rhetoric

Turning to more ordinary circumstances, there has been a moderate degree of interest in analyzing the rhetoric of political executives, primarily at the presidential level (Hart 1984; Tulis 1987; Edelman 1988; Jamieson 1988). It has been based on the assumption that presidential messages are potent political stimuli because they emanate from the top official of the country. The power or lack of power of the message sender thus transfuses to the message. One needs to know the senders' political role and orientations to accurately interpret message meanings.

A number of scholars have focused on the use of presidential rhetoric as a political tool to overcome congressional opposition (Kernell 1993; Tulis 1987). Instead of trying to negotiate with congressional leaders, as was past practice, presidents appeal to the country by 'going public' via the electronic media. If the president is popular, the public is likely to rally around him, making it difficult for the Congress to deny approval. Even before presidents go public, the possibility of such action may persuade members of Congress to succumb to presidential wishes (Edwards 1983; Foote 1988; Graber 1982; Simon and Ostrom 1989).

Far less attention has been given to the rhetoric of politicians below the presidency. Internal communications in public sector agencies have rarely been examined (Graber 1992b). Herbert Kaufman's (1967) study of the U.S. Forest Service, which describes how communication policies helped to create high morale among agency personnel, is a welcome exception. The role played by governmental public relations personnel in spreading the government's messages via mass media has also been given some attention. A study by Stephen Hess (1984) described how government press officers within the United States national government operate when they prepare messages for press use. Martin Linsky (1986) has reported a series of cases in which policies were aided or hampered by public relations efforts. Manheim and Albritton (1984) investigated how effectively foreign governments used public relations firms to change media coverage in desired ways. These studies break new ground but much more needs to be done to fully

investigate and assess how honestly and effectively governments use media to foster governmental purposes.

The data about influence patterns reflected in media coverage have remained hazy because it is often difficult to identify the sources of unattributed messages. Scholars have largely failed to establish which officials are frequent sources of news stories, and how much control such sources have over the substance and slant of news. Success rates in gaining support and cooperation from journalists seem to vary widely, depending on factors such as the power of the source desiring access, the journalistic appeal of the story, and competing claims for news coverage. Story significance and the source's need to have it covered are lesser considerations (Goldenberg 1975; Protesse et al. 1991).

Political scientists disagree about whether media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or left side of the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and Stanley Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading news media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding kindred views. Scholars like Lance Bennett (1988), Michael Parenti (1986), and Benjamin Ginsberg (1986), to name but a few, consider media to be the minions of big business and right-wing politicians. They fault the media for using news selection to strengthen white middle class values and suppress competing left-wing views. Some critics, such as Michael Parenti (1986, 1992) and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) contend that these choices are made deliberately to perpetuate capitalist exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological preferences of media owners. They also claim that the media have intentionally suppressed facts about dangerous products and technologies to protect the profits of large corporations (Cirino 1972; Schiller 1973). Still other scholars see the media as apostles of the status quo, reflecting the views of the political establishment. As proof, they cite the fact that government officials are the predominant sources interviewed by journalists and that media, while critical of specific policies and politicians, rarely challenge the main principles that undergird American political institutions (Sigal 1983; Bennett 1988; Entman 1989; Bagdikian 1990).

Charges have been plentiful that messages transmitted in the political arena are biased. Numerous scholars have therefore tried to identify bias, particularly in the election context (Hofstetter 1976, 1978; Kressell 1987; Sorauf 1987). These efforts have been hampered because there is no agreed-upon definition of bias or standards for spotting it. Various imbalances in mass media coverage that may constitute bias have been documented, such as uneven coverage of various candidates and selective treatment of issues. They seem to result predominantly from normal news production

factors, rather than from deliberate, politically motivated behavior. Nonetheless, they can have a profound impact on electoral fortunes. More bias research seems therefore desirable. But it cannot be done successfully without developing reliable, widely accepted, measures to identify bias.

Underlying the vigorous debate about the ideological thrust of media messages is the assumption that these messages color the ideological thrust of political life (Bennett 1988; Entman 1989; Edelman 1988). This is an interesting and important assumption. However, little has been done by political communication scholars to flesh out the bare theoretical bones and demonstrate the extent of news story influence on the ideological orientations of leaders and mass publics.

Transmission Networks and Modes

Information Flows

Rather than looking at the content of messages, a number of scholars have looked at the passage of information through political systems to discern where messages originate, how they travel through networks of receivers and are transformed during their passage through the system, and how they are ultimately received and lead to decisions. Karl Deutsch's pathbreaking study of *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (1966) remains the prime example. Initially, the study of communication flows was used most widely by scholars of comparative government who were interested in factors that might influence political and economic development of the many newly independent nations that were emerging in the 1960s (Easton 1965; Fagen 1966; Pye 1963). When interest in these studies flagged in the face of disappointingly slow political and economic growth in the Third World, and dwindling foundation support for this type of research, communication system analysis by political scientists withered.

The earlier studies of information flows through internal and external networks show that the configuration of transmission channels is very significant. Messages cannot reach their destination if communication channels are unavailable or if they lack the capacity to handle the flow of essential messages. Systems must be able to access organizational memories and to avoid distortions that result when messages are filtered through 'screens' of various prejudices and preferences of the message receivers. The limits in the capacity of channels often become acutely apparent during political crises, such as wars or revolutions or major natural or manmade

disasters. Overload problems are compounded by the fact that few organizations have developed satisfactory ways for screening incoming messages so that information that deserves priority can be identified and channeled accordingly.

Studies of communication networks have shown that the paths that formal and informal messages take have crucial political consequences (Hecl 1977; Kessel 1983, 1984; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Knoke and Kuklinski 1987). Routing decisions often hinge on communication technologies. For example, congressional communications patterns have been altered by the computer revolution (Frantzich 1982). Generally speaking, people who are at the hub of communications in a political unit and receive comparatively large amounts of information are, or become, the formal or informal leaders of the political unit. If important information fails to reach them, their decisions suffer. People who are not connected to the networks through which essential information flows may be unable to participate effectively in decision making. If units within political systems are improperly connected, messages may miss their appropriate targets. This has been a serious problem in impoverished societies where outlying areas often are not adequately connected to communication hubs where most of the political decisions are made.

Channels of communication may vary in the numbers of people that they connect and in the character of the information flow that they carry. Official channels are often supplemented by a network of unofficial channels that may carry substantive official information, unofficial leaks, as well as gossip. From a democratic perspective, one of the most serious problems in even the most democratic societies is the scarcity of channels through which citizens can communicate with public officials. Disadvantaged groups in particular often find it difficult to route their concerns appropriately so that they receive consideration. Voting usually serves as the only publicly provided avenue through which all groups of the citizenry can send a message to officials. But, except for referenda, elections are a poor channel to voice specific concerns and complaints.

Mass Media Modes

The bulk of political messages that have been described or analyzed have been transmitted in a verbal, visual, or oral mode. Non-verbal messages, such as the emotions conveyed through architectural symbols, like imposing public buildings and interior settings, have been largely ignored, with a few notable exceptions (Goodsell 1988; Ferguson and Ferguson 1988). Communications scholars have paid far more attention to message differences related to the characteristics of various modes

of message transmission, focusing most heavily on comparisons of audio-visual messages with printed messages (Neuman et al. 1992).

Characteristically, political scientists have examined this facet of communication studies mostly in the electoral context (Schram 1987; McCubbins 1992). They have found that television and newspapers cover similar arrays of topics but vary in the transmission of intellectual and emotional content. The brevity of television stories necessitates condensing and simplifying story texts. Pictures, which are often loaded with emotional stimuli, supplement and reinforce the brief verbal messages. To conserve time, television newscasters usually create stereotypical images of candidates during the early campaign stages. Later stories are then tailored to these stereotypes (Robinson and Sheehan 1983). When the stereotypes misrepresent reality or when candidates have changed their policy stands, this can create serious problems (Arterton 1984). A few political scientists have focused their research on the impact of the candidates' facial expressions (Lanzetta et al. 1985; Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987; Rosenberg et al. 1986; Kepplinger 1990). More general studies of audio-visual aspects of information transmission -- such as analysis of the content of visual messages, and assessments of the quality of comprehension and recall -- have been rare (Graber 1988, 1990; Neuman et al. 1992).

Information Processing Channels

How do individuals accept and process information to extract meanings from the flood of messages that reach them? This intriguing question has inspired much research into information processing in the 1980s and 1990s (Kraus and Perloff 1985; Lau and Sears 1986; Graber 1988; Sniderman et al. 1991; Piazza et al. 1989). The desire to model the basic cognitive processes through which information is channeled, processed, and used by the human brain is a natural outgrowth of findings that message stimuli are not absorbed unchanged by audiences. Instead, the relationship is transactional. Audiences interpret incoming information in line with their own cognitions and feelings. The outcome is a multiplicity of perceptions springing from the same stimulus. The precise impact of messages depends on whether receivers have relevant mental schemata stored in memory and on the fit between incoming message images and these schemata (Graber 1988; Miller et al. 1985; Lau and Sears 1986; Fiske and Kinder 1981; Conover and Feldman 1986, 1989; Hamill and Lodge 1986, Lodge et al. 1991).

Research suggests that processing varies depending on the type of information and on a multitude of audience factors. The latter include cultural variables,

context variables, personality variables, as well as the processors' political memories, political sophistication, and interest in politics. Because multiple interacting audience variables must be considered, information processing needs to be studied in a variety of contexts. Nonetheless, election messages have continued to be the primary research focus. Researchers have been interested in information processing differences among people of differing partisan orientations and sophistication. They have studied how people pare down information that is of interest to them so that it can be managed more readily and how they incorporate it into their thought processes. Scholars have also examined the inferences drawn from this type of information (Conover and Feldman 1986).

While little progress has been made in measuring information processing directly, various experiments and computer simulations are shedding light on how the human brain functions (Piazza et al. 1989; Boynton and Lodge n.d.). For example, Milton Lodge tested political decision making in the laboratory with human subjects while G.R. Boynton simulated the identical situation through a computer program. The comparison of computer decisions with human decisions was designed to assess the extent to which man and machine thinking processes use similar stepwise progressions and produce similar results.

The Scope of Message Effects

Election Messages

The study of political communication is based on the premise that political messages have some kinds of political effects, on ordinary citizens, on political elites and, at the systems level, on general operations and policies. It remains arguable, however, what precisely these effects are under a variety of circumstances. As Bernard Berelson commented somewhat ambiguously (1948, 192), "Some kinds of communications on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects." Researchers have found it difficult to isolate message effects from other influences with which they are intertwined. It has been particularly troublesome to distinguish the impact of messages about events from the impact of these events themselves.

Again, as throughout political communication studies, elections have received most attention in the study of communication effects, with a focus on the perceptions and attitudes of individual voters, and, most importantly, their electoral choices. Judging from the vast share of research resources devoted to the field, one might expect that a firm body of knowledge has been

created. Not so. While much has been learned, major debates continue about fundamental issues. The scope of information on which average voters base their voting decisions in presidential elections is one example (Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990). Some scholars have concluded that American voters, thanks to mass media messages, have acquired a steadily expanding base of knowledge for voting decisions (Nie et al. 1976; Popkin 1991). Others claim that voters cast uninformed votes and that political sophistication continues to be low (Keeter and Zukin 1983; Smith 1989).

Studies of television, newspaper, and news magazine coverage of recent presidential elections show that the information supplied by the major media is inadequate for the kind of rational decision making that democratic theorists favor. The bulk of the news deals with candidate qualities so that voters often find it difficult to base their vote on adequate issue information. As mentioned, presidential debates ease the situation only slightly, because the format allows only cursory discussion. Voters also find it difficult to compare contenders because news stories cover various traits and competencies unevenly across the field of candidates. Moreover, the information reaching voters usually comes from multiple sources and therefore presents contradictory information about individual candidates. Adherence to journalistic criteria of objectivity prevents journalists from making explicit value judgments in ordinary news stories. Accordingly, audiences are deprived of guidelines for judging contradictory messages.

Extensive publication of public opinion polls muddies the informational waters even further. The fact that published poll data seem definitive because they carry precise numbers misleads audiences into believing that they represent an established situation, rather than a time-bound glimpse. When that happens, a bandwagon effect may set in so that putative winners gain support at the expense of putative losers. It is uncertain to what extent this effect is offset by a 'sympathy' effect that favors the underdog (Tannenbaum and Kostrich 1983). Political scientists have also speculated that negative messages about politicians contribute to the rising political cynicism of the American public. However, this remains speculation. Negative portrayals of political candidates have been blamed for making it increasingly difficult for public officials to govern with public support after elections and to win a second term in office (Ranney 1983; Semetko et al. 1991). Again, more research is needed to establish this as a firm scientific datum, rather than an incompletely tested hypothesis.

Most scholars would agree with Dan Nimmo's conclusion (1981, 257), "In sum, the verdict concerning the part played by the mass media in relation to individuals' voting behavior is that they are influential

informers and impotent persuaders. Just what aspects of mass communication inform — or persuade, however, is not clear." The impact of election messages apparently hinges on many factors, including the substance of the message, the appropriateness of its forms, the setting in which it occurs, and the voters' receptivity. Nimmo's conclusion runs counter to the claims made by public relations professionals that voters are highly susceptible to media persuasion, even with respect to election commercials. Such claims receive only mixed support. Richard Joslyn (1984) contends that exposure to political commercials can actually produce voting defections, but other scholars disagree (Meadow and Sigelman 1982).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, interest in the effects of negative advertising mounted, sparked by criticism of such advertising in presidential elections (Kern 1989; Kaid et al. 1986; Jamieson 1992). Research was also stimulated by candidates and their handlers eager to know the impact of such advertising. There has been concern that advertising messages constitute powerful priming that shapes the political climate and guides the thinking and feeling that goes into the audience's decision making. The specter of Orwellian manipulation looms, but the verdict is still pending, because some scholars have found a backlash against negative advertising and its partisan sponsors (Arterton 1992; Garramone et al. 1990). It is also questionable how much information can be conveyed through the extremely brief messages squeezed into thirty-second commercials (Just et al. 1990). The knowledge that people are active rather than passive message receivers who construct their own meanings from messages, and that there are ways to immunize publics against persuasive messages, may give further comfort (Pfau and Burgoon 1988).

Political Learning and Socialization

Learning

Aside from studies of the effects of election messages on individuals, research on other individual-level impacts has been rather sparse. It is particularly surprising that there has been relatively little research on the extent and substance of factual knowledge that individuals garner from mass media messages and political events, and on the impact of various types of political messages on political socialization and resocialization.

Several studies have examined learning variations springing from differences in message transmission modes, such as the use of audiovisuals compared to the use of printed text (Robinson and Levy 1986; Neuman 1991). Other studies have sought to dissect the learning process on a single medium that contains multiple

coordinated or uncoordinated information stimuli (Tiemens et al. 1988). Television, for example, often combines visual images with non-verbal and spoken sounds, and written messages that may be disparate or even inconsistent. Studies that try to determine the interaction effects of such complex stimuli are still in their infancy. Studying what and how people learn from audio-visual messages is especially important in an age when exposure to visual media constitutes the most common form of contact with political information (Rosenberg et al. 1986; Keeter 1987; Graber 1988).

'Priming' and framing effects have also been investigated. Priming studies try to determine to what extent concepts to which a respondent has been alerted through prior information influence judgments about subsequently received information. The effects appear to be profound (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). For example, evaluations of presidents vary substantially depending on whether the preceding discussion has touched on successful or unsuccessful policies. If this is so, concern about the priming effects of political advertising may be well justified. Framing effects can be powerful as well. News framed as a series of discrete events, rather than a cohesive pattern, fails to suggest that someone is responsible for these events. For example, when homelessness is framed as a series of stories about individual cases, government responsibility for the problem does not become readily apparent. Television news, which routinely uses such an episodic format, thus discourages people from holding public officials responsible for political conditions (Iyengar 1991).

Does attention arousal and subsequent processing of information vary when message content stirs emotions or elicits empathy or presents conflict and violence? Observers have been concerned that such cues may steer people away from rational judgments during important political activities such as voting and during times of serious national and international conflicts. Thus far, the impact of non-rational appeals on thinking and behavior has remained controversial (Morello 1988; Rapport and Alexander 1989).

Public Opinion Development

Individual learning and opinion formation lay the groundwork for the development of publicly shared opinions. The role played by political messages in this process remains of continuing interest. Scholars are still seeking answers to basic questions about the triggering mechanisms that arouse widespread attention to particular issues, produce stereotyped images and lead to mass opinion trends (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page et al. 1987; Page and Shapiro 1991; Zaller 1992). Public opinion polling has also been examined as an opinion-shaping

force, not only as a device to measure opinions. Researchers now realize that the focus of poll questions and the way they are asked can shape respondents' thinking by pinpointing particular perspectives and facets of the issue in question (Ratzan 1989). When polls are subsequently publicized, the same opinion-shaping forces that affect poll respondents' answers, ripple out to the public. The effects may even be enhanced because views gain legitimacy when they seem to be widely shared. This is the reverse side of the 'spiral of silence' phenomenon that Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1984) has documented by showing that people keep silent when they think that their views are unpopular. Widespread silence then condemns these messages to neglect and even scorn.

Socialization

Political socialization involves communicating societal traditions, values, and beliefs to people at various phases of the life cycle so that they can function appropriately as citizens of their society. Study of communication factors in political socialization has many facets, ranging from scrutiny of classroom texts and mass media content to studying the work of public information agencies and propaganda ministries. Some of this work, as mentioned, was done by scholars interested in Third World development (Pye 1963; Fagen 1966; Davies 1977; Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson 1977), but otherwise media influences have rated only a few lines in political socialization studies, including those dealing with adult socialization. By contrast, public opinion studies generally acknowledge that media play a major role in socialization and opinion formation (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Corbett 1991).

In the closing decade of the twentieth century, it seems particularly important to analyze the role of mass media and other messages in the casual and formal political resocialization that is going on in countries that are switching from Marxist ideologies to various forms of Western-style democracy. Apparently the concerted efforts made throughout much of this century to indoctrinate people into Marxist ideologies did not meet with the high degree of success that had been reported (Bahry and Silver 1990). Can the resocialization campaigns that attempt to lead mass publics towards democratization and economic development do any better?

Elite Decision Making

Turning to messages involving political elites, three areas have received the lion's share of attention. They are the rhetoric of leaders, which has been discussed already; information processing by political

elites, and decision making, especially in small groups. Information processing by political elites has been examined indirectly by analyzing patterns of themes in their messages and constructing 'cognitive maps.' These maps presumably represent the individual's core beliefs and approaches to analyzing and solving problems. They are the bases of 'operational codes' that guide decisions and actions (Jervis 1970; Axelrod 1976).

Political decision-making studies have paid considerable attention to the information flows in foreign policy decisions (Kennedy 1969; Allison 1971; Janis 1989). Scholars have focused on information management when major decisions must be made, including the ways in which information is collected, processed, and channeled to reach the appropriate receivers in timely fashion. They have also analyzed various common problems, many of them psychological, that lead to information distortion and faulty decisions (George 1980; Etheredge 1985). These problems are particularly evident when decisions are made by small groups of people at times of crisis (Janis and Mann 1977; George 1980; Etheredge 1985). Irving Janis (1989), for example, showed how U.S. policy makers bungled policies designed to overthrow Cuba's Communist government. Communication in decision-making groups generated psychological pressures that impaired the quality of deliberations and reinforced flawed policy plans.

By and large, studies of decision making by elites have probed the psychological processes involved in decision making far more extensively than has been the case for comparable voting decision studies. Jonathan Roberts (1988), for example, in a study of decision making during international crises, examined the personalities of decision makers, their feelings and subjective perceptions, their levels of fatigue and stress, their mental and physical health, as well as the use of drugs and other mind-altering stimuli that might impinge on communication and decision making. All of these factors may play a part in voting decisions as well and therefore deserve consideration in that important context.

Macro-Level Institutions and Policies

Much of the effects research has taken place at the micro-level investigating message effects on individuals. However, when one begins to talk about communication effects on elites, one enters the outskirts of the macro-level effects arena. Macro-level studies look beyond individuals to the impact of messages on political processes and situations. In these studies, macro-level phenomena are often attributed to message effects without empirical testing which would be impossible in many situations.

Once more, election research predominates. Scholars have noted that coverage of election campaigns by the mass media has changed the conduct of these campaigns. Campaign rallies, including the presidential nominating conventions, are staged as television spectacles and timed to reach large mass media audiences. The ability to present an attractive image on television and to handle reporters expertly has become an important skill that is likely to determine which candidates will enter a race and which will win (Arterton 1984). Research has revealed significant relations between news stories, including the publication of opinion poll data, and campaign contributions and election outcomes (Graber 1989; Joslyn 1984; Owen 1991). Favorable publicity attracts money and support, but may also lead to more intensive scrutiny when candidates attain frontrunner status. Scholars have also examined the political consequences of making New Hampshire and Iowa political hotspots that receive disproportionate amounts of media coverage because their contests occur first during the primary season (Orren and Polsby 1987). Such 'front-loading' of campaigns jeopardizes the chances of candidates who have not yet become familiar to voters. They may be forced out of the race prematurely. The waning influence of political parties in electoral contests has also been attributed in part to the rising influence of the mass media. "Would you ever vote for a person you had never seen on television?" is no longer a facetious question.

The impact of the relationship between journalists and the president and Congress has been studied. Apparently, it affects how these institutions function because politicians gear their activities to gaining good publicity and avoiding bad press. The fact that presidents are able to garner more media attention than Congress has strengthened the presidency at the expense of Congress. However, a central position in the media limelight can be a mixed blessing (Hess 1986, 1981; Robinson and Appel 1979; Cook 1990). Several authors have concentrated on the president's press relations, often with a specialized focus, such as television news or presidential news conferences (Grossman and Kumar 1981; Smith 1990; Smoller 1990). Others have highlighted the general impact of communication on the presidency (Edwards 1983; Kernell 1993; Maltese 1992). Presidency scholar Richard Neustadt's study of *Presidential Power* (1960) relates the president's effectiveness to access to information and control of information flows. He states categorically that "presidential power is the power to persuade."

The judiciary has received less attention from communications scholars than the presidency and Congress. Most of the studies of courts have focused on media coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court and selected

Supreme Court decisions and on the social consequences of crime news coverage (Devol 1976; Graber 1980; Campbell 1990). Researchers have rarely examined the impact of reporting about the Supreme Court and its decisions on public knowledge and attitudes about the court and its work (Newland 1964). However, there have been attempts to investigate how newly emerging media, such as television, alter law because a transformed political culture changes the rules of the game (Katsch 1991).

While most research of the systems-level impact of political communication has focused on major political entities, such as nations, political parties or political leaders, there are important exceptions. They include research on media coverage of politically disadvantaged groups like racial and ethnic minorities, the handicapped, women, the elderly, or perpetrators and victims of crime (Cohen and Young 1973; Van Dijk 1988; Downing 1990). How these groups are depicted and perceived appears to have major psychological and political consequences for the perceivers and the perceived, including their respective self-images. The study of the publicized images of such groups deserves more attention because it may reveal serious political problems for which solutions are possible.

In the past, communication by, between, and inside public agencies has rarely been considered despite a burgeoning literature on organizational communication in the private sector. Even studies that deal with the problems of individual public agencies rarely consider communication problems despite their frequency and severity (Graber 1992b). As mentioned, the public relations area is a notable exception, including lobbying messages and public service campaigns (Crompton and Lamb 1986; Hess 1984).

The impact of publicized stories on the success or failure of particular policies has been documented infrequently. We know very little to what extent stories about environmental pollution or homeless people or life in Japan or the travels of foreign heads of state have affected public policies. For example, what role did the media play in the civil rights movement and in the integration of minorities into political life (Goldenberg 1975; Lipsky 1970; Gitlin 1980; Wolfsfeld 1991)? Has the rise of truly national media altered national politics? When a story about shenanigans in financial institutions is broadcast nationwide, how great a danger does it pose for the country's economic soundness? Can it, for instance, frighten bank customers and thereby produce a massive withdrawal of funds that further weakens shaky financial institutions?

There is much political folklore about such matters, but it remains to be substantiated. The study of the Watergate incident by Kurt and Gladys Lang (1983) is

an example of the comprehensive analysis that needs to be done. The study reported the interplay of the president, Congress, and the news media during the course of the incident. Other examples are Barbara Nelson's (1984) comprehensive analysis of agenda setting for the child abuse issue and Martin Linsky's (1986) research of the multiple interacting factors, including media coverage, that affect the activities of public agencies.

The impact of mass media messages on foreign policy has been scrutinized more extensively and from a variety of vantage points. Studies of the impact of media coverage on the course and conduct of foreign affairs have been most common (Cohen 1963; Braestrup 1983; Hallin 1989; Berry 1990). Conclusions, often based on case studies, range from viewing the media as government's full partner or rival to assigning media messages a minor supportive or oppositional role. A few scholars have interviewed foreign policy officials for their assessments of media impact (O'Heffernan 1991). Others have studied presidential use of news media to promote the president's foreign policy or the impact of newspaper coverage on public perceptions of foreign affairs. When these events occur in remote, exotic locations, media impact is likely to be profound (Kern et al. 1983; Welch 1972).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, several scholars toyed with the idea of using media messages to control international conflict. Karl Deutsch suggested that it might be possible to establish official media monitoring enterprises to give early warnings of mounting tensions. Preventive steps might then be taken (Deutsch et al. 1957, 201-202). "It should be possible to say whether the amount of attention given to a specific conflict area or to the image of a particular 'enemy' country is reaching the danger point, in the sense that continuing hostile attention in the mass media may harden public opinion to such a degree as eventually to destroy the freedom of choice of the national government concerned." Charles Osgood explored the possibility of using media strategically to reduce world tensions in *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (1962). Osgood suggested that his GRIT plan (Graduated Reciprocation In Tension-reduction), would reduce international tensions. Since tensions are endemic in international affairs, the need for tension reduction exists always, even when no major wars loom. Consequently, a Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, housed at New York University, specializes in this research area. It has issued numerous publications, including bibliographies (Dorman et al. 1988; Manoff et al. 1988). The possibilities of tension and violence reduction through control of mass media messages have also been raised in domestic policy contexts (Wolfstfeld 1984; Tichenor et al. 1980).

Maintaining Democracy

Do media help or hinder democratic politics by educating citizens and alerting them to governmental misbehavior? This has been an important concern since Thomas Jefferson argued that media were essential for maintaining democracy. Little has been done to put his theories to empirical tests. The role of mass media messages in calling attention to governmental misbehavior and major policy failures has received ample scrutiny since the days of muckraking in the Progressive Era, but other aspects of the question have been neglected (Protess et al. 1991; Lang and Lang 1983; Sabato 1991).

Media have fulfilled their watchdog role, but not with great distinction (Entman 1989; Bennett 1988, 1992). Sometimes, they simply serve as transmission channels for messages created and shaped by public and private sources. At other times, the media's main contribution lies in alerting important audiences. However, there are a number of well publicized instances where media institutions became more entrepreneurial and engaged in investigative journalism, often followed by government remedial action (Protess et al. 1991). Though these ventures have been helpful, they are relatively scarce, unsystematic attempts, guided and limited primarily by the desire to produce good stories.

Few studies have examined media impact on democratic institutions in general. Many of these have suggested that media, as currently operating in the United States, may be bad for a healthy democracy. Media have been accused of making audiences cynical about government by constantly stressing its shortcomings (Robinson 1976). They have been charged with trivializing and slanting politics, undermining political learning, and making citizens apathetic, disinterested, and unduly compliant (Manheim 1991; Bennett 1988; Entman 1989). Jeffrey Tulis (1987) and others have documented that presidential rhetoric has deteriorated because presidents try to deliver messages in ever briefer, catchy soundbites (Hallin 1990; Hinckley 1990). Others contend that the need to attract media attention has led politicians of all stripes to focus on trivial, catchy matters at the expense of serious issues. "Show horses" win elections, while "work horses" are abandoned by their constituents. Therefore the quality of political life has been steadily deteriorating (Cook 1990).

Though media coverage may be deleterious to the nation's political health, lack of coverage can also be harmful. The Kerner commission report in 1968, for example, condemned the media for insufficient attention to the problems of black citizens. It blamed the riots of the 1960s on flaws in the media (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). Similarly, a presidential commission that investigated the nuclear mishap at Three Mile Island charged that inadequate

media coverage worsened the impact of the problem (President's Commission 1979).

As mentioned, several political scientists have explored the possibility of using the news media to spur political development, based on research showing substantial correlations between mass media growth and economic growth in developing countries. Although their hopes were disappointed and most lost interest in these investigations, public optimism has persisted about the power of mass media to provide the knowledge base on which modernization and democratic governance must rest. In the wake of the restructuring of Communist nations in Eastern Europe and Asia, questions of the role that the media will and should play in that process have come to the fore with renewed vigor. Questions relate to the nature of media impact, and the kinds of media organizations most conducive to democratization objectives. For example, it is important to know what part media messages played when Eastern Europe's Communist governments collapsed in domino fashion in the 1990s (Dennis et al. 1990).

More generally, how does the nature of governmental structures and policies influence the shaping of news? Although such questions fall squarely within the purview of traditional political science, the answers remain a matter of much conjecture and insufficient proof (Pool 1983; Abramson et al. 1988). In the U.S. context, the neglect is partly due to the extraordinary difficulty of designing and executing such studies. Another factor is the misconception that the reciprocal influences of media and government are best studied abroad, especially in countries with authoritarian governments, because a constitutional wall separates American media from government control (Fagen 1969; Liu 1971; Mickiewicz 1988).

Most studies of governmental mechanisms for regulating mass media institutions in the United States have been done by historians, communication scholars and lawyers. There is general agreement that all governments constrain the freedom of expression to some degree, and that some limits are needed and must be enforced by the state because self-controls are not effective enough over the long run. But it is disputed where the limits lie and where they should lie. The impact of constitutional provisions and laws like the First Amendment or the British Official Secrets Act on each nation's political life remains ill-defined (Lichtenberg 1991). We do not know how much of the impact is related to each particular political culture and how much could be transplanted into other political cultures. Much has been said and written on that score, but more often in the popular rather than the scholarly literature. Aside from law books and law reviews, the literature on First Amendment rights and other laws related to political

communication, even in the United States, remains sparse.

Among the few political science studies that deal with media policy making in a U.S. setting, Krasnow, Longley, and Terry's *The Politics of Broadcast Regulation* (1982) provides a sophisticated mix of theory, description, and analysis. Neuman, McKnight and Solomon (n.d.) discuss policy needs and the political obstacles to policy advances. Many more such studies are needed to cover the broad spectrum of laws that directly or indirectly affect the interrelation of media institutions with other political and economic institutions. They are particularly essential now to guide policies to cope with the revolutionary changes in information transmission technologies and to assist the nations that are moving from totalitarianism to more open systems. In recognition of such needs, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) have commissioned and published several studies to guide public officials in making communication policies (NTIA 1988, 1990; OTA 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990).

Conclusions

What overall assessments can we make about the state of the subfield of political communication? Looking back at the intellectual journey that we have completed, what features stand out? Obviously, the field is broad and scholars have tried to do it justice by researching many diverse areas. It is equally obvious that the breadth of the field has left much terrain unexplored or insufficiently explored. There have been numerous tentative probes into some areas, such as media use for political development, which were later abandoned. Not everyone is pleased about the breadth of development. What some welcome as diversification, others see as premature fragmentation of the field. They point out that the depth of research individually and collectively, and even data collection, has suffered because researchers are dispersed. As is often true of newly active research areas, the soundness of evidence leaves something to be desired. Current scholarship is better in description of messages — what they are and who communicated with whom — than in explaining the reasons for these messages and their effects. But even when it comes to descriptions, our collective ignorance remains enormous.

Election communication is the only area where description is at least satisfactory and where major progress has been made in theories and analyses. Even there, much remains to be done. But the heavy focus on election communication and, to a certain extent, on mass media messages, is the reason why scholars have been

spread very thin in research of other aspects of this broad subdiscipline. What is needed is more tillers in the vineyard. This should not be an unsurmountable obstacle since the concerns of political communication scholars are central to the concerns of scholars in many other subfields of political science and its sister disciplines. If current trends of subfield boundary jumping continue and even accelerate, the outlook seems bright for substantial progress in this burgeoning subfield.

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